*1 herself to deal problems and medicated jury pain. Accordingly,

with part that at least

could have believed sought pain- reason that Provencher followingthe accident was

relief treatment Thus, condition. pre-existing

due to her to exclude jury could have decided expenses from its of her medical

some amount for the and award her some

award experienced as a

pain suffering she words, In other

result of this accident. “[ajward damages claimed by which

have been a convenient means damages pain jury included disallowing ... some of the

suffering while Long, 954 damages.” Wright

claimed v. 470, (Mo.Ct.App.1997) (per cu

S.W.2d

riam); Burger, v. Symon see also (Ind.Ct.App.1988). 852-53

N.E.2d say cannot

Consequently, we exceeded the bounds of its discretion

court im jury did not act deciding that the awarding damages

properly Provencher

as it did. damages that the Because we hold in- may have included sum

award here pain compensate Provencher for

tended not address her suffering, we need

remaining arguments. entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

2006 ME 33 et al.

LINNEHAN LEASING et al. TAX ASSESSOR

STATE Court of Maine.

Supreme Judicial Nov. 2005.

Argued:

Decided: March

posed transactions between Linnehan Ken-05-183, the Atlantic. Assessor appeals Court’s (Kennebec J.) County, Studstrup, judg- *3 overturning a of ruling ment the Maine holding Linne- Revenue Services and han was entitled a bad debt sales tax in credit for defaults consumer credit con- tracts with Atlantic. affirm the Han- We County judgment, cock and we vacate the County judgment. Kennebec Lancaster, I. Ralph Esq., James G. I. CASE HISTORY (oral-

Good, Block, Esq., Esq. A. Jonathan Portland, ly), Atwood, plaintiffs. Pierce for The Applicable A. Statutes Rowe, General, Attorney G. Steven for sales Eligibility [¶2] the bad debt Atty. A. Thomas Knowlton Asst. Gen. by governed tax credit is 36 M.R.S. (orally), Augusta, for defendants. § 1811-A that states: represented by on paid tax sales SAUFLEY, C.J., Panel: and charged off as accounts worthless CLIFFORD, DANA, ALEXANDER, tax against be credited due on CALKINS, LEVY, SILVER, and JJ. report years filed within subsequent 3 SAUFLEY, C.J., Majority: and but, any if accounts charge-off, such CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, DANA, retailer, by are thereafter collected CALKINS, LEVY, JJ. paid upon tax shall be the amounts so collected. SILVER, Dissenting: J. 1811-A, a Pursuant to section

ALEXANDER, J. if it: qualify “retailer” can for credit (2) (1) sale; pays upon consol- [¶ This matter is before us on 1] charges-off buyer’s later account as appeals judgments by the Su- idated books; on its for applies worthless perior Hancock and Kennebec years the credit of the ac within three Each application Counties. case involves charged-off. DaimlerChrysler count being credit, of the bad debt sales tax Am., Asses Servs. N. LLC v. State Tax (2005), § M.R.S. 1811-A the transac- ¶ sor, 27, 12, ME A.2d 865. arrangements tional between Linnehan by “Retailer” defined Leasing Company Credit Now Auto d/b/a 1752(10) (2005) “person as a who makes (Linnehan) and com- its affiliated finance register required retail sales or who is (Atlantic). pany, Acceptance Atlantic Co. “Person,” by 1754-A or 1754-B.”1 section Han-05-162, Linnehan and Atlantic purposes of this was defined as: appeal, (Hancock appeal Court’s Mead, J.) individual, firm, [A]ny copartnership, County, of their claim dismissal club, association, declaratory corporation, judgment regarding pro- society, for a headquartered requires because it is Trenton Title 36 M.R.S. 1754-B personal "eveiy tangible property ... seller See 36 M.R.S. sells motor vehicles. any this State office” to 1752(17) (2005). that maintains in register. Linnehan falls under this section

4H month, receiver, Linne- trust, trust, At the end of each estate, business to the State on the total pays or combi- han sales tax assignee unit, plural during sold price and the of all vehicles purchase nation .... singular as the number as well that month. 1752(9)(1990).2

