*1 Mansheim, va v. 725 P.2d (Colo.App.1986),we conclude that Olona was process by hearing

denied due officer’s

finding that time of 12:35 A.M. was preponderance

established of the evi

dence, though even the officers who made present stop initial were not at the

hearing.

We reverse and remand reinstate-

ment of revocation order. HOME

EVERGREEN MEADOWS ASSOCIATION,

OWNERS’ Lillian Pau Miller, Eugene Miller,

line Robert Wil Weaver, Weaver, Nancy liam L. Theo Denver, Huckeby, Richard M. for plain- Ziegers, Ziegers, dore Marianne Cole tiffs-appellees. Gulley, Gulley, man and Mrs. Coleman Feuer, Rich, Wesoky Flossie & Jack M. Plaintiffs-Appellees, Kaplan, A. Englewood, James for de- fendants-appellants. MANOR, INC.; Marjorie DOUBLE D PIERCE, Judge. Rust; McGee; McGee; Mark G. Ellen Mandell; Joy Mandell, Elias A. L. Manor, Inc., Defendants-Appellants. Manor, and the owners Double Rust, Maijorie McGee, Mark G. Elias Mandell, Mandell, Joy appeal L. Colorado Court of grant trial court's injunc- Div. I. barring its use of the Ever- green Meadows Subdivision as March homes for chil- Rehearing Denied June dren. We affirm. (Double D) Certiorari Granted nonprofit Double Manor is a Colorado corporation whose tois

home life situation its residents. When arose, applied it had for a state operate license to as a residential child care 26-6-102(8), as defined in 11). occupies It two ad- joining lots Meadows Sub- division. Each has dwelling lot de- signed single family to house a on it. Dou- planned place a total of 16 developmentally disabled children in the two houses. plaintiffs, Evergreen Meadows

Homeowners’ Association and several indi- *2 residents, sought preliminary phrase “single-family dwelling” Since the vidual defined, specifically is not it should retain to bar the defend- injunctions and, thus, its traditional definition property using the ants from not include a residence for the devel or residence lacking opmentally impaired the character asserted that such an persons. permanent family istics of a normal and the restrictive covenants violated ation maintaining family-style unit the usual liv Meadows Subdivision. The ing arrangement. Region 10 Client sites states: shall at issue covenant “[A]ll Management, Hampstead, Town only, only one be for residential 885, City 120 N.H. A.2d 207 any dwelling permitted on single-family Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d White Plains v. site.” N.E.2d 357 N.Y.S.2d facts, stipulated to certain parties The of the trial court is there- managers of the among that which was fore affirmed. house, reside in either project would matter to the trial court and submitted CRISWELL, J., concurs. ruled, The trial written briefs. on TURSI, J., dissents. law, Double Manor’s a matter TURSI, Judge, dissenting. properties the two of the covenants the restrictive violated respectfully dissent. intent and the clear It held subdivision. D Manor asserts the trial court Double purpose of the cov- unambiguous plain and of the restrictive erred its each lot in the use of to restrict enant was It contends the covenant con- covenant. single family residence. ato the subdivision restrictions, independent a use tains two agree. We that all sites be used for resi- restriction purposes, structural restric- and a above-quoted covenant contains tion which limits the of structure that concept is clear and single complete placed a site. may be on unambiguous. Appellate courts are not bound covenant is clear. language of the court determinations of whether written language indi Nothing ambiguous, nor of their inter covenant govern only architec that it an intent cate pretations of the covenant. Littlehorn As exclusion of use. design to the tural Also, (Colo.1982). Stratford, 653 P.2d Realty Trust Co. v. Burns stated in D.C. occupancy use or all restrictions as to the (1969): P.2d 75 Mack, 168 Colo. property strictly construed of real be creating re- urged that covenants “It is against the restric with all doubts resolved free use of land are to upon the strictions and unrestricted tion and in favor of free limita- strictly construed be 38-34-103, property. of the Section today may not tion. This rule 16A); (1982 Repl. Vol. Flaks v. possessed past. in the sanctity that it has Wichman, P.2d 737 128 Colo. event, application has no when any In it in its terms. language is definite ambiguous The covenant plain dictates of must follow the One possible interpre- subject since it is to two English.” possi- tations. The trial court followed essentially com- proposed here is The use finding “single-family” interpretation, these two lots populate mercial and would use” such that modified “residential persons, only significant with a number only could be few, biological However, have a any, if who would cov- purposes. ly residential additionally, there would relationship; interpreted as two inde- can also be enant restrictions, the residence. use re- parental figures in a residential pendent be no circumstances, structure re- single single-family fami- such striction and a Under adopt this second inter- I would ly requirement covenant would not striction. restric- provides the least pretation since it be met. property. the use Section home much any like residents of is, That home. 38-34-103. must be resi- by single-

