*1 Abiding ample precedent,84 ments.83 construing light exemption clause goal pervading the Act’s traffic

safety,85 accept that clause as

grant Secretary authority to the regrooved all

sanction interstate uses of requirements

tires meet his which

regulation has set. America,

UNITED STATES

v. BROWN, Appellant

William

No. 72-2080. Appeals,

United States District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued April 12, 1973. Aug.

Decided Bennett, Washington,

Fred Warren D. (appointed by Court), C. was on the appellant. brief for Titus, Jr., Atty., Harold H. U. S. John Terry, Kotelly, A. John T. and Richard Beizer, Attys., L. Asst. U. were on S. appellee. Frederick brief C. Mulrooney, Moss and Asst. John J. U. S. Attys., appearance also entered appellee. Cohen, Washington,

Marilyn C., D. was on the brief for Defender the Public as amicus Service curiae. BAZELON, Judge,

Before Chief MacKINNON, Circuit WRIGHT Judges. Judge: BAZELON, Chief questions difficult This case raises importance about a matter 369.7(a) (1)-(6) (1972). 261-262, Id. § U.S. Distributors, (1966) ; L.Ed.2d Hudson supra 84. See cases cited notes 74-75. Lilly Co., & Eli c. v. In 386, 392-394, Compare Inc., Meyer, FTC Fred 12 L.Ed.2d Bilder, 341, 354-357, (1964) ; Commissioner (1968); 499, 502-504, First Nat’l 82 Co., Bank v. Walker Bank Trust L.Ed.2d 65 *2 the Federal' Reform Act. continually the reso Bail the court: this before ap 1970,3 pending D.C. Court Reform Act of Con for bail of motions lution peal. gress provisions movant, enacted the harsher bail Brown, The William was 1325(c).4 codified at 23 D.C.Code We § convicted in federal District Court gauge upon ap called to the robbery were first plicability armed and assault dan gerous provisions weapon in United those D.C. Code —both U.S.App.D.C. 1, subsequently States v. filed no offenses.1Brown denied, appeal, presented in 452 F.2d 1333 cert. tice of and a motion 31 L.Ed.2d 467 the District Court judge (1972). appeal. After careful review The trial denied the mo language statute, intent of stating the the tion, that Brown did not meet Congress, and relevant Constitutional the for forth criteria release set case, considerations, held, in that we D.C.Code 1325. § provisions code of the local that the bail argues appeal, On this Brown that his apply appellant was did not to an who wrong motion was decided under the fed of a in the federal courts convicted for statute. He maintains that motions (U.S.Code) offense. eral Dis release the federal courts trict must be decided on the basis of Thompson opinion reach did not The governing statute Bail bail—The today appli- question us before the cability —the Reform Act of 3148— U.S.C. § to an the local provisions. rather than D.C. Code a lo- pellant court of in federal convicted judge explicitly noted that The trial Thompson rec- (D.C.Code) offense. cal entitled to release under Brown would be ognized possibility that though he the federal bail even might the D.C.Code intended could not be released under harsher cases. apply such provisions. Accordingly, we code local proceed argues government what now to determine which bail Thompson “possible” recognized apply to motions for movant, the oth- on in fact correct. in the federal courts can- possibility argues hand, er jurisdiction.2 case, govern first because Thompson changes right pend- statutory since to bail Prior ing any appellant issued, and second because appeal opinion in this for in the D.C. infirmities in accordance with court determined of Constitutional expresse apprecia- (armed its The court rob- amicus. §§ 22 D.C.Code helpful par- quite (ADW). bery) ; her amicus tion to ticipation. requested supplemental memoranda Formerly Colum- parties “The District of titled curiae and from amicus argument point, and Criminal Procedure Reform bia Court on this we heard oral 1970,” movant, government, 84 Stat. 473-668 from the Act provide: pertinent 4. The sections of the two codes G. Code S. Oode U. D. person person shall who been convicted .A has been convicted “shall A who has court or released “unless judicial

