*215 RICHARDSON, P. J.

Petitioner seeks review of the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief on the ground that it was not timely filed. ORS 138.510(2). We affirm.

He makes essentially four arguments in support of his assignment of error. We have answered the first two against him in Boone v. Wright, 110 Or App 281, 822 P2d 719 (1991), and Bartz v. State of Oregon, 110 Or App 614, 825 P2d 657 (1992).

The third argument is that application of the statute would violate constitutional protections against ex post facto legislation. Ex post facto laws are prohibited by both the Oregon and the federal constitutions. 1 Ex post facto laws punish acts that were legal when they occurred, change the quantum of punishment for previous acts, deprive a defendant of a defense previously available or, in some instances, impose new disabilities for a conviction. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 US _, 110 S Ct 2715, 111 L Ed 2d 30 (1990); State v. Gallant, 307 Or 152, 155, 764 P2d 920 (1988); State v. Burke, 109 Or 7, 818 P2d 511 (1991), rev den 312 Or 589 (1992). Petitioner does not explain how retroactive application of the amendment runs afoul of those prohibitions. The 120-day limitation period does not in any way alter the proof required, the defenses available or the punishment meted out for any crime. We conclude that retroactive application of the amendment does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.

Petitioner’s final argument is that, because there is no evidence that he was given actual notice of the change in the time limitation for exercising his rights to post-conviction relief, he has been denied due process of law. There is no right to notice of passage of legislation.

Affirmed.

Or Const, Art I, § 21; US Const, Art I, § 9.