*1 and Sandra T. ARGENTA Argenta, Appellants, NEWTON, Appellee,

CITY OF Insurance Jones and Travelers

Joe

Company, Defendants.

No. 85-359.

Supreme Court of Iowa. 19,

Feb. 18, 1986.

Rehearing Denied March *2 grounds. grant

cess We affirm of summary judgment city. in favor of the I. Jurisdiction. must plain-

We first decide whether right appeal tiffs had the from the ad- summary judgment. Ordinarily verse our appellate jurisdiction is limited to review of judgments finally dispose orders which parties. of the entire case as to all See 1(a) P. R.App. (permitting appeal Iowa right only order). from judgment final jurisdiction We conclude that we have appeal. key inquiry decide this was City well articulated in McGuire Ce- Rapids, 1971): dar 189 N.W.2d 592 James, Dwight W. Roxanne Barton Con- question whether the determina- [The is] Ogden lin and P. James Dennis & Galli- any tion of the issues as to defendant P.C., Moines, gan, appellants. Des depends on affects the determination of the issues as to the other defendants. Langdon G. Richard and Richard A. Stef- liability If the claimed basis of of the Herrick, Langdon Langdon, fen of & Des with, dismissed defendants is connected Moines, appellee. to, or so related the claimed basis of

liability remaining defendants that other, judgment one affect the as discharged ap- defendants is not WOLLE, Justice. pealable until the issues as to the remain- Joseph Argenta Plaintiff T. injured was ing defendants are settled. in the cave-in a ditch aon construction 597; Nepstad, Wilson v. site employer performing where his (Iowa 1979); N.W.2d Swets Motor city work (city). Joseph for the of Newton Sales, Pruisner, Inc. N.W.2d and brought personal his wife Sandra (Iowa 1975). Here, McGuire, 302-03 as in injury against city action and two other pleaded separate divisions employer’s supervisor defendants —his against defendants, their claims the several project and an company insurance and there is “distinct line of demarca- inspected had the work site. plaintiffs’ tion” against between claims appeal grant summary Sandra from the city their against claims the other judgment ruling city, for the that did not McGuire, defendants. directly involve the defendants. 597; see Mason Production Credit summary judgment court found that Duzer, Association Van had proved compliance (Iowa 1985) (contrasting McGuire (1981) with Code be- separate-claim exception cases where had they neither writ- resolved issues were entwined with unre- ten sixty days claims within issues); solved Lunday v. nor commenced the court action within six (Iowa 1973) (dismissal months of the incident. Plaintiffs contend against city appealable claims because re- city’s receipt that the of information con- maining against separate claim teacher was tained in report its and a news- distinct). paper account of the incident satisfied the requirement, challenge summary judgment terminating constitutionality of the plaintiffs’ against written notice re- claims was a quirement equal protection appealable and due final order as of because incapacitated by injury giving separate and his from claims were distinct those against such notice. claims asserted from the other two defendants. required plaintiffs This statute either to file their action within six months of the City.

II. Sufficiency Notice act, alleged give tortious or to written no- *3 the municipality sixty days tice to within of summary judg- was entitled to alleged wrong file the their action only if the factual materials within ment years. within two Because did summary judgment the record essen- months, petition not file their within six undisputed tially and established firm compliance sixty day with the notice re- judgment a matter of basis as law. quirement predicate was a survival of Cox, 411, 413 Hildenbrand v. 369 N.W.2d of the city’s their action in the face summa- 1985); 237(c). (Iowa Iowa R.Civ. P. This ry judgment motion. summary judgment record discloses no ques- issue of fact on the genuine writing plaintiffs rely material The first on which compliance compliance city inspec- tion of with the statu- to establish was a entry log in a tory daily notice. The their answers tor’s handwritten he routinely interrogatories clearly kept concerning project. to written identified That writings entry recorded the on which relied cave-in, eyewitness of the compliance. Summary account efforts judg- to establish workman, to rescue the buried appropriate procedure de- ment was an inspector’s subsequent investigation termining that issue in this case. entry inspector incident. de- (1981) pro- Iowa Code section 613A.5 injuries by Joseph scribed sustained vides: expressed opinion on the reason the Every person damages claims who collapsed. ditch officer, any any municipality from or em- proffered writing by plain- The second agent ployee municipality or of a for or report newspaper, tiffs was in the local death, any wrongful on account loss cave-in, published report- day after the injury scope within section was buried at a cave-in or section or under 613A.2 613A.8 com- Newton, rescued, and taken ambulance shall an action mon law commence there- hospital to a local where he was under months, person six said for within unless article treatment and observation. The presented gov- shall cause had in because stated that the trench caved body erning municipality of the within gave way. sand wet days alleged wrongful after sixty death, injury loss or a written notice We have held that substantial rath time, stating the place, and circumstanc- compliance than with the statute er literal compensa- es thereof the amount of be sufficient. Knox Orr or other 507, 1984); tion relief demanded. Failure to ville, (Iowa 346 509 N.W.2d place time or Sneller, state or circumstances 392 Vermeer v. 190 N.W.2d compensation re- (Iowa 1971). the amount mu knowledge of the Actual nicipality, lief demanded shall not invalidate the satisfy does not notice; providing, statutory the claimant shall fur- notice. requirement of written days compliance nish full information within fifteen To substantial establish municipality. governing plaintiff after demand No must show “the body written given action therefor shall be maintained un- Kohl, given claim.” 286 N.W.2d less such notice has been and un- Franks (Iowa 1979) added); (emphasis Py less the action is commenced within two N.W.2d years Astley, after such The time for land v. notice. 1982); Perry Community include a Shearer v.