be ordered officer be detained unless judge no believe that one has reason convincing by clear evidence finds reason- of release will or more conditions likely person (1) flee ably person not flee assure person pose danger or or community. danger If others, property to the flight is believed such risk of . . a substantial raises exist, appears that an or if fact result of law or person delay, taken for is frivolous may trial.” or an order a new a reversal §§ detained.” U.S.C. be ordered 23 D.C.Code provisions.5 Code bail We need decide position just reiterated that a few weeks questions today. first of these ago. Davis v. United (U.S. 1973). any question Nor is there that the Federal Rules to all crim- April 24, 1972, On some six months inal cases in the Federal Courts.9 It Thompson after United was is- *3 logically seems to follow that sued, Supreme adopted Court amend- courts of this should adhere Fed.R.App.P. 9, ments to and Fed.R. Rules, dictates of Federal 46, providing Crim.P. that motions for amended, rather than to the in all federal Act, D.C. Court Reform which courts should be determined in accord- thereby superseded. were ance with the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966.6 Those ef- amendments became government At argument, oral counsel 1, 1972; fective on October under the recognized cogency of this reason statute,7 any clear command of con- ing ; suggested, he however, that neither trary provision of law became ineffec- Congress Supreme nor the Court could basis, ap- tive after that date. On this argued have intended this result. He pellant that, maintains even if the D.C. general the Court’s issuance of Court Reform Act did the local make rules on for the na provisions applicable to defendants tion as a whole was not meant affect courts, in the federal that statute was application by the federal courts of superseded by subsequent of action the district previously Supreme Court. by Congress particular enacted for this jurisdiction. He said that the failure to There is no but that exempt general this Supreme circuit authority Court has the 10 “oversight” part rule was an on the establish the at rules issue here8 recognize the Court. We at the core of of law. the force rules have that these argument principle: a salient Co., 61 Sibbach Wilson wary broad, general courts should legislative pronouncements (1941). The L.Ed. 479 appear which rules government new that the contends specific provisions prior to subsume repeal promulgated cannot the Court law. United States v. Wallace & statutory set provisions; it is well but Tiernan, Inc., U.S.App.D.C. 245, Rules can the Federal tled that States, F.2d we observed that those effect, v. United Mookini L.Ed. prepare 543, 82 who codifications “must indeed, Supreme Court (1938); necessity rely to a extent considerable section, did not consider 5. of course 3772. That entitled “Procedure pro- applying constitutionality the local Verdict,” Court, After states that may prescribe to a local offender. visions the times for and manner taking applying appeals for writs ; Fed.R.App.P. 9(c) Fed.R.Crim.P. preparing certiorari records (c). exceptions bills of and the conditions on provides 7. 18 U.S.C. : § 3772 supersedeas may which or bail be al- Supreme may dates fix the lowed. when such rules shall take effect and And, Congress “can be deemed to have they apply to extent shall adopted” which Supreme under rules issued proceedings pending, and after statutorily authority. then delegated Court’s Singer become effective all laws conflict See force. therewith no further shall government argu- suggested 8. The at oral 1; Fed.R.App.P. Fed.R.Crim.P. authority Supreme ment Court’s procedural give appears pp. argument to establish rules does not 10. The same authority government’s bail. to set conditions filed memorandum directly This refuted 18 U.S.C. this court on March staff,11 pend- on work of their into which determine motions for bail ing creep.”12 inevitably appeal in errors some accordance with the Feder- case, Act, of that we refused al Bail Reform On the facts U.S.C. oversight” recognize as law a “clerical specific drafting superseded a which II But, prior this case differs rule. Ascertaining legisla an unstated many ways Tiernan. from Wallace & purpose hazy best, tive is a business at gener appeals A court arewe fortified in our conclusion ally to assert that the inclined well-recognized statutory cannon through erred, “over Court has sight” either interpretation construction —“when one particu it is or otherwise. And of a statute would create substantial suggest larly difficult in this ease doubt as to the statute’s constitutional of the situ was unaware that the Court validity, the courts will avoid inter of Columbia. Just ation the District *4 pretation a absent 'clear statement' of the the issued one month before Court legislative contrary intent.” United had de it amendments, Federal Rules Thompson, supra, v. 146 U.S. v. in United States certiorari nied Thompson, 5, App.D.C. ap As at 452 F.2d at 1337. recognize supra.13 We govern suggests, adoption pellant meaning dangers attempting of to draw necessarily ment’s