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In Re the Marriage of Hunt
909 P.2d 525
Colo.
1995
Check Treatment

*1 inhеrent from injuries resulted Graven’s denying sum- skiing. I believe

risks of this case the facts of

mary judgment under imaginative termi- encourage the use

(cid:127)will statutorily characterizing a identi-

nology in applica- to avoid risk order

fied inherent on Safety preclusion Act’s the Ski

tion of injuries resulting from inherent

recovery for failed to skiing. Because Graven

risks of showing of non-liabil- affirmative

rebut Vail’s matter of law under

ity accident as a for the amendment, wording the 1990 specific appeals. affirm the court of

I would say that Chief Justice

I authorized to am join in and Justice KOURLIS

VOLLACK

this dissent. MARRIAGE OF John

In re the HUNT, Petitioner,

S. Hunt, Respondent.

Dianna L. Stephen OF Mark

In re the MARRIAGE

RAIMER, Petitioner, Harte-Raimer, Respondent.

Melissa 93SC565, 93SC631.

Nos.

Supreme Court Colorado.

Dec. (93SC631) 29, 1996.

Rehearing Jan. Denied

527 *3 Patín, P.C.,

Thomas, Porter, Ar- Spence & Hunt, Porter, Bryan L. thur W. Colorado Hunt. Springs, for Petitioner John S. McDermott, P.C., Susemihl, Lohman & Lohman, Richard V. Catherine Woelk-Rudi- (William Carew, sill, Springs L. Colorado counsel), Respon- Springs, of Colorado L. Hunt. dent Dianna Kirchner, Springs, for E. Colorado John Amicus Nelson O. Kelm. Curiae Hock, P.C., Gregory Gregory John John Hock, Springs, for Mark Colorado Petitioner Stephen Raimer. Culin, Springs, for Re-

Greg Colorado Van spondent Melissa Harte-Raimer. tary pension and determined that Wife MULLARKEY delivered the Justice fifty percent should receive of his Opinion of the Court. 10/20 pension on an as-received basis at the time granted certiorari in In re effect, ruling In trial court’s he retires. Hunt, (Colo.App.1993), P.2d 1140 grants portion of Husband’s Wife Raimer, No. 92CA0759 upon the rank he achieves at the time based 5,1993), (ColoApp. Aug. to determine wheth- Captain than rank of of retirement rather his post-dissolu- increments based on er appeal- at the time of the divorce. Husband included in deter- tion increases rank are portion ed that of the trial court’s distribu- military pension is mining what of a tion. subject to division as marital cases, appeals both the court of affirmed the appeals court of affirmed the trial trial courts’ deferred distribution noting court’s division that Husband’s “limit- *4 pensions based on the “time rule” formula of of the retirement ed view the value benefit which includes distribution of benefits attrib- during marriage earned will not result in an post-dissolution Hunt, increases in rank. utable to equitable distribution.” 868 P.2d at petitioners, The instances the hus- holding, both appeals In so the court of bands, petitioned the court to review the authority proposition that ad- cited for the opin- distributions. We issued consolidated resulting higher vancements benefits are 15, 1995, May reversing judgment in ion on ‘“developed throughout and enhanced remanding both cases and with directions. parties’ years ... course of the of mar- ” 19, 1995, By granted Bullock, order dated June we riage.’ (quoting Id. Bullock v. (N.D.1984)). respondents’ rehearing motions for and The court of N.W.2d previously opinion. Af- withdrew our issued appeals also reaffirmed “the trial court’s dis- requesting receiving ter and additional cretion fashion division.” briefs, appeals’ Hunt, now affirm the court of 868 P.2d at 1142. approve

decision in Hunt and the trial court’s distribution in that case. reverse the B. Raimer of appeals’ court of decision Raimer. We petitioner, Stephen The Mark Raimer trial court in its find Raimer abused (Husband), respondent, and the Melissa altering discretion in the “time rule” formula. (Wife), Harte-Raimer received a decree of 6, 1990, thereby dissolution on November

I. ending sixteen-year marriage. their At the divorce, time of Husband was member of InA. re Hunt of military position Major. and held the of (Husband), petitioner, John Hunt eighteen years He had accumulated and six (Wife), respondent, Dianna Hunt were those, months towards his retirement. Of years married in 1977 and fourteen divorced years during fourteen were accumulated his During marriage, later in 1991. their Hus- marriage military pension to Wife. The was service, years band earned ten of creditable only any asset of real value accumulated required twenty years, of the towards retire- dining marriage. the comise of the ment from the United Air Force. At States divorce, 1, 1991, July initially the time of their Husband had On the trial court Captain. twenty-five rank percent achieved the of October awarded Wife of Hus- permanent trial court entered or- band’s attributable to the rank and dividing parties’ property. longevity ders The trial attained Husband on the of date Thereafter, court, court of mili- deferred distribution Husband’s dissolution.1 the trial on bench, years put 1. In its comments from the which is what he had in at the time decree, stated that: up divide that two and I come something percent with like 37 for her. But adopt juris- I think the Court will the reserve going I'm One, to discount that for two reasons. way [sic] diction method and the normal of And, support dealing her was lukewarm at best. with that would be in the Court’s view two, years again approximate up she has ended with a bit more of the to divide 14 which is parties by married life of these effective, clarify judg- erty including is to its become motion to amend and Wife’s desirability awarding family ment, home its decision and accorded amended right marital fraction or the to live therein for reason- forty percent of the Wife (fourteen periods spouse having able custo- years over the number of retires) children; dy of the benefit when Husband service trial court ex- an as-received basis. The on (d) any or increases decreases forty percent plained that it used instead separate property value allocating fifty percent in marriage depletion or the it pension because of what deemed separate property pur- for marital mil- support of Husband’s Wife’s “lukewarm” poses. itary career. two-part in The UDMA establishes a appeals denied Husband’s The court of dissolution, quiry. Upon a court first must order, appeal trial court’s amended “property.” determine whether an interest is summarily invoking its decision Hunt. so, If the court next determines whether the Raimer, slip. op. at 5. i.e., “marital,” acquired during subject distribution, “separate” and from shielded distribution.

II. incorporates presump The UDMA A. *5 by property acquired spouse tion that a property A trial court’s distribution of be- subsequent marriage, regardless spouses upon dissolution is controlled tween ownership, the form of is marital Marriage Act by the Uniform Dissolution of 14-10-113(3). Separate property is distin (the UDMA), -133, §§ 14-10-101 to 6B guished property from marital in section 14- (1987 and, Supp.), specif- C.R.S. & 1995 more 10-113(2) which states that: ically, 14- the criteria enumerated section (2) only, purposes For of this article “mar- 10-113, (1987), forth in 6B C.R.S. which sets property” property acquired ital means all part relevant that: subsequent by spouse either to the mar- (1) proceeding In a for dissolution of mar- riage except: legal separa- riage рroceeding or in a for (a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, proceeding disposition in a tion or for devise, descent; or property following previous dissolution (b) exchange Property acquired for by marriage a court which at the time of marriage property acquired prior to the prior dissolution of the exchange acquired by property or in for jurisdiction personal lacked over the ab- devise, descent; gift, bequest, spouse dis- sent or lacked (e) by spouse Property acquired a after pose property, the court shall set legal separation; a decree of spouse property apart to each his and shall (d) Property by agree- excluded valid property, regard marital without divide the parties. ment of the misconduct, proportions in such to marital just considering as the court deems after Property “as of the date of the is valued including: all relevant factors hearing on decree or as of the date hearing disposition property pre- if such (a) spouse contribution of each § 14-10- cedes the date of the decree.” acquisition property, marital 113(5). spouse including the contribution of a homemaker; B.