giving such notice shall reason- District, length time, 693-94 ninety not to exceed School able (Iowa 1975). summary judgment injured court days, during person which the writings trap unwary layperson. found here were deficient be- for the become See, Orr, any (letter failed to “indicate claim or e.g., N.W.2d 508-09 by plaintiffs. to make a claim” intent compensation put from workers’ insurer ting municipality subrogat- on notice of its interpreting cases Our rights ed constitutes sufficient notice of entry support summary judgment. employee); claim behalf the covered City, In Rush v. Sioux Appanoose County, Mihalovich (Iowa 1976), plaintiff stopped abruptly (Iowa 1974) (report by 566-69 colliding an intersection avoid with a county’s designated agent insurance suffi police injuries car and sustained in the re- cient; agent plaintiff advised contact sulting rear-end collision. else); Vermeer, anyone 190 N.W.2d at 393- police report pre- contended that official (written report of information pared by investigating officer constitut- designated agent school district’s insurance *4 compliance substantial ed with the statu- sufficient; report prepared on behalf of requirement tory because it in described plaintiff). cases, however, all In of these writing detail and in the circumstances of express require have we maintained the rejected collision. We argument, the that “person ment of section stating: 613A.5 that the presented govern shall to be to the Given most the liberal construction the ing body the municipality ... written bear, City will the facts knew date the added.) (Emphasis writing, notice.” The place automobile collision be- sufficient, present to be must be made and vehicles, private tween one of by the or by ed claimant someone on behalf stopped for squad a car on emer- was plaintiff. the Neither the log City gency points mission. The out this newspaper report nor the prepared by plaintiff “notice” does not state whether plaintiffs, prepared the from information injured. Perhaps important, more furnished, plaintiffs the or caused to be nothing making indicates by presented them on their any sort claim at all. While section state, behalf. not specifically 613A.5 does so its underlying purpose require obvious is to summary The judgment record does not claimants municipalities inform support plaintiffs’ assertion that a period claims within limited of time.... requirement satisfied the written notice Any interpretation would lead to Iowa Code section 613A.5. absurd results and seemingly would ne- gate legislative a intent whenever there Questions. III. Constitutional police investigated occurs motor vehicle plaintiffs argue in the alternative accident which in some manner have that Iowa Code section 613A.5 is unconsti- brought by city. about been by equal protection tutional reason of the added) (citations 437 (emphasis Id. at omit- process guarantees due of the federal ted). Iowa constitutions. do Plaintiffs not recently, Pyland Astley, More in we contend that Iowa Constitution rejected assertion that vides relief where the federal constitution requirement by written notice was satisfied not, interpreted does and we have equal log entry by police made the chief of protection process provisions, and due concerning injuries she received when she our federal and state constitutions be icy fell public sidewalk. 324 N.W.2d substantially similar. Stracke Rush, Relying 326. we no found Bluffs, Council in merit log entry assertion that the 1983) (citing cases). several Al- constituted written notice within the mean- though contends that ing of section 613A.5. failed to raise their constitutional claims we specificity several cases with in summary shown sufficient requirement our concern judgment proceedings, we find ade- preserved equal protection relationship their We find a rational quately between the requirement writing appellate issues re- in purposes and the served section 613A.5. view. general purposes are clear. A. Plaintiffs Equal Protection. requirements protect Such notice apply a strict scru contend we should public treasury claims, permit from stale protection tiny deciding equal test their claims, prompt settlement of meritorious challenge. scrutiny To withstand a strict unnecessary avoid litigation, facilitate analysis, must ad planning budgets, state actions statutes of municipal and en- public state interest sure that notice compelling vance reaches offi- cers responsibility with to deal means least restrictive available. Bernal them, enabling Fainter, remedy such officers -, U.S. 104 S.Ct. municipal property defects oth- before 2312, 2316, (1984). 