construction would Mary certiorari, of from a denial cf. questions of constitutional difficult Show, 338 Radio U.S. land v. Baltimore 912, law. (1950), 252, L.Ed. 562 70 94 S.Ct. argue Appellant curiae amicus it safe to assume but we think provisions, bail that creating the D.C.Code that the Court such action at least harsher standard a the statute the facts and familiar with in Federal Bail embodied Thus, than that must be in this case. we at issue the Constitutional protection Attorney’s Reform violate accept Act, the U.S. hesitant guarantee equal of of addition, “oversight” argument. Sharpe, Bolling U.S. laws; 347 v. “oversight” argument rejection of the cf. 693, 497, 98 L.Ed. 884 provi 74 bail not render the D.C.Code does discus- suggestion from our follows nullity This for remain sions a provisions in Unit- of the D.C.Code sion courts. Ac in local to offenders convicted supra. not- agree v. appellant ed States cordingly, bail the D.C.Code there that ed to Fed.R. amicus that amendments “powerless, voteless single a out sions App.P. 9, and Fed.R.Crim.P. minority” the District the residents value; this federal that at face taken harsher, special, and courts, court, of Columbia14 like all protections). extraordinary knowledge constitutional public that 11. It under problems have surfaced that named a “Committee Court relies on “equal protection” mantel revisions the Judicial Conference” actually Thompson Douglas, cases are Cf., J., similar dis Federal Rules. the senting problem: just symptoms basic of- more a from the order of November depriving Doug unfairness the fundamental F.R.D. Mr. Justice 56 (the residents 756,000 citizens American “is mere con a states that las D.C.) Washington, in the voice of a Id. duit.” govern them. who of those selection Of. at at F.2d Vote,” Reid, The Wash Man —No “One Monthly, April, ington 66-67. the Constitution is true that While gives 31 L.Ed.2d 92 S.Ct. power Congress plenary (March 20, 1972). O’Donoghue Columbia, District 516, 538-539, Independent 289 U.S. Antonio School See San Rodriguez, L.Ed. probably of our Constitution authors 36 L.Ed.2d thought position use (those “relegated would ... never deny power political powerlessness” the citizens are entitled regard right uniformity against treatment “funda- within the District uniformity in the system. mental” sense it “involves is- within the federal personal sues of freedom.” We deter- Brown further contends that the D.C. limiting interpretation mined that a provisions deny process Code bail due necessary to avoid un- law to convicted offenders. Brown's at- constitutional discrimination. Accord- requirement tack concentrates on the ingly, we held that judi- that release be denied “unless the applied to fed- could not be cial officer finds clear convinc- eral offender in federal court. ing evidence . . . might Such considerations raises a substantial law to the situation before us: fact result reversal 1325(c) D.C.Code bail ...” 23 D.C.Code (emphasis supplied). in a Appellant offenders federal court. If we were asserts government’s accept may contention this standard be inconsistent provisions, “safeguards apply, the local do then with the for disinterest- certain defendants in the federal courts edness and detachment” which due process of this treated demands, clause it often because harshly more requires judge than defendants to find clear and seri- other federal court —at least as far as ous errors his own conduct of is concerned. As we trial. Illinois, See Bartkus v. Thompson noted such discrimination *5 might justified be if this court were (1959). requires The federal dealing prosecuted only crimes that are with judge that the trial find de- U.S.App. legal in no arguments other federal court. 147 fendant’s are not frivo- But, D.C. at 452 F.2d it is grant at 1340. release; judge lous in order to ap- unclear whether that rationale readily can find the existence of non- ply to case. The armed Brown’s “local” question being frivolous without forced robbery for which Brown convicted to conclude that he made has an error may discernably not be different to result in reversal. regularly prosecuted crimes that are in Appellant suggest and amicus also g., federal courts nationwide: e. 18 U. provisions deny that the D.C.Code due (robbery in a en- federal S.C. § process by requiring application of a clave) ; (bank 18 U.S.C. rob- virtually precludes standard which re- ; bery) (robbery U.S.C. § presented any lease. Neither side has mail); (assault on 18 U.S.C. § govern- statistics on As the this,point. officer). federal us, ment has reminded it has been said government apply- concedes that right that there is no “automatic” ing the in local statute Brown’s case pending appeal. Bowman v. United unequal must lead to of of- treatment States, 85 S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d 171 system, (1964). fenders within the argues hand, On the other has Congress rationally has government that cho- been said that cannot inequality sen to in order tolerate such automatically deny release. Harris v. equal to achieve of all those treatment States, United offenses accused and convicted local (1971). Justice Black is, There in the Columbia.16 “obligates observed that the Constitution legis- however, in the judges no clear indication deny [bail] history strongest lative did balance of reasons.” v. United Sellers voting rights Benjamin Thompson, District all whatsoever. See States v. United municipal Madison’s statement “a 452 F.2d legislature purposes, derived suffrages, from their own of course Appellee them.” Federalist No. 43. allowed n. Memorandum Cf. pending appeal L.Ed.2d 64 under the federal release in It the motion for release the D.C.Code standard follows Whether is as to be unconstitu- case unreasonable is so competing inter- tional, view Granted. greatest ests, is a difficulty.17 Judge, MacKINNON, dissent- Circuit ing: today appel- do not decide whether majority opinion the con- reaches asserting correct lant provisions on clusion that the D.C.Code 1325(c) plication to his of 23 D.C.Code § to one do not guaran- constitutionally motion violates in the offense of a D.C.Code convicted rights. to do so is ob- The need teed (which at United States District Court appellant’s acceptance viated original try time had argument. statutory construction April offenses) because “On after some six months U. S. Ill issued, Thompson adopted to Fed.R. amendments Application to motion Brown’s providing, App.P. 9, 46,1 simple and F.R.Crim.P. task. herein rule announced pending already judge that motions determined The trial has deter- all federal courts entitled release that Brown is cases, prob- (c). of the three the difficult two This claim involves statutory prohibition judge striking found between trial a balance lem strong against that he did be so of con- interests incarceration societal on raised persons in- consider the issues not even and the individual’s victed ruling fraught liberty process motion. See on the terest —a Jones, complications 476 F.2d practical moral Judge opinion (dissenting steps of Chief highest must take order. We Bazelon). properly con- those who assure panel April a unanimous On not flee or crimes will victed of the convictions reversed of this court their convictions others while *6 James being appealed; and Jarvis. Smith should seeing Claude we are and Jarvis, F.2d 976 society’s respect “in that Smith interest 1973). cases, (D.C.Cir., men prompt In two beginning these to the sen- ais there erroneously by to serve forced imposed each were the court.” The coun- tence prison. year tervailing a of the individual de- interests weighty. A defendant are also fendant Fed.R.App. of subsections wrongfully convicted stands been who has provide: P. and Fed.R.Crim.P. freedom of all'— to lose the most basic (c) deci- for Release. Criteria he is denied to be free” —if “the freedom appeal pending shall release sion as to appeal. pending United States release Title made in with be accordance 452 F.2d of establish- The burden § U.S.C. 3148. ing or flee not the defendant will hypothecation merely the not all This is person pose danger any or to the to Three of a theoretical civil libertarian. community the defendant. rests with demonstrate in our court recent cases April As amended eff. Oct. impact quite disturbingly the bail the of today. us Wilbur statute Jones, before Fed.U.App.P. 9(c). Smith, and James Jarvis Claude (c) Pending of Sentence and Notice offenses all convicted of D.C.Code were pending Appeal. Eligibility for release All in the District Court. three pending of notice sentence pointing appeal, for release moved filing expiration of time allowed the errors in their motions substantial out appeal, in accordance notice of shall be arguments raised on trials. The their of The burden with 18 U.S.C. raised sub- in each of the cases establishing will not the defendant defend- doubt to the stantial whether per- any flee or to guilty crimes for which ants were community the rests with son or to the they charged. motions Yet all three were defendant. 46(c). denied under Fed.R.Crim.P. were mined in the nies the accordance with Federal U.S. courts would be released Supra majority Bail Reform Act at 2. under what asserts is of 1966.” more lenient bail while those adopted ap This was as a rule (and convicted of tried misdemeanors plicable to and all United States courts courts) an al D.C. would under any repeal express did not of contain legedly harsher statute. Such con bail provisions the release of the District reading plain struction is absurd Columbia Court Reform Act of 1970. knowledge judicial statute and Thus, accomplish it is an intent to of criminal offenses in the District implied repeal majority finds. that it intended Columbia indicates However, scope of the Rules not principally major apply D.C. felo any way changed time,2 and it nies. “scope” is the are the Rules concluding hesitancy in concerned I thus have no in the In decision. this Congress respect specifically that neither the nor the Su- the Rules define preme they scope apply ac- they their Court intended at time to when state complish the result the ma- reached “United States District Courts” and reading jority. Appeals” It is “United clear me from States Courts of and controlling provisions change