(b) apart set The value spouse; to each many plans com Pension come forms, (c) including plex vested or circumstances of each varieties The economic pensions, or unmatured prop- unvested at the time the division matured methodology method as that term is used in this termed "reserve distribution The trial court its opinion. jurisdiction” actually applied but it the deferred employer-supported but unmatured or defined contribu- pensions, defined benefit contributory plan, plan or noncontributo- that such has been pensions, tion to the extent military ry A has pensions, by employee employer etc.2 contri- funded and/or military pension unique attributes. A marriage, certain butions the course of plan and is non-сontribu- is a defined benefit subject distri- only employer tory (footnote in nature because proceeding”) in a dissolution bution military pension, In an em- contributes. omitted). towards a ployee earns “credits” Here, noncontributory we are faced with on, example, years of active ser- based pension plans that are both defined benefit (1983). military § 1405 A vice. 10 U.S.C. plans unmatured. are unvested and Such twenty years of creditable pension vests after contingencies from affected different vesting; a partial There is no mem- service. in which those considered Gallo and Grubb military twenty ber of the must attain if plans particular, were vested. In pension. forfeit the entire of service or vested, plan is not the amount of the benefit al, Troyan & Dis- M. et Valuation William is unknown: it can increase or decrease de- (1995). Property § Marital 46.32 tribution of pending on a number variables. Conse- computed specific benefits are as a Pension permitted quently, some courts that have duty pay for the percentage of the active plans of vested have held that un- division for each rank held at the date of retirement pension plans are not divisible be- vested year of creditable service. U.S.C. contingencies cause of the of such benefits.3 (1983 1406,1407 Supp.). §§ & 1995 we address the additional issues and Before including pension plans, We have held circumstances, concerns raised such military “property” under the pensions, are must the different means at a trial review marital, and, subject if to divi- UDMA pen- disposal court’s to effect distributions of sion. re plans. sion (Colo.1988)(“vested and matured *6 during pay, retirement which has accrued all C. part marriage, constitutes marital or of a uti subject Three methods of distribution are property division by pension proceeding”); lized courts order divide dissolution (Colo.1987)(‘Vested (1) value; Grubb, plan upon present dissolution: net vest, is, highest monthly salary. employee’s J. Thom- 2. Pension benefits the benefits arе See Oldham, Divorce, longer subject employ- Separation even the and. the Distribu- no to forfeiture if (1987 Property Supp.). employer, 7.10[2] & 1995 ee chooses to leave the when the em- tion of retirement, Upon employee will receive that ployee employed predetermined the has been for a Turner, formulary predetermined years. Equitable benefit. number of Brett R. (2d ed.1994). plan A defined contribution is one in which Property § 6.02 Distribution of employee employer the contribute a both Conversely, pension benefits are characterized as specified money employee’s amount of and the contingent employee when the has unvested or expressed benefits are as a current balance in a required years met number of to be not the retirement, pension account. Id. On the em- assured the benefits. The benefits are forfeited if ployee dies, will receive the balance in the account employee quits, the or is fired. employee. pensions maintained for that Some employee Pension benefits mature when the noncontributory only employer are in that age, typically reaches a certain called “retire- Alternatively, contributory contributes. Id. matured, age. plan ment” If the is vested and plans, employee plan. all or funds some employee eligible receiving pension is to start Any by employee by funds contributed definition, (a pension, by benefits cannot be ma- immediately definition vested. Id. unvested). matured tured and A vested but not Unfortunately, and commentators have courts plan contingent upon employee's is survival consistently pension utilized the same termi- until the benefits mature. An unvested and un- result, nology. As a the reader must scrutinize plan contingent upon employee's matured is carefully being cases and articles to avoid misled employment continued and survival until by labels. benefits mature. See, Kirkman, plan plan, employ- e.g., If a is a defined benefit 3. Kirkman v. 555 N.E.2d (Ind.1990) computed (holding pension ee's benefits are either in advance or that if pursuant prior to a which contains variables are not vested to dissolution the benefits formula as, division). example, length such of service and the should be excluded from (3) distribution, distribution; pre- (2) jur- In and reserve deferred deferred Turner, Equitable percentage pension Distri- R. determines the isdiction. Brett (2d nonemployee § 6.11 ed. 1994 & income that Property stream of bution of “Turner”). (hereinafter Supp.) eligible to receive once the will be approved all three recognized and If the pension have is both vested and matured. Grubb, discussed the net jurisdiction, nonemployee methods. court reserves and deferred distribution present percentage value is calculated later spouse’s share possibility out the of other methods and held pension at the time when the has vested and Grubb, P.2d at of distribution. methods matured. Gallo, Subsequently, we discussed 666. methods, present net Two of the three delayed extensively the methods of dis- more distribution, require the value and deferred tribution.4 percentage a formula or trial court to devise method, value, present The first net apportion pension which to benefits. in immediate distribution to the non- results Here both trial courts used the deferred spouse. method also is re This is, distribution method. That both courts “immediate offset” because the ferred to as receipt determined advance of the bene- present lump represents sum that the net portion of those benefits the nonem- fits what be offset value of the future benefit eligible ployee spouse would be to receive. of other in the marital the value mili- Both courts based their allocation of the method, court, using If the trial estate. this tary pensions at issue on the “time rule” data, by actuarial values the future guided “time rule” formula includes a formula. The benefit, a number of different fac considers fraction, sometimes referred to аs a tors, including (depending risks on certain fraction,” which determines the “coverture plan), type and accords pensions. marital interest in the The marital present value to the future benefit. The net fraction consists of the numerator which is used most often value method (or if years months more the number because when the value of low accurate) employee spouse has only employee spouse has worked a few during mar- earned towards the years qualifying marriage, has denominator, riage, is the over the which paying job, held a low or both. (or months if more accu- number rate) pension. of total service towards the methods, remaining de two multiplied marital fraction is times the jurisdiction, The distribution and reserve ferred *7 (in monthly in half benefit and divided order also to as “wait the latter of which is referred see,” pension to divide the and do not result immediate offset benefits). At the court establishes nonemployee spouse does not receive the time and the actually percentage, is an unknown any benefits until the benefits are the benefit Therefore, spouse employee figure. actual calculation of a dol- paid employee to the or the eligible receipt lar must await of benefits. spouse becomes to receive benefits.5 amount Gallo, pension delayed ployee spouse eligible both methods of is to receive the described jurisdiction. they actually distribution as reserve 752 re benefits rather than when are Koelsch, P.2d at 55. We now differentiate between de- See, e.g., v. 148 Ariz. ceived. Koelsch and on the ferred distribution reserve 1234, 176, (1986); 713 P.2d 1241-43 In re Mar percentage basis of whether or not a is fixed in Gillmore, 418, Cal.Rptr. riage 29 Cal.3d 174 advance of distribution. 493, 496-98, 1, (1981). 4-5 In In re 629 P.2d Blake, 1211, (Colo.App.1990), Marriage 807 P.2d 1213-14 example, employee spouse may choose 5. For denied, (Colo. t. No. 91SC22 cer March beyond to continue to work the time when he 25, 1991), Appeals Court of Colorado pension eligible she is to receive the benefits. affirming decisions in the trial relied on these Receipt of such benefits is deferred until the spouse pay court’s order that the employee spouse makes a unilateral decision nonemployee spouse pension her share of the on nonemploy- delay may retire. This frustrate the monthly prior employee spouse's basis spouse's expectations and undercut ee needs (a lump receipt distribution of the benefits sum plan. Some courts have the court's distribution because there were insufficient was not feasible employee spouse begin pay held that the should offset). estate which to ing nonemployee spouse assets in the marital with as soon as the em 532 allocating pension now hold benefits. We Troyan, Pension Evaluation M.

William Distribution, post-dissolution increases Rep. expressly that 10 Fam. Law Equitable (1983). (BNA) 3001, property when pension The formula is as benefits are marital 3007 court, in the sound exercise of its follows: discretion, pension under either Years of Service divides the n Monthly During x x Benefit jurisdic- distribution or reserve the deferred Taxes) (After of Total Years partnership” The tion method. “economic Service necessarily between pension continues ap has been The “time rule” formula (or post-dissolution increases parties See, jurisdictions. by a number of proved decreases) proper- pension are marital 482, e.g., Cooper Cooper, v. 167 Ariz. 808 P.2d paid ty nonemployee spouse unless denied, 1234, (Ct.App.1990), 1242 review present value of his or her share of the net (Ariz. 7, 1991); May Frei pension at the time of dissolution. ‍‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌​​​‍792, 304, Cal.Rptr. 127 berg, Cal.App.3d 57 (1976); Stouffer, Haw.App. 10 796 v. Stouffer (1994); 267, 226, B. v. 867 P.2d 231 Warner Warner, 1339, (La.1995); 1340 651 So.2d cases, however, petitioners The both (Mo. 20, Lynch Lynch, 665 23-24 v. S.W.2d statutorily that the trial court is con- assert 294, Rolfe, Ct.App.1983); v. 234 Mont. Rolfe dividing separate property, strained from Gemma, 223, (1988); Gemma v. 766 P.2d acquired mar- after the which (1989); 458, 429, Berry 105 Nev. 778 P.2d riage. рetitioners implementation The seek Meadows, 1017, v. 103 N.M. “bright post- likens of a line” rule which Welder, (Ct.App.1986); v. Welder post-di- enhancements divorce (N.D.1994); Woodward N.W.2d in- earnings and characterizes all such vorce (Utah 1982). Woodward, 433-34 separate property creases as the of the em- ployee spouse.

III. earnings indisput Post-divorce are A. ably separate property. See J. Thomas Old- present disputes appli- ham, Divorce, arose because Separation and the Distribu necessarily (1987 cation of the “time rule” formula § Property tion & 1995 7-10[5] “Oldham”). (hereinafter post-dissolution includes enhance- Similarly, Supp.) Thus, presented ments.6 the issue is wheth- property acquired by party after the disso UDMA, er, enhanced ben- under 14-10- lution is immunized from division. post-dissolution 113(2)(c). however, in rank efits due to increases agree, that it We do not “acquired” during marriage under post-divorce pension enhance follows 14-10-113(2). practical section Stated separate property ments are under the same terms, question nonemploy- is whether rationale. eligible should be to receive a ee split on this issue. There Jurisdictions are percentage employee spouse’s pension *8 general authority. of line are two lines One by on the of the rank held

benefits basis adopts “bright line” rule decisions employee spouse on the date of dissolution by petitioners advocated here. The oth- or, alternatively, based on the rank held at approves er line of decisions use-of the “time the time the benefits are received. incorporates distribution rule” formula which view, implicitly post-marital pension enhancements. This

In our this issue was decisions, line based on the “mari- decided in and Gallo when we autho second Grubb theory, delay tal foundation” has a more solid theo- rized trial courts to distribution by premise and fair pension of the deferred dis retical and is sensible use approach.- or methods of tribution reserve passive post-dissolution petitioners 6. enhancements at issue in both cases concede that The rank, properly apportioned pertain only passive to their to increases in not increases were cost-of-living spouses. The increases such as increases. 533 Gallo, post- Similarly, approved we the award- equate cases “bright line” rule ing appropriate percentage pension benefit enhancements of “the dissolution n with See, earnings. e.g., ‘if, as, post-dissolution payment marital interest each and ” Koelsch, 176, P.2d when, 148 Ariz. 713 Koelsch v. paid equally it is out’ order to ”) (hereinafter (1986) 1234, II 1239 upon “Koelsch apportion the risk of forfeiture both “time rule” formula (holding that use of the parties. (quoting 752 P.2d at 55 John- that fruits of labor contravenes the notion Johnson, 38, 705, son v. 131 Ariz. 638 P.2d marriage community expended during are (1981)). 708 earnings after the mar property whereas Shill, riage separate property); Shill v. are IV. (1988) 115, 140, 115 Idaho 143 impermissibly (holding that A. increases in benefits accru awarded agree employed by with the rationale ing since such benefits are not after divorce jurisdictions reject “bright those which marriage” and hence “acquired approve line” rule and the use of the “time separate); Berrington Berrington, 534 are v. rule” formula under the “marital foundation” (1993) 393, 589, (holding Pa. 633 A.2d 594 See, Adams, theory. e.g., In re that “in a deferred distribution of a defined 181, 298, Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 64 134 302 pension, participating benefit (1976) (holding “[t]wo of the factors may any portion par not be awarded increase, causing namely job’ ‘time on the ticipant-spouse’s benefits which retirement earnings, directly and increased were en- post-separation salary are based on increas by many years service”); hanced credited to the es, incentive awards Stoerkel, (Tex. 945, marriage”); v. 711 Stoerkel S.W.2d Berry Berry, v. 647 S.W.2d 946 1983) 594, (Mo.Ct.App.1986) (holding that “in- (disapproving it the “time rule” since “ part awarding ‘has the effect of benefits accru creased bеnefits arise from the ser- ing [employee spouse] performed during after the di vice and ”) nonemployee spouse]’ proper [the vorce from it to make on that reason the award Rister, (quoting [the the basis of the total amount which 72, (Tex.Ct.App.1974)). S.W.2d employee spouse] would receive the time commence”); Lynch Lynch, such benefits to follow this line of decisional We decline (Mo.Ct.App.1983) (holding 665 S.W.2d authority. “bright We find that line” higher that “the retirement benefits underlying principles rule contravenes the [employee spouse] by be realized con- unduly constrains distribution employment tinued after the dissolution statutorily performing from their courts possible, part, [the made duty prescribed under the UDMA. Further- spouse’s] years employment during the above, more, adoption would be as noted its Gemma, marriage”); Gemma v. 105 Nev. contrary decisions. to our Grubb Gallo (1989) (noting Grubb, approved In the use of the de- building “early working periods are the percent- ferred method of distribution on a mobility hopefully upward blocks noting spouses age basis that it allows both salary” and no method is “[w]hile increased in the incremental value of the to share perfect, advantages of the ‘time rule’ “equally apportioning risk while clearly outweigh any other method of upon parties to the of forfeiture both dissolu- Bullock, division”);7 Grubb, Bullock v. 354 N.W.2d proceeding.” tion 745 P.2d at 666. instances, Gemma, Supreme the court held that the Court held 431. In those the Nevada possibility compelling employee spouse request that a situation ad- *9 out could the court in requiring opposite may the conclusion occur "if jurisdiction and that this meth- vance to reserve employee spouse undergraduate the attained procedure "providefc] a to accommodate od degree promotions and received or an advanced relatively where it would be those few cases department, transferred to an with the same or nonemployee spouse re- inequitable the to for entirely governmental service with new area of upon high sala- retirement benefits based ceive salary an increased but remained within the cov- employee spouse's post- ry level achieved the Gemma, erage pension plan." 778 P.2d 534 identically to (N.D.1984) must be treated

