*1 some unique characteristic of that particular Here, office. appellant points to the sheriffs office interaction with the public judicial and the system as features which distinguish it from the other county offices. While to some extent exist, may distinction is insufficient to justify different treatment have, other offices which extents, to varying interaction, same types e.g., the county police, district attorney, and others who must relate to both the public and the courts. case,

In this sections 4216 and 4217 bear no relationship the status of Allegheny County’s second class classification or any unique characteristic of the office of sheriff in a second class county. Judgment affirmed.

Justice ZAPPALA concurs in the result.

756 A.2d 1107 EASTON, Appellant, CITY OF

v. AMERICAN STATE, FEDERATION OF COUNTY EMPLOYEES,

AND AFL-CIO, MUNICIPAL 447, Appellee. LOCAL Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of

Submitted Jan. 2000. Aug. Decided *2 Hogan, Easton, Theresa for of Easton. Chierici, Wilderman,

Wendy Spear, Spear, Samuel L. Bor- ish, Runckel, Spear Endy, and AFSCME. Philadelphia, FLAHERTY, C.J., CAPPY, ZAPPALA,

Before CASTILLE, NIGRO, SAYLOR, JJ. NEWMAN

OPINION NIGRO, Justice.

At issue in the instant appeal whether the Commonwealth in affirming Court erred the decision the Court Common Pleas denying petition of Easton’s to vacate an *3 arbitration award which reinstated Daiello to his Joseph posi- tion of at the of Easton’s employment water treatment follow, facility. For reasons that we reverse. 30,1996, Daiello, May

On a member of the Joseph American State, County Municipal Federation and AFL- Employees, (the CIO, Union) Local 447 fired from job his the (the City’s) of Easton’s facility request- water treatment for: worked; not ing receiving pay actually and for hours falsifying by recording implied records data that that he had treated the on drinking supply purification water with chemicals occasions not; when his neglecting failing he had and duties by treat the public supply with the chemicals. proper Sideletter A to bargaining agreement the collective in force between the City and the Union at the time of Daiello’s termination set following policy forth the disciplinary procedures, pursu- ant to which the terminated employment: Daiello’s

DISCIPLINARY POLICY disciplined shall not be or Employees discharged without If willful an in employee engages cause. misconduct or duty that in neglect consequences results serious adverse including] but not limited City, or to the the Contractor fines, any or violations of penalties operation, costs of policies, regulations require- permit health or safety, immediately be dismissed ments, may the employee Manager. Project the level of willful miscon- that not rise to

For offenses do set forth consequences or do result adverse duct above, shall as follows: disciplinary action

First Offense: Verbal Warning Offense: Written

Second suspension notification of without Third Offense: Written (2) a day period for two pay with- suspension Offense: Written notification Fourth (1) pay out for a one week period termination, grievance his filed written

Following Daiello A board of arbitra- reinstatement. three-member requesting (the Board) hearings grievance on Daiello’s written tors held To its claim that August August support on by requesting committed misconduct and receiv- Daiello willful hours not worked November ing pay hearings documentary consisting evidence at the presented records, daily weekly several time sheets its own time from out and and time records signed, Daiello himself filled part on a Coley Security Agency, employed Daiello record for November City’s daily basis 1995. The time time weekly sheet indi- corresponding 1995 and Daiello’s time Daiello a shift at the water treatment cated that worked addition, day. 7:00 11:30 facility p.m. a.m. to *4 documentary hearing at the con- City presented evidence the Security from the One Coley Agency. of time records sisting records, ostensibly out. time which was filled he and build- patrolling Daiello while was various businesses that he Coley Security Agency, on behalf indicated ings from on working Coley Agency p.m. for 9:00 Security 18, a.m. 1995. The 1995 to 4:00 on November November and from testimony of Easton also documents City presented repeatedly that Daiello City employees which established failed to add the proper amount of chemicals to a chemical bin, feed failed to fill properly out chemical reports feed and failed to obtain permission before leaving the water treatment facility duty.1 while

