*1 age. a child under Nebraska, appellant, State v. Kevin K. and Department Nebraska of Health appellees. Services, Human

Filed June 2007. No. A-06-447. Henderson, Kara E. Mickle and Alicia B. Lancaster Deputy County for Attorneys, appellant. Keefe,

Dennis R. Defender, Lancaster Public County Elizabeth Elliott for Kevin K. appellee General, Steen,

Jon Bruning, and B. Attorney Gail Special General, Assistant Attorney Nebraska appellee Department of Health and Human Services. Chief Judge, Judges.

Inbody, Moore, Sievers Inbody, Chief Judge.

INTRODUCTION The State of Nebraska has the decision of the appealed Lancaster Juvenile County Court Separate terminating jurisdic- tion over Kevin K. The issue is whether a presented court which has assumed over a minor child issues continue over that may child when the basis for exists. FACTS

STATEMENT OF 25, 2005, court adjudicated On April (Reissue 2004), find- 43-247(3)(b) to Neb. Rev. Stat. § *2 from school. truant habitually Disposition that he had been ing custody legal was entered on 14. July Temporary in this matter of Health in the Nebraska Department of Kevin was placed (DHHS), and custody and Human Services physical that The order remained with his mother. dispositional provided without truan- to “attend all scheduled classes Kevin was verified and that illnesses shall be “[a]ny cies or tardies” nurse or health paraprofes- a medical school through provider, that Kevin’s mother “shall not sional.” The order also provided without excuse Kevin . . . from school prior approval [DHHS].” 21, 2005, Kevin filed a motion to terminate

On November old, that Kevin was 16 years based fact upon re- and on November Kevin’s mother executed notarized school, Kevin’s lease on a form provided to terminate was held enrollment. The on motion hearing December 13. The DHHS case to Kevin’s manager assigned on recommendation that the case case testified that it was DHHS’ old, because it was a Kevin was 16 truancy be closed on November Kevin’s mother disenrolled him from school no The case further testi- truancy longer manager applied. that he believed it was in Kevin’s best interests to close the fied that enrolled in there case and since Kevin was that DHHS could to Kevin. were no further services provide 14, 2006, On March court sustained when a motion to terminate that even jurisdiction, reasoning court, child is under the parent her child retains the to disenroll his or from school right pursu- (Cum. Rev. and that ant to Neb. Stat. 79-201 when a exercises that the child is no right, longer legally to be enrolled in school and the court’s juris- based diction should terminate where the child’s The court further noted: solely truancy. upon clear that Kevin’s interests are not served is best [I]t the court’s by terminating dismissing not enrolled in Petition. Kevin has no daily program,

[643] a GED is not and indeed has no sig- employed nificant work whatsoever. such situation history Clearly bode does not well for his of his “development capacity and useful healthy personality, well-being, physical Neb. Rev. interest.” (Reissue 2004). Stat. §43-246

The State has this court. timely appealed

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR terminat- State contends court erred in ing over Kevin issues based his mother’s execution discontinue release to parental his enrollment in school to 79-201.

STANDARD OF REVIEW An order final, R.P.,

is a order. In re Interest L.P. and 240 appealable V., (1992); Neb. N.W.2d 421 In re Lisa N.W.2d *3 record,

Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the the court is to reach a appellate conclusion independent however, of the juvenile court’s when the evidence findings; conflict, in the court will consider and give weight to the fact that the lower observed the court witnesses and one version of the the facts over other. In re Interest accepted of B., Phyllisa

ANALYSIS The State contends that the court erred terminat- in juvenile the ing over Kevin for based truancy issues his mother’s execution of a release to discontinue upon parental enrollment in school to 79-201. State pursuant § juvenile contends that the court should have continued to exer- cise its to 43-247. jurisdiction pursuant §

Section 43-247 provides, part:

Notwithstanding entered the any by disposition Code, the court under Juvenile the juvenile Nebraska individual to be court’s jurisdiction adjudged within the of section shall until provisions this continue the court of or reaches the age

the individual from its jurisdiction. the individual discharges otherwise to took The juvenile “The 43-247(3)(b). part: The statute provides, pertinent § have juris- as herein shall county court in each provided truant from . . . who is habitually . . . [a]ny juvenile diction of of age despite Kevin reached home or school.” Once not that Kevin’s mother shall order providing dispositional DHHS, without approval excuse him from school prior release his discontinuing executed a notarized Kevin’s mother 79-201(3)(d). This section enrollment school pursuant § education requirement an to the compulsory provides exception of sixteen age the child reached “[h]as a notarized release has signed such child’s parent of the child on a form provided the enrollment this Kevin’s mother’s execution of Based school.” by upon release, over Kevin. court terminated its jurisdiction main- May juvenile The issue raised this is: appeal over a minor child when the basis tain jurisdiction exists? in the context of a juvenile’s This court considered this issue K., in the Steven 11 Neb. App. case marriage of and in (2003), N.W.2d 320 in part part affirmed In In re Interest 671 N.W.2d 777. dismissed 267 of held that a minor’s terminated marriage Steven this court court. Our determination of (Reissue of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-2101 language based upon of a under the minority which person provides marries, he and the language ends when or she 43-247, that a which specifically provides the age an individual’s reaching terminates Thus, statutes contained in Nebraska language of majority. re K.: the end of a dictated both results in In due to and the termination of marriage child’s status minority *4 the age court’s a child’s jurisdiction reaching the juvenile of majority. identical to nearly