904, (holding that the hus hancement 910 cost-of-living in- passive increases such as during the military service “years of band’s pension to or increases ascribable creases for marriage provided a basis parties’ equitably apportion plan changes in order to pay and increases promotions future delay in the deferred the risks of inherent he become length of service which and reserve methods distribution “military earning career and entitled” and his of benefits.8 for distribution enhanced ability developed and were parties’ seven throughout course of the marriage significant the length of the is a The v. Buli years marriage”); prop- Bulicek of marital teen consideration in distribution 630, 394, cek, recognized that the total Wash.App. erty. 800 P.2d 399 have 59 Courts (1990) years dur- number of credited the (holding prospective that “the increase marriage factor in the ing the is a substantial pay to increased benefits due retirement Cooper Cooper, pension’s distribution. See v. [length of separation founded on the after is 1234, (1990), 482, P.2d 1242 167 Ariz. 808 effort”). community marriage] the (Ariz. denied, 7, 1991); May In re review 1, Poppe, Cal.App.3d 97 158 B. (1979); 500, Cal.Rptr. 503-04 recognizes formula that The “time rule” Adams, 181, Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 64 134 pension benefit enhancements post-divorce (1976). 298, length marriage 302 The is defy easy categorization. Typically, there during employment play into in two comes during the commingling of effort undertaken First, ways. it is relevant to the determina- marriage which to- marriage and after the method which the tion of the future bene- gether enhance value marriage per- A short term often divided. spouse’s ability to en- fit. The mits immediate distribution of the marriage after the hance the future benefit Second, under the value method. on foundation work and frequently builds component of the “time the marital fraction during marriage. undertaken efforts fairly apportion rule” formula serves Hence, theory underlying the “time rule” length it reflects the enhancement because called the “marital foundation” formula is Thus, marriage. the “time rule” formula (2d theory. at 66 ed. See Turner 6.10 alleviates concerns as to what Supp.). agree with the cases cited 1995 enhancement is related to either the nonem- accept foundation” employee’s during that the “marital ployee’s above efforts Thus, although marriage. employee spouse If continues theory. we find that some- effort, beyond or she post-dissolution en- to work the date on which he times related to Id., distinguished pursuant theories 8. Turner has two effort and achievement.” approved at 432. to which courts have the use of the Fondi, 856, predominant Subsequently, Nev. rationale in Fondi v. "time rule” formula. The (1990), Supreme 802 P.2d 1264 Court of theory. Other is the “marital courts, however, foundation” explained that the "usual” situation in Nevada post-dissolution pension treat appropriate, the "time rule" formula is which passive appreciation of bene enhancements like employee's wage increases were sim- "where marriage. Turner fits that accrue ply living, gradual cost of or a due to rise in the (2d (citing Supp.) § 6.10 at 65-66 ed. 1995 Stouf Id., up corporate movement ladder." 267, Stouffer, Haw.App. 867 P.2d 226 v. fer supplied). (emphasis at 1266 Barlow, (1994); N.C.App. Barlow v. position Supreme Court of Nevada’s has (1994); Banagan, Banagan Va. S.E.2d 464 by one commentator as an been characterized (1993)). App. 437 S.E.2d 229 Under this imposes pre intermediary position because it rationale, sepa “time rule” formula alternate sumption post-dissolution enhancements passive appreciation of marital rates (2d § 6.10 at 67 ed. 1995 marital. See Turner (benefits marriage) sepa from attributable Supp.). presump The burden to overcome the By stating post-dissolu rate Id. employee spouse rests with the who can tion should be treated in the same tion enhancements enhance come forward with evidence that the agreed parties to treat manner as the here have extraordinary post-dissolu ments resulted from increases, passive suggest we do not mean to analysis Id. The Gemma has been tion efforts. Rather, rationale. we follow this alternate Supreme adopted by Court of Louisiana agree adopting (La. the "marital foun with cases Hodgins, 586 So.2d 127-28 Hare v. 1991). theory. dation” *10 benefits, weight in formula.” and the receive extra Old- eligible to receive Therefore, § as of the date court orders distribution ham at 7-69. de- 7.10[5][c][iii] eligibility, rather than receipt of benefits pending plan, years of on the the earlier of adequately compensates marital fraction employment, occurring during marriage, employee spouse for rewards the his and years employment, occurring or the later of efforts. This is so because the her continued post-dissolution, may greater weight in have length fraction is based on the of the contributing to the benefit. The “time rule” (or years employment marriage of year employment formula treats each of service) employee military versus equally. This unburdens trial courts from (or military spouse’s employment total ser- having years to assess which have more vice). years employee spouse’s total As the weight the accumulation of toward the bene- (or service) increase, employment Thereby, fit. “time rule” formula inter- pen- nonemployee spouse’s share of the highest salary nalizes the notion that necessarily decreases. sion product realized is the of all extension, “bright prior years sensibly rejects By logical line” rule and the miscon- require attempt parse ception particular years employment courts to out would that portion post-dissolution vacuum, “marital” snapshot can be examined in a like a fine” rule.9 “separate” portion, from the time, enhancement “bright as under the i.e., solely attributable Furthermore, agree Supreme with the employee spouse and not relat- efforts analysis Court of Arkansas’ in Askins v. As Implemen- ed to the whatsoever. kins, (1986). 288 Ark. S.W.2d formula, in tation of the “time rule” the first Askins, acknowledged the court instance, accomplishes goal and removes “[t]he enhancement of the ultimate retire complicated, time-consuming, courts from the pay may ment be most dramatic at the end” inefficient, hopelessly and flawed task of but nevertheless sanctioned the “time rule” evaluating the enhancement and denominat- formula because it could not hold that marital, ing sepa- the enhancement as either wife’s “contribution to the was rate, passive, or some combination thereof. less because she was married to hus [the (2d § Supp.) Turner 6.10 at 65 ed. 1995 See in the middle of his career than it band] (the time rule formula has the benefit of would have been had she been married to simplicity “it because avoids the need to for, Id., say, years him the last twelve of it.” messy draw distinctions between different at 634. S.W.2d increases”). types postdivorce It is not appropriate for courts to delve into this sort juris- If the trial court decides to reserve analysis for a number of reasons. Such income, diction over future stream inquiry widely divergent would lead to pertinent court can consider all the events results, inject inconsistent an element of fault transpired that have since the dissolution. division, into the and enmesh the knowing The court also benefits from parties’ many years. courts fives for pension payout, exact amount of the which is However, already certainty fixed. this rule, adopt “bright