Following the conclusion of the hearings, a divided Board awarding issued decision Daiello reinstatement to his former position City’s at the water facility treatment pay.2 with back Although the majority two-member of the Board found as a matter of fact that Daiello had stolen time from either City or from the Coley Security Agency 17, 1995, on November nevertheless City found had to prove failed Daiello’s provided just misconduct cause for his immediate termination presented because the evidence failed to establish whether Daiello stolen had time from the City Easton or Coley Security Agency. The the Board further concluded that although Daiello had neglected his duties on several by failing occasions to fill a bin chemical feed chemicals, with proper amount of failing properly complete chemical reports, feed and leaving plant without presented documentary The also evidence which established that 20, 1995, on October Daiello worked for the from 7:00 a.m. to a.m., shift, 11:00 then sick remaining portion took time for the of his which was p.m. scheduled to end at 3:00 day, Later that same Daiello Coley Security went to work Agency, beginning for the his shift at 9:00 p.m. addition, ending and a.m. on October 4:00 1995. In presented testimony previous that sometime to March injured result, job Daiello shoveling his back on the mud. As a 8, 1996, reported Daiello that he was unable to work on March and the City paid eight day. him for hours of sick Despite time for that the fact work, reported that Daiello that he was unable to and collected a full 8, 1996, day’s sick-pay Cily from the on March he nevertheless went to Coley Security work Agency for a seven hour shift that same evening. Fairchild, Jr., 2. Board member Alvin F. dissenting opinion authored a in which he stated that: testimony presented hearing by [t]he at the arbitration certainly City’s position confirmed the working that Mr. Daiello was Coley Security Agency being paid by while he was expected to be at the Water Plant. This "double dipping” certainly was willful placed misconduct which could have the citizens of Easton in a serious situation. The citizens must be drinking healthy assured that their water is safe and to use. Mr. disregard Daiello's blatant jeopardized for his duties could have supply placed our citizens at risk.

443 did job his duties neglect repeated his permission, City because for his termination just cause constitute it. by adversely affected was not Easton Common Court of a petition Easton filed The the Board’s to vacate County seeking Northampton Pleas of On manifestly unreasonable. it was on the basis award entered an 1998, Pleas of Common the Court February proceed of Easton then The petition. denying order Court, arguing that to the Commonwealth to appeal ed of the collective the terms misinterpreted Board had failed and that its determination agreement misconduct” “willful had committed that Daiello prove supported was not termination warranting his immediate from one stolen time that Daiello had indeed finding of fact its Court A divided Commonwealth 1995. employers of his two the order affirming a decision published issued subsequently AFSCME, Easton v. Pleas at of Common of the Court (Pa.Commw.1998). AFL-CIO, Local Commonwealth Court short, majority of the the two-member Daiello was reinstating that the Board’s decision panel found terms of the collec its essence from the and drew reasonable on the Board’s rested bargaining agreement because tive misconduct.” Id. of the term “willful interpretation unfettered however, Leadbetter, dissenting authored Judge at that, facts of this under the in which she reasoned opinion stealing Daiello was case, employer of which question jobs of his for both concurrent time sheets he filled out when (with Security Agency) Coley with the City of Easton and he committed of whether question was immaterial working while he was “willful misconduct” (Leadbetter, J., Lead- dissenting). Judge Id. at 1115 Easton. to two salaries “[ajverring entitlement better added dishonesty directed same time is places in two can fire him for I either or both and believe employers, to both Id. misconduct.” willful one such as the instant of review cases

Our standard See, State e.g., “essence test.” circumscribed highly is the Univ.) College v. Univ. State Higher (Cheyney Educ. Sys. of (PSEA-NEA), Ass’n Prof'l

(1999). test, Pursuant to the essence our review of the Board’s decision ordering that Daiello be reinstated is limited *6 to a issue, determination of defined, whether the properly is encompassed within the terms of the collective bargaining Id. Assuming that agreement. is, it then the Board’s deci sion on the issue must upheld be if it could be rationally Id.; derived from the collective bargaining agreement. see also Community College Beaver v. County Community of (PSEA/NEA), College, Soc’y Faculty 576, 594, 473 Pa. (1977). 1267, 375 However, A.2d if the Board’s decision could not rationally be derived from the bargaining collective agreement, then it can be reversed. See State Correctional Graterford, Inst. at Dep’t Corrections v. State Civil Serv. Comm’n, (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (citing Pennsyl vania Liquor Union, Control Bd. v. Independent State Stores (1989) 520 Pa. 553 A.2d 948 County Centre v. Musser, (1988)). 548 A.2d 1194 Initially, we note that the issue of whether Daiello commit- ted “willful providing just misconduct” cause for his immediate termination by stealing time from one of his two on employers November 1995 is within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, since the Disciplinary Policy contained within Sideletter A agreement clearly encompasses the Therefore, issue in question. question before this Court becomes whether the Board’s reinstating award can in Daiello any way rational be derived from the disciplinary policy contained in Sideletter A to the collective bargaining agree- can, If ment. it then our inquiry ceases and the Common- wealth cannot, Court must be If affirmed. opposite then an result attains. Court,

