*1 184 remanding trial, for a new course” “better is to

remand for the case an evidentiary hearing at which counsel will have opportunity explain the reasons for the course chosen. See Commonwealth v. Spotts, 341 Pa.Su- per. 31, 36, See also Common- 132, A.2d 135 Turner, wealth 319, Pa. Gray, Commonwealth v. supra.

(1976); reasons, foregoing For the we judgment vacate the sentence remand the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether trial counsel had a reasonable failing basis for to object to the introduction testimony regarding prior criminal If activity. the trial court finds that no reasonable basis exists counsel’s actions, a trial Otherwise, new must granted. the judg- ment of sentence shall be reinstated.

Judgment of sentence vacated and case remanded for evidentiary hearing on counsel’s effectiveness. Jurisdiction is relinquished. HOLDEN, Appellee,

Frances G. HOLDEN, Appellant. Superior Court of

Argued Dec. 1987.

Filed May *2 Wilkes-Barre, appellant. for Geddes, Jr., F. James Allentown, appellee. for A. Bergstein, Steven CAVANAUGH, and CIRILLO, Judge, Before President OLSZEWSKI, ROWLEY, McEWEN, BROSKY, JOHNSON, JJ. MONTEMURO, POPOVICH CAVANAUGH, Judge: a court case is whether

The issue this appellant, over exercise personam may conduct by all of the Holden, where Diane in a civil action does If such in Texas. place took refusing open exist, erred the court below judgment default entered the appellant and the against her must complaint be dismissed. appellee, Holden,

The Frances Holden, G. Dr. Stanley not a party litigation, who is were divorced in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, following extended and com- plex A proceedings. property agreement settlement into parties entered between the to the divorce action which inter alia provided alimony for Frances Holden G. her lifetime. during Subsequently, Dr. Holden married Holden, appellant herein, who has been a resident of Texas at State all times relevant this action. appellee The present commenced the action in Luzerne County. complaint was served on Diane Holden at her Humble, residence Texas on November 1985. She did a responsive not file pleading on December 1985 a *3 to notice of intention take judgment default was to sent her. 13, On January 1986 judgment liability default as to appellant entered the who a petition open filed to 7, the judgment default on May petition open 1986. The to lack alleged personal jurisdiction appellant. over the The court the petition below denied and appeal this followed.1 Holden,

The for jurisdiction exists, basis if over it would found in the Pennsylvania Long be Arm Statute 5322(a)(4): which at 42 provides part Pa.C.S. § (a) General rule.—A of this tribunal Commonwealth (or may exercise personal jurisdiction person over the personal representative aof deceased individual who would be to this if subject jurisdiction under subsection deceased) not directly agent, who acts or as to a by cause action other arising or matter from such person: dissenting posits deciding opinion footnote the that we are question ruling sufficiency not this before court on the complaint. appeal refusing open When the is from an order to judgment, sufficiency complaint we must rule on the as to appellant to determine if the below court had over not, appellant nullity judgment and if it did then the default was a and McMeekin, DeFay must set aside. 508 Common- (4) Causing injury or tortious this harm an act omission outside this Commonwealth. by wealth or all. had no contact with The has appellant in Pennsylvania was reached agreement The settlement Holden, Diane Holden appellee and Stanley between settlement to the divorce or the party proceedings was not a that “Defend- complaint alleges factually The agreement. J. Holden to breach Stanley has induced ant [Diane Holden] threatening marriage dissolve her said contract The complied Holden if said contract.” Stanley he J. Stanley “induced” allegations appellant other are him from prevented his contract Holden to breach agreement, terms of the settlement complying with the relationship” between has with the contractual “interfered complaint also Holden and Frances Holden. The Stanley has inflicted emotional alleges appellant negligently set allegations None of the upon appellee. distress any forth activities permit Arm our Long Statute does persons beyond

courts to extend their except in limited circum- Commonwealth boundaries Company with International Shoe Beginning stances. (1945), Washington, 90 L.Ed. S.Ct. cases order for state innumerable have stated that exercise may fulfill of due it requirement process, if only a non-resident defendant personal jurisdiction over the defendant there are “minimum contacts” between *4 of does not so forum state that exercise play jus- offend of fair and substantial traditional notions that it must be such tice. The defendant’s conduct his actions in a him to defend require and fair to reasonable California, Superior Court Kulko 436 foreign state. of (1978). The 84, 1690, Supreme 132 98 S.Ct. 56 L.Ed.2d are “territo- has noted there Court of the United States states.” power respective rial on the limitations Denckla, 1228, 1238, 2 235, 251, 78 Hanson S.Ct. 357 U.S. 1283, L.Ed.2d 1296

188 us,

In the appellant case performed before no acts in it Pennsylvania, alleged that she interfered in Texas performance of a with contract made in Pennsylvania. complaint seeks embroil the in the contin- long dispute ued bitter between appellee and her former husband, Dr. Holden. The Stanley predecessor cur- to the Long rent Arm Statute found 8305, at Pa.C.S. § (Purdon Supp.1974-75), which was repealed Chief Nix Justice discussed conduct by a defendant occurring of outside the state which has a harmful effect upon one within in the context of 42 Pa.C.S. § Kenny v. Equipment Alexson Company, 495 Pa. 116-117, (1981) stating: requires (1)

Section 8305 "... the non-resident have acted outside his action [shall] ‘any have caused harm’ within Pennsylvania, and [shall] (3) the cause action arisen have out [shall] causing McAdams, conduct the harm” B.J. Inc. v. Boggs, (E.D.Pa.1977). 426 F.Supp. This section is a formulation of what has been termed the “effects test” jurisdiction. test,” extra-territorial Under the “effects derived from the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of (1971): Conflict of Laws 37§

A power state has to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects the state an act done elsewhere respect any cause of action arising from these effects unless nature effects relationship and of the individual’s the state make the exercise of such unreasonable. In Kenny v. Alexson Equipment Company, supra, Supreme complaint Court dismissed a aby individual, Piracci, resident Sr., non-resident Mr. who never did business nor maintained office in Pennsyl- vania. Mr. in Maryland Piracci sold a hoist which was eventually used in Philadelphia, Allegedly, the hoist defect in injuries caused because of a it. The court stated at Pa. at 980: *5 Piracci, subjected Sr. can be of the issue whether ... does of this Commonwealth of the courts the jurisdiction allegedly come finding that his activities end with Long-Arm Statute. language of the literal within the jurisdic- may exercise whether state analysis The tested individual must be over a non-resident tion The due standards. statutory and constitutional both imposes a Fourteenth Amendment process clause non-resi- over a jurisdiction exercise of limit on the state’s Co., Ins. McGee v. International dent defendant. Life (1957).2 199, 2 220, 78 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. set above, process requirements the due As noted Company Washington, Shoe International forth supra with the there must be minimum contacts are that state and this necessitates examination forum Vacu-Maid, Covington, Inc. v. case. facts each 1974). in (Oklahoma In the Appellate Division P.2d 137 case, in Texas and complained acts of occurred stant to leave appellant threatening of the principally consisted agreement complied if he with the terms her husband appellant, The her husband and his former wife. between most, It was the appellee. harmed the only indirectly dissenting opinion Kenny Equipment Com- interprets v. Alexson 2. The theory had supra, support that the court pany, in a its manner overlooks the jurisdiction appellant in our The dissent over case. persons jurisdiction principle over courts do not have basic beyond granted by our Commonwealth, except it is where the boundaries of our seek extend rather than The dissent would statute. jurisdiction. commercial rather Kenny, which dealt with a restrict than a where the In matter, jurisdiction even family to extend the court refused Pennsylvania. the dissent- injury As noted in occurred in case, Kenny Pa. ing at 495 opinion Supreme Court stated in our be extended over would not by the purposeful participation non-resident seller "in absence product ...” in a chain such seller continuous distributive activity engaged purposeful dissent reasons that subject Pennsylvania. to be order calculated to cause harm some mini- jurisdiction, state must have personam one outside the case, conduct In our mum contact with was might impact his on he did her husband. What directed toward by appellant plaintiff the harm to former wife in supra, appear to be a Kenny, would have at best. would been indirect own. stronger imposing than our case for *6 who caused direct harm, husband appellant’s if any, to the not appellee by carrying out the terms the settlement event, In alleged the agreement. any by appel- conduct the in complaint lant set forth the too to tenuous invoke the jurisdiction of our courts under the Long-Arm as Statute had no the contact with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.3 McMeekin,

Our to DeFay analogous case is 352 Pa.Su- 409, (1986) A.2d 324 in per. which the plaintiff brought defendant, against Jersey suit a New alleging negligence in an accident which automobile occurred in New The Jersey. while plaintiff pain suffered in recuperating Pennsylvania. defendant, served, The though did not file a responsive default pleading judgment was A entered him. the petition open judgment was denied an appeal was court. taken We stated at 352 Pa.Super. at A.2d 325: considering

Before the merit appellant’s argument in favor of opening the default judgment, we must necessar- ily address contention that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over him Jersey because he is New resident and the automobile accident occurred in New Jersey. Pa.Super. 413,

We further stated at 352 508 A.2d 326: Inc., Flymo, dissenting opinion relies on Skinner 351 Pa.Su- per. Pennsylva- support proposition 505 A.2d 616 its that extending compelling jurisdiction appel- nia has a interest in over the Skinner, supra, plaintiff injured lant. the was defendant, rotary lawn the mower which had been certified non-resident, meeting Pennsylva- certain standards. We held that jurisdiction nia courts had no We over defendant. stated at 351 620: question determining The critical whether has defendant purposefully directed forum is not his activities at residents of whether it was activities would have an foreseeable defendant’s injurious state, in the but whether the effect forum defendant’s conduct his connection with were such he state forum ",haled” reasonably anticipate being could (Citing into court there. turn, question, cases). by examining This must resolved added.) contacts state. (Emphasis defendant’s forum directed, be, contacts, Again, any, we are as we must to the if which defendant with the had forum state. suffering [Pennsylvania residual harm [plaintiff’s] require- satisfy sufficient to the constitutional was] of minimum contacts. ment DeFay, supra, vacated judgment

The default us, alleged In the case before harm jurisdiction. lack of v. Jo- not direct.4 McDaniel Similarly, is residual and (W.D.Pa.1976) it was determined F.Supp. seph, court did not over jurisdiction have that a mere- engaged in a alleged who was have Ohio resident outside of relationship plaintiffs with the husband tricious The court concluded that exercise alleged individual to have been interfer- over the confer ing relationship would *7 spousal in “The record this case does beyond constitutional limits as Com- contact the defendant with the any not establish can be jurisdiction of on which monwealth F.Supp. 409 at 1004. based.” on Ru and reliance dissenting opinion’s The (M.D.Pa.1978) Harsha, 285 to establish F.Supp. 470 sack v. Rusack, appellant, misplaced. over the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania, resided outside supra, the defendant who in Me plaintiff’s employer letters to the defamatory sent that alleged publica It was chanicsburg, Pennsylvania. harm in plaintiff caused the tion of the material defamatory that was a sufficient The court held there jurisdiction, of but minimum contact to the exercise allow is a different situation page stated at footnote 290: “This the state from that where harm is caused outside The court fur felt the state.” residual effects are inside ther 290-291: F.Supp. stated “minimum for not allow me- test does contacts” in- Also, Shoe

chanical since International application. a state of what circumstances volved issue under over an out-of-state personal jurisdiction eould assert McMeekin,supra, distinguish- dissenting opinion DeFayv. 4. The finds different, Certainly, facts are able from instant case. pain although plaintiff point endured DeFay focused on the that Jersey suffering tort occurred New residual. the effect corporation and since of many subsequent cases dealt awith setting, commercial it is somewhat difficult to apply the of reasoning many considering cases the “minimum contacts” test to the case currently before Nevertheless, the court. the “minimum contacts” test is the standard to here. See applied Kulko Superior California, Court S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 132

It is true today the vast majority long-arm statute cases Pennsylvania deal with commercial transactions or involve non-resident who defendant transacts business or otherwise acts in Pennsylvania. Hester J. summarized this Pecot, v. Sirianni, Inc. 462, 467, 295 Pa.Super. (1982):

Long-arm designed statutes were provide an effec- tive and convenient means of redress resident plain- happen tiffs who to experience the adverse effects non-resident activities; defendant’s interstate they were designed to warn non-resident they defendants could escape the consequences litigation where they voluntarily chose to act. (Em- added.) phasis

Nevertheless, our may courts not reach out and extend over a defendant who has no contact *8 with Pennsylvania and at whose acts best have a residual upon effect one in Pennsylvania. concepts of fair play and substantial justice would be subverted if we allowed a Pennsylvania court to exercise over a Texas resident such circumstances as those before us. The dissenting on opinion focuses the domicile of plaintiff rather than on the defendant’s non-resident status lack of meaningful Pennsylvania. contacts with The minimum contact requirement with the forum guarantees state also that individual states do not placed exceed the limits on them by their co-equal sovereigns status as under our federal system. Volkswagen Woodson, World-Wide 100 S.Ct. 62 L.Ed.2d 490 above, dealing most cases with As noted context, and contacts in a commercial Arm are Long Statute state, thereof, readily are discerni- with forum or lack complaint that dealing case with a are this ble. We relationship. a involving family a tort alleges psychological alleging by create a cause of action may A not plaintiff settle- arising from a with a contract tortious interference case, facts establish in a where the agreement divorce ment jurisdiction of subject is not to the the defendant that by drawing party a mischief could be court. Untold caused is this Common- before courts dispute into a wealth, is outside the Commonwealth party where us, a In this case before has no contact Frances has between dispute and bitter ensued prolonged Holden. husband, Stanley Dr. and her former G. Holden our courts embroil mayWe not extend dispute. Holden is judgment and the court below is set aside Order opened. opinion

CIRILLO, concurring files Judge, President JOHNSON, JJ. ROWLEY, MONTEMURO joined opinion. BROSKY, dissenting J. files concurring: CIRILLO, Judge, President of this disposition disagree majority’s I with the Because case, I concur. respectfully McMeekin, DeFay

As this court held case, identical (1986), procedurally over personal jurisdiction lacks where court entered defendant, judgment a default an out-of-state and, therefore, we nullity a defendant such sup- argument merits of need reach the Id., Pa.Superior port opening judgment. the default powerless court is When a 508 A.2d at 326. Ct. at that court entered judgment judgment, any enter a open subsequent petition and a inception invalid its *9 of that similarly is outside judgment that re Estate, Patterson’s court. See Pa. (1941)(an adjudication a court without jurisdiction

void).

The majority correctly finds that does not personal jurisdiction have over Diane that, Holden and therefore, the chancellor had power no enter default judgment against her. It then resolves this case by opening judgment. that When this court reverses denial of a seeking petition open a judgment, are, essence, we that the saying chancellor erred not having granted it. cannot say We both that there was no jurisdiction for him to act and that he granted should have the relief sought. Opening judgment clearly exercise of the jurisdic- tion over defendant which we said the have court below lacked. The majority’s disposition tacitly acknowledges the jurisdiction of our courts over Diane Holden even while no declaring such existed. This is logically inconsistent.

For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the default judgment for jurisdiction, lack of set aside the deny- order ing the petition open moot, judgment and dismiss the underlying complaint.

ROWLEY, JOHNSON, MONTEMURO JJ., join. BROSKY, Judge, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I affirm would the order denying appellant’s petition open default judgment. I

Initially, cannot concur in the majority’s determination that “the alleged conduct set forth in the complaint is too tenuous to the jurisdiction invoke of our courts under the Long-Arm Statute.” This conclusion in- volves a misunderstanding of both nature of the tor- tious conduct alleged, as well as the situs the harm flowing alleged from the conduct.

The majority begins its analysis by asserting that Fran- ces Holden’s complaint allege any does not contact with or activities Pennsylvania, by Diane Hoi-

195 subject or her den would make it fair reasonable of ignores gravamen This the clear in a forum. foreign suit pleading: Holden is a tortious interference what Frances relationship Holden with the contractual between Stanley forged Pennsylvania. Holden Frances and G. action in inten- a cause of for To set forth four relationship, with a contractual tional interference pled: elements must be

(1) existence of a contractual relation between party; and a third complainant defendant, on (2) part action of purposeful relation; to harm the existing intended specifically (3) justification part or on the privilege the absence defendant; and (4) legal damage as a result occasioning actual of the defendant’s conduct. 1337, Cohen, 536 A.2d Pelagatti

See Co., (1987); also v. Pike Thompson see Coal Co. Coal 488 Pa. (Second) of Torts defines dam-

The Restatement “actual follows, at ages” contract as for interference with a 774A: § Damages. 774A.

§ for interference with One who is liable to another is contract or contractual relation liable prospective damages for

(a) the benefits of the contract loss pecuniary relation; prospective or the (b) interference losses for which the consequential cause; legal if reputation, harm to (c) emotional distress or actual from the are to result reasonably expected to be they interference____ glance allegations at Frances Holden’s cursory

An even interference a cause of action for intentional indicates that she is pled: she has precisely with a contract what action, in the purposeful took alleging Diane Holden dissolution, form threats of marital specific with the inducing intent of Stanley Holden to breach Pennsylva- his Holden, nia settlement agreement with Frances thereby causing Frances legal Holden actual damage, including loss and pecuniary This, emotional distress. clearly, is a contact sorts It therefore remains to be determined allegations, true, whether if presumed permit Holden, our courts assert over Diane Interna- under the “minimum contacts” test established tional Company Shoe Washington, *11 (1945), S.Ct. L.Ed. 95 and its progeny. by

As noted the the majority, “minimum contacts” test applied not to mechanically, requires be an examination of In discussion, the facts each case. its the majority places upon, reliance three primarily, deci- Pennsylvania sions, actions, and concludes best, that Diane Holden’s at have or caused “indirect” “residual” harm to Frances Hol- den, thereby making any jurisdiction by exercise of Penn- sylvania a subversion of fair play and substantial justice. As I upon find all three decisions relied majority the to distinguishable, disagree. I Kenny Co., v. Alexson Equipment first, Pa. (1981), hoist, A.2d 974 concerns an elevator which was retailer, sold in originally to a New Maryland, Jersey eventually shipped Pennsylvania, injured to where it The Pennsylvania brought resident. resident suit against Jersey retailer, the New who then attempted to join defendant, the Maryland as an seller additional based upon predecessor the statute Long to the current Arm Statute.1 The Court Supreme personam juris- held diction could not be extended to the seller subject Maryland to suit in Pennsylvania. of Kenny,

In analysis its upon the focuses the majority Maryland manufacturer’s failure to maintain an office or do analogizes business to Pennsylvania, Holden’s commission of the of interference ex- complained under Kenny, that, Texas, and clusively within concludes 1. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305. resulted in indirect extra-territorial has at best

her behavior jurisdiction. invoke harm too attenuated holding: of however, crucial This, ignores part Kenny seller, an individual hold that when therefore We Commonwealth, transacts an doing within business the Commonwealth an unrelated sale outside isolated itself, within the causing a harmful effect buyer, product entry single or mere Commonwealth Commonwealth, of commerce within the into the stream seller purposeful participation the absence product distributive chain such a continuous requirement the minimum contacts satisfy insufficient and such seller cannot be found amenable process of due Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction pursuant personam to in Statute____ Long-Arm

Id., (Emphasis supplied.) p. Maryland beyond seller holding the Court, in state, analysis forum its Supreme rely solely did not upon

seller’s contacts with (one), of the seller of contacts or the location the number lack of it was the (Maryland): his activities business upon the impact calculated to any purposeful activity, *12 forum, holding that the to the Court’s key that was to justify too attenuated transaction had been question assertion of jurisdiction. an random, chance or

The issue of to purposeful, opposed As our Court noted activity, consequence. is not of little Inc., Flymo, Skinner (1986): if directed “purposefully are

... efforts [an actor] state, the absence toward of the forum residents an cannot defeat actor’s with the forum physical contacts state, (cite in that omit- personal assertion of jurisdiction foreign defendant ted). Indeed, a single even a act though jurisdiction, may support within the forum state quality and the if its nature that act will not be sufficient only its create of the circumstances of commission forum, (cite omitted) with the “attenuated” affiliation Once it has been decided a defendant purposefully established minimum State, contacts with the forum these may contacts in light considered of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal would comport play “fair justice.” substantial (cite omitted).

Factors to be include considered “the burden on the defendant,” “the forum State’s interest adjudicating “the dispute,” plaintiff’s interest in obtaining conve- relief,” nient and effective “the judicial interstate sys- tem’s interest obtaining most efficient resolution of controversies,” and the “shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social poli- (cites omitted). cies.”

These considerations sometimes serve to establish the of jurisdiction upon reasonableness a showing lesser minimum contacts required. than would otherwise be On where a hand, who purposefully has the other defendant directed his activities at seeks residents forum defeat jurisdiction, he must present compelling case that presence some other would considerations render unreasonable____” Id., Rudzewicz, citing Burger King Corp.

105 S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (Emphasis supplied.) In the matter sub judice, Frances Holden is alleging very purposeful Holden, activity on the of Diane part calculated impact have a direct upon Pennsylvania resident. She averring that, happenstance, mere chance or Diane’s Frances, threats to harm indirectly Stanley caused that Diane made those threats with the deliberately specific intent inducing Stanley neglect his Pennsylva- nia obligations, contractual the harm Frances directly purposeful resulted from Diane’s interference. Kenny holding part

As the upon is conditioned *13 finding of non-purposeful activity, appear it would not con- trolling case, in in any meaningful the absence of evaluation of other to a pertinent factors determination of personal the jurisdiction, policy such as considerations delin- Skinner, As view that the I am the supra.2 in eated an in the form of activity, alleges purposeful complaint tort, remaining question perti- I the believe intentional of “minimum is a determina- finding a contacts” nence to the resulting of the harm from intentional tion of the situs a the two point that discussion of latter tort. It is at this is the warranted. upon by majority, decisions relied us, analogous to the matter before cites as majority McMeekin, of DeFay the case DeFay, In Pennsylvania a resident A.2d 324 a accident. The other Jersey in New automobile injured Upon returning resident. home Jersey was a New driver filed a negligence resident recuperate, Pennsylvania the Jersey holding New that suit resident. “minimum did not have sufficient Jersey resident New our to exercise courts Pennsylvania contacts” with Neesan, Hilferty Court, citing our jurisdiction, (E.D.Pa.1980), following: noted F.Supp. residual plaintiff may have some the mere fact that

... in the forum state suffering recuperating while pain out of the state entirely which occurred from accident ‘caused the Commonwealth’ is not the harm type statute____ long arm contemplated which ____The has the forum sole contact suffering of residual harm is appellee’s instant action satisfy the constitu- This is not sufficient the forum. Thus, contacts. under both requirement of minimal tional made, showing this situation of "minimum contacts” Provided a Skinner, which, compel- Pennsylvania has appear under would one Taking resolving controversy. com- ling policy interests true, thoroughly disrupted perform- plaint has as Holden agreement, matters of Pennsylvania intended to resolve of a ance alimony, children, support of the Holden property, and educational divorce, thereby bringing Pennsylvania and emotional financial seriously Pennsylvania hardship upon resident. It cannot significant no interests in would have averred assuring Pennsylva- nullify of non-residents does that the behavior equivalent implying be the To aver otherwise would nia contracts. disregarded may be legally contracts enforceable will, verbiage, by meaningless non-residents. *14 statutory and constitutional analysis, the court did not personal have jurisdiction over appellant at the outset of this action.

DeFay, supra, p. at is clearly distinguishable,

DeFay and in fact supports finding the harm to Frances Holden was not residual forum, in actually suffered the forum. In DeFay, plaintiff harm to the was inflicted by accident in accident; at the situs Jersey, New upon returning of recuperate, harm”, home to she merely “carried her so to speak, back to the forum harm, state. Such clearly, best residual harm within the borders of Pennsylvania. contrast,

By the harm suffered Frances did not Holden occur at the of. situs the tort. While alleged Holden’s tortious took place Texas, behavior in the resultant harm included, as set forth in the complaint: (1) the termination utility home; (2) services Frances Holden’s the incur- ring legal expenses; (3) of loan and alimony; (4) the loss of interruption educations; (5) children’s college protection; loss insurance emotional pain and suffering, including reputation. harm to These harms did Texas; place take in they were incurred by Frances Pennsylvania. children within Holden and her They were not merely “carried home” to Pennsylvania, were the in DeFay. plaintiff’s injuries Hence, to the contrary majori- I find DeFay ty’s reading, of an supportive extension personam jurisdiction in this matter: the case defines resid- alia, harm, inter ual to be that harm which incurred complainant state, one brought into the forum solely due to the complainant’s residency in the forum. The harm pled by Frances simply Holden does not fall within the parameters of this definition.

The finds decision McDan- majority analogous another iel v. Joseph, F.Supp. (W.D.Pa.1976), which the district court granted a motion to dismiss due to a lack personam case, jurisdiction over the defendant. In that Pennsylvania plaintiff defendant, filed suit an Ohio alleging that engaged the defendant had in meretricious con- plaintiff husband. plaintiffs with the relations in Ohio and West the relations had occurred ceded that in and not Virginia, “minimum However, holding that the defendant had no to discuss neglected the court contacts” with in its rationale. alleged situs of the harm the nature or *15 best, fact, is, at on its recount- sketchy the decision point In facts. the of a more operative absence ing decision, I find the in of its fail to support detailed rationale marginal- in McDaniel to be even disposition district court’s upon reliance its majority’s and find the ly persuasive, holding misplaced.3 to be Harsha, opinion

A is that of Rusack v. persuasive more (M.D.Pa.1978), which the has F.Supp. majority 470 285 Rusack, In Washington, a inapplicable judice. found sub to the defamatory plaintiff’s resident had sent letters D.C. In the upholding long-arm juris- employer Pennsylvania. defendant, noted over the the court diction upon publication harm to had occurred plaintiff that the distinguishable thus the letters in and was Pennsylvania, is caused outside the from those situations “where harm Id., the state.” state and residual effects are felt inside p. 290.