If we were to line” price. prolongs It comes with distribu- required courts also would be to consider the costs, years process, legal tion increases and under- weight employment towards Instead, goals finality. pension. cuts a trial court enhancement of the Some defined plans legitimately benefit are “frontloaded” or “backload- choose to defer distribution ed,” by way employment apportion i.e. “earlier or later the benefits in advance explained employment) 9. One commentator that courts that and the time at which the adopted theory: have the "marital resulting (generally foundation” retirement benefits accrue plans employment) have also noted that most later has reinforced the belief retirement are employees end-loaded: if two do the same ac- of some courts that retirement benefits salary, [sic] work for the same but one has quired for the after divorce consideration other, seniority more employee than the the more senior just employee's period entire of service and not acquires often more retirement bene- for service after the divorce. fits. This difference between the time at which (2d Supp.). Turner 6.10 at 66 ed. 1995 employees perform (generally services earlier *11 de that accrue the increased benefits 752 P.2d percentage. See of a fixed (“Further (holding Stouffer, can be at 232 lay. to the courts resort See ameliorated, however, determining a for- by required spouse] is [nonemployee “if the by payments the percentage which mula employed until the after the divorce to wait time of the dissolu- be divided at the should or she receives the party retires before he (ex- Bulicek, decree.”); 800 P.2d at 399 tion employed party’s retire percentage of the award of percentage a fixed plaining that then he or she should be payments, ment an as-received basis pension benefits on all of the em percentage awarded it “avoids diffi- encouraged be because should if, payments ployed party’s retirement as in- problems, shares the risks cult valuation made”); (recog Rolfe, 766 P.2d at 226 when income, receipt in deferred herent nizing if is deferred the distribution spouses of income to both provides a source spouse lose interest nonemployee stands to likely greater will be at a time when there compensated). and should be it”). changed cir- need for Consideration jurisdiction under the reserve cumstances recognize that important It is to fixing percentage analogous is to method lead to unfair and “bright line” rule can spouse in advance on an as- share of each only illogical affecting not the nonem- results received basis. spouse. ployee spouse employee also the but example, promotion, in addition to For distribution In both the deferred subject post-dissolu- employee spouse is methods, the nonem- and reserve usually results tion demotion. Demotion his or her ployee spouse must wait to receive those the em- benefits that are lower than Consequently, as al pension. share of eligible spouse been ployee would have discussed, ready receipt of the benefits is had he or she retired at the date receive variables.10 contingent upon a number of ap- “bright line” dissolution. Under Grubb, “[a]ny contingencies we noted that proach, employee spouse would still have underlying commencement of re the actual pension plan pay proportion should be out a tirement under a account, determining nonemployee spouse taken into not when would have pension plan properly is includa- whether the eligible to receive had the been estate, but, rather, in the marital when ble spouse retired on the date of dissolution even disposes of marital be the court not forth- though anticipated amount was Grubb, parties.” 745 P.2d at 665 tween the coming. appropriate it is We find that holds (emphasis suppliеd). The same notion spouse in the con- nonemployee to share where, here, contingency true contingency tingency of as the loss as well survival, only also increase or decrease but gain. This value based on uncertain future events. reject holding, explicitly In so the rea- since, particularly compelling for the most Supreme soning employed by the Arizona risks, uncertainty part, delay, and II, 176, 713 P.2d in Koelsch 148 Ariz. Court benefits, in the control receipt II, at the time 1234. In Koelsch the husband nonemployee employee spouse. If the away from of the decree was six months spouse must bear the risks attendant to wait eligibility He chose to con- ing, nonemployee should share for retirement. then the following Spouse ‍‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌​​​‍contingencies 6. dies before retirement. 10. The include Spouse events: 7. dies after retirement but before terminates, benefits, spouse. Spouse withdraws other 1. Significant changes [benefits]. [em- and does not reinstate are made 8. terminates, benefits, Spouse 2. withdraws ployer] retirement in after divorce and before subsequently upon reinstate reem- does the accrual of benefits. ployment. Significant changes [em- are made 9. terminates, Spouse withdraw ben- does not ployer] of benefit after retirement in level efits, as matured. and leaves payments. spouse spouse 4. Other dies before has either (2d ed.1994) (footnote omit Turner 6.11 at 351 elected to terminate or retire. Broadhead, ted) (citing Broadhead v. but be- 5. Other dies after retirement (Wyo.1987)). 736 n. 5 spouse. fore *12 delay working receipt and of benefits the fact that the economic tinue circumstances of many marriages permit do not in immediate which would result increased pension’s present distribution of the value. ultimately court when he retired. The lower nonemployee spouse The often remains an applied formula and deferred the “time rule” “involuntary investor” who should be com- compensation began until to the husband re- pensated fairly. reasoning ceive his benefits that: case, In in consideration of the one such C. spouse foregoing present enjoyment the II The Koelsch decision is cited benefits, any he or she share in will frequently very proposition for the we now employ- in benefits that continued increase First, reject.11 post-dissolution we hold that produce, including in ment will increase categorically separate enhancements are not pension salary. benefits and The covered Second, but rather are marital. we hold that spouse complete has control of who now nonemployee spouse compensat should be the time when benefits will be received forfeiture, delay ed receipt, for risk in and reap continue to work and the re- timing receipt lack of control over the thereof, wards but does so with the knowl- appropriate way compensate benefits. An to edge ex-spouse’s that the interest in retire- nonemployee spouse permit is to him or ment benefits is fixed and he she in post-dissolution her to share enhance employ- will share in what the continued ments. This serves achieve a balance produce. ment will between, hand, employee’s on the one II, (quoting Koelsch 713 P.2d at 1237 in making, unilateral control decision and on Koelsch, 187, 148 Ariz. 1249 other, nonemployee’s interest in the (Koelsch I)). (Ariz.Ct.App.1984) Likewise, pension. nonemployee if spouse contingencies, shares in beneficial Supreme unequivo- Court of Arizona nonemployee spouse also should share cally rejected appeals’ reasoning: the court of post-dissolution pension risks of decreases. appeals attempted The court of to amelio- rate the risk of loss faced the non- Moreover, parties if the each have a con- employee spouse by devising a formula tinuing interest in the that extends permit which would to share in beyond marriage, partner- the “economic ship” forged during the future increases in the bene- in effect Thus, compromise improper marriage. fits. This particular- for sev- survives the it is First, ly appropriate parties improperly eral reasons. it that both share in the allows risks, detrimental, both beneficial and non-employee spouse associ- to share delayed ated with distribution. post-dissolution separate property earn- ings employee-spouse. Since great The trial court has latitude non-employee spouse legally cannot share equitable to effect an distribution based prospective delayed in the benefits of upon the facts and circumstances of each retirement, he or she should be forced 14-10-113(1), (1987); case. 6B C.R.S. see potential to share in the risks such a Radigan Radigan, also v. 465 N.W.2d non-employee spouse venture. The should (S.D.1991); Bullock, 910; N.W.2d involuntary not be made to be an investor Bulicek, Certainly 800 P.2d at 396. the un ex-spouse’s pension plan. in an derlying purposes equitable distribution II, (emphasis Koelsch 713 P.2d at 1239-40 equity general preclude from courts supplied). While the underscored state- application rigid categories. blind appeal, they ignore key ments have explained equita- some surface have to an “[t]he Id., Subsequently, Cooper Cooper, 167 Ariz. contribution versus defined benefit.” (1990), denied, (Ariz. Although disagree 808 P.2d 1234 review P.2d at 1241. we with the 7, 1991), May appellate reasoning employed by Supreme an Arizona court inter- the Arizona II, preted distinguished Supreme the Arizona Court in Koelsch find that the pensions Court’s decision in Koelsch II because the "blan- before us here are akin to the post-dissolution plan Cooper, plan, ket statement” that and all a defined benefit rather II, separate property plan increases are “fails to account than that in Koelsch a defined benefit i.e., plans, requiring employee for the differences in benefit defined contributions. UDMA] article “[t]his [the states that fairness, not mathematical which ble distribution (emphasis as to effec- applied 752 P.2d at 55 so and construed precision.” shall be fair shaping uniform supplied). general purpose to make tuate its distribution, court considers numer subject the trial respect of this law with totahty-of-the-circumstances in a ous factors it.” among those states which enact article wrong permit the analysis. be It would recognized legisla- this previously We have many weigh and balance trial court Wells, mandate. tive *13 respect with competing considerations (Colo.1993). analogous to Statutes P.2d 694 “bright impose a property division and then by other been codified seven the UDMA have respect to enhanced test with line” states, four have rec- states. Of these seven particularly true because This benefits. ognized trial court should be afforded that a only impor pension benefits are often dividing in marital as- discretion considerable estate. See Old asset in the' marital tant sets.12 (“Pension rights fre ham at 7-41 7-10[1] codified the Although not a state that has significant portion of the quently represent a UDMA, long pro- courts have California estate.”). aggregate value of the marital permitting pounded a rationale for similar in Accordingly, premium is a such sit there post-dissolution enhance- division flexibility. on uations In by “time rule.” application ments review, appellate court must On 302, Adams, Cal.Rptr. at the court ex- 134 by disturb the delicate balance achieved position plained its as such: in the trial court division rule, selecting in general “As a method is best-situated to render the dis trial court community inter- effect distribution instance, and its decision in the first tribution rights court acts in in retirement est appeal on unless should not be disturbed judicial discretion and its the exercise of discretion. has been a clear abuse of there respecting such will not be determination Further, shifting the trial court’s distribution appeal with on unless an abuse interfered by achieved may skew the delicate balance gov- The criterion of discretion is shown. re trial court’s distribution. This is erning judicial actions is reasonableness of discretion standard of flected the abuse the circumstances. The method under review. may vary in each adopted with facts case.”

D. Adams) by (quoting UDMA, (emphasis supplied guided Id. construing In we are 14-10-104(1), (1987), Marriage Freiberg, Cal.App.3d 57 6B In re section C.R.S. solely employee adopted to [the other that have stat- increases are attributable 12. The seven states efforts, Marriage spouse's] increments result on the Uniform and Divorce own such as utes based based) Arizona, excluded). (on ing promotions" Act which the UDMA is from which be Minnesota, Missouri, Illinois, Kentucky, conflicting Mon- case law on this issue. Illinois has tana, Wells, Alshouse, Washington. at 696 n. Marriage and 850 P.2d Compare 255 Ill. In re Act, (citing Marriage 960, 394, 396, Uniform and Divorce 9A 3 App.3d N.E.2d 194 Ill.Dec. 627 these, Arizona, (1987 Supp.)). 731, (1994) U.L.A. Missouri, & 1992 Of (holding that the trial court did 733 Montana, recog- Washington have using the "time rule” not abuse its discretion court is afforded considerable nized that the trial employee spouse’s objections formula over the dividing and have discretion in marital assets grant does not that the formula nonemployee spouse held in favor of the in cases worked, the benefit of "additional Cooper, this court. See similar to the ones before earning occurring the dis the increases in solution, after 482, 1234; Stoerkel, 167 Ariz. 808 P.2d 711 changes pension plan, all and the in the 223; 594; 294, Rolfe, 234 Mont. S.W.2d increased value of of which contributed to the Bulicek, 630, Wash.App. 59 800 P.2d 394. denied, 555, appeal pension”), 156 Ill.2d 202 918, (1994) states, 638 N.E.2d with In re Ill.Dec. 1112 remaining acknowledge Of the three Blackston, 401, Ill.App.3d 196 258 opposite ap adopted that Minnesota has 606, (1994) (holding Petschel, Ill.Dec. 630 N.E.2d 541 proach. 406 N.W.2d See Petschel (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (approving 604, granting nonemployee erred a fixed 607 post-dissolu of benefits that accrued percentage approach noting but that future sala prior making "legitimate no mention of the con ry concern" so that tion increases are ). Kentucky trary [employee spouse] may present decision reached in Alshouse evidence “the showing part post-dissolution salary to have considered this issue. does not seem what (1976)). 792, post-dissolution pension ment of Cal.Rptr. Guided enhance- standard, ultimately by this flexible the California ments turns on the method of Appeal court, trial court did employed by found that the distribution Court the trial using the date of particular not abuse its discretion which is driven circum- apportioning retirement marriage. retirement when stances of the A trial court’s dis- holding, gave the court determining benefits. so cretion lies in which of the three weight fact that the lasted apportioning pension. methods to use in twenty-one years seven months and end post-dissolution The treatment of enhance- shortly ed before the was distribut ments flows from this determination. Adams, Cal.Rptr. ed. at 302. The benefits associated with immedi jurisdictions Other have also accorded particularly compelling ate distribution are See, great e.g., trial court. deference pen those instances where the value of the Johnsrud, 181 Mont. sion benefits minimal relative to the mari (1977) (“The [trial court] *14 pension tal estate. A division benefits on hamstrung devising need not be in methods present a net value basis at the time of proper- accomplish to division of appropriate, dissolution example, is for (Utah ); Turner, ty.” Turner v. 649 P.2d 6 pension those cases where the value of the is 1982) (refusing modify equi- to a trial court’s employee spouse small because the has clearly unjust table distribution unless relatively qualifying years during worked few discretion). clear abuse employee spouse or the earned relatively pay.13 low rate of This method V. may appropriate if spouses also be both have reject Synthesizing the decisions parallel pension careers and their benefits rule,