On appeal to this City of Easton argues first that the Board of Arbitrators’ determination that the City failed to prove that Daiello committed “willful misconduct” ra- tionally derived from the collective bargaining agreement be- cause the Board improperly assumed that the collective bar- gaining agreement between the of Easton and the Union permitted the immediate termination of an employee who employee’s if miscon- only “willful misconduct” committed The significant way. in a adversely affected duct regard language is based argument this policy section disciplinary contained provides any which that en- agreement, duty results neglect in “willful misconduct that gaging may ... ... consequences adverse significant immediately dismissed....” The contends employ- to mean an misinterpreted language Board “willful would constitute cause only ee’s misconduct” adversely if the affected his immediate dismissal misconduct way. properly in a This contention was significant Court, correctly to rest the Commonwealth put Board of never concluded that Arbitrators determined grounds misconduct” on Daiello’s would constitute part “willful if his affected only adversely for his termination misconduct *7 Easton, way. in a 722 A.2d significant City the of Rather, the Board found that the had failed provid- misconduct” that Daiello had committed “willful prove just cause for his termination it failed to establish ing because actually time employer it was whom Daiello stole the from, of a regardless of whether or not his theft time had effect on the significant City. adverse Next, that the that it City argues the Board’s determination prove that Daiello “willful misconduct” had failed committed rationally from bargaining agree- is not derived the collective supported by finding because it is not the Board’s of fact ment Security stole either or the Coley that he time from the City’s on the Agency he was clock at the water treat- facility. City’s argument regard While the ment awkwardly phrased, somewhat we nevertheless find it have merit. above, Board in its specifically

As noted commented “Clearly, fact findings of that: there was theft of time however, presented of was employers, one the evidence city alleged conclusive as to whom. this theft While the at the of the could expense city, Coley Security occurred easily have the victim of this theft.” Adopting been 446 dissent,

reasoning Judge Leadbetter’s the City contends question of which employer Daiello was stealing time from is immaterial to a determination of whether he commit- misconduct-by claiming ted willful working that he was employers essence, both at the In same time. City argues that once it established that Daiello committed a theft while he supposed at the water treatment facility, the Board should have found that he committed “willful justifying misconduct” his termination. support its argument, cites to several cases where this Court overturned arbitrators’ awards of reinstatement based on the notion that governmental entities/agencies do not have the bargain away freedom to powers that are essential to See, proper discharge of their e.g., Pennsylva- functions. Bd., Musser, nia Liquor 948; Control 520 Pa. (1988); 519 Pa. A.2d Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. Union # Security Officers (1983).3 The above cases cited support of its argument do indeed illustrate the error of the essential hold ing Court, of the majority of the Commonwealth which was that it lacked authority to overturn the arbitration award because the Board’s interpretation the term “willful miscon duct” the disciplinary policy section of A Sideletter agreement beyond purview judicial review under test. In rendering essence its decision on the merits of Daiello’s grievance, the Board did not, as the majority of the Commonwealth Court improperly assumed, absolutely have unfettered authority to interpret *8 Rather, term “willful misconduct” as it saw fit. the Board’s have, construction of the term “willful misconduct” should but not, did take into City, account the fact that the by entering majority 3. We note that the misinteipreted of the Commonwealth Court cases, holdings of our decisions in these three concluding they that only were employee’s limited to those situations proven where an Easton, employer. City misconduct is criminal as his to 722 A.2d at cases, however, Nothing language 1114. in the of the cited so limits (cid:127) holdings reject any judicial their interpretation and we limiting so them. issue, agreement at did not and bargaining into the collective were essential to its powers those relinquish could not functions, including its various properly discharge to ability who from the to those steal employees terminate power itself, working City. for from others while steal Bd., 277-78, See, 520 Pa. at Liquor Control e.g., Pennsylvania that governmen at (recognizing principle 953-54 those relinquish not have the agencies tal do freedom their discharge proper are essential powers functions, to, power but not their to termi including, limited thieves). Board’s to take light failure proven nate not did not and could into account the fact that away right proven to terminate a thief such bargain its follow, Daiello, simply and for the reasons that cannot awarding that the Board’s decision Daiello reinstatement said rationally bargaining agree from the collective was derived City. and the ment between the Union above, As conclude noted order to that Daiello’s working supposed time he was to be for the theft of “willful misconduct” on November 1995 did constitute agreement, the under the terms of the collective found, have by necessary implica Board must tion, bargained away right its to terminate City had proven an who had been to have committed a theft employee party itself or third while he was against either the However, working City.4 entities do not governmental relinquish right to terminate an have freedom their who to have from them. proven property stolen id.; Musser, 395-96, 1201-202; 519 Pa. at See at Auth., 627. Philadelphia Housing A.2d at lines, Along City, governmental entity, those same as a did fact, job findings left his 4. Pursuant the Board’s at worst Daiello facility anyone post informing at the water treatment without Security leaving, Coley Agency, he was went to work for the then applied pay for he and collected for hours when facility, actually supposed but to be at the water treatment best, working Coley Security Coley. At Daiello from the stole time by applying Agency collecting pay for and for hours when he was actually City's facility at the treatment November *9 not and does not have the to relinquish freedom its absolute best, right who, terminate an such as Daiello at party stole a third while he working the employ City.5 the addition, wish emphasize we that the portion relevant (i.e.,

