MEMORANDUM

INTRODUCTION:

In this bankruptcy appeal, a mortgagee, Horizon Financial, F.A. (“Horizon”), has sought appellate review of a May 10, 1988 Order of the bankruptcy court sustaining the objection of Susan J. Norris (“the Debt- or”) to the secured proof of claim of Horizon and granting recoupment of $1,000.

Jurisdiction over this bankruptcy appeal in this court is pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (West 1968 & Supp.1991). I have reviewed the record on appeal (Document Nos. 1 and 3), and the May 10, 1988 opinion and Order of the bankruptcy court (Document No. 3, Tab 10), as well as the appellate briefs of Horizon and the Debtor (Document Nos. 4 and 5, respectively). For the reasons set forth below, I shall affirm the May 10, 1988 Order of the bankruptcy court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

Susan J. Norris filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on August 3, 1987. Thereafter, Horizon filed a secured proof of claim in this bankruptcy case in the amount of $2,993.72 (Document No. 1, Tab 5). The claim included the sum of $1,000 in attorneys’ fees.

The Debtor objected to claim of Horizon on two grounds: 1) the claim sought excessive fees, 1 and 2) the claim should be reduced by $1,000 for violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq., allegedly committed by Horizon in connection with a residential mortgage transaction with the Debtor. 2 See Document No. 1, Tab 6. At the hearing before the bankruptcy court, neither party presented testimony, relying instead on four documents introduced into evidence by stipulation, which included: 1) a truth-in-lending disclosure statement, 2) the mortgage agreement, 3) the mortgage settlement sheet, and 4) the mortgage Note. See Document No. 1, Tab 7, Exs. P-1 through P-4.

*469 THE BANKRUPTCY COURT OPINION:

The bankruptcy court determined that the TILA objection of the Debtor was a defense in the nature of a recoupment to the proof of claim submitted by Horizon. The court, therefore, held that the one-year statute of limitations for affirmative TILA claims, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), did not apply, because the TILA claim here was raised defensively as an action in recoupment. See Document No. 3, Tab 10, at 2-3.

The bankruptcy court then found that Horizon had committed a TILA violation in its negotiation over its mortgage with the Debtor. Specifically, the bankruptcy court agreed with the Debtor that Horizon violated former 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(8), which requires a creditor to disclose accurately a “description of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with the extension of cred-it_” See Document No. 3, Tab 10, at 4-5.

On July 26, 1978, the Debtor and the predecessor of Horizon, Trevose Federal Savings and Loan Association (“Trevose”), entered into a purchase money mortgage transaction. See Document No. 1, Tab 7, Ex. P-2. In connection therewith, Trevose, the mortgagee, provided the Debtor with a disclosure statement which stated the following:

7. This Association’s security interest in this transaction is a mortgage on property located at 3886 Dungan Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124 to be more specifically described in the mortgage instruments which, upon execution, will cover all after acquired property and also stand as security for future advances.

See Document No. 1, Tab 7, Ex. P-1 (emphasis added). The bankruptcy court interpreted the mortgage instrument itself, a different document from the disclosure statement just excerpted, as covering all future advances, but not “after acquired property.” 3 The bankruptcy court thus determined that a TILA violation had occurred under 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(8), because no provision existed in the mortgage which granted a security interest as broad as that disclosed to the borrower in the disclosure statement. 4 See Document No. 3, Tab 10, at 4-5.

DISCUSSION:

The Scope of Review on Appeal

The scope of review that a district court is provided in examining the factual findings of a bankruptcy court is set forth in Bankruptcy Rule 8013:

On an appeal the district court ... may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge’s judgment, order, or decree or remand with instructions for further proceedings. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

*470 11 U.S.C.A. Rule 8013 (West 1984 & Supp.1991) (emphasis added). See also Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union, 851 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir.1988) (“The findings of fact by the bankruptcy court are re viewable only for clear error.” (citations omitted)).

The clearly erroneous standard of review mandated by Rule 8013 for findings of fact does not apply, however, in examining conclusions of law by a bankruptcy court. Legal conclusions of a bankruptcy judge are subject to a plenary review by a district court on appeal. Brown, 851 F.2d at 84; Frymire v. Paine Webber, Inc., 107 B.R. 506, 509 (E.D.Pa.1989) (“ ‘The bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions ... may not be approved without our independent determination of the legal questions.’ ”) (quoting In Re Gilchrist Co., 410 F.Supp. 1070, 1074 (E.D.Pa.1976)).

“ ‘When construction of a contract is the issue before the appellate court, the question is one of law and is freely reviewable.’ ” Wiltshire v. Government of Virgin Islands, 893 F.2d 629, 633 (3d Cir.1990). Also, whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 935 F.2d 1428, 1431 (3d Cir.1991). If the contract or instrument in question is not susceptible to differing interpretations, it is not ambiguous. Id. See also In Re F.A. Potts & Co., Inc., 115 B.R. 66, 70 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd, 922 F.2d 830 (3d Cir.1990).

The Appeal of the Order of May 10, 1988

As discussed above, the bankruptcy court issued an Order and opinion on May 10, 1988, after notice and a hearing, that sustained the objections of the Debtor to the proof of claim submitted by Horizon. As a result, the bankruptcy court granted the Debtor recoupment in the statutory amount of $1,000 for a TILA violation.

The Truth in Lending Act is a federal statute which regulates the terms and conditions of consumer credit. The primary purpose of the TILA, along with Federal Reserve Regulation Z (“Regulation Z”), 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1 et seq. 5 is to assure the informed use of credit through meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that consumers may more readily compare different financing options and costs. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601. Pursuant to TILA, a creditor must issue to a borrower a disclosure statement summarizing certain information in the loan documents. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-32. Upon the failure of a creditor to make the necessary and proper disclosures, TILA provides the debtor with several remedies, including an award of actual damages, attorneys’ fees, and an additional statutory award of up to $1,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). Finally, an action for damages for a violation of TILA, filed pursuant to Section 1640(e), must be brought within one year of the alleged violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). 6

Under the facts in this case, the Debtor would be barred from bringing an affirmative action for a TILA violation. This much is not in dispute. The primary issue here, therefore, is whether the one year bar to the institution of a TILA suit also prohibits the Debtor from objecting to a proof of claim filed by a lender who allegedly violated the TILA where the proof of claim was filed more than one year after the alleged TILA violation.

The bankruptcy courts and district courts in this district have held that a Debt- or is permitted to raise defensively a TILA violation as an objection to the proof of claim of a creditor. 7 See Gambale v. Lo *471 mas & Nettleton Co., 80 B.R. 308, 309 (E.D.Pa.1987); Werts v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 48 B.R. 980, 983-43 (E.D.Pa.1985); In Re Johnson-Allen, 67 B.R. 968, 972-74 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1986); In Re Perry, 59 B.R. 947, 949 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1986); In Re Hanna, 31 B.R. 424, 426 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1983). When such an objection is made, the Debtor raises the TILA violation in the nature of a recoupment, and not as an affirmative action. 8

Although decisions from other jurisdictions have prohibited a Debtor from reducing a proof of claim of a creditor for a TILA violation, I am persuaded that these cases are distinguishable from the case at hand. Thus, as the bankruptcy court noted (Document No. 3, Tab 10, at 3 n. 4), in the principle case relied on by Horizon, In Re Smith, 737 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir.1984), the debtor was the party who initiated the action and haled the creditor into court seeking monetary damages and rescission. Id. at 1554. 9 The Smith court recognized the division of jurisdictions on the question of whether a TILA counterclaim is in the nature of a set-off or recoupment, and expressly left this complex question for another day. Id. at 1553.

Horizon also relies on Basham v. Finance Am. Corp., 583 F.2d 918 (7th Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1128, 99 S.Ct. 1046, 59 L.Ed.2d 89 (1979). While the procedural posture of the case in Basham is identical to the case at bar, 10 1 find that the reasoning of the opinion is flawed. The Basham court relied significantly on the fact that the debtors did not claim that they were actually damaged or injured as a result of the claimed TILA violation. Id. at 927. Therefore, the court reasoned that the TILA claim was not directed at or an answer to the underlying debt. Id. at 928. As noted below, however, the prevailing law in this circuit is that debtors are presumed to be injured by a TILA violation and need not establish actual harm. Therefore, the objection of the Debtor in this case to the proof of claim because of an alleged TILA violation must be presumed to be directed at or an answer to the underlying debt. This defensive claim in the nature of recoupment is permitted, despite the expiration of the one year statute of limitations for affirmative TILA claims.