ing “bright line” we set forth the near-equal value. following guidelines for a trial court faced pension part with a which accumulated in If permit, circumstances and the tri marriage. recognize opts that in court present al to use the net value method, post-dissolution nonemployee certain cases in a spouse exchanges increases pension separate prop contingent post-dissolution should be treated as future enhance However, erty. pension qualifies sepa ments for the benefits of immediate distribu time, property post-dissolution employee spouse rate treatment of tion. At the same only reaps potential increases if the trial court can award the the benefit of enhancements pension present theory post-dissolution.14 practical under net value that occur In ef fect, at the time of If present dissolution. the value of the the use of the net value method pension very cannot be divided at the time of avoids the raised in the cases issues because, presently dissolution but must be it divided when before us. This is so received, post- among things, present received or could be then other the net value property upon employee dissolution increases are marital un calculation is based theory. spouse’s salary der the “marital foundation” Treat- at the time of divorce.15 See Raimer, value, example, appro- pension 13. For [i]n the trial court order to reduce a to priately pension, pursuant (1) awarded necessary Wife’s to it is to know the amount of the eligible division, (2) $68 which she is to at monthly receive her, month subject benefits to age entirely to and offset the value percentage of that to be awarded to the benefit pension against other in the mari- (3) nonemployee spouse, and when that benefit tal estate. begin payment. would Where it cannot be known will be until the what these variables addition, employee sрouse employee spouse actually begins 14. In if the foresees retires and benefits, extraordinaiy that his or unnecessary, her efforts will dramati- receive retirement it is cally increase the value of the after the improper, employee indeed to wait until the marriage, spouse may have an incentive to spouse actually retires and use the actual nonemployee “cash out” the interest of the spouse. amounts received Rather, circumstances, spouse. Under such each pension benefits the amount of the stands can, should, to benefit. be determined at the time of (1) upon assumptions: divorce based three particular, employee spouse that the would retire at the 540 Svalina, effecting a distribution of interests B. Mari- Tingley & Nicholas John ed.1995). (2d fac- Relevant property under UDMA. § at 83 Property Law 10.08

tal include the contribu- tors under the UDMA present value serves of net Distribution acquisition of spouse to the tions of each finality. parties goals It allows a home- including contributions of property, pro financially and disentangle themselves maker, apart to set the value Moore v. some measure of closure. See vides circumstances spouse, and the economic each (1989) Moore, A.2d 114 N.J. 14-10-113(1). Among spouse. of each (“The proceedings is to elimi goal of divorce balancing parties’ inter- things, other and strife between possible nate contact court assess which help the trial ests will (“such Shill, P.2d at 145 parties.”); is best suited method of distribution of disentan would have the merit solution For exam- particular for the circumstances. at a finite gling parties and their affairs weigh can the value of the ple, time”). Immediate offset also fos point marital estate relative to the II, P.2d judicial efficiency. Koelsch ters offset, if and ascertain whether immediate par for the 1241. It is more economical possible, appropriate under the circum- thеy not have to return ties because do may Alternatively, court the trial stances. A of other at a later date. number courts parties should a conclusion that both reach general prefer jurisdictions have stated a presented equally contingencies share present value method for ence for the net plan. The and unmatured an unvested See, e.g., similar reasons. Diffenderfer distribution, court, in advance of *15 (Fla.1986); De Diffenderfer, 491 265 So.2d of percentage calculate the share each Dewan, 506 N.E.2d 399 Mass. wan pension. in the (1987). choice of a distribution method The however, If, do the circumstances of the trial lies within the sound discretion because immediate distribution warrant Supreme Court of Okla court. Like the in the estate to there are insufficient assets homa, any specific “to dictate we hesitate offset, permit or the value of the distributing pension technique for benefits ascertain, future benefit is too difficult plan presents pension each a divorce because necessary may find it to utilize trial court problems.” Pulliam v. a different set of or the re either the deferred distribution (Okl.1990). Pulliam, 623, 626 We See, Gallo, e.g., method. serve leeway accorded trial courts substantial have Nelson, 55; 752 P.2d at of determining which method of distribution (Colo.1987). of ei Use circum suits the needs and financial best the risks to ther of these methods increases Grubb, 745 P.2d parties. stances of the See differing nonemployee spouse and entails (“Our is not to create at 665 intent here interaction between the levels of continued valuation.”). Al rules of inflexible In parties and with the court.16 consider flexibility of such trial court serves lowance and the continued ation of the increased risks goals Col of distribution. See parties partnership” between the “economic Bene bey Campbell, Distribution Pension delayed of distri under either of the methods Determining in Marital Dissolutions: fits bution, always post-dissolution enhancements Community Time Evaluation property if distri must be treated as marital Interest, 24 Property Santa Clara L.Rev. delayed. bution is (1984) (noting that because of the differ plans composition pension “courts determining the method of distri ence bution, parties’ apportionment various methods of to as the trial court balances the use Svalina, (2) plan; Tingley Marital permitted that 1 John & Nicholas B. earliest date under the ed.1995). (2d Property 10.08 at 82-83 Law pension upon is based divorce; (3) spouse's salary at the time of methods, remaining that of the two note pension ‍‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌​​​‍upon that the is based the number advantages outweigh of deferred distribution up years earned to the date jurisdiction. of credited service See discussion su- those of reserve 535; pra p. 752 P.2d at 55. see also of divorce. Obviously, something it’s I spouse’s interest in retirement ben consider. It’s certain a something attempt equita par- funds I consider that —that in an to distribute efits time, I bly”). guidelines we set forth here ties were married say, certainly something element of trial court started to and it’s retain the essential guidance going I’m I flexibility providing some consider when determine while here, rely proper amount of upon courts to when confronted maintenance calculation, proper plan. [Hus- but should awith service, military band] retire from the Having post-dissolution concluded that en- years marriage the 10—the 10 over the are marital hancements of military time, proba- amount of service if is de- distribution of the benefit bly perhaps longer stays if [Husband] layed, the trial we now consider whether it, course, longer, by— and then divide abused their discretion in courts nonetheless percent payable or takes it times 50 the cases before us. as her share of [Wife] [Husband’s] retirement.

VI. The Hunt court also ruled in its written order: Here, Hunt court considered the rele- The court believes that mili- [Husband’s] and effected distribution based vant factors tary retirement is an asset must which be equities. The court ruled that on the divided the court. The cоurt finds that nonemployee spouse pen- should share in the figure of ten is a [Husband’s] correct sion at the time of retirement because figure. Although the court reasonable length marriage dur- of their and her efforts marriage finds that this is a of almost ing marriage. The Raimer court similar- years, recognizes fourteen the court ly length considered the only years military there have been ten ruling nonemployee spouse could service attributable and creditable toward share in the at the time of retire- result, retirement. As a should [Husband] court, however, misap- ment. The Raimer *16 retire, the numerator for division of plied Accordingly, the “time rule” formula. any military ten retirement shall be over we find that the Raimer court its abused years of in number service whatever discretion. proposal those be. for [Husband’s] division of this as an of asset asset re A In Hunt marriage using present a value calculation convincing. is not The court does not find orally trial court in The Hunt held: by that the value calculation made retirement, regard military to I With any generally accepted follows [Husband] any question my don’t have in mind that accounting court find standards. The does [Wife] is entitled —entitled to a share of military that retirement benefit shall be military that retirement should —should using divided the fractions noted above 10-year I [Husband] retire. think that the upon based rank at the time [Husband’s] figure good figure. is a I understand that argued [Husband] retirement. has talking 14-year marriage. we about upon [Hus- calculation should be based And I understand that —that in most cir- rank at The band’s] the time divorce. [Husband] cumstances that would be—or authority position. court finds no for this [Wife] would be entitled to that calculation The factual circumstances demon years. which would include the whole strate that the Hunt court did not abuse its retirement, part It’s not of the as I under- making discretion in distribu stand it. It’s —the time that [Husband] tion. in took out order to attend medical school time, as I disallowed—[dis]allowed a— B. Raimer it, testimony understand from the herе. going initially I’m in made And not to order that the retire- court Raimer following ruling: ment be calculated on that disallowed time. oral really percentage The Court has reduced property, what we’re As to the other military pension. for reasons earlier stated on dealing here is the from 50 to 40 with adopt will the re- fraction is a And I think the Court the record. The coverture method and the nor- [sic] serve numerator of 14 and a fraction with the way dealing with that would be years mal equal denominator number years which is the Court’s view to divide time [Husband] of service at when military married life again approximate of retires. parties which is what of these Although find that the Raimer decree, put had in at the time of the he not abuse its discretion trial court did up and I come with divide that two utilizing deferring distribution17 But something percent for her. like 37 formula, we find that the court “time rule” reasons. going I’m to discount that for two altering abused its discretion nevertheless One, support lukewarm at best. her was forty according percent the formula and Wife And, two, up has with a bit she ended instead So, property. going I’m more of the fifty percent. percent receive 25 order she military retirement benefit and order Sur- Initially, court we note that the Raimer if, you say, Plan as Mr. Van vivor’s Benefit interjected inappropriately marital fault con attorney], possible. I that’s [Wife’s Culin analysis. siderations into the distribution pay think it is. But that she has parties’ The determination of the contribu plan of the retire- out her share acquisition tions to the of marital way that’s the we’ll work that. ment. So any way. marital fault in See cannot assess fair for her under the I think that’s a share § 14-10-113. support fully circumstances. did not She however, recognize, that some authori- for a career while. permit of “economic fault” ties consideration himself said when he was [Husband] distinguished from “marital fault” captain, did. And it’s lieutenant or she division of marital See Turner coupled her after that she didn’t. So with (2d ed.1994). Although 8.09 coupled getting mоre of the fault,” on using the term “economic we relied although support, with her lack of it didn’t concept arising a similar a case before end, I hurt his career toward the think Liggett Liggett, adoption of the UDMA. I that’s a fair allocation and that’s what (1963). 152 Colo. 380 P.2d 673 will order. concept “Economic fault” is a limited which Subsequently, in Raimer *17 only ruling play comes into in extreme cases such amended its and stated that: spouse’s dissipation marital assets as the of method of [sic] The reserve See, e.g., contemplation in of divorce.18 the dividing military appro- retirement is (Colo. Ebel, 874 P.2d 406 priate under these circumstances. App.1993) (approving trial court’s distribu share should be calculated as follows based fifty-six percent tion of marital assets to upon finding that the the Court’s earlier forty-four percent to be wife and husband 14 parties during had been married unilaterally had withdrawn cause husband military career. The [Husband’s] course), jointly golf assets from owned military their formula for share of the [Wife’s] (Colo. denied, 23, May cert. No. re- 94SC44 retirement should be the benefit when 1994). prohibition by multiplied Given the UDMA’s ceived times [Husband] fault,” percent. against “marital it is the coverture faction times 40 consideration of $900,000 terminology opinion, against pensions used in this “borrowed" two from 17. Under mistakenly methodology corporation). called its his medical We leave for another jurisdiction." supra “reserve See note 1. day question whether distribution of deferred pension appropriate in such a case. would be 18. Some economic fault cases have arisen involv dissipa The case before us here does not involve See, ing dissipation pension e.g., In re assets. tion of assets. 168, Malters, Ill.App.3d Ill. 88 460, (1985) (husband Dec. 478 N.E.2d 1068 integrity especially important that “economic fault” be of the formula and detracts from its strictly very purpose. it not become a confined so that does prohibition. The means to circumvent that multiplier If representing parties’

Liggett problems inherent case illustrates the (1/2 fifty percent) adjusted up shares or fault” and distinguishing in between “marital case, down as it was this the method of case, upheld “economic fault.” In that distributing hybrid. becomes a any the trial court’s refusal to award is, part That is distributed Liggett in part, to the wife. immediately by discounting spouse’s one dissipation volved the wife’s of marital assets augmenting spouse’s share and the other $12,000 apply since she failed to some toward finding share because of the of “economic payment mortgage resulting in of a hotel pension, fault.” The remainder of the how- property through the loss of the foreclosure. ever, “ paid out under deferred distribution 112, Liggett, 152 380 P.2d at 674. Colo. ” ‘if, as, it is when’ received. However, upholding this court’s rationale for Johnson, (quoting P.2d at 55 Johnson the award of all marital to the (1981)). Ariz. Husband indistinguishable finding husband is from a proposed way quantify has no rational to marital fault: parts hybrid pension two of this division and [W]here, here, the court found that the we know of none. period wife failed the entire relationship perform to her This lack of sound theoretical basis partner duties as a wife and a in the hybrid distribution leads us to the final marriage relationship did not contrib- rejecting reason for the Raimer trial court’s ute to business or financial resources discounting nonemployee of the share of the parties, addiction and but her spouse: wholly subjective. arbitrary it is upon conduct constituted a drain the hus- percent imposed by The ten discount detriment, band to his embarrassment and trial court has no basis in the evidence and say we cannot as a matter of law that she apparently was selected as some form of is entitled to a division of rough justice penalize nonemployee spouse for what the trial court viewed as her finding Id. at 380 P.2d at 675. This phase lackluster interest one her hus- upheld could not be under the UDMA and military Penalizing band’s career. the non- Liggett pre-UDMA must be limited cases. course, employee spouse, of has the direct support The facts in Raimer do not awarding effect of a bonus to the initially conclusion of fault.” “economic Wife increasing pen- his share of the military supported Husband’s career but en- sion. couraged military him to leave the which he life, did. After short time civilian Hus- approve could the trial court’s action band returned to the with Wife’s only prepared logi- if we to endorse its were approval. The trial court found that Wife’s corollary cal which would allow the trial court attitude “didn’t hurt career to- [Husband’s] penalize employee spouse appro- ward the end.” This is not the kind of priate showing case for insufficient interest equivalent dissipation misconduct promotion or effort of his or her *18 support finding marital of assets which will Implementation career. of the trial court’s “economic fault.” theory nonemployee spouse invite a would Second, employee spouse if fault” had that his even “economic been assert the owed found, present bright prospects modification of the “time rule” formula her rank and future pension nonemployee spouse’s good for deferred distribution of the would to the influence improper. Conversely, nonemployee be If the “time rule” formula is or efforts. the used, employee spouse the formula cannot be altered. As we could claim that the above, explained pen- “time rule” formula in- should receive a discounted share of the the herently employee spouse accounts for the would have various considerations sion because simplify higher and serves to the trial court’s task. obtained a rank if he or she had Alteration of the formula undermines the worked harder. We conclude that determi- third beyond tion of the benefit times the imponderables is

nation of such i.e., multiplier). component, formula permissible inquiry. trial court scope of 1/2 majority’s adoрtion of the I concur with the Accordingly, Raimer we remand components two of the formula to identi first appeals to the trial court of with directions agree fy property. marital I also with in apply the “time rule” formula its court to conclusion, compo in those reflected pure to recalculate the overall form and nents, post-dissolution pension benefit appropriate. property distribution as be marital enhancements are to be treated as However, of because the division VII. spouses property marital between the reasons, foregoing we hold that For the court, I of the trial within the discretion in abused its discretion neither court that the trial court must be allowed conclude mili- deferring petitioners’ distribution of the adjust multiplier, discretion to 1/2 fixing nonemployee tary pensions component the formula that divides the of pur- spouses’ an basis shares on as-received portion between the marital However, suant to the “time rule” formula. man spouses, if an evaluation of the factors its we find that the Raimer court abused 14-10- dated for consideration under section altering in rule” formula. discretion the “time 113(1)(a)-(d), (1987), requires 6B C.R.S. such up- appeals’ affirm decision the court adjustment. I that the trial would hold holding in Hunt the trial court’s distribution Hunt, courts in both In re in appeals’ the court of decision and reverse (Colo.App.1993), P.2d 1140 and In re Mar directions Raimer. We remand Raimer with (Colo Raimer, riage App. No. 92CA0759 applied in “time rule” formula be its 5, 1993), Aug. properly the marital identified appropriate form. in property and acted within their discretion dividing property spouses. between J., LOHR, part in concurs in and dissents Accordingly, agree majority I with the part. Ap judgment Court of Colorado peals upholding the trial court’s division ERICKSON, J., dissents. military pension benefits Hunt should be concurring part Justice LOHR affirmed, majority’s from the re but dissent dissenting part: appeals’ versal of the court of affirmance of the trial сourt’s division of such benefits concerning These cases an issue Raimer. military pension in a the division marriage proceeding. The for-

dissolution majority adopted by

mula for the deter- I. portion mination of the such benefits be Dissolution of Mar Under Uniform property classified as marital and for division (UDMA), -133, §§ riage Act 14-10-101 to 6B spouses of that marital between the C.R.S.(1987 Supp.), the trial court is & under the deferred distribution method em- charged dividing property with the task ployed by the trial court in each case is as spouses following dissolution between follows: marriage. process of a The distribution Years of Service First, n steps. conducted in two During Marriage x Benefit x Monthly classify separate or must (After Taxes) Years of Total Second, Service marital. the court must divide the formula, Maj. op. By applying property equitably this between the formula, spouses pursuant a trial to the factors set forth in known as the “time rule” agree general court effects both the determination of the the UDMA. I with Justice steps benefit that is marital Erickson that these two are undertak *19 (the property product compo pursuant legal standards. of the first two en different formula) Erickson, J, dissenting op. at clas nents of the and the division of 549. The property equally spous property sification of an asset as marital is marital between the (by multiplying property por typically legal determination to be made es the marital by pursuant equitable an distribution of fashion marital without discretion property. at 528 n. 1. applicable law. But see infra property the marital is com The division of Following marriage, dissolution of a of the trial court to mitted to the discretion property trial court effects division of be- criteria in accordance with the be exercised spouses pursuant tween the to the UDMA. 14-10-113(1)(a)(d). The in section listed 14-10-113(1), Specifically, section 6B by majority adopted “time rule” formula C.R.S.(1987),requires the trial court to: steps and combines the classification division property, rеgard divide the marital without single process impermissibly elim into misconduct, proportions to marital in such inates all discretion of the trial court with just considering as the court deems after marital share of respect to the division of the including: all relevant factors military pension benefits.

(a) spouse contribution of each acquisition property, of in- the marital A. cluding spouse the contribution of a formula, Under the “time rule” the share homemaker; eligi- of the benefits that is (b) property apart The value of the set by to be the trial court as marital ble divided spouse; to each computed by multiplying the first (c) components of the formula. of the The economic circumstances of each two Use spouse rule” formula results in the inclusion of at the time the division of “time effective, post-dissolution pension including is to become benefit enhance- desira- estate, bility awarding family marital for the of home or ments within the “monthly component right periods of the formula to live therein for reasonable benefit” custody monthly upon spouse having actual to the of chil- is the benefit received dren; maj. op. agree I retirement. See 532. majority proper

with the such result is (d) Any increases decreases precedential policy Accord- reasons. separate property value of the of the ingly, majority’s adoption I concur in the of spouse during deple- or the determining the “time rule” formula for separate property tion of the for marital military pension marital share of benefits purposes. dividing when such benefits under de- scheme, statutory this a trial court Under distribution method. ferred specifically must consider the criteria identi 14-10-113(1)(a)-(d), including fied section

B. acqui the contribution of each however, agree, majori- property. Implicit I in the do not with the sition of marital ty’s positive adoption application of the third consideration of contributions to the equal nega component of the “time rule” formula. Fol- ‍‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌​​​‍marital estate is the relevance Turner, lowing Equita R. the calculation of the share of the tive contributions. Brett 8.05, military pension prop- Property that is marital ble Distribution at 575- (2d ed.1994). In erty, requires multiplication the formula of 76 & n. 105 its evaluation of factors, however, statutory mandatory this marital share This court 1/2. necessarily to fashion an multiplication results has broad discretion 1/2 equal spouses disposition Marriage In re division between the 47, (Colo.1988); benefits. The 752 P.2d In re share Price, majority Marriage that a trial court that elects to 727 P.2d holds (Colo.1986).Equitable not use the “time rule” formula has no discretion distribution is neces equal sarily equal coterminous with an division of to alter this division of the marital Simon, assets, Maj. op. at In re benefits. majority’s requirement (Colo.App.1993); I consider the Gercken, (Colo.App.1985), equal impermissible limi- division to be fairness, key tation of the trial court to and the consideration on the discretion *20 value, present and the avail approximate P.2d at net precision. mathematical marital es ability of sufficient assets the 55. maj. an immediate award. See tate to offset may not alter By holding that a trial court op. at 539-540. These factors focus on component of the “time rule” for the third ability support marital to estate mula, majority trial eliminates payout nonemployee to the immediate traditional discretion to consider the court’s spouse. selecting a distribution meth When dividing circumstances of the case od, the court is not concerned with allocative impermissible effect of marital assets. The of each factors such as the contribution holding prevent trial majority’s is to spouse property marital or the other to the considering factors statutori court from required factors for consideration before the 14-10-113(1). by Fur ly section mandated spous actual division of benefits between thermore, rigid, division of such a formulaic must be un es. Evaluation of these factors long- is in direct conflict with the benefits dertaken the trial court after the selection above, that recognized principle, discussed Consequently, I of a distribution method. do granted broad dis the trial court must be agree apply that a trial court’s decision to equitable, rather than cretion to achieve an applica the “time rule” formula reflects an mathematically precise, division of statutory factors forth in tion of the set Accordingly, agree I that a trial court do not 10—113(1)(a)—(d). section 14— applies pen to the “time rule” formula required apply sion benefits is to the 1/2 II. considering multiplier the factors set without 10—113(1)(a)—(d). forth in section 14 — trial in Hunt the mili- The court divided tary pension equally fund benefits under the majority contends that the trial court deferred distribution method. I conclude implicitly takes into consideration the factors proper that this was a exercise of the 14-10-113(1) in evaluat set forth section court’s discretion. method, i.e., ing of a distribution its selection however, majority’s pres disagree, I either immediate distribution of the net with through ap trial court in Raimer ent value or future distribution conclusion improperly marital fault consider- plication of the deferred distribution or re included maj. analysis. Maj. op. jurisdiction op. at ations in its at 542. serve method. See Therefore, majority important concludes that There is an distinction between 540.1 “moral”, misconduct, following marital use of the “time rule” formula se consideration specifically prohibited of a method is not incon that a court is from lection distribution duty considering dividing when marital sistent with the trial court’s consider 14-10-113(1), However, statutory the ma under section and the contribu- those criteria. jority’s supported acquisition conclusion is not a re tion of a to the of marital underlying property, of the factors a trial court’s an “economic” factor that must be view pursuant 14-10- selection of a distribution method. As the considered to section 113(l)(a). Michaelson, majority recognizes, of a distri the selection See Michaelson (Colo.1994) largely bution method turns on the value of 884 P.2d 699-700 & n. 5 (describing concept of marital benefits relative to the entire the historical estate, ability provided ground for marital of the court to fault as conduct that notes, majority present separate property, contrary precept the net value As classification of tal as marital or nonmari- identifying property does not method of legal involving determination not military pension include increments of Erickson, J., exercise of discretion. See dissent- promotions employee spouse based on ing op. military pension at 550. The division of subsequent Maj. op. at 539. dissolution. jurisdic- benefits on basis other than reserve Thus, permit the trial court to elect between tion, however, necessarily assumptions involves value method of distribution on net and risks that will be tested and resolved on the the one and the deferred distribution or hand accept basis of uncertain future events. I would reserve methods on the other does departure conceptual purity from as neces- this inject the classifica- an element of discretion into sary to a sensible and workable scheme for divi- military pension military pension benefits. tion of benefits as marital or sion of *21 mili existing prior to that fails to divide the marital share of under Colorado law divorce UMDA). tary pension equally benefits “undermines commentator adoption of the One integrity of the formula and detracts as follows: explained the distinction very purpose,” from its for “the formula can factor, is not a the court is not Where fault Maj. op. Finally, not be altered.” at 543. it to the moral or social permitted consider rejects “discounting of the share of the non- during the impact party’s of a conduct employee spouse” because the discount “is dividing marital estate. subjective.” wholly arbitrary Maj. op. and at can, course, consider econom- The court individually I find these reasons and negative ef- which has a ic fault —conduct collectively unconvincing contrary and to the upon parties’ fect financial condition. 14-10-113(1)(a). standard of section only Economic fault includes miscon- finances, directly parties’ aimed at the duct First, simply way “economic fault” is a consequences the economic of so- but also expressing statutorily an element of man cial or moral fault. marital-property-division dated factor of spouse Turner, “[t]he contribution of each to the ac Property Equitable Distribution of (footnotes omitted). quisition property, including of the marital 8.09, § at 600 Our cases spouse the contribution of a as homemaker.” preceding adoption of the UDMA also reflect 14-10-113(1)(a). reason, For this a court recognition of the distinction between these must consider economic fault in order to be Liggett Liggett, factors. we stated: two requirements faithful to the of the statute. property on division was issue [T]he Although isolation of the effect “economic fault. It was whether not one of marital proper fault” on marital the accumulation of prop- the wife was entitled to a division of ty may be difficult and the result be erty by having reason of contributed imprecise, statutorily required it a task is preservation of the accumulation or the type traditionally and of the committed to divided, and on this issue it assets to be the discretion of trial courts. proper was for the court to determine justify whether her conduct was such as to Second, majority’s inflexible rule that sharing property. her a division of such used, the ‘time rule’ formula is the for “[i]f altered,” maj. op. mula cannot be at (1963); 110, 113, Colo. upon practical based considerations of alloca Kraus, 331, 333, see also Kraus v. 159 Colo. (1966). concerning tion of risks future events 241-42 In accord with simplification of the trial cоurt’s task rather authorities, I these would conclude that con- upon statutory maj. op. than criteria. See at spouse negative impact duct of a that has a 536-537, “time formula 543. The rule” does property on financial of marital value not take into account the contribution of each properly aspect characterized as an of that thereof) acquisition marital (or towards the party’s contribution lack military pension share of the benefit. See assets, appropriate marital and is for consid- supra pp. A court con 528-529. must dividing eration marital comply statutory sider that factor to with the property under section 14-10-113. 14-10-113(1)(a). requirements §of however, majority, rejects consider rejects party’s Finally, majority departure ation of the economic effect of fashioning equitable equal from of the marital conduct division of division share military pension military pension marital benefits because it is “whol- share subjective.” Maj. ly arbitrary op. method. It at 543. under the deferred distribution First, it This criticism can leveled at the division of does so for three reasons. concludes be separate fault is form of marital The selection that economic difficult misconduct, equal principle by from marital that it “is a limited division as which only apportion concept play comes into in ex between the which cases,” spouses arbitrary. recog- treme and that Raimer does not is itself We have nized, however, Maj. op. application of the statu- such an extreme case. Second, majority tory criteria for marital division is 542-543. holds exactitude, way not a that admits of alteration of the time rule formula task key component, equal to an distribution is fair- the third which effects an “[t]he ness, precision.” property portion not mathematical division of the marital with- *22 express- of out 752 P.2d at 55. The difficult task consideration of factors set forth 14-10-113(1). ing parties section I would affirm the relative contributions judgment Appeals mathematical is the of a trial of terms essence Colorado Court discretionary dividing upholding court’s function the trial court’s identification and property. property marital division of marital Hunt and both Raimer. Raimer, ruling, In the trial court’s allocat-

ing forty percent of the marital of share dissenting: Justice ERICKSON military pension sixty benefit to the wife and husband, percent to the reflects that I respectfully agree dissent. I do not with support court considered the wife’s lack of majority’s analysis of the Uniform Disso- military for her husband’s career as evidence Act, -133, Marriage §§ lution of 14-10-101 to military of her lack of contribution to the (1987 Supp.). 6B In resolving C.R.S. & 1995 pension fund asset. trial court not did property of division issues a dissolution of support east lack the wife’s as marital action, marriage the inclusion of an asset misconduct, and limited her share of the legal within the marital estate is a determi- only based not on her lack of contri- nation; the manner of distribution of that receipt higher bution but also on her asset once characterized as marital non-pension property. marital appropriately a matter within the trial Such a determination is within the trial court’s discretion. court’s broad discretion to divide the marital rights important Pension are economic as- in an manner.2 Accord- Marriage sets within a unit. In re ingly, uphold I would the trial court’s deci- Gallo, (Colo.1988). 47, 51 percentage sion in Raimer to limit the wife’s “[Sjince military pay retirement is awarded of the marital share of her husband’s services, past in return for it an constitutes forty percent. to asset which should be divisible as marital property to the extent the entitlement was

