*1 505.03, 2(c), does not alter § subd. Stat. in Minn. time deadlines established 2(a). 15.99, § subd.

Stat. reasons, I would foregoing all the

For 15.99, § subd. that Minn.Stat.

conclude

2(a), application to a subdivision applies county requires

submitted to 60-day time deadline.

County to meet GABLER, al., Appellants, et

Jack H. FEDORUK,

Elizabeth et

al., Respondents.

No. A08-0517. Appeals of Minnesota.

Court

Oct. 2008. *2 which, according land—land as determined

court, the Fredrickses are entitled as a *3 simple matter of law to a fee interest. Duluth, MN, Jennings, ap- for Mark C. pellants. FACTS Beaumier, Andrew J. Har-

Matthew H. dispute The facts of this over lakeside Beaumier, Attorneys at rington, Gerlach property County St. Louis were deter- Duluth, MN, Law, LLP, respondents. for mined the district court after a bench ROSS, and decided Considered 1973, Mary trial in 2007. In October Mau- MINGE, Judge; Judge; and Presiding Township riala divided her parcel Cotton JOHNSON, Judge. of land and sold Lester Mattson the west- it, portion retaining

ern the rest. Matt- OPINION son soon removed trees and underbrush boundary along separating proper- the his ROSS, Judge. ty property, from Mauriala’s and he con- appeal regarding dispute between This driveway on structed there land that he landowners over the location of their two to believed be his. Mauriala and her boundary appellants common Rich- —with Fedoruk, daughter, Elizabeth continued to pre- Patricia Fredricks and their ard and possess adjoining parcel own and the to interest, Gabler, on one decessor Jack object Mattson’s east and did not to the boundary, respondents side of the construction or existence of Mattson’s on Stanley Elizabeth and Fedoruk the oth- driveway. Only guests Mattson and his requires us to decide whether the dis- er— driveway years the used entire nine discretion, may, trict court in its refuse to parcel, that he owned the and Mattson that it has give legal effect to driveway along maintained the with the by practical loca- expressly found to exist rest of his land to the west of it. also tion. We must decide whether parcel the landowners on Mattson sold his to Jack Gabler district court order Mattson, exclusively pay one side of the to the owners in 1982. Like Gabler full, fee-simple driveway own- used and maintained the on the other side the objection disputed proper- value of the entire from Mauriala or Elizabeth Fe- ership it. For ty compensate prescriptive them for a doruk the entire time he owned Matt- possession years limited nine he had the same belief as easement allows was to the east part and limited use of a of the son driveway. died in 1986 and property. Because answer to both Mauriala husband, no, her Stan- district Elizabeth Fedoruk and questions is we reverse the Fedoruk, In 1991 ley parcel. than a fee inherited her judgment granting court’s less driveway learned that the was not simple interest to the Fredrickses after Gabler boundary, his land as described in the recorded they proved the location of the deed, on the Fedoruks’ land.1 He damages reverse the award to the but we notified the Fedoruks of the encroachment purportedly compensate Fedoruks made it, to resolve but the Fedoruks for the Fredrickses’ future use of the and offered them presump- record to confirm or contradict this presumed 1. The district court that Gabler driveway’s misplacement learned about tion. nothing survey, there after a exist, announced, respond substantively. They did not nei- the district court “In the driveway case, ther relocate the asked Gabler to context of this the Court feels the nor or to investigated just whether what extent most resolution is to Plaintiffs a driveway actually beyond extended easement over Defendants’ parcel. recorded onto their Ga- land. This entitles Plaintiffs to use the driveway to maintain driveway bler continued in the same manner as have parallel portion immediately it, and a of land ... historically allowing used while De- east, extending length to its the full fendants to title to the land maintain!] beyond lot even to the lake- itself.” shore, where a boat ramp serving Gabler’s *4 The district court then also awarded the parcel place had been since 1973 also $8,400, damages Fedoruks of which it de- objection by the Fedoruks. Ga- property termined to be “the value of the segment bler maintained the as his own by prescriptive burdened easement” based property until he sold the to the Fre- appraisal, the Fedoruks’ submitted drickses in 2006. only which valued not the land on which

Coinciding with the Gabler —Fredricks driveway lay the but also the land that sale Gabler and the Fredrickses extended from the to the lake. brought against suit the Fedoruks seek- appeal. Gabler and the Fredrickses ing a declaration from the district court by that the established its was ISSUES 33-year based on the location I. Did the district court err as a matter performance parties pre- of the and their by failing of law to enter alternative, they In the decessors. re- establishing boundary by prac- quested that the district court them tical location it after determined that prescriptive easement for continued use Gabler and the Fredrickses had land, of part disputed specifically of proven boundary? trial, driveway. After II. Did the district court abuse its dis- sponte requested par- court sua by cretion awarding damages to the supplemental briefing ties submit on the compensate Fedoruks to them for disputed parties land’s value. The sub- the Fredrickses’ future use of the motions, pre- mitted and the Fedoruks land? an appraisal valuing sented the land. posttrial Based on the trial evidence and ANALYSIS

submissions, the district court concluded that Gabler and the Fredrickses “have es- I boundary by practical tablished a location Gabler and the chal Fredrickses through acquiescence.” But the district lenge the district court’s decision not to stop analysis did not there. It recognition order the be went on to find that Gabler the Fre- parcels tween the two after ex proved drickses also their alternative theo- pressly found that had established the ry easement. The district boundary by practical by location clear and declared, court then “As this Court finds convincing challenge evidence. The is well proved Plaintiffs have entitlement under founded. theory, either the Court must choose one.” stating any why Without reason would An action for the establishment location, not recognize boundary by practical that it found to aof like the “clear, boundary by positive, establish the posses action for adverse closely related Benz, unequivocal” evidence. sion, title-transferring event that relies is a Minn. at 93 N.W. at 1039. on the deed holder’s part in substantial Paul, 89 City Benz v. St. conduct. See The district court followed case (1903) 1038, 1039 93 N.W. Minn. law, carefully applying it to the uncontest high quantum of evi (explaining that facts, ed and it concluded that Gabler and establishing a necessary because dence is proved the Fredrickses their case clear boundary by practical location “shall de convincing evidence and established a under the deed of prive party claiming boundary by practical location ac through rights”). party claiming A his held, quiescence. It “Plaintiffs are enti establishes location tled to the area under this theo (1) ways: in one of three ry.” The Fedoruks seem to contest this length acquiescence “for sufficient conclusion, but, as Gabler and the Fre- entry time to bar a under the out, point drickses the Fedoruks did not (2) limitations”; express statute of file a challenging notice review the dis claiming the land agreement parties supporting trict court’s factual findings, *5 by on both sides of the line then had, if they they provide and even did not (3) acquiescence; by estoppel. or Theros a trial transcript to facilitate our review of (Minn. 852, Phillips, v. 256 N.W.2d 858 finding. the factual basis for the See Du 1977). Plymouth luth Herald & News Tribune v. Co., 495, Optical 498, Minn. 286 176 boundary by prac To establish (1970) 552, 555 (noting N.W.2d lack of a through acquiescence, tical location Gabler preludes of factual transcript ques review and the Fredrickses had to demonstrate Fritz, tions); 924, Fritz v. 390 N.W.2d 925 affirmatively tacitly that or the Fedoruks (Minn.App.1986) (ruling appellate court and mainte placement consented to findings cannot of fact where tran review years. nance of the for at least 15 if script provided). judg “Even (Minn. Harris, 4, 404 N.W.2d 7 LeeJoice ultimately is [in court] ment the district Nielsen, App.1987); see also Fishman v. favor, party its must file a notice of 7-8, 553, 1, Minn. 53 N.W.2d 556-57 237 challenge review to rul court’s (1952) boundary by (finding practical loca ing particular City Ramsey on a issue.” through acquiescence prede tion when two (Minn. 302, Holmberg, 305 N.W.2d line, agreed on a built a cessors title (Minn. Aug. App.1996), review denied line, acquiesced in fence on the 1996); Barg, see also In re Estate years). line for at least 18 When landown (Minn.2008) (deeming issue N.W.2d occupy adjoining premises up their to a ers filed). waived when no notice of review was recognize that certain line both unchallenged by On the facts as found acquiesce years, they general in for 15 are court, district the evidence supports bound-, ly precluded contesting from finding that Gabler and the Fredrickses Haraden, ary line. Amato v. 280 Minn. boundary by practical established the loca 403-04, (1968); 159 N.W.2d tion. (2006) § (providing see Minn.Stat. 541.02 the statute of limitations for actions to Gabler and the Fredrickses estate). primarily maintain signifi recover real Given the grant merely prescriptive a find no to cance of the divestiture follows had basis ing has been established easement to limited use of the land after location, they proved boundary by practical lo- by practical the disseizor must cation. The difference understood, between these two and divestment of title. So significant. land interests is What is at our review does not generous afford the land, stake is title to the because breadth of discretion framed in cases such by prescription Pooley easement as and Wenzel. “[a]n defined by giving the use made of the land rise The district court found that the easement and carries with it no title to by practical location was es itself,” of possession of the land tablished, but it entered with Nadler, 174, 174, Romans v. 217 Minn. 14 substantially another, less relief on non- 482, 483, (1944), while effect “[t]he conflicting finding that Gabler and the of a location of a line is proven Fredrickses had also their right proprietor divest one of a conceded title to an easement prescription. Whether Jelinek, Marek v. 121 Minn. deed[.]” the district court’s judgment prop was a (1913). 141 N.W. We consequence er of its findings ques is a must therefore decide whether the district law, tion of which we review de novo. a judgment enter that disre- Hodgman, See Ebenhoh v. gards title-transferring legal effect of 104, (Minn.App.2002) (reviewing de holding and the Gabler Fredricks- novo whether the district court erred es established the concluding that proven disseizor had ad location. possession verse and repeating the court’s duty to determine whether findings appro We first determine the support judgment). district court’s priate standard of review question. for this We conclude that the district court’s *6 quiet Actions to title and determine ad judgment should recognized have equitable verse claims are actions. Miller location and that (Minn. Hennen, 366, 438 N.W.2d By omission was error. very 1989) (stating that prop adverse claims to terms, judicial action to determine a relief). erty subject are to equitable It is boundary by practical location is designed true that district courts generally have give full effect to the boundary broad discretion fashioning when reme as it has been practically recognized and Mathies, dies. Wenzel v. treated parties over a lengthy pe (Minn. (Minn.App.1996), review denied riod. And this effect includes the trans 1996). Mar. particularly And it is true fer of title from the deed holder to the that equitable “[a] fashion reme An disseizor. unbroken chain of cases dies based on exigencies and of facts throughout history the state’s accentuates each accomplish justice.” case so as to this conclusion. Metal, Pooley Inc., v. Mankato Iron & N.W.2d 837 (Minn.App.1994), question review No serious exists that the rem- (Minn. 1994). May 17, denied But edy we are boundary for establishment of a deciding whether the district court practical in always location Minnesota has fashioned an appropriate remedy satisfy included the automatic recognition of that any unique equities of the case. are boundary We transfer of title as a asked instead to decide whether a district matter of to the disseizor. areWe (and cite) court is disregard free to the basic aware of appel- Fedoruks no always has been in granted Minneso late decision that has treated this long ta’s jurisprudence optional consistent ad as or discretionary in the district dressing the of a boundary met, establishment court once the elements have been by practical boundary relocation either when deciding boundary claims of location— (“The title-divest- effect of a location of a by practical location or similar equitable under the related line is to divest one proprietor ment claims possession. adverse doctrine of ... a title (citing Beardsley deed.” Crane, 52 Minn. 54 N.W. have contrary, once the elements To (1893))). established, of the land- application been remedy has been uniform and transfer highlights The dissent various cases un- nondiscretionary, despite gen plainly property-line related to disputes for the ac erally nature of the overall proposition sitting district court Ebenhoh, example, in we held tion. For equity generally has latitude to fashion an to the the disseizors were “entitled equitable remedy given to a suitable case’s appli tract” based on our de novo facts. proposition question. This is not posses cation of the elements adverse But proposition does not address this 107, 112 (emphasis sion. N.W.2d that, teaching train of cases in the class added). engaging in or re And without title-divesting equitable actions adverse quiring any weighing equities, additional possession by practical loca- that the elements of holding based on our tion, the factual establishment of a new satisfied, the doctrine were we “direct[ed] boundary always in Minnesota in a results court to enter judgment acknowledging the new bound- enter an order appellants favor of and to ary. the two establishing the between point The dissent does to one Minnesota Id.; parcels.” see also Halverson v. Vill. case, boundary-by-practical-location Wo Deerwood, 767-68 (Minn. Johnson, jahn v. 297 N.W.2d 298 (Minn.1982) township es- (holding that was 1980), “illustrating] which describes as topped denying from was that a district court has discretion to fash by practical location as a mat established equitable remedy boundary- ion an in a applied ter of law based on the elements dispute particular case based on the facts additional appeal Wojahn of the case.” neither holds nor consideration); discretionary SSM Invs. *7 implies may that a district court withhold (Minn. Siemers, 386 legal boundary the a after a effect of new 1980) (remanding to the district court with party prevailed by establishing has the judgment the consis directions to amend Indeed, boundary by practical location. supreme analysis tent with the court’s re a Wojahn the court was concerned with flecting by possession title adverse after driveway only shared that was the access holding convincing that clear and evidence plaintiffs property. to the This led it to possession); demonstrated adverse Ehle the district court to remand the case for Prosser, 183, 192, Minn. 197 293 N.W.2d address an issue that had not been raised (1972) (“Having 463-64 concluded considered, or which was whether an ease plaintiffs have established title to the dis might ment be on the facts appropriate possession, it is puted property adverse boundary relocation could not given ... necessary not to consider establish to our dis be established. Most relevant line.”); boundary Ko practical ment of a cussion, its Stein, supreme the court described nantz v. Minn. (1969) clearly dis holding own in a manner that (discussing whether the N.W.2d “Equiv tinguishes Wojahn from this case: land in plaintiffs acquired “had title to the of the exis amorphous ocal and evidence controversy [by proof ... of] virtue boundary line”); alleged boundary tence and location of an practical location of the ek, not, law, a matter of establish Mar 121 Minn. at 141 N.W. at 788 fence did as discretionary equitable of one location be- selection marking practical the it as argument of land.” 297 N.W.2d over another. This parcels two tween added). Here, by sharp builds on the district court’s characteriza- (emphasis court contrast, unchallenged district its decision as a choice between tion of practical persuaded. the evidence of are not holding optional is that remedies. We boundary a between establish that the Despite location did the dissent’s view district Additionally, land. the Wo- parcels may two to apply equitable give factors “balancing jahn comment court’s a that has no effect to been just than the auto- is more equities location, the dis- established injunction” cannot be matic balancing trict court here did no such equities regarding a call to balance read as equities. Neither the district court’s find- already credit a whether to fraud, ings misrep- nor the record hints of Rather, at 307. found to exist. Id. resentation, hands, unfair dealing, unclean party whether one statement concerned might other concern that enjoined continuing from his should be judgment affect the even under the dis- driveway to access his historic use of suggested approach. sent’s The district rights to the land home while no suggested basis dis- landowners competing used both of the regard ongoing litigation,

are resolved recognized findings analy- it had in its bearing it has no on how Minnesota law argument And the Fedoruks’ that an sis. estab- always prevailing party’s treats the appropriate easement is based on the Fre- boundary by practical loca- lishment of a driveway at trial drickses’ focus access tion. extending rather than on the land lake- relevant; driveway ward from the is not precedent No Minnesota law driveway the focus have been give court to exists for refuse gives pause access no reason to because boundary by practical to a legal effect the district court held that the elements of that the disseizor has finding location after location had been Instead, boundary. “[i]n established met and the was established land ... possession Minnesota adverse along and to the lake. only bars the [deed holder’s] practically extinguishes but rely heavily single The Fedoruks on a party having paper title and vests support case to their contention that the in the holder.” perfect title adverse district court’s award of a mere easement Ehle, Minn. at at 463. finding boundary by practical after loca- *8 true of the establish The same must be unprecedented not ... in tion “is Minneso- boundary ment a under related doc Henricksen, ta,” citing Moore v. 282 Minn. location, effectively which practical trine of (1968). 209, 216 But N.W.2d extinguishes party having of the the Fedoruks’ reliance on Moore overlooks paper title and vests title in the dissei- express repeating Moore’s of Minnesota’s zor. that a district court’s We conclude issue, oft-stated, black-letter law on this judgment may disregard not ef analysis. they also misread Moore’s practical fect of a established expressly The Moore court declared location. a remedy: fundamental effect of “[T]he of a is to divest urge practical The Fedoruks that we frame the location property a to which he has a conceded judgment granting pres- district court’s one of at criptive merely reflecting title deed.” Id. at easement as tion), clearly with an alternative analysis, theory which fallback 215. The Moore (easement recovery by prescription) lesser statement of settled plain on that rests principal be considered case the theo- law, argument undercuts the Fedoruks’ ry failed. Gabler and the Fredrickses’ Reflecting on the district even further. complaint asks first that the district court that finding Moore court’s mistaken [they] Boundary by “decree that a have a had title-transfer- evidence established Location,” only Practical “AS AN AL- location, boundary by practical ring [they] TERNATIVE” to “decree that have openly that supreme court indicated by Prescription.” an exclusive Easement correctly analysis ended its district court argument correspond- Their written final any separate basis to consider the ingly contended for a strongly finding is a lesser interest of a claim there they boundary by prac- had established a “This [of easement: issue location, short, having only tical a conclu- prescriptive easement] there is a whether sory by prescription reference to easement complicated by the fact that is somewhat clearly secondary, as a position. alternative having decided as he did judge, the trial They were entitled to consideration of boundary by practical a there was [that primary their cause of action on the mer- location], any had no occasion to make its, a corresponding judgment. with Cf finding ultimate as to the creation of such Minn, id. 282 at N.W.2d at Minn, an Id. 282 at easement.” (“[The court], decided having as added). And this (emphasis N.W.2d at 216 boundary by did a practical loca- [it] [that by the in- supreme court dicta—anchored established], tion was had no occasion to place- variable result our cases of finding make ultimate as to the cre- ment of a new once has been easement.”). ation such by practical location—is our established The Fedoruks reference this court’s dic- court, holding today: upon The district proposition ta in Skelton v. Doble for the deciding it did that the disseizors “have as by practical established boundary by practical established a loca- ownership. location does not affect tion,” any ulti- had no occasion to make (Minn.App.1984), review de- finding pres- as to the creation of a mate 1984). (Minn. July do not nied We criptive easement. Skelton, broadly. so In we read Skelton The district court treated the alternative whether the district court erred considered and the Fredrickses’ nature of Gabler allowing purchasing landowner inviting claims the court to select be- as ownership trial on the issue of acceptable two remedies: “Plaintiffs tween practical based on location property through convincing clear and proven n have The district court boundary. Id. 82. are entitled to either a evidence that the other landowner made le- held prescriptive easement for use the drive- convey- purportedly ineffective sale gally location. way or and that the doc- ing parcel a 3.47-acre proved As this Court finds Plaintiffs have inapplicable trine of location was theory, the entitlement under either Court intended to re- because doctrine is “[t]he *9 But on review we con- must choose one.” to estab- disputes, line solve does not accurate- approach clude that this ownership parcels of substantial lish ly claims. reflect the ... would Expanding land. the doctrine construed, and the complaint and ar- the statute of frauds Fairly the undermine (emphasis principal theory recording act.” Id. at 83 gument instead included dis- Although we held that the (boundary by practical original). loca- recovery 734 the effec- hold that the district court erred as appropriately decided We

trict court by failing judg- a matter of law to enter purported the trans- scope tiveness recognizing boundary by prac- the ment broaching deed by quitclaim fer after it tical location determined that Ga- boundary by practical lo- the assertion Fredrickses bler and the had established certainly reject did not a centu- cation, we boundary by convincing clear and evi- instructing case law that a ry of Minnesota dence. by practical location boundary established new as a matter of

becomes the II transferring to the disseizor law with title Gabler and the Fredrickses holding The of Skel- upon the occurrence. challenge the district court’s award of that the doctrine of conclude ton—“we to damages the Fedoruks and the method does not practical apply”— [location] by computed which the district court those suggest misread to that should not be damages. We review a district court’s clearly apply does and a when the doctrine damages award of for an abuse of discre established, clearly as the dis- boundary is tion. Robert v. W. Carlstrom Co. German here, judgment trict court determined Evangelical Congre Lutheran St. Paul’s boundary. Id. may disregard the 168, gation, 662 (Minn.App N.W.2d body to the uniform In addition. .2003). conclude that the district court We decision, guiding case law our Minnesota by awarding abused its discretion the Fe- jurisdictions indirectly from other cases damages entