*1 removal explanation for his ya’s only plainly provides the state conspiracy Holland meeting is that Holland from the peti violation of to show a direct essential about questions to his respond equal pro refused tioner’s Fourteenth Amendment Determining whether there. why actions he was rights, whether or not the tection plausible, more Sebunya’s explanation is officially authorized or police Knowles, Sebunya is credi- lawful.”); necessarily whether 113 and see also Johnson (9th Cir.1997) this ble, factfinder and is (stating in is for a F.3d simply function pri proper Court’s against section 1983 action context of “[bjecause individuals, summary judgment. viewing the Plaintiffs a vate state action for establish light most Viewing the facts [¶ 35] claims, constitutional we purposes of their just the sort conjures favorable to Holland requirement the color-of-state-law treat actions seek that section 1983 of scenario requirement equiv as and the state-action through its prevent: government, alent”); George v. Work Fur indi private Pacific-CSC agents conspiracy or in with Cir.1996) (9th lough, 91 F.3d viduals, punish or seeking prevent (“In actions, law’ is ‘color state speech of for otherwise lawful citizen action.”). synonymous with state When See, Helvey v. disapproves. e.g., which it leave, Sebunya had him Holland refused to (8th Cir. City Maplewood, 154 F.3d 841 forcibly arrested and removed from 1998) trial court erred (holding meeting. on a former granting summary judgment Sebunya’s against act moti- claim being As for section 1983 bartender’s by personal animosity conspired vated toward Hol- with they police alleging 7(d) land, Sebunya’s Rule statement no party, to have her employer, private her way personal relationship testimony refers to the in a civil of her fired because Sebunya. officers, Further- between Holland and involving the rights proceeding more, reference to relation- First Amend thereby depriving her of her 7(d) ship appears in-Holland’ Rule speech). Because there right ment to free simply statement refers to Holland’s atti- regard genuine of material fact is a issue Sebunya tude toward and makes no refer- Sebunya capacity in what ing why and Sebunya’s feelings toward ence Holland: Executive Com ejected Holland from the Sebunya engaged 27. had in a ca- Mr. vacate the meeting, mittee I would sum relationship sual sexual with the respect to Holland’s mary judgment with Sebunya later Mr. Hol- for de woman who became claim section 1983 and, land’s wife once she became Amendment priving him of his First child, Sebunya’s pregnant with Mr. speech. to free support he failed to her either emo-

tionally financially. previously Mr. had con- Holland opin- Sebunya

fronted Mr. with 2000 ME 162 Sebunya was “a com- ion Mr. PAYMENT charlatan and that In re WAGE plete fraud and man” be- LITIGATION.1 he was dishonorable Sebunya’s per- failure to cause Mr. of Maine. Court Supreme Judicial which Mr. responsibilities form 5, 2000. Argued June Sebunya M. Holland contended Aug. Decided woman who later be- owed to the wife. came Mr. Holland’s parties’ Rule

Confining our review to

7(d) in fact reveals Sebun- statements 8, 1999); McNabb v. Star Cty., Nov. berland were consolidated cases that

1. The individual Basinger v. Wal-Mart appeal are: for this Inc., Stores, (Me.Super. Cum Ct. CV-98-351 *2 Resorts, Inc., wood Hotels & (Me.Super. CV-98-359 98-383 Cty., Ct. Cumberland Nov. (Me.Super. Cty., Ct. Cumberland 1999); Nov. Group, Newcomb v. The Newark CV- 1999); Burger v. King, Pelletier CV-98-344 (Me.Super. 98-192 Cty., Ct. Kennebec Nov. (Me.Super. Ct. Cty., Cumberland Nov. 1999). 1999); Inc., Hotels, Simpson Harper CV- *3 (orally), F. Petruccelli Petruccelli