legisla since there was no aof tive Rules and providing nature statutes that in the Rules scope sions Reform D.C. Court Act of their in the intended, were at all times both Federal Bail Reform Act 1966 the Congress scope Supreme Court, and the of the Rules affected apply to those convicted of both felonies amendments Rules 9 and supra. misdemeanors the District. reaching conclusion, interpret brings This us to the as to terms Courts” “United States District accomplish what intended to Appeals” and “United States Courts of passed when it the D.C. Reform quoted in the Rules to refer to the Unit- containing Act of 1970 ed States District Court for the District now set forth in D.C. of Columbia and the United States (c) Code The effect of the .4 Appeals Court of for the District Col- majority opinion tois have us read the they umbia Circuit when ing were exercis- release and bail of that D.C. regular jurisdiction any felony con Appeals United States Courts (which viction for D.C. Code offenses Courts, not when murder, robbery, rape, include armed exercising etc.) since all in the District of felonies *7 felony (equivalent to that of state Columbia at that time were tried courts) encompassing and the trial United Under States District Courts. peal are not of local crimes that D.C. construction, such claimed offenders regularly by other tried or heard U. convicted of District Columbia S. courts in the nation. felo Fed.it.App.P. 1; judicial Fed.R.Crim.P. officer clear and finds (a), (e). person convincing (1) the evidence that likely is not any to flee or a property to Supra person n. 2. or to the others, petition and (c) (Supp. V, 1972) for a writ of certiorari raises sub- provides: stantial fact to law (c) person A wlio lias convicted in a for been result reversal an order new Upon findings, judicial of an offense sentenced to a term and trial. such imprisonment person of confinement or has officer shall treat ac- petition filed an or a for a writ cordance with the of section of certiorari shall be detained unless 23-1321. tried, Evoy States, this case was At the time Co. v. United 322 U.S. (to many years prior thereto some 102, 107, 890, 893, 64 S.Ct. 88 L.Ed. exists), jurisdiction still extent the 1163; Foureo Glass Co. v. Transmirra of Columbia courts the District U.S. Corp., 228-229, 353 U.S. 77 S.Ct. jurisdiction, which dif- had a twofold 787, 791-792, 1 L.Ed.2d 786. greatly fered from other U.S. District States, Bulova Watch Co. v. United Appeals, in that it Courts and Courts U.S. 6 L.Ed.2d 72 jurisdiction, criminal included in both recognized the exis- generally matters, exer- civil that is substantially tence of rule: same Supreme cised state trial courts and Courts in states. This the various local Moreover, Railway Labor isAct type jurisdiction to was in addition specific statute directed limited conferred on U.S. proceedings special type. of a Ap- Courts and Courts gen- Administrative Procedure Act is peals. type It offens- legislation. eral It is well settled that type juris- es within that state criminal specific ordinarily statute will not diction of the U.S. in the District courts superseded, deemed amended or re- hold the re- Columbia I would pealed by gen- later enactment aof lease and bail the D.C. Compa- eral character. Bulova Watch applicable. Court Reform Act of 1970 ny States, v. United 365 U.S. just It does make sense attribute (Em- 758, 81. 6 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Congress Supreme and the Court an phasis added). fragment Act, intent to so that D.C. Eng. Brotherhood of Loc. Fire & v. Chi only apply to have it felonies and Q. cago, Co., F.Supp. 11, B. & R. misdemeanors, and thus attribute to (D.D.C.), aff’d, U.S.App.D.C. Supreme and the Court an in- denied, 331 918, cert. F.2d 377 U.S. accomplish absurdity. tent to effect, (1964). To the held same pro- To hold that the release and bail earlier: visions of the D.C. Court Reform Act of statutory It D.C.Code offenses is is a canon of construc- that, tion there an earlier required where recognized the well rule of special general statute and a later statutory interpretation “specific that a being the terms of the later general statute controls the [statute] enough broad to include the matter contrary legislative absent a intent and provided former, regard priority without of enact- an ex- statute must be considered as ment.” The Court has stated ception to the Ex statute. the rule: parte Dog, 556, 570, 3 Crow. petitioner But even if were correct Rodgers 1030; L.Ed. concluding 2411(a) is to be re- 87, 99, 89, garded enactment, later 46 L.Ed. 816. precedence necessarily would not take Simon, 3711(e), *8 Simon v. 58 for it familiar is law 160, 530, specific These de- 532 26 F.2d a statute controls over a general gen- regard priori- instances where one “without cisions refer to enactment, ty Little, eral statute later enactment.” Townsend v. 362, 504, 512, special later en- 109 here the statute was the g., even Ginsberg it is See, 27 L.Ed. 1012. actment. In such instance e. & to have Popkin, Sons clearer the intent is v. 52 infra). 704; (see special prevail See n. 76 L.Ed. Mac- 1322 sixty