of the bargaining agreement collective at issue the disci- plinary policy section contained in A agree- Sideletter ment) does not contain any language remotely even suggesting that an employee’s willful job only misconduct on the will provide just cause for his immediate termination if it can first be City established that the is the direct and intended victim employee’s the contrary, misconduct. To the the relevant portion of agreement provides the that willful misconduct on part alone, the of an employee, will standing provide just cause for his termination. It is telling also there is no by mention made the the Board or either courts of any below other evidence indicating an intention on part City of the to relinquish right its to terminate Court, In its brief to this argues the Union that the decision of the Board simply satisfies the essence test because the Board found that the City prove failed to specific Daiello committed the infraction of stealing City which he was time from the while he was accused— actually working Coley Security Agency. disagree We with the Board, myopic proceedings Union’s view of the below. Before the City required prove that it had cause under the terms of the bargaining agreement terminating During Daiello. Board, hearings course of the proved before the the crux of its charge justifying that Daiello committed willful misconduct his termi- by presenting clearly nation evidence which established that he filled out pay time sheets and collected Coley from both the and the Security Agency day. doing, for the same hours on the same In so (1) City affirmatively applied established that Daiello either: for and eventually pay collected actually from the for hours when he was working being (2) paid Coley Security for and Agency; applied eventually pay for and Coley Security Agency collected from the actually for hours working being paid by when he was City. for and instance, In either supposed Daiello committed a theft while he was Therefore, working be facility. water treatment we find no argument merit to the Union’s failed to establish that Daiello’s employment misconduct bore a close relation to his at the facility. contrary, by Judge treatment To noted Leadbetter below, dissenting opinion in her attempt Daiello’s successful to claim entitlement to places two salaries for in two at the same time dishonesty constituted Coley an act of directed at both the and the Security Agency, regardless employer actually of which he stole from. job, so on the misconduct while willful who commit employees been, was, specifically or could have as the misconduct long expected, As would party. a third against directed *10 what- any not include evidence does before this Court record City. of the part on the an intention indicating such soever facts, to conclude not hesitate we do Given these rationally is not derived in instant case arbitration award at issue. bargaining agreement from the collective must Court, it asks whether this In its brief to of an becoming a victim potential to risk the continue while he has fraud perpetrated who it knows employee set forth For the reasons City. to be supposed the order above, not and therefore reverse that it does we hold Board’s decision vacate the Court and of the Commonwealth position his awarding Daiello reinstatement pay.6 with back facility treatment in which Justices opinion dissenting files a Justice CAPPY join. SAYLOR ZAPPALA and reinstat- vacating the arbitration award that we are

6. The dissent states own, interpretation of the unbargained-for ing based on our Daiello issue, applica- than on a strict bargaining agreement at rather collective goes on our reliance The dissent then to assail of the essence tion test. Musser, Bd., Housing Philadelphia Liquor Pennsylvania Control Auth., authority light in of the continuing precedential questioning their “manifestly to describe the they term unreasonable” fact that use the attempts Finally, the dissent awards at issue therein. arbitration decisions, by an arguing a theft committed distinguish supposed to be agency he governmental of a inextricably governmental agency is somehow not working for the proper functioning of the on-the-job and the linked to his conduct is incorrect on agency for he works. The dissent governmental all three counts. First, straightforward based on a in the instant case is our decision test, interpreta- un-bargained for application not our own of the essence Next, bargaining agreement at issue. the dissent tion of the collective employed by expressly this standard of review ignores the fact that the was, fact, Liquor Bd. Musser in Pennsylvania in Control Court 272-74, Bd., Pennsylvania Liquor 520 Pa. at Control essence test. See 951-52; Musser, By at 1198. Pa. at A.2d at cases, the arbitration holding Court concluded that as it did in those underlying rationally have been derived their awards could not from to use the term bargaining agreements. That the Court chose collective awards at issue "manifestly to describe the arbitration unreasonable”

CAPPY, Justice, dissenting.

Oftentimes, questionable decisions lower tribunals pres- greatest challenge appellate They tempt ent the to an court. stray jurisprudential the court to from the sound foundation of in de entice court to appellate engage review and limited novo This especially review. true the area of a court’s of labor arbitration awards. Labor arbitrators consideration often render decisions that are most curious to those both arena, including inside and outside the labor those of us in the However, judiciary. if this court is to remain true to its awards, deferential standard of review of labor arbitration must pull resist to vacate an award with which the court disagrees, but which is nevertheless rationally derived parties’ bargaining agreement. case,

Unfortunately, been lured into has substituting its own interpretation the collective *11 agreement for that of the arbitration panel by selected so, parties, doing and vacates the arbitrators’ award. Sim- stated, ply I believe that arbitration award this case First, passes the essence test. issue of whether cause grievant’s existed for the termination is contained within the Furthermore, bargaining agreement. the arbitra- tors’ interpretation rationally can be derived the lan- Thus, of guage agreement. context I respectfully dissent. greater

Of than the majority’s concern failure to to adhere by the essence test the route vacates the panel’s arbitration award. The majority bases its opinion rationally cases in addition to "not derived from the collective bargaining agreement” magically does not transform the standard of applied by review the Court into a "manifest unreasonableness” stan- Nevertheless, explain dard. the dissent fails to how the standard of employed by continuing validity review this Court affects the rule repeatedly governmental of law set forth this Court that entities do private enterprises powers not have the relinquish freedom of inher- ently proper discharge Finally, essential of their functions. we any governmental agency fail to see how proper could ensure the discharge power discharge of its official functions if it lacked the (like Daiello) employees proven who were to have committed theft governmental agency party either from the itself or from a third they governmental agency. were for the

451 utilized the in the 1980’s which decided three cases upon or “reasonableness” of “manifest unreasonableness” concept time, which, first de- awards and vacate arbitrators’ not have the agency does government that a concept vised the matters, discipline such as the “bargain away” freedom Pennsylvania conduct. for certain employees dismissal Union, 520 State Stores Independent Board v. Control Liquor Musser, 519 (1989); v. 266, County 948 Centre 553 A.2d Pa. (1988); Philadelphia Housing 380, 1194 Pa. 1, 213, Pa. 455 # 500 Security v. Authority Union of Officers (1983). for a misplaced cases is upon Reliance these A.2d 625 number of reasons.

First, cases, concept upon which all relied these three or “rea for “manifest unreasonableness” reviewing an award in State sonableness,” in our recent decision rejected were nature of inconsistent with the deferential System being (Cheyney Education System Higher State essence test. Associa University University) College v. State Professional (1999); tion, Pa.135, see Dan 743 412-13 also A.2d Area Education Associ ville Area District v. Danville School ation, will (2000)(reviewing Pa. 754 A.2d 1255 court “manifestly whether an arbitrator’s award consider unreasonable”); v. Civil Pennsylvania Game Commission (Toth), n. 7 Service Commission (2000). Thus, as the founda because these cases which serve an iteration of a majority opinion upon tion of the were based valid, I their value as longer question standard that is no precedent.

Second, majority opinion is premise upon which based, i.e., may bargain away not governmental entity of its proper discharge that are essential to the powers function, also The contends suspect. is (City) in this case did not have the freedom Easton an who relinquish right its absolute to terminate i.e., City, party stole from a third while he appropriate of the bargain away the ultimate determination discipline for theft.

The of this is origin legal proposition Philadelphia found award, Housing Authority, supra. vacating an arbitrator’s stated, “however, court Philadelphia Housing Authority manifestly Housing unreasonable to conclude that the Au- thority could have to bargain away intended its absolute responsibility to ensure the of its integrity housing security by discharging force an officer who has defrauded one of the whom very people paid protect.” he is Id. at 627.1 Similar an language was used vacate arbitrator’s award Indepen- Union, dent State Stores 953.