Gerald Martin, LLP, Fontaine, F. Donald Jona- & Beal, than S.R. Nicolaas W. Groenenveld- Portland, Beal, P.A., Meijer, Fontaine & Case, McTeague Case Higbee W. James P.A., Whitney, Topsham, Cohen & Watson appellants. L. (orally), Ann Kayatta J. Jr. William Erdman, Rudisill, At- K. Pierce Douglas Messerschmidt, wood, Gregory Michael G. Preti, LaMourie, Hansel, J. P. Matthew LLC, Beliveau, Haley, Flaherty, Pachios & Sheils, III, Per- Rich J. H. William John P.A., kins, Hinckley Keddy, & Thompson, Kelly Chapman, Chapman, & John W. Moon, Moss, Shapiro, Philip J. Jonathan P.A., McGill, Moss, Shapiro, Hayes Portland, for appellees. General, Ketterer, Attorney

Andrew Gen., Thomas, Atty. Asst. Gwendolyn D. Bureau for amicus curiae Maine Augusta, of Labor Standards. CLIFFORD, RUDMAN,

Panel: dated motion dismiss. Although SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and motion was filed after defendants CALKINS, discovery occurred, parties JJ. some had agreed and the court to treat the cases

CLIFFORD, J. procedure under the used for motions to affidavits, discovery, stip- No dismiss. appeal [¶ 1] Five classes of employees ulations of fact were upon. relied judgments of complaints dismissal of their J.) (Crowley, motion court granted their employers asserting that employers’ motions to dismiss in all employers’ practice paying them spects. ap- then filed this a bi-weekly basis created causes of peal. pursuant to 26 *4 Supp.1998) (concerning timely pay- & II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND P.L.1999, of wages), repealed ment by ch. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION 465, (effective § 18, 1999), 1 September and 26 Supp. M.R.S.A. complaint 3] Dismissal of a [¶ 1998) (concerning penalties rights only proper and of when the to complaint fails action for by employers), violations may state a claim which relief (effec- P.L.1999, 465, by 12(b)(6). § 1 granted. amended ch. See M.R. “A Civ. P. 18, 1999); Sept. tive M.R.S.A. 26 664 motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficien (1988 & Supp.1999) (proscribing cy complaint.” minimum of the Livonia v. Town of ¶ wage requirements); Rome, 39, 5, 83, the Federal Fair La- ME 1998 707 A.2d 85 Act, 268, §§ bor Standards 29 v. (citing Soucy, U.S.C.A. 201-219 Richards 610 A.2d (1998); (Me.1992)). unjust in and common law enrich- 270 For of a purposes Determining 12(b)(6), ment. Superior pursuant motion made to Rule (Cumberland Court allegations and Kennebec Coun- “the material of the complaint J.) ties, Crowley, Livonia, properly dismissed their taken must be as admitted.” ¶ 5, complaints, 39, we affirm judgments. 1998 ME 707 (citing A.2d at 85 Foods, Inc., Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen (Me.1984)). 97, I. 486 A.2d 98 When review PROCEDURAL HISTORY dismissal, ing a we examine complaint 2] The in this case are in most light plaintiff favorable to the hourly industry workers in the service to whether it determine sets forth ele who were employers their on a ments of a cause of action or facts alleges bi-weekly basis. The defendants are ser- entitle the relief plaintiff would industry corporations. vice The five law- pursuant legal to some Livo theory. See suits that ap- constitute this consolidated nia, ¶39, 5, ME “A 1998 707 A.2d at 85. in peal filed 1998. These suits all ap should occur it dismissal alleged the same claims different pears ‘beyond doubt that plaintiffis] [the] (Mills, J.) employers. Superior Court any entitled to no relief under of [are] set conducted a conference of all counsel in [they] might prove facts that in of support October 1998 to encourage parties ” Cole, claim.’ v. A.2d [their] 637 McAfee resolve the cases on some consolidated (Me.1994) 463, (quoting Board Hall v. proce- basis. cases were in various Protection, 260, Envtl. 498 A.2d of stages. Discovery dural been had com- (Me.1985)). some, summary menced motions others, judgment had been filed in interpreta We review the [¶4] certify motions to been class had filed tion de law. of statute novo for errors of conference, Servs., Inc., Following still others. v. See Daniels Tew Mac Aero (Me.1996). parties 984, produced joint stipulation 675 A.2d con When statute, regarding legal the resolution common struing give of we seek to effect issues, and the filed a consoli- defendants intent legislative examining Har- Corp. also Maine v. Maine meaning statutory language. Davric plain ¶ Whittier, 1, (Me. 7, Comm’n, 99, A.2d Estate ME Racing See ness 1996). If of the text plain meaning 289, 293. 732 A.2d interpretative does resolve an issue

