Hart, J.,

(after stating the facts). Over the objection of the plaintiff, the court instructed the jury that, if J. L. Cannon, the agent for the plaintiff, requested the defendant’s agent to divert the shipment of apples from Dallas, Texas, to Austin, Texas, saving the through rate if possible, the delay in Dallas was justified. It is earnestly insisted by counsel for the plaintiff that this instruction was abstract and necessarily prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff, because there is no testimony in the record tending to show that the plaintiff asked the defendant to save the through rate in making the diversion order. In this contention we think counsel for the plaintiff is correct.

The diversion order was in possession of the defendant, and was not produced at the trial. J. L. Cannon, who was the agent for the plaintiff, and who acted for it throughout in the transaction, gave in his testimony what purported to be a copy of the diversion order. There is nothing in it about saving the through rate. According to the testimony of Cannon, the diversion order was not upon any condition whatever. There is nothing in the record whatever from which it might be inferred that the diversion order was subject to the condition that the railway company was to secure a through rate if possible. It is true that the order was diverted via M., K. & T. Railroad, and that the evidence on the part of the defendant shows that a through rate could not be obtained over this route. This, however, was not sufficient evidence upon which to base the instruction. The plaintiff may have known that it was necessary to get the car of apples to Austin as quickly as possible and may have chosen this route on that account. Be that as it may, the fact that the car of apples was directed to be diverted over the M., K. & T. Railroad is not sufficient evidence that a through rate over that line was requested. There is no other testimony whatever in the record upon which to predicate such an instruction. It follows that the court erred in giving the instruction complained of.

Inasmuch as the judgment must be reversed, we call attention to the established rule of this court as to the measure of damages. The general rule of damages for unreasonable delay in the transportation of goods is the difference between the market value of the goods at the time and place when and where they should have been delivered and their value when they were delivered, with interest. St. L. I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Coolidge, 73 Ark. 112, 83 S. W. 333; K. C. Sou. Ry. Co. v. Mabry, 112 Ark. 110, 165 S. W. 279; K. C. & Memphis Ry. Co. v. Oakley, 115 Ark. 20, 170 S. W. 565; and St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Tilby, 117 Ark. 163, 174 S. W. 1167.

For the error in giving the instruction complained of as indicated in the opinion the .judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial