STIPULATION OF FACTS
The parties dispute the meaning of General Statutes §
The plaintiff, Interlude, Inc.,2 argues, in essence, that the statutory language should be interpreted to mean that once the plaintiff took title, "it owed no tax whatsoever and any taxes it paid should be reimbursed." The plaintiff further contends that General Statutes §
The defendant, the City of Danbury, argues, inter alia, that the assessor properly applied the above statutes when it granted the plaintiff an exemption from tax on October 5, 1992, the date the deed was recorded, and thereby granted the plaintiff an exemption from tax for 360 days in the 1992 year, but for no days in the 1991 tax year. The defendant further argues that the exemption applies to taxes accruing from the date exemption is granted forward, not for past taxes, and "[i]f the legislature intended to give the exempt entity acquiring property an abatement from previously assessed and levied taxes it would have CT Page 9196 specifically provided for that option."
General Statutes §
"A basic tenet of statutory construction is that when a statute . . . is clear and unambiguous, [generally] there is no room for construction. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Mattatuck Museum-Mattatuck History Society v. Administrator,Unemployment Compensation Act,
In keeping with the overall meaning of General Statutes §
Nevertheless, since the plaintiff paid taxes through October 5, 1992, the date of the deed for the property, the plaintiff is entitled to a refund for twelve days tax. Danbury Code § 18-20 makes the date of acquisition the triggering date for exemption purposes. While no definition for "acquisition" is provided in the code, Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1991) defines the term as "[t]he act of becoming the owner of certain property." As to the definition of "owner," the Supreme Court has stated that "when we have construed `owner' in the context of real estate, we have defined the term with reference to title. `When we say, a man has the title to . . . [property], we mean, he is the owner of it; and vice versa.'" Warner v. Leslie-ElliotConstructors, Inc.,
MIHALAKOS, J.