raised, we then consider the statute’s his TIMELY PAYMENT III. WAGE tory, underlying policy, and other extrinsic STATUTE legislative intent. factors ascertain allege that ¶ Crossman, 92, 7, ME Arsenault v. practice paying them employers’ legisla In ascertaining bi-weekly a violation of 26 basis is intent, interpret section of the tive we Because of these 626-A.2 statutory statute the context of the violations, they they are enti contend City which it is found. See scheme a civil tled enforce forfeiture $100 ¶ Doud, Rockland 1998 ME and, addition, re per violation $500 Moreover, although costs, damages, attorney cover treble agency’s interpretation of a statute it is fees. charged administering binding with is not Court, on this we will that interpre accord For- Rights A of Action Civil Private tation substantial “unless the deference *5 feitures plainly compels contrary statute a result.” that The the mo- [¶ 6] contend Maine Bankers Ass’n v. Bureau Bank of 1304, (Me.1996); ing, holding tion erred in see court provide: wages. 2. The statutes of This subsection shall not those permit nonpayment be or construed § payment 621. Time of wages withholding payment of due. of when employers; weekly payment 1. Certain (1988 Supp.1998), § & re- M.R.S.A. required. Every person corporation, or P.L.1999, 465, § pealed by 1. ch. partnership engaged mechanical, manufacturing, in a § 626-A. Penalties mercantile, mining, quarrying, provisions any the of Whoever violates of hotel, restaurant, camp, beauty summer 626, sections 621 to 623 or section 628 or amusement, parlor, business; telephone telegraph or subject 629 shall be to a forfeiture of not trades; any building of the in $500 each $100 nor more than for less than logging lumbering operation; upon pub- or violation. works, repair lic roads, in the or construction or of Any employer liable the em- shall be sewers, bridges, gas, water or elec- ployee the or for amount of works, lines; light pipes every tric or incor- being unpaid wages. Upon judgment porated express compa- company water or employee any favor em- of or rendered ny; every company steam railroad or any brought ployees, in action to recover corporation pay weekly employee shall each wages subchapter, unpaid under this such engaged wages in his or its business the include, the judgment shall in addition to by employee days earned the to within of due, wages adjudged be rea- unpaid payment; every county the date of that . interest, of an rate additional sonable city pay employee every shall so who is equal such to twice the amount of amount engaged wages salary or in its business the liquidated damages of wages as and costs him, by employee earned unless the attorney’s fee. including a suit reasonable quests writing paid in a different be wages may be action for The pay Every manner. town shall so each brought by employee either affected or the employee by in its business if so by Department employees or of Labor. employee. An who is absent Department of Labor is further autho- place employment regular from at a his of judg- supervise payment rized to ment, payment paid time fixed for shall be there- judgment on behalf of the collect after on demand. employees and fines employers; employee or collect payment of balance of All through subchap- hourly Any regardless of this employer, of violation incurred brings Department of Labor whether enumerated shall ter. When in subsection unpaid wages, an this action and employee, before action for its on or may to collect a civil forfeiture ployee's regularly payday, next scheduled action proceeding. joined in employee's hourly earned be the same the balance of the both Supp.1998), § 26 M.R.S.A. 626-A due to be which P.L.1999, § by normally payment amended ch. on the date scheduled § Whittier, M.R.S.A. 626-A harmoniously. does not allow for a See Estate of private right of action A.2d at 2. against employers. collect forfeitures Moreover, 17-A, 4-B title section 626-A provides Section for a forfeiture of “civil states that violations ... are enforce for each to be violation en- $100 $500 General, by Attorney repre able party party forced is any sentative other appropriate public 623, 626, of violation sections official in a civil action what to recover or 629. See 26 626-A. M.R.S.A. fine, may designated a penalty be or other statute, however, does not state to sanction, toor secure the forfeiture whom that payable. forfeiture is may 17-A decreed the law .” § 4-B civil (Supp.1999). M.R.S.A. [¶ 7] Because does forfeiture referenced section 626-A private not state that a right of action “civil exists, type solely of violation” that is right such a of can enforceable un Attorney In General implied. Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Larrabee, Foods, Inc., specified. less (Me.1984), otherwise 486 A.2d 97 we Cf. dealt with a similar at 101. We discern no issue whether 26 intention of part Legislature, of from private right 6303 contains a either plain language legisla action to assert of the statute a civil See Lar or the forfeiture. rabee, history, provide pri tive would A.2d at 101. noted that We vate of action Legislature right when the it under section 626-A to deems “essential Moreover, private action, enforce civil our party forfeiture. have a interpretation is in expressly harmony it has Id. with that created one.” For the Labor, Department main purpose of the creation which has private right of a *6 action, pursuit tained that the Legislature penalties of the its in of these is expresses province. its tent the exclusive See Bank statutory or in the Maine language history. ers Ass’n v. Bureau A.2d legislative Banking, 684 of (holding at 1306 that deference be should case, In present 8] the is clear [¶ it that given agency’s to an of interpretation a sections 621 and 626-A enacted for were charged statute it is with enforcing). The the benefit of wage and that earners these Department may elect to pursue such rem plaintiffs are wage We earners. examine edies, the decision but to do so is a discre any legisla- whether there is of indication See tionary England one. New Outdoor intent deny tive a private create or Ctr. v. Commissioner Inland Fisheries of forfeiture, remedy of and imply- whether ¶66, 12, Wildlife, & 2000 ME 748 A.2d the ing remedy existence of is such a 1009, 1014. with purpose consistent of underlying legislative scheme. Wages B. Paid Late Wages Unpaid vs. Larrabee, In9] that [¶ we concluded sec- to Section 626-A Pursuant 630 private tion created no right of action Larrabee, a employees enforce forfeiture. See [¶ 11] The also contend at 101. language Section 626-A has court erred in their dismissing motion similar to that of part unpaid section 630 and is wages, liquidated claims for dam- legislative the same ages, attorney scheme. See 26 and fees under section 626- (1988 M.R.S.A. Supp.1998). 621-634 A by concluding & that “late” were wages provisions These interpreted should be not “unpaid” Section 626-A in ef- Larrabee, it 3. As read at the employment. employer time of section An who fails 630 stated: request satisfy days this within 15 of receiv- shall, ing may subject employer upon request it be to a not An written forfeiture of employee, give employee $50 the affected nor more $500. less than than § (Supp.1984-1985). the written reasons for the termination of Co., 952, 955 Ry. time initiated Terminal at the these cases were feet field (Me.1993). that, disputed It in the is not stated: wages employees, of these case Any employer employee liable to the is ultimately paid. the amount of or for Upon and wages health benefits. right 13] Pursuant any rendered favor of judgment being “un- or an action for an to collect enforce any or employee employees, an fails wage employer accrues when paid” or unpaid, wages brought recover after termination employee subchapter, under this health benefits de- employee’s employment upon and includes, in judgment addition such § payment. See M.R.S.A. mand health ad- unpaid wages or benefits Supp.1999). Under section due, to be rate of judged reasonable must employee leaving employment “[a]n interest, including costs of suit a reason- time in full within reasonable paid fee, attorney’s and an additional able employer demand at the office after equal to twice the amount of amount kept wages are payrolls where are and unpaid wages liquidated damages. as Id. statute states further paid.” 26 M.R.S.A. 626-A. Section 621 subehapter, of this purposes “[f]or wages paid employ- were to be means the earlier of either reasonable time a weekly on basis. See 26 M.R.S.A. ers day employees would the next on which Therefore, con- 621.4 day not more than regularly or tend, passes as soon as a week without on which demand day after the weeks payment, wages “unpaid” such are under made.” Id. statute, a cause of action thus employee remains [¶ 14] When the costs, wages, attorney accrues those that some all of his but asserts ployed fees, liquidated damages. Alie v. Cf. “unpaid,” wages or her earned Nadeau, 93 Me. A. 891-92 unpaid wages ac- right to sue to collect (1899) (holding that a cause of action if an is not employee crues unpaid wages accrues on each instance employee’s regularly payday, scheduled paid). that the are not up by and the difference is made created payday. regularly next scheduled *7 to “un- by section 626-A is to sue collect 621(2). § M.R.S.A. wages subchapter.” under this Thus, legisla- § reveals a “unpaid 15] 626-A. The term the statute [¶ M.R.S.A. however, private litigant intent to allow a wages,” explicitly is not defined tive 626-A, against employer in for an in nor is it defined sec- course an section (1) been then, employee if: has wage It is to look appropriate, tion 621. to be discharged, subsequently demands legislative part scheme of which it is a so, to do meaning “unpaid employer and refuses paid, to ascertain the of (2) 626; that Rockland, § when ME 26 M.R.S.A. wages.” City see of ¶ 5, pay has a current previ- employer failed 721 A.2d at 982. We have full, pay employer in if fails to ously “unpaid wages” ployee stated that under by employee’s amount withheld that precisely [are] 626-A what “[are] section regularly payday, see pay an not an next scheduled owing employer when does §§ 626-A.5 Cooper Spring- M.R.S.A. employee work.” manner, employees timely repealed, employees and a provision since been 4. This has P.L.1999, pay paid by period. See their next amended. See must section has been 621(2). au- wage § “late” was If a ch. M.R.S.A. mandatory wage, tomatically "unpaid” an superfluous would 621(2), language of this section urged reading of section 5. A different already ac- employees would have because employees, would render the section employ- their employer crued a cause of action superfluous. an fails to If they note and employees prove that that could facts show a 621 explicitly section states that “[t]his requirement. violation of this permit subsection shall not be construed to statute, wage [¶ The minimum how- 18] nonpayment or withholding of ever, time-of-payment contains no lan- 621(2). They argue due.” M.R.S.A. guage. protection granted by language precludes that this a construction of statute is kind than the different employers of the statute that allows protections provided for in section 621. up payment wages by catch their of protect employees The statute is meant to First, pay period. disagree. next We being paid from too little. Sections way sentence —if the employ read protect from not be- ees contend—would obviate the language ing paid timely in a manner. Enforcement in section 621 requiring employers payment of the time of of employees is up wages by payday. make late the next expressly limited provided scheme Second, if an all employer pays wages in by the 626- Legislature sections 621 and period, full the next pay although that A. employees’ claims the Act under employer subject is employee’s not to an were properly dismissed. private right of action under 626- A, employer subject nevertheless the is V. UNJUST ENRICHMENT brought by a civil forfeiture the Attorney pursuant to General section. Ac same 19] The [¶ contend full, late, cordingly, wage paid but in dismissing court erred claim their “unpaid” not under section 621. The unjust disagree. enrichment. We “ remedy for the enforcement a “late” ‘Unjust recovery enrichment describes is the wage insignificant civil forfeiture for the value of the benefit retained when penalties that be brought by can the Attor there is relationship, no contractual but ney Only General.6 if wage remains when, grounds jus on the of fairness and “unpaid” beyond the time frames set out tice, compels performance the law of a 621(2) or 626 may sections an ’ legal duty pay.” and moral Lynch v. recover in a private of action. (Me.1996)(em Ouellette, 670 A.2d added) A.F.A.B., phasis (quoting Inc. v. IV. MINIMUM WAGE CLAIM Beach, Town Orchard Old [¶ 17] The next claim (Me.1994)). 105 n. 3 practice employers’ bi-weekly cases, In 20] these contractual payment also constituted violation of 26 661-672, relationship employers between the which establishes exists, the employees creating employ wage requirements minimum work per relationship. ment Burnell v. Town The employees formed Maine. do not Cf. *8 (Me.1996) contend, however, Kingfield, 686 that A.2d 1074 employers the have (discussing employment con wage violated the minimum as indefinite statute to tracts). This hourly paid; employment the amount of contract be wage the rath er, they parties argue precludes plaintiffs that this claim should tween the the not maintaining have because a “minimum from a cause of action for been dismissed due, wage” paid unjust must promptly enrichment. Alie, require employers er. 93 Me. at 44 A. at the in 891-92. these cases does not Cf. wage merely Because that is “late” and not differently. that we construe the statutes A yet "unpaid,” employer an is not liable in a by Attorney decision the General to seek a private to cause of action an unless penalty discretionary. Eng- civil is See New employer and until that fails to the em- land Outdoor Ctr. v. Inland Commissioner of by ployee pay period. the next 66, 12, ¶ Wildlife, ME Fisheries 2000 748 A.2d 1014. penalties