81 L.Ed.2d persons injured. er are argue 613A.5 Plaintiffs that section de- right them of rea- prives Shearer, 692; of a fundamental Lunday N.W.2d at (cit- sonable access to court—the have v. N.W.2d at 907-08 authorities). supporting damage civil claims heard and decid- ed. legislature rationally impose could claimant, requirement that the some- extend the We decline this invitation to *5 behalf, give one on the in claimant’s scrutiny analysis test to of statutes strict writing, just not oral notice. Written no- like section This does not 613A.5. statute promote prompt tice would tend to investi- doors instead re the courtroom but bar gation per- increase likelihood that early to quires notice of intention seek in responsible sons to take action would access to the courtroom. We follow our notice, just fact not receive read the precedent applying in the traditional own injury-causing hear inci- about rumored cre rational basis test classification might details of oral dent. Vital by ated section 613A.5. Code See per- in well be misstated transmission to Co., v. 339 N.W.2d Farnum G.D. Searle & responsible acting city’s on sons for (Iowa 392, 1983); Shearer, 396 236 N.W.2d behalf. at 693. pro- plaintiffs’ equal We find no merit in test, Applying we will the rational basis challenge. tection if it uphold the statute bears some fair B. Process. court twice Due Our has relationship legitimate public purpose. to a rejected argument Stracke, In 733-34. process guarantee due violates the strong presumption face of the of constitu- fourteenth amendment of the vided statutes, given tionality plaintiffs state Harryman federal constitution. heavy negating every have burden (Iowa 1977); 631, Hayles, upon basis which the statute reasonable Shearer, In neither 236 N.W.2d at 691-92. 734; Shearer, be sustained. require- focus on the statute’s case was the 236 N.W.2d at 691. governmental entity to ment that notice notice. ask us be a written Here Plaintiffs focus their attack on what requirement to focus on the written notice arbitrary and irra they characterize as reexamining the question in whether line drawn be tional classification—the We satis- process. statute satisfies due are give claimants who a written notice tween mandatory is fied that the written notice city which satisfies section 613A.5 and to a public to rationally related interest though even those denied access court response each reasons equivalent notice and had actual plaintiffs’ equal protection argument. ask, Why, should access information. upon rely cite two deci- turn the bureaucratic notion Plaintiffs to court Supreme Court keep? sions of the United States that a has records hearing process challenge. due action were reasonable. The alterna- Connecticut, 371, giving Boddie v. 382- U.S. written notice of the claim tives— 780, 788-89, 91 S.Ct. sixty days L.Ed.2d within followed suit within (1971), Court declared violative of years, or commencement of their ac- process due requirement the state’s that all provide six tion within a rational months— persons decree, seeking a divorce even wel system early-written-warning cities recipients, fare required to advance cer governmental system entities. The Thereafter, tain costs in Logan and fees. process. satisfies Co., Brush Zimmerman 455 U.S. passes Iowa Code section 613A.5 consti- 429-30, 102 1148, 1154-55, S.Ct. 71 L.Ed.2d tutional muster. (1982), the Court invalidated they substantially complied shown beyond barrier the control of a require- statute’s reasonable unreasonably deprived which him of access ments. job to court on his discrimination claim. AFFIRMED. obstacle, That quite different the no than here, requirement tice involved a factfind- except All Justices concur REYNOLD- employees conference state C.J., SON, LARSON, JJ., and HARRIS and timely to schedule in fashion. Ac LAVORATO, J., dissent and who who cess to court could not be on the denied part. no takes employee’s inept basis of the state schedul ing. REYNOLDSON, (dissent- Justice Chief Logan ing). essence Boddie and is that a claimant must be entitled to a mean I On rationale which advanced in ingful opportunity to be heard when the Lunday dissent permitted state has access to its courts on 1973), respectfully I type of claim asserted. Due from this dissent decision. by requiring not violated claimants satis *6 fy steps. quote To procedural reasonable LARSON, JJ., join dis- HARRIS Logan: sent. nothing Obviously, said we have en- litigant hearing

titles every to a civil every merits ease. The State procedural require-

erect reasonable triggering

ments adjudication, statutes limita-

tions, or, case, appropriate filing in an

fees. certainly And the State accords it a claim when terminates WYCOFF, Ray Appellant, Steven comply for failure to with a reasonable procedural evidentiary rule. What the require, Fourteenth Amendment does Iowa, Appellee. STATE of n ... granted opportunity “is ‘an No. 84-160. meaningful meaningful at a time and in a manner,’ hearing appropriate Supreme ‘for Court Iowa. [a] case,’ the nature of the ...” Feb. 1158-59, 71 455 U.S. at 102 S.Ct. at (citations added) (emphasis L.Ed.2d at 279

omitted) Boddie, (quoting 401 U.S. 119).

91 S.Ct. at 28 L.Ed.2d at procedural steps plaintiffs, commencing follow before