A case in which a factual situation C.W., Ill. is In Interest of the instant case was addressed Dec. In that N.E.2d 226 Ill. 3d case, the minor child on the that he sole basis adjudicated was a truant minor in need of his 16th Following supervision. minor child filed birthday, petition seeking discharge from that Illinois law no alleging longer supervision, him to attend school and that the trial court no accordingly had over him. The trial court denied the longer jurisdiction peti- tion and retained and the minor child jurisdiction, appealed. court held that minor child who is a tru- adjudicated in need ant minor is not entitled to discharge supervision virtue of his of 16. supervision merely by reaching In the instant status has not ended minority as a result of his mother’s discontinuing his enrollment from 43-247, school. He a minor. remains Pursuant to “the juvenile over individual to be within jurisdiction adjudged of this section shall continue until ... the court provisions Further, . . . the individual from discharges jurisdiction.” child, order for a court to assume juvenile over State must a factual basis that the child falls within the prove asserted subsection or subsections of 43-247. statute This does not set forth that the factual basis justifying must continue to acquisition exist throughout the duration of the court’s exercise of that jurisdiction. Thus, a continue to exercise may a minor child after the even basis for exists.

We note that this of the statute with the reading comports Code, stated of the Nebraska Juvenile which include purposes assure of all to care and rights juveniles protection “[t]o safe stable environment and to of their living development for a healthy capacities personality, physical well-being, useful interest.” Neb. Rev. 43-246(1) (Reissue 2004). Stat. §

The final is whether it is in Kevin’s best interests question that the retain over him. We have novo, reviewed this case de and we are in complete agreement with the court’s findings: is clear that Kevin’s are not best interests served

*5 [I]t the court’s by terminating dismissing Petition. Kevin has no not enrolled in daily ^[646] and indeed has no sig-

a GED is not employed such a history Clearly nificant work whatsoever. situation does not bode well for his of his “development capacity a and healthy well-being, useful personality, physical interest.” Neb. Rev. (Reissue 2004). Stat. §43-246 Since termination of the is not in interests, find that the court erred in Kevin’s best we terminating its over Kevin.

CONCLUSION determined that a court is not Having terminate its over minor child even when the sole basis for the court’s over the child no exists and that it not in Kevin’s best interests that the terminated, juvenile court’s be we reverse the order and remand this cause for further proceedings.

Reversed remanded FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Judge, dissenting. Moore, I must dissent from the While respectfully majority opinion. I do not with the either disagree of finding or the that the best of Kevin are interests not opinion served by I believe that the lan terminating jurisdiction, plain statutes, education guage together with compulsory K., noted in In re Interest jurisdictional Steven 11 principles of 828, (2003), Neb. 661 N.W.2d 320 App. part affirmed dismissed 261 Neb. part 671 N.W.2d an requires affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of the juvenile petition in this case. law, aof statute of

Interpretation con presents question nection with which an court has an to reach obligation an conclusion of the decision made independent irrespective the court below. Johnson v. 654 Kenney, N.W.2d (2002); In supra. construing statute, a court must determine and effect to the give purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire of the statute considered in language its plain, ordinary, V., re sense. In Interest Valentin 12 Neb. popular N.W.2d (Cum. 2004) 79-201(3)(d) Rev. Stat. provides an to the education exception compulsory requirement the child reached the sixteen such child’s “[h]as has signed notarized release the enrollment of child on a form school.” provided by In instant Kevin’s mother a notarized release on signed form enrollment discontinuing Kevin’s provided by *6 with the statute. compliance State, The having high for the education of responsibility citizens, its has the to regulations reasonable power impose the control and duration of basic education. rel. Douglas State ex Church, Faith v. 301 N.W.2d 571 Baptist the the The context of law children Legislature, to requiring attend which the regularly Legislature deter- implicitly children, mined was in best the interests of carved out an ex- ception, recognizing of a to disenroll right child who 16. The has reached no age Legislature put limitation on to the right, according this statute’s lan- plain all that must occur is that the child reach guage, and that form. The effect parent sign is to 79-201(3)(d) limitation on opinion place by excluding children who under the are of the court. While this be an on may certainly limitation this appropriate section, courts, it is for not the to Legislature, make this decision.

Further, Kevin was under Neb. Rev. Stat. adjudicated solely 43-247(3)(b) (Cum. found whereby he that had been truant virtue habitually from school. By mother, can execution release Kevin’s no long- be er considered truant under the education laws. compulsory circumstance, this there Under is no other basis for jurisdiction, court can no See In re jurisdiction. retain supra. it is that the case Finally, noteworthy manager assigned Kevin’s case recommended that the case be because dismissed case further longer applied. manager opined closed, it was in the case as there Kevin’s best interests that be the basis connection with services available no further were for Kevin’s adjudication. reasons, decision of affirm the I would

For the foregoing case. in this Inc., appellee, Cup-O-Coa, Bank, v. TierOne Kearney appellants, al., State Bank et intervenor-appellee. Company, and Trust 12, 2007. No. A-07-006. Filed June