III. upon military based service rendered reasons, foregoing part For the I concur in marriage.” all or Id. at 52 added) majority’s adoption compo- (emphasis of the first (involving two retirement bene- vested, matured, nents of the “time rule” formula for deter- fits which had and were mining collected); Grubb, military рension being the marital share of In re (Colo.1987) 661, benefits under the deferred distribution (involving 665 vest- dividing property. method of I dis- ed retirement benefits which had not ma- tured).1 sent, however, majority’s framed, adoption Narrowly question pre- Jackson, particular, agree majori- property). 2. I cannot with the Contra Jackson v. 656 So.2d 875, ty's (Ala.Civ.App.1995) statement and (cataloguing characterization that the "ten 877 cases percent imposed issue, discount the trial court has holding on both sides of the but that an appar- no basis in the evidence and was selected military pension right unvested "is a contractual ently rough justice penalize as some form of right, subject contingency, to a and is a form of nonemployee spouse for what the court al., property”). Troyan See also 3 William M. et phase viewed as her lackluster interest in one Property Valuation & Distribution Marital military maj. op. her husband's career.” See (1995). § requires 46.32 Our statute the trial property acquired by court to divide "all either spouse subsequent marriage" with certain exceptions applicable enumerated here. See 1. This court has not determined whether unvest- added). ed, (emphasis Although 14-10-113 I be “property" unmatured benefits are division, subject majority lieve the court as a whole should nor consider wheth does the address military pension property, er an unvested this that issue. "Nonvested retirement bene assumes, following majority, dissent property: fits lack the as did the that unvest- characteristics of ed, value, value, military pension rights redemption "prop unmatured cash surrender loan val ue, value, Grubb, erty” lump sum and a value realizable under the statute. See P.2d at after 745 Burns, 61, J., (Erickson, dissenting) (discussing death.” 23, v. Burns 312 Ark. 847 S.W.2d 667-68 vest (1993) ed, (holding benefits). military pension 26 that such benefits are not but unmatured promotions review is whether due to and similar individual ef by this consolidated sented due to military pension benefits occurring increased forts after dissolution of the mar increases are marital post-dissolution rank See, riage. e.g., Bishop Bishop, v. 591, (1994); N.C.App. 595-96 S.E.2d Berrington Berrington, 534 Pa. majority recognizes, ap- have As the (1993). pen- of distribution of proved Although spousal sup three methods A.2d (1) value; upon dissolution: net sions port may employee’s influence final rank (3) (2) distribution; jur- deferred reserve position, support presumably such ceases Maj. op. at 530-531. isdiction. See in the event of divorce. See *23 Grubb, 55; at 745 P.2d at 666. See 752 P.2d Olar, (Colo.1987) 747 P.2d 679-80 of Turner, Equitable R. Distribution also Brett (distinguishing degrees between educational (2d § Property ed. 1994 & 1995 6.11 of pensions and vested but unmatured and hold jurisdiction, Supp.). If a court reserves it ing spouse that the contribution of one pension if division when and the determines earning potential increased of the other is vests. If the court utilizes the net appropriately considered when the dissolu method, value the court awards the nonem- property tion court marital divides and spouse liquidated at ployee share dissolu- maintenance). Generally, pension awards Finally, if the method tion. the court elects during marriage benefits which accrued are distribution, of it establishes a for- deferred appropriately property. classified as marital dissolution, mula for division at the time of However, pension increased benefits result employee but distribution until the defers ing post-dissolution promotions from spouse actually receives the benefits. analogous degrees to advanced educational Although the trial court has broad discre is, during marriage. post- obtained the That see, dividing e.g., property, tion in marital increases, although perhaps dissolution rank Nelson, P.2d re of support spouse influenced the dur (Colo.1987), property classification ing upon experience and based determination, separate legal marital or is a during marriage, depend obtained on the § not a matter of discretion. See 14-10- post-dissolution efforts of 113(2); Franz, spouse. employee spouse definitiоn, Both the with an (Colo.App.1992). By unvested, spouse unmatured property property marital does not include acquired prior marriage subsequent to holding degree an advanced the mar leave legal separation. 14-10- decree See riage with an has no value asset which cash 113(2). dissolution, may prove at the time but dependent upon spouses’ value individu govern Three the classification basic rules al, such, post-dissolution As increas post-dissolution pen- increases in efforts. post- sion benefits: es benefits attributable to

First, appropriately rank as con- dissolution increases are retirement benefits earned sideration for marital efforts are marital separate property classified as Second, property. retirement employee spouse suscepti and should not be postmarital ef- earned as consideration ble to division the dissolution court. Third, separate property. forts are when majority non- “[i]f The concludes market or other nonmarital forces cause employee spouse must bear the risks attend- passive appreciation between the date of waiting distribution, [under ant either the deferred classification and the date method], appreciation given the same classifi- distribution or reserve Thus, underlying property. cation as the nonemployee should share in in- then the postdivoree passive the marital share of that accrue the de- creased benefits appreciation is the same as the marital Maj. majority lay.” op. at 536. The also unappreciated share asset. “contingencies notes that we have held that (citations omitted). Turner, supra § 6.10 the court should be taken into account when disposes property marital between the rules, nonemployee basic Under these determining parties, not when which assets spouse should not share increased benefits added).3 Thus, (emphasis nonemployee belong in the marital estate.” Grubb, 52; maj. P.2d at 665. See who contributes to the career of the However, majority con- op. remedy. at 536. then employee spouse is not without a first, contingencies: siders two interrelated can The court and should consider unvested, pension, unmatured such as nonemployee spouse’s contribution when di here, vest; and, might those at issue never viding awarding marital main second, that, result, nonemployee as a 14-10-113(1)(a), §§ tenance. See 14-10-114. Maj. spouse might get paid. op. never at However, spousal consideration of contribu majority The the nonem- then rewards inappropriate determining tion is when ployee spouse contingen- who “risks” these inclusion of the marital asset within the es by deeming military pension cies increased tate. rights in such cases to be marital majority separating states holding majority, Under the an in- “separate” “marital” in increase from the crease benefits attributable widely divergent crease “would lead to post-dissolution rank increases is results, inject inconsistent an element of fault nonemployee spouse when the *24 division, property into the and enmesh the bears a of the risk that the many years.” vest, parties’ courts lives for will not as distribu- with deferred Maj. contrary, methods, op. at 535. On the jurisdiction tion and In result reserve see McGinnis, espoused by majority re leads to inconsis (Colo.App.1989), tency by placing but is not marital the determination of the entirely by when the risk is borne the em- marital estate within the trial court’s “discre ployee spouse under the net value majority’s approach, tion.” Under Maj. op. at method.2 539. post-dissolution pension whether the increase property depends entirely constitutes marital The court should consider such con upon the distribution method the trial court tingencies selecting methodology Further, appropriate. deems the courts are property, distribution of the marital see Nel parties’ many years enmeshed in the lives for son, 1349; 746 P.2d at method, jurisdiction under the reserve which Beckman, (Colo.App. majority today expressly Finally, allows. 1990), determining not whether the benefit if even the “time rule” set forth Indeed, property. is marital majority appropriate is the statutorily required method to deter to consider the “con nonemployee’s participatory spouse acquisition tribution of each mine the share increase,4 property, in the including the marital the contribu the trial court’s ” spouse’s tion nonemployee as homemaker when divid consideration 10—113(1)(a) ing § inject the marital contribution or lack thereof does not 14 — method, adopted positions appropriate have Courts three on the 4.If the time rule is the post-dissolution pension extent which benefit coverture fraction should be determined (1) property: Beckman, increases are divisible as "points” years. marital rather than See only the marital estate includes those benefits P.2d at 1379. classification; (2) which exist of the date of military points The benefit is based on which benefits, regardless the marital estate includes all years are converted into of service. Since the earned; (3) they of when are marital years points, basis of of credited service is only passive estate includes increases in benefits. military coverture fraction for benefits must be Turner, supra majority § See 6.10. The here points determined in terms of rather than appears posi- to combine the second and third years, tions, normally simple as is the case. Use of a concluding that the benefit increase computation separate property of service rather than rec- dependent be either marital or will, ognition upon point system in some situa- the trial court’s discretion. inequitable tions lead to conclusions. greatest potential for distortion of the marital recognition homemaking 3. The statute’s as a share of the benefit occurs in situations where “contribution” indicates that the contributions system dividing the member of the retirement be considered in contributions, regular component switches from monetary to reserve limited to but can types component include service. domestic other of noneconom- support. Troyan, supra § ic 46.34. maj. property division. Contra fault into the Rather, the trial court’s

op. at 542-543. nonemployee spouse’s

consideration marital asset is contribution to the

relative

statutorily required. 14-10-113. The See consideration, stating:

majority this disallows used, the formu

“If the ‘time rule’ formula is maj. op. at 543. altered.” See

la cannot be majority today effectively stating, so provisions of section 14-10-113

overrides the trial court uses either the de

whenever the or reserve

ferred distribution property division.

methods of

Accordingly, I dissent. Norton, General, Attorney Stephen A.

Gale Erkenbraek, Deputy Attorney K. Chief Gen- eral, Timothy Tymkovich, M. Gener- Solicitor Mills, al, Attorney ‍‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌​​​‍K. Assistant Gen- Sandra eral, Denver, Plaintiff-Appellee. for P.C., Gerash, Miranda, Todd Robinson & Denver, Thompson, Intervenor-Appel- J. lant. *25 Colorado, The PEOPLE of the State of

Plaintiff-Appellee, Opinion by Judge ROY. (Am- Surety Company Amwest Insurance MADISON, Defendant, William H. west) $10,000 appeals judgment from the against it on the forfeiture of the bail entered Surety Concerning Amwest defendant, posted it for the release of bond Company, Surety, Insurance Madison. reverse and remand William Intervenor-Appellant. proceedings. for further No. 94CA1863. appear failed to When the defendant Appeals,

Colorado Court of 1994, required July on Div. V. warrant, forfei- issued an arrest ordered the Amwest, posted ture of the bail bond Nov. 1995. cause issued a citation to Amwest show Rehearing Nov. Denied against why judgment should not be entered forfeiture, and set a show cause it on the 11,1994. hearing August for hearing, the defen- Prior to the show cause custody, into and the sheriffs dant was taken writing department notified the trial court that the defendarit was then incarcerated city jail for court and was “available anytime.” appeared at the The defendant hearing custody and Amwest show cause appear. failed to court, de- questioning the trial Under stopped had been fendant stated that he offense, that he told a routine traffic

Case Details

Case Name: In Re the Marriage of Hunt
Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado
Date Published: Dec 18, 1995
Citation: 909 P.2d 525
Docket Number: 93SC565, 93SC631
Court Abbreviation: Colo.
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