36 M.R.S.A. percent of Approximately twelve at- go into default. After Atlantic’s loans History B. Factual outstanding loan to collect the tempting significant dispute There is no balance, account charges-off Atlantic Linnehan, an automobile about the facts. deducts the on its books and as worthless with several used car sales offices dealer for tax amount from its income *4 Maine, retailer, pur- registered is a Maine repossesses Atlantic then purposes. (2005). § to 1754-B suant auction, car, Linnehan sells the car at and company Atlantic is a finance indicates, to record for ten usually, the exclusively with Linnehan. Atlantic works purchase twenty percent of the customer’s com- registered is not a retailer. The two price auction sale price of the vehicle. The here, panies together “buy pay constitute a credited to the defaulted of the vehicle is company sepa- Each is operation. here” account. Linnehan then deter- customer’s rately incorporated and files in- of the total sales percentage mines what tax come returns. outstanding on the customer’s tax remains corpora- Linnehan Atlantic [¶ 6] The and against its figure account and credits that by the Lin- tions are owned and controlled liability. tax subsequent sales family. nehan Some business associates controversy, Linne- Prior to this minority corporation. interests in own each for bad debt credit han had taken the space, Linnehan and Atlantic share office a 2002, In Linnehan years. fourteen was team, system, management telephone deter- Maine Revenue Services audited. lot, site, system, parking computer web qualify for that Linnehan did not mined service, coverage. and insurance payroll it no credit because suffered the bad debt buys a customer a car from [¶ 7] When Accord- accounts. loss financing, or is Linnehan and seeks he she taxes, ingly, Linnehan was assessed back approved by first Atlantic. After the cus- period from and interest for the penalties, accepted, tomer’s credit is the customer 31, 1999, 2001. The May to December signs agreement a retail sale finance with pay to required Linnehan assessment Linnehan, which states that he or she will tax, $334,134.51 use in sales $3825.76 vehicle, price ap- pay purchase $84,490.14 $70,249.30 interest, tax, and fees, interest, and sales tax to plicable negligence. penalty for immediately agreement Linnehan. That reconsideration Linnehan filed for exchange for the assigned to Atlantic. (2005), to 36 M.R.S. a assignment, pays Atlantic Lin- the assessment. upheld the Assessor reflect immedi- price that is discounted to Superior in the appeal then filed an nehan of the risk of payment acceptance ate County pursuant in Kennebec the Court assignment, As a result of the default. § 151. Atlantic, and 36 M.R.S. P. 80C obligated pay rath- M.R. Civ. customer is cross motions for sum- hearing a on After than Linnehan. er (2005), wording, 1752(9) (1990) now defines with similar was re- 36 M.R.S.A. 2. Tide law, P.L.2003, (effective use tax "person” in the sales and term pealed by ch. 111(3) 2003). portions of the tax code. and other Sept. Title 36 M.R.S. mary judgment, the court County petition vacated the as- nebec case to include a sessment, holding that Linnehan and At- declaratory judgment an equal pro- lantic they were so intertwined that could alleged tection claim based on disparate “person” be considered one and thus a compared treatment with the treatment qualify “retailer” in order to for the section given to Lee. Linnehan’s motion to amend 1811-A tax credit. The State Tax Asses- untimely. was denied as Linnehan then appeals sor County that Kennebec deci- brought declaratory judgment action sion. separately County. in Hancock Linne- complaint han’s asked the Court

[¶ 12] While the Rule 80C action was advisory opinion declare the Lee pending, Linnehan learned that the State interpretation a correct of the law and that Tax advisory Assessor had issued an opin- Linnehan was entitled to the same sales ion to the Lee Group, stating Auto that treatment; order the planned course of transactions between substantially Assessor to issue the same Lee and a company related finance advisory ruling to Linnehan. make eligible Lee for the bad debt tax Lee, Linnehan, credit. like worked with a County The Hancock *5 closely company affiliated finance to which granted Court motion to Assessor’s assigned it agreements. finance pro- Lee grounds dismiss on the that Linnehan’s posed that before an account charged- petition for declaratory judgment failed to off books, on the finance company’s but a claim upon state which relief be it after was determined that there were granted justiciable due to lack of a contro- problems payments account, with on the versy. The court also dismissed without Lee would repurchase the finance agree- comment Linnehan’s claim that the Asses- ment from the finance company and at- rights sor had violated its equal protec- tempt to collect the debt from the custom- appealed tion. Linnehan the Hancock unsuccessful, er. If Lee was Lee would County decision. charge-off the account on its books. The Assessor determined that proposal II. LEGAL ANALYSIS eligible

would make Lee for the bad debt tax § credit to 36 M.R.S. 1811-A. A. Standard of Review: 36 M.R.S. 151 Linnehan asked the Assessor Superior When the Court whether, after Atlantic had identified acts in an appellate capacity, intermediate account, bad charged-off debt and Lin- ordinarily we final agency review determi eligible nehan would be for the bad debt directly. Corp. nations Davric Me. v. Me. tax credit if it purchased already Comm’n, 99, Racing Harness 1999 ME charged-off Atlantic, accounts from re- ¶ 7, 289, cases, 732 A.2d In tax how newed collection attempts, and then ever, Superior by Court is instructed charged-off the again, accounts this time 151 to “make its own determi on Linnehan’s books. The Assessor ad- law, questions nation as to all of fact or vised it eligi- Linnehan that would not be regardless questions of whether the of fact ble for the credit under those circum- during or law were raised the reconsidera stances. proceeding.” tion Superior Because the acting appellate capaci [¶ 14] After the Assessor advised Linne- Court is not in an han that proposal ty, directly. its would not make it we review its determinations credit, eligible for the Apex Corp. Linnehan filed a Lease Custom State Tax Assessor, (Me.1996). complaint 530, motion to amend its in the Ken- 677 A.2d 532 Accordingly, Linnehan tax credit. Governing Application B. Statutes debt tax credit to the bad not entitled that At dispute There is no from Atlantic’s it can benefit unless on its lantic the bad debts of the bad debts. charge-off and books and then received the federal resulting from state income tax benefits corporations separate The Further, there is no dis charge-offs. Linnehan and to benefit purpose have a not, pute that Atlantic is and never has Atlantic; otherwise businesses been, sales tax registered retailer for separate and distinct not have created two pursuant to 36 1754-B. purposes, M.R.S. ownership the same corporations within of ob purposes Linnehan asserts that for inde management structure. When credit, taining tax Lin- the bad debt sales are created order pendent corporations nehan and Atlantic should be considered benefits, they accept must to achieve some entity, one as the Moline any accompanying detriments. concluded, County Kennebec because of Internal Reve Inc. v. Comm’r Props., identity ownership corporate the near 439, 1132, nue, 436, 63 S.Ct. 319 U.S. management, the definition of (1943); Taylor v. L.Ed. 1499 see also tax “person” code. Co., & Elec. 306 U.S. Standard Gas code defines “retailer” (1939). 83 L.Ed. 669 S.Ct. sales, person as a who makes retail 36 Here, enjoy corpo Linnehan and Atlantic 1752(10), M.R.S. but then defined a including liability, limited rate benefits “person” “any ... include individual acts, liability separate for their corporation ... or for Atlantic to receive capacity and the unit, plu- combination and the *6 charge-offs from the income benefits ” singular ral as well as the .... number separation debts. The of the retail bad 1752(9)(1990), 36 similar- M.R.S.A. now corporation is corporation and the finance 111(3).3 ly pursuant defined to 36 M.R.S. family has a business choice the Linnehan purpose The of the [¶ 19] bad debt made. tax credit to 36 M.R.S. 1811-A interpretation of the The [¶ 21] “give paid is to a credit on a sales tax on a that corporations that state tax code sale, charge payment for which was corporations are choose to be subsequently Expendi- not made.” Tax by applica is confirmed separate persons Report Standing ture Review: of the Joint our rule of construction that we will tion of (Dec.1986). on Taxation As 38 Committee as any provision of a statute not treat retailer, pays required a a reasonable construction surplusage when purchase price sales tax on the of the provide meaning can to each of a statute Linnehan also receives from At- vehicle. Me., Home Builders Assoc. full, discounted, provision. although pay- lantic the of ¶82, 7, Eliot, 2000 ME Inc. v. Town price for the of the vehicle. purchase ment of when a “Surplusage occurs Thus, A.2d Linnehan has no accounts receivable of a statute provision of one generate to construction may that become uncollectible unnecessary or provision and a renders another charge-off a of a worthless account trust, receiver, trust, assignee 111(3) or by business 3. "Person” is defined acting as a group any or combination as: other unit, or individual, Government the State or Federal 3. Person. "Person” means an association, club, agency either firm, any political or of subdivision partnership, society, institution, estate, government. corporation, financial ¶ meaning without that Linnehan or force.” Id. 750 the State asserted and At- egos, working A.2d at 570. lantic alter to defraud were defaulting purchasers by of cars conduct- interpretation Linnehan’s of the ing repossessed resales of vehicles in a statutory person ignores definition of deprived manner that the owners of the “other” in- word and would read all the repossessed opportunity vehicles of the dividually named entities out of section receive the full retail for their vehicle value 1752(9) 111(3), leaving or section a defi- against to be credited the sums due on nition “person” “any of that would read their loan. ... any individual ... or com- bination as a unit.” Such an in- judicially estop entity To an terpretation would be inconsistent with asserting position a in a subsequent statutory our rules of construction. (1) legal position action asserted in the require Those rules “cor- the word subsequent legal clearly action must be 1752(9) poration” within section or sec- previous position inconsistent with a as 111(3) separate meaning. tion have a serted; party previous action reference the law to “other” successfully must have convinced the court groups or combinations is a catch-all accept position; the inconsistent phrase, applying possible party gain advantage must an unfair organizational entities that be iden- change position result of their of tified; it is not a device to sepa- allow subsequent action. See State N.H. v. corporations rate to be treated as sin- Me., 742, 750-51, State 532 U.S. gle entity under the tax code when such (2001). 1808, 149 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 968 single entity treatment pur- suits their Assuming, deciding, without pose. judicial estoppel the doctrine of could be Accordingly, interpre- Linnehan’s against asserted Tax Assessor in 1752(9) supported tation of section is not circumstances,4 apply some it cannot to the by reading either commonsense facts of this case. The statute under tax code or statutory our rule of construc- proceeding which the State was in the possible tion that where we avoid treat- *7 action, previous the Trade Practices Unfair statutory ment of terms as surplus- mere Act, (2005), §§ 205-A to 214 age. entirely different than tax code. The the prior repossession action did relate to the Estoppel C. Judicial of returned resale vehicles result loans, Linnehan asserts that the of defaulted but the action had noth- [¶ 24] judicially estopped ing State should be from to do with the tax laws and did not asserting require application interpretation that Linnehan and Atlantic are or of because, 111(3), 1752(9), 1752(10), separate corporations in an earli sections or 1811(A). er, action, circumstances, practices unrelated unfair trade In these Linne- Tax argument the State asserted that Linnehan and At han’s the State Asses- action, single judicially estopped asserting lantic were a unit. sor is (“When governmental Although we have never considered whether A.2d 1256 judicial apply estoppel the doctrine of would discharge responsi- function at issue is the of Assessor, against we taxation, the State Tax have held regarding we have consis- bilities equitable estoppel that the related doctrine of tently estoppel may held that never be in- Fitzger- not be invoked in a tax case. See voked.”). ¶50, 15, City Bangor, ald v. 1999 ME 726 attempts to claim the tax cred- Linnehan’s that Linnehan and Atlantic are it. corporations fails. Declaratory Judgment Action

D. The An action filed Act, 14 Declaratory Judgment to the that, as a Linnehan asserts (2005), al need not §§ 5951-5963 M.R.S. advisory Tax result of the State Assessor’s A trial on the merits. ways addressed be allowing Lee Lee to take the opinion to the merits and court’s refusal to address credit, bad debt in a matter is declaratory judgment issue a that Linnehan should have determined a reasonable exercise reviewed for ruling, and should receive the same Nor Dodge v. Town court’s discretion. Tax Assessor to retroac ordered State (Me.1990); A.2d ridgewock, 577 tively the bad debt allow Linnehan take Garriga Trading citing Paper E. Fine ruling tax credit based on the issued (Me.1983). Co., 1111, 1112-13 457 A.2d Lee. dismissed the declara Here the trial court had, proposed, and Lee action, determining that tory judgment whereby dealer arrangements financial or controver justiciable was no case there sale, retailer, consummating after appropri action was sy. The trial court’s and transfer the pay the sales tax Essentially, Lin in the circumstances. ate company. loan to the related finance Un asking compel the court to nehan was proposal, problem der the Lee when a to Linnehan apply Assessor loan, payments on identified with by a third advisory ruling an obtained from the paper would be transferred back pattern. fact party on a different Lee, company to before commence finance an en to enter position court was no of collection efforts. If collec ment Lee’s in favor of Linnehan judgment forceable successful, tion efforts not the loan were advisory ruling is prospective on a based would then be on Lee’s books. set of facts party to a third on a sued Lee, loan, having charged-off the could the court from the facts before different apply for the bad debt tax credit. The relation concerning Linnehan-Atlantic proposal Lee met all of the criteria for Lee ship. bad qualifying to be a “retailer” for the DaimlerChrysler, debt tax credit that we established ¶27, 12, A.2d 3 ME III. CONCLUSION

200 at 865. above, the discussion Based on the contrast, By under the Linnehan is affirmed. The judgment in Han-05-162 case, and under practice at issue this *8 is vacated and judgment in Ken-05-183 to the proposal the Linnehan submitted that entry judgment of a remanded for Assessor, problems with State Tax once qualify Atlantic do not Linnehan and identified, on a loan were payments pursuant to sales tax credit the bad debt dealer, would not the company, finance remand, the Su- § 1811-A. On 36 M.R.S. ef- collection If those commence efforts. result, Court, changed will with the perior unsuccessful, the loan would be forts were to determine whether have company’s finance charged-off on the negligence required pay should be then, charge-off of Only after the books. Tax Asses- by the State imposed penalty books, company’s the finance the loan on (2005). 187-B(3-A) sor. See back to paper be transferred entry The is: again support charged-off Linnehan and estate, trust, trust, Judgment poration, in Han-05-162 business re- affirmed. ceiver, vacated, any or Judgment assignee in Ken-05-183 remand- or unit, a acting plu- combination as and the proceedings ed for further consistent with singular ral as well as the number.” 36 opinion. party. this No costs to either 1752(9) (1990).5 There is no M.R.S.A. SILVER, J., dissenting. dispute pursu- Linnehan is a retailer 1752(10). Furthermore, ant to section I from Part respectfully dissent Atlantic, together, Linnehan and constitute II, opinion holding B of the Court’s and its 1752(9), a “retailer” when subsections in Ken-05-183. We have often said that given plain ordinary are their mean- primary objective interpreting our when a ing. Accordingly, eligible for Linnehan is give Legislature’s statute is to effect to the pursuant sales tax to section 1811— credit See, e.g., City Bangor intent. v. Penob ¶ A. 35, 9, County, scot 2005 ME 868 A.2d goal, 180. To achieve we look undisputed The facts demonstrate plain meaning language. first to the together that Linnehan and Atlantic work statutory Id. “We avoid constructions that here, “buy pay operation. here” absurd, illogical create re inconsistent owners, officers, corporations two share Co., Darling’s sults.” v. Ford Motor team, management office tele- space, ¶ 232, 5, Although ME 719 A.2d 114. website, phones, computers, a and adver- I agree with the conclusion that Court’s tising. exclusively Atlantic with works only the “retailer” who Linnehan, result, they and as a share the account can benefit the bad debt same customers. Linnehan and Atlantic sales tax credit to 36 M.R.S. entirely dependant upon are each other for (2005), DaimlerChrysler § 1811-A see financing the sale and of used cars. As Am., Servs. N. LLC State Asses stated, relationship ¶ sor, 27, 12, 862, 865, 2003 ME 817 A.2d I “they is so close that could be considered agree cannot with the Court’s determina twins, equivalent the business [of] Siamese qualifies pursu tion of who as a “retailer” joined hip.” at As two corporations 1752(10)(2005). ant to 36 M.R.S. cars, working together to used Linne- sell han Atlantic “person” pursuant are a “Retailer” is defined to mean “a 1752(9) they to section because are “com- person retail or who is who makes Furthermore, a unit.”6 bination required register by section 1754-A or they “person are a who makes retail sales” registered 1754-B or who is under section 1752(10). pursuant to section provides, “per- 1756.” Id. As the Court son,” Moreover, purpose as defined for the of this purpose the stated individual, firm, appeal, support “includes co- the bad debt sales tax credit lends association, club, society, meaning analysis. That stat- partnership, plain cor- to this P.L.2003, 1752(9) repealed by phrase 5. Section clusion of catch-all demonstrates 13, 2003). (effective Sept. ch. See intent to cast a broad net rather than some- supra n. 2. possible how limit the combination of the Reading phrase listed entities. the catch-all Giving statutory language plain its *9 combination, any to mean whether or not any language meaning does treat the as not of consisting entity, of a listed does not render surplusage. Although "per- the of definition meaning language or force. of the without corporation, explicitly son” includes a that Me., Inc. v. Town See Home Builders Ass'n of "any does not mean that or com- 82, 8, ¶ Eliot, 2000 ME 750 A.2d 570. of acting apply as a unit” cannot to bination multiple corporations. Legislature’s The in- “join together Linnehan Atlantic purpose “give a credit on a sales that and ed is to sale, for con- paid charge payment on a the and motor to to sell finance vehicles subsequently not made.” al- which was The State further purchasers.” sumer Report the Joint Expenditure Review: of Atlantic although that Linnehan and leged (Dec. Standing on Committee Taxation 38 they of part are separate corporations “are 1986). undisputed