The law clearly holds that TILA must be strictly construed, and that liabili *472 ty must be imposed for a TILA violation, no matter how technical. Thomka v. A.Z. Chevrolet, Inc., 619 F.2d 246, 248-50 (3d Cir.1980). 11 Further, any proven TILA violation is presumed to injure the borrower by frustrating the legislative purpose of this statute of enabling the consumer to compare various credit terms. Dzadovsky v. Lyons Ford Sales, Inc., 593 F.2d 538, 539 (3d Cir.1979). Because TILA provides for statutory damages in addition to actual damages, a plaintiff need not show actual harm. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 680 F.2d 927, 930 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 56, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982).

Section 129(a)(8) of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(8), 12 requires that a creditor accurately disclose the “description of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with the extension of credit.” 13 Section 226.8(b) of Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b), contains the disclosure requirements for the type of transaction here. Section 226.8(b) mandates that the creditor provide “[a] description or identification of the type of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the security interest relates_ If after-acquired property will be subject to the security interest, or if other or future indebtedness is or may be secured by any such property, this fact shall be clearly set forth in conjunction with the description or identification of the type of security interest held, retained or acquired.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5).

In this case, the disclosure statement describes the security interest as covering “all after acquired property.” Document No. 1, Tab 7, Ex. P-1. However, as the Debtor argued, and as the bankruptcy court correctly found, the actual mortgage instrument makes no mention of a security interest as broad, but rather is limited to “all fixtures now or hereafter attached to the property, all of which, including replacements and additions thereto, shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property covered by this mortgage[.]” Document No. 1, Tab 7, Ex. P-2. As the Debtor argues in her brief, Document No. 5, at 12, there is a distinct difference between “after acquired property” and “fixtures,” the latter representing a more restrictive security interest than the former. 14 Here, the mortgage creates a security interest in only that property which becomes, upon attachment to the realty, 15 a fixture. The disclosure statement, however, indicates that the security interest will be perfected against “all after acquired property.”

I find, as a matter of law, that the language in the mortgage instrument is not ambiguous, because it is not susceptible to an interpretation that creates a security *473 interest as broad as that described in the disclosure statement. Cf. In Re Cervantes, 67 B.R. 816, 819 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1986) (mortgage instrument deemed to include a security interest in after acquired property where the language reads “any and all appliances, machinery, furniture and equipment (whether fixture or not) of any nature whatsoever”). Similarly, I also find that the relevant language of the disclosure statement is not ambiguous, as it is not susceptible of being construed to provide a security interest as narrow as that found in the mortgage instrument. Accordingly, I conclude as a matter of law that the bankruptcy court was correct in finding a violation of pre-1982 TILA Section 129(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(8), because the disclosure statement given the Debtor inaccurately described the security interest created by the mortgage instrument.

As at least one circuit court of appeals has stated, the failure accurately to disclose a security interest, no matter how technical or de minimis the inaccuracy, “might well have an adverse impact on [a] borrower in either of two distinct ways: by deterring future borrowing or property acquisition out of an exaggerated belief in the security interest to which they would be subject, or by giving a lender an apparent right which, even if ultimately unenforceable, could serve as a significant bargaining lever in any future negotiations concerning rights or obligations under the loan.” Bizier v. Globe Fin. Servs., Inc., 654 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.1981). Since I agree with the conclusions of the bankruptcy court that Horizon committed a TILA violation by failing accurately to describe the security interest in the disclosure document, and that the objections of the debt- or were in the nature of a recoupment, I affirm the Order of the bankruptcy court to reduce the proof of claim of Horizon by $1,000.

CONCLUSION:

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal of Horizon from the May 10, 1988 Order of the bankruptcy court shall be denied. That Order shall thus be affirmed.