dential but is not limited to use Thus, I weigh believe we must this dual long so as it in an family, is situated identi- nature Double Manor’s single family dwelling fiable structure. determine whether its This structural restriction itself to lends is for purposes. business *3 develop- architectural control the jurisdictions Other have addressed this thus, and, prohibit ment construction that, same majority issue. The held have duplex multi-plex dwellings. of a or other under restrictive covenants similar to the sup- of is My the covenant issue, one at use of property group ported by public policy the announced of for developmentally home the disabled is developmentally this state to assist dis- Son, in Hobby residential nature. J.T. & persons to in normal abled live residential Family Inc. v. Homes County, Wake of 30-28-115(2)(a), surroundings. § Inc., supra; Trainor, v. supra; Knudtson (1986 12A) Repl. Vol. 31-23- C.R.S. Concord Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. 303(2)(a), 12B). Special Foundation, Inc., Children’s 459 1242 (La.App.1984); Beverly So.2d Island Under similar restrictive covenants and Zinger, Mich.App. Ass’n v. 113 317 situations, in jurisdic- factual courts 611 N.W.2d Leland Acres Home interpretation. have adopted tions the same Ass’n, Owners Inc. Partnership, v. R.T. Supreme “single The Nebraska Court held Mich.App. (1981). 106 308 N.W.2d 648 dwelling” family described an architectural required the style relationship and not of Giving plain meaning, words their persons occupying the the structure. building would hold that a to limited resi- Trainor, Knudtson v. Neb. purposes building is a in which peo- Supreme N.W.2d Court of homes, ple distinguished make their provision held a North Carolina a people from where conduct business or specifying restrictive covenant the Trainor, of commerce. v. supra; Knudtson may structure which be located a lot Concord Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. by Inc., does itself constitute a restriction to Special Foundation, Children’s su- particular premises. J.T. pra. Hob- Son, Family by Inc. v. Homes & Wake of Although receipt compensation the Inc., County, N.C. S.E.2d 174 consider, may be a factor to it is not con- trolling. The focus be on activity must the plaintiff majority parallels concludes that the in the house and how it the ordi- and, conducting operation meaning is nary a commercial and common resi- therefore, purposes. Beverly the use is not residential. dis- dential Island Ass’n v. Zinger, supra. The fact that is compensated for its cost to D emphasizes, As Double Manor the provide paid employees to super- ate and manner in the which residents change vise the residents does not the char- home shows the to be residential. The acter of the actual use of the home from a residents share bedrooms but their residence to a business. Concord Estates They own and dressers. share the beds Association, Special Homeowners common areas the house and the house- Foundation, Inc., supra. Children’s Re- They together, family- chores. hold eat ceipt money support care resi- style, helping prepare with the children dents incidental to the meals. All children attend Jefferson home, which tois a home life situa- County public assigned schools and are reap .the residents and not to mone- surrogate parent. staff to act advocate Son, tary Hobby benefit. J.T. The children are residents of Family County, Homes Wake su- they age until Double Manor reach the pra. can move to a more self-sufficient supervised environment. Considering method day. operate together hours residents function homes an- policy of to assist public nounced persons to live in surroundings, see 30- residential

normal 31-23-803(2)(a), I 28-115(2)(a) of Double

conclude

Manor is a residential dwelling house.

ly for the

A not be within traditional may residence, but the man-

understanding of Double Manor in which

ner meaning clearly within the homes usage.

Therefore, I would reverse *4 and remand with instruc- plaintiffs’ complaint. dismiss

tions to INVESTORS, INC., a SERVICE

COIN Plaintiff, Corporation, GROOMS, Grooms, Emogene

Don Gale Tuttle, E. L. Tuttle and Jean

Defendants-Appellants,

and

Joseph Norma Goecke and Defendants, Goecke,

and Enterprises, a Colorado

Snowflake Respondent, Corporation, Show Cause Aurora, Rooney, for defend- Daniel ants-appellants. Zeller, Harold R. Show Cause Garnishee, Respondent and Jr., P.C., Moyle, Daniel T. Daniel T. Jr., Golden, respon- Moyle, for show cause Zeller, Respondent garnishee-appellee. dent and Lucile Show Cause Garnishee-Appellee. CRISWELL, Judge.

Colorado Court Emogene Don and Div. III. Tuttle, and Gale L. and Jean E. Grooms April judgment They appeal creditors. from judgment to enter a trial court’s refusal Rehearing May Denied Zeller, gar- their favor Lucile (Grooms) Certiorari Denied affirm. nishee. We debtor, Coin Ser- Plaintiff and Investors, (owner), equip- owned vice