Preliminarily, the use the limitations on prin- in the ciple, rejected “manifestly context the now unreason- standard, legal proposition able” renders this fatally flawed. aside, scrutiny This close of the public statute based, employee grievance Pennsylvania arbitration is (Act),2 Employee Relations Act upon casts serious doubt validity a legal principle. Specifically, of such Section 701 of subject the Act sets forth the matters that are to collective hours, § bargaining. 43 P.S. 1101.701. These include wages, and others terms and conditions of employment. Conversely, 702 of Act subject Section sets forth what matters not are § bargaining. 43 P.S. 1101.702. These are mat- ters of inherent managerial policy. They include areas of pf policy discretion or such as the functions programs services, public employer, budget, standards utilization of structure, technology, organizational and selection and di- personnel. Notably, rection of discipline discharge are specifically prohibited subjects of bargaining and at our least one case from court has come to the conclusion that employees subject the “dismissal” of is a matter to collective Dist., bargaining. PLRB v. See Mars Area School (1978). 1074-75 Additionally, proposition public employer that a does not have the freedom to bargain away discipline or dismissal for interesting Philadelphia Housing Authority It is to note that the court any legal authority support unique proposi- failed to cite to of this tion. etseq. § 2. 43 P.S. 1101.101

453 at "withthe test articulated to be odds appears certain conduct is, not, or is whether a matter court used to determine by our College PLRB Area of v. State subject bargaining. a In (1975), Dist., this court 268 School is a matter of dispute an item of that “where proclaimed hours wages, in employes’ to the interest fundamental concern it is not of employment, other terms and conditions and subject good bargaining....” to faith as a matter removed are at the discipline of or dismissal Obviously, parameters fall into the clearly employment relationship, core of the and thus, and are employment, category terms and conditions Area School subject bargaining. of collective Mars proper a Dist., 1075; Police v. Pennsylvania see also State A.2d (Betancourt), 540 Pa. Pennsylvania Troopers’ State Assoc. is to the terms and (1995)(discharge related 111). cogently Act As noted employment conditions of under in his State Stores by Zappala Independent Justice dissent Union, may strong policy why while there be reasons Governor, may impose or the seek to limitations legislature, for, upon agencies respect bargaining discipline with to over alia, theft, Thus, so. in the absence they inter have done dictate, any such or limitation in a collective any found bargaining agreement, appears rights and obli and dismissal remain matters gations regarding discipline may interpreted to and be and subject bargaining by reviewed an arbitrator.3

Finally, assuming viability legal proposition even Housing Authority regarding created in the lack Philadelphia or bargain away power discipline of freedom to to dismiss conduct, principle inappli- for certain this of law is employees prior to the facts in this case. each of the three cases cable utilized, conduct was employee’s doctrine was role in illegal directly employee’s both and related assertion, Contrary majority’s government it is not that agency power discipline discharge employee. It is lacks the or to an power. simply discipline It is not an unfettered subject parties discharge employees between the may subject discipline discharge that a decision to an review an arbitrator. agency’s example, out function. For carrying employing Housing Authority, Philadelphia security officer was committing against elderly fraud one of the discharged after Likewise, in patients protect. with whom he was entrusted to *14 Musser, for their prison guards repeated two were terminated Indepen- Finally, on their vigil. assault an inmate under Union, a dent State Stores store was fired for liquor manager responsibility. theft of store over which he had proceeds cases, Thus, illegal part in each of these act on the inextricably on-the-job was linked to the conduct of employee of the employee agency. and the function n Conversely, the facts of this case are devoid of a similar grievant City’s nexus. The laborer at the water treat- plant. charge ensuring quality ment His to aid gravamen against The of the supply. charge wages was that he collected from either the employer actually working or another for the other. for Discipline grievant type objectionable, yet of the this indirect, simply discipline affront to the not akin to directly which is role- with employee’s conduct related or respect agency impacts upon to the function of the which Furthermore, integrity agency. of the it is critical to note theft prove against employer failed Thus, of time occurred or that the was in fact harmed. regarding of the free- application principle limitations bargain discipline over the facts in dom dismissal under is simply misplaced. case reasons, I foregoing respectfully For all of the dissent and affirm would the decision the Commonwealth Court which arbitrators’ award. upheld the join ZAPPALA and this Dissenting

Justices SAYLOR Opinion.