generally (60) days. 561 and The facts are thus Am.Jur. Statutes § closely point in factual situation 369: C.J.S. Statutes § present. adop- holding here In leg- purposes interpretation, For by tion of the rule long islative enactments have been repeal special by did im- statute general special, classed either or as pointed plication, the court out: given on other en- different effect act, general The rule that a later in is dependent found actments are its will re terms not be construed as to fall into or other. one class pealing treating prior spe a act a dealing Where there is one statute way something pur cial within the subject general compre- with a general view act. other terms, dealing hensive and another words, special particular subject part same repealed by general statute, is not way, more minute definite repeal unless the intent to is manifest. together two should be read monized, and har- It should also be borne possible, if with a view to ‘repeals by implication mind giving legisla- effect ato consistent favored, indulged and will not be policy; any but, tive to the extent of any if there is necessary reasonable con repugnancy them, between special struction. . . . Another rule is statute, dealing or the one bearing upon ‘that different statutes subject with the common matter in subject the same matter way, prevail should be so gen- minute over the construed, give if possible, effect according eral to the authori- applica all.’ . . For later question, appears ties on the unless it legislature tenets, to make tions these intended see: Favour v. general controlling; act and this Frohmiller, 576; 44 Ariz. P.2d special is true a fortiori when the act Miser., State v. Ariz. 72 P.2d point time, although is later in 408; Shapley Frohmiller, 64 Ariz. rule regard without Comm, 306; 165 P.2d Arizona Tax respective passage to the dates Dairy Cooperative & Consumers Ass’n, 70 Ariz. 215 P.2d 235. \_A]nd where the later, special act is be statute will P.2d at 428. remaining exception construed as an It should be noted that other courts terms, its repealed unless in ex- that similar determined press words necessary implica- procedure sions of a code civil did (Emphasis added; tion. footnotes repeal implied not work earlier omitted). concerning special pro- enactments foregoing princi- ceedings. See Hannon v. Grand ples is Corp. illustrated Arizona Lodge, Kansas, 99 Kan. A.O.U.W. Com’n v. Estates, Catalina Foothills 169, supra; 163 P. Lee v. Lincoln Ariz. 278 P.2d 427 wherein Cleaning Dye Works, Neb. the court was faced with the 227; Ashwan- N.W.2d Duncan v. whether a statute enacted D.C.W.D.La., der, F.Supp. 829. requiring appeals Corpo- from the 278 P.2d at 429-430. ration Commission taken within thirty (30) days applied Applying principles should be held these the court thirty whether the days promulgated by time limit the rule the state repealed by implication supreme court did not indicate an inten- sub- sequent adoption repeal tion a court rule or in manner affect permitting appeals statutory provision. taken de- within eai’lier *9 practically on all with fours cisión except case the instant issue here FIREMEN’S INSURANCE COMPANY stronger there presents indication WASHINGTON, OF D. C. Rules 9 to have never intent apply to local offenders and 46 al., Walter E. et WASHINGTON This is evident Columbia. Appellants. language rules where- from the of both No. 71-2009. they provide that release Appeals, United States Court of peal Title “in accordance with shall be District of Columbia Circuit. makes 3148.” The rule thus U.S.C. § unques- Argued and it is the statute Nov. 1972. statute, enacted on June tioned that such July Decided applica- 215),8 (80 no had Stat. of Col-

tion in the District to offenders July enactment on after the umbia provi- 647) (84 Stat. ofAct Reform

sions of the D.C. Court re- that the D.C.

1970.9 It is also clear they apply because

lease they

special consti- statute and because

tute the enactment.10 later

I would thus hold D.C.Code in the U.S.

sions to to all releases

courts of the District of Columbia offenses

connection all D.C.Code adoption Rules con-

because repeal, express tained no because against repeals

presumption

implication,11 statutes because

generally repeal special or do not language

statutes and because appli-

Rules makes the 1966 the 1966 do not reenact

cable and en- it a later

statute so as to constitute Thus,

actment statute. only applies to the extent

section 3148 applied a statute and after releases no

1970 this had

in the District of ColumBia. accordingly respectfully dissent contrary reached conclusion

majority. Supra 1966 enactment. See June Pub.L. note 89— (80 214-217). Stat. 6. Id. (84 647). 23-1325 Stat. 7. Id. Supra note 8. phrase to this 8. The addition the short Sutherland, Statutory 15,1970, 11. .1A single Construction Pub.L. section on October (Sands 1972) 952) ed. (84 23.10 4th not alter Stat. being of the statute basic character