6. fact civil The that no forfeiture sought Attorney against were the General

225 policy congressional undermine the would FEDERAL FAIR LABOR VI. STANDARDS ACT in all states. uniformity of enforcement 98-334-P-H, slip op. at Basinger, See No. Wal-Mart, Basinger v. one [¶ 21] this ap consolidated for the five cases removed to the United States peal, was Thus, magistrate’s adopting [¶ 23] District of Maine. District Court for the full, States in the United recommendation (Hornby, The States District Court United found no violation District Court C.J.) adopted the recommendation in That court’s decision Basinger. FLSA {Cohen) Magistrate Judge United States in no persuasive and we find error is summary that was entitled Wal-Mart adopt its ra- Superior Court’s decision judgment employees’ on the Fair Labor as to the other class tionale all of pursuant Act claims filed 29 Standards §§ Basinger 201-219. v. U.S.C.A case. present Stores, Inc., No. Wal-Mart 98-334-P-H entry is: (D.Me. 1999). Mar.9, The United States subsequently District Court declined ex Judgments affirmed. supplemental jurisdiction and re ercise Superior the case to Court. manded CALKINS, J., dissenting. 1367(a) (1993) (provid See 28 U.S.C.A. ing supplemental jurisdiction). This I III-A of the concur Part [¶24] decision is the law of the case as § 626-A opinion holding that 26 M.R.S.A Basinger plaintiffs. Alley, See Blance v private provide employees right not does (Me.1979). 589 employers their to collect of action The magistrate judge reasoned in I that v. forfeitures.7 believe Larrabee “ ‘[t]here recommendation that is noth- Inc., Foods, Penobscot Frozen 486 97 ing says pay period [FLSA] in the (Me.1984) I compels holding. also has employees to be one week must IV, V, concerning VI ” concur Parts paid weekly.’ Basinger, No. 98-334- wage, unjust employees’ minimum en- P-H, op. 7 slip (quoting at Marshall v. richment, and Federal Fair Labor Stan- Ford, Inc., F.Supp.

