The defendant has moved to dismiss, alleging that as an employee of the State of Connecticut, she is immune from suit, either as an agent of the state or, in her individual capacity, as an employee covered by the shield of Conn. Gen. Stat. §
No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment.
The plaintiff opposes the defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Both parties have included additional allegations of facts in their supporting papers that may frame the controversy for later stages of this case, but that add little to the current issues before the court. For example, the defendant argues that she reported the plaintiffs statements to college authorities pursuant to a policy promulgated by the State of Connecticut for instances involving threats of violence in the workplace. The plaintiff argues that the defendant had a personal vendetta against the plaintiff and that her accusations were not made in the scope of her employment.
What governs at this stage, however, are the allegations in the complaint. It is well established that in ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader. Pamela B. v. Ment,
The court reads the complaint as alleging a personal, intentional act on the part of the defendant, which was committed out of malice and not in furtherance of any State policy. That the defendant vigorously denies this to be so does not provide the basis for a dismissal of this case at this stage, however.
Conn. Gen. Stat. §
The Motion to Dismiss is denied.
___________________ Patty Jenkins Pittman, Judge