I on In both Rusack directly point. find Rusack to be us, tortious conduct precipitating and the matter before letters in defamatory occurred outside the forum state: the from, in, Washington, were written and mailed Rusack D.C., of Diane Holden the contractual interference while however, cases, the conduct place took Texas. both came to rest did not result until its fruits harm defamatory- not harmed Rusack was Hol- and Frances letters until reached they she failed to receive den did not have a cause of action until rationale, Moreover, to delineate its had the McDaniel court chosen necessarily dispositive. of lower federal Decisions it would not courts, courts, instructive, though binding even on state albeit are Corp., question John-Manville is involved. See v. a federal Cianfrani (1984); Pa.Super. 1051 Commonwealth Rundle, the appropriate and payments, suffered emo- pecuniary and hardships tional in Pennsylvania. Unlike the I majority, do not find well-reasoned Rusack upon reliance misplaced. to be so

Based I foregoing, on feel that Frances Holden has alleged purposeful tortious on activity part of Diane Holden, disrupt contract, intended to a Pennsylvania cause direct harm resultingly resident, and has thus satisfied the “minimum contacts” test of International Shoe so as to permit our courts assert over personam jurisdiction Diane Holden.

Having jurisdictional resolved the question appellee’s favor, it necessary determine whether has satisfied the criteria for the opening of default judgment. settled, Those are criteria well require petitioner to (1) petition filed; demonstrate: to open timely (2) that there explanation exists a reasonable or excuse default; that there exists meritorious defense allegations Egan, complaint. *16 Wolfskill 223, 326, Pa.Super. Upon review below, the record I am accord with the trial court’s satisfied, finding that the criteria have been most nota- bly the second criterion to the excuse for default. pertaining

Both appeal, below on Holden’s excuse for default she upon has been that relied her husband’s attor- ney However, to handle the it previous- matter her. has been ly held that a defendant’s that his are belief interests being to protected justifiable ceases when the defendant possible problem, alerted such in the somehow to as receipt of a Rule notice letter. See Autologic, ten-day 237.1 Inc. Movers, v. Christinzio (held: Rule purpose requirement 237.1 upon of service of notice letter as ten-day party well counsel, party potential problem, to alert and permit party default). to take action appropriate prior entry

In the matter sub has judice, admitted to both letter, receiving making notice and to at- ten-day no tempt entry her interests to the protect prior default. cannot heard to that her cry She now be deliberate inaction was “reasonable”. I find no of discretion in the trial finding

As abuse court’s opening the second criterion for default has not been met, I would affirm trial court’s denial of Hence, I petition open. dissent. respectfully

542 A.2d 567 UTILITIES, Co., Metropolitan GENERAL PUBLIC Edison Co., Wilcox, Ray Electric Babcock and J. Co., Inc., Catalytic, Appellants, McDermott LANCASTER, INC., Cherry GLASS KITCHENS OF Lane Motor America, Inc., Corp., Inn Inns of Continental Continental t/a Inn, Cosgrove James Revere Tavern and Best Western d/b/a Inn, Martin, Co., Corp., Revere Motor Noah N. Pentidatillo East, Tours, Rutt, Italian Richard M. Rutt’s Villa d/b/a d/b/a Inc., Homestead, Inc., Realty, Earl the Amish Room One Schoolhouse, Inc., Inc., Shop, Twenty- Homestead Gift Two Strauss, Inc., Skiadas, Corporation, Two Thomas E. Trifon N. Skiadas, Skiadas, George Nandas N. N. Peter N. Skiadas Keares, Harry Style Enterprises, Family Bros. Skiadas t/a Restaurant, Inc., Inc., Appellees. Enterprises, and Host

Superior Court of

Argued Jan. 1988. May

Filed