Allen-Russell I dissent in respectfully Act claims. dards (E.D.Tenn.1980)). Moreover, III-B I conclude that 26 Part because court held that violations of section granted and 626-A trigger insufficient to a violation of the ployees, who were entitled to be 98-334-P-H, Basinger, No. FLSA. See weekly paid weekly, not slip op. at concluded that court to collect their bring governed FLSA claims are in Serapion First Circuit’s decision (1st Martinez, Cir.1997), F.3d “ requirement I start with the [¶25] ought

which that court stated that ‘courts in this employers case interpretation of a presume weekly. have were to dependant federal statute is state ’ disputes that basic litigation No in this one 98-334-P-H, slip Basinger, op. law.” No. disagreement whether premise. 988). at at (quoting Serapion, F.3d statutory enforce their can *9 The District held that the Court to right by an action collect those bringing to of the attempt peg enforcement FLSA weekly. wages paid Act not Prompt Wage Payment to the State P.L.1999, dissent, repealed by ch. and 7. I refer to the versions was In this P.L.1999, §§ at 621 and 626-A effect the ch. M.R.S.A. time the M.R.S.A. was amended section 626-A 465, complaints were filed. (see (Supp. § 1 26 M.R.S.A. Supp. and 626-A 2000)). 1998). opinion, As section 621 noted the statutes, In the I interpreting paid [¶ 26] note which not paid were on the date the fact that sections 621 and 626-A were normally scheduled for of those payment statutes, remedial wage obviously intended wages.” The section assumed a regularly remedy problems to faced by low-wage scheduled at which payday employees time living workers paycheck paycheck. from to generally were was paid what due them. We have said such statutes must be if Common sense dictates that an employer liberally. construed Bu See Director of required employees weekly, was its pay to Cormier, reau Labor Standards employer the must have established a (Me.1987). 1297, 1300 621(2) weekly payday. Leg- In section employee [¶ 27] Section 626-A allows an was not authorizing employers, islature bring wages. an action unpaid for The quired pay weekly, regu- to establish a statute, as it was at worded the time these larly payday biweekly scheduled on a or filed, actions implicitly were referred to basis, monthly any or basis other than a violations of section as as other well Yet, weekly exactly basis. that is what the statutory provisions, as basis for an ac- employers in they this case did: estab- tion for unpaid wages, by referring to biweekly regular lished a for their payday paragraph. those sections the first employers whom the were re- opinion concludes the wages of these quired pay weekly. “unpaid,” they were not “late,” merely spite were of the fact that 621(2) simply Section with 30] dealt statutory scheme makes no distinction nonrecurring not wages situation wages between “unpaid” wages. “late” and regularly on the payday, scheduled fact, In there no mention the statutes and it employer pay on the of “late” fact, 621(2) next In fur- payday. opinion wages [1128] The decides that ther it stated that “shall not be construed (1) “unpaid” are in two situations: when an permit nonpayment withholding or fails to employer pay employee after payment of wages opin- due.” The employment is employ- terminated and the ion employers weekly allows to ignore the wages, ee has made demand and payment requirement long they pay so as (2) employer pay when an fails to employees by next regularly payday pay- on the following it payday, scheduled whenever is. Such day when the wages were due. We are plain result was not authorized not concerned with the former situation statute, and, therefore, meaning of the it dealing because we are not with terminat- Legislature was not what intended. employees. ed opinion suggests that an em- opinion determines, [1129]The with re- ployer biweekly who payday established a gard employees, current employees, its who were supposed “unpaid” payday when not on the paid weekly, the employer’s did so at after the payday they on which are due. peril Department because the of Labor only portion statutory scheme sought could have forfeiture payment payday that allowed on the next however, employer. Department, If the 621(2). was section That section stated weekly pay failed require- to enforce that an employer employ- “shall to its ment, remedy ee, employees were if on or without employee’s regu- before the next larly they payday, bring scheduled the balance of allowed to an action employee’s hourly wages earned due to wages.8 sale, “Every person, injury completely for an done him in his and and de without without immunities, person, reputation, property nial, promptly delay.” and without Maine law; remedy by shall have due course of I, § art. Const. justice freely shall be administered *10 the dismissal I would vacate this reason meaning plain I that the 32] conclude unpaid claims for employees’ em- of sections 621 wages to these ployers and, were

weekly, weekly, they unpaid. proceed with their

ployees entitled wages. For

statutory remedy