paid It is that Linnehan in alter unitary and are fact a business required tax for it later the which [They] to form a used .... combine egos the undisputed credit. It is also that took ‘Buy- commonly known as a dealership car pay not tax. retail customer did the sales (Em- Here/Pay operation.” Here’ sales “person,” ultimately and “retail- By giving complaint original.) result- phasis er,” unnecessarily interpreta- an narrow decree, whereby in a consent Linnehan ed tion, the Linnehan preventing Court is enjoined from certain and Atlantic were taking Legisla- credit from a tax that the activities, forgive con- required to certain effect, provide. In ture intended to debt, $40,000 pay to to required and sumer preventing anyone is from benefit- Significant present to the case the State. ing allowing from and the credit thus and Atlantic is the fact that Linnehan cramped a windfall. This State receive single entity for the were treated as a construction of the statute an ab- creates liability.- purpose imposing of The State and illogical present surd result. The case also, as only recognized, not but a central DaimlerChrys- can distinguished be alleged Lin- complaint, of their that aspect ler, both because of the intertwined rela- together Atlantic form a car nehan and Atlantic, tionship of Linnehan and and be- notions dealership. The aforementioned paid cause Linnehan is the retailer who public policy fairness and concerns of question. the sales tax in approach a whether counsel consistent Finally, 36] considerations of common [¶ operate their or not Linnehan and Atlantic an in- public policy fairness7 and warrant they unit. If single business as a retail recognizes terpretation that Linnehan joined for “dealership” are considered Atlantic as a a “combination as they liability, of then should also purposes noted, As I previously unit.” have joined purposes of the considered be interpretation prevents Linnehan Court’s credit. The Court states there sales tax claiming or Atlantic from the sales tax act, and for each purposes are different on indisputably credit tax that Linnehan However, true. the fact remains this is Moreover, previously State paid. has as one. the two entities were treated unitary treated Linnehan and Atlantic as business. poten- To further demonstrate the 38] [¶ interpreta- unfairness of the Court’s tial In an unfair the State filed contexts tion, can to other one look against Linnehan practice complaint trade nature the intertwined which Lin- alleged and Atlantic. The State joint likely result and Atlantic would were perpetrating nehan Atlantic requisite liability upon finding “churning” utilizing repossessed scheme Fust, civil con- rights in the alleged violation.8 complaint, cars. Bouchard, conclusively that My to state 8. intent not In Stevens v. 532 A.2d (Me.1987), explicitly our refus- liable if we stated that Atlantic be either Linnehan or existed, impose implied warranty simply al to an of habitabil- hypothetical but violations upon existing an home ity the seller of potential for Linnehan illustrate based, part, on at least in "considerations single entity for to be Atlantic treated sense.” fairness and common *10 text, “employer” the term has been liberal for the corporation. acts of its affiliate See Pearce, also Schiavone v. ly F.3d construed applied and has been to inte (2d Cir.1996) 254-55 (citing See, grated enterprises. e.g., Trevino v. Lansford- reiterating Coaldale and analy court’s (5th Corp., Celanese 701 F.2d 403-04 sis). The trend the law is to treat sister Cir.1983) (stating entities corporations liability as one for purposes. sufficiently be interrelated to consti single tute a employer, indentifying Applying plain meaning of sec- “(1) (2) operations, interrelation of cen 1752(9), (10), Atlantic, tion -Linnehan and relations, tralized control together, of labor com are “retailer.” Accordingly, eligible Linnehan is for sales tax credit management, mon common owner Furthermore, to section 1811-A. ship or financial control” as factors to be by as demonstrated an examination of considered). Second, the Comprehensive Legislative intent and notions of common Environmental Response, Compensation, fairness, denying the sales tax credit ele- (CERCLA), and Liability Act see 42 Therefore, vates form over substance. I (1997 §§ U.S.C.S. 9601-75 & Supp.2005), judgment would affirm the in Ken-05-183. liability “any extends person9 owning or operating facility” [a] where violation

occurs, 9601(20)(A) (1997); 42 U.S.C.S. 9607(a)(1) (1997).

see also 42 U.S.C.S. Joint Water Auth. Lansford-Coaldale (3d Corp., Tonolli 4 F.3d

Cir.1993), the court stated that a sister

corporation that was operator deemed the facility

of a could be hable under CERCLA liability purposes despite they “person” fact that are 9. The corpo- definition of includes technically corporations. 9601(21) (1997). distinct ration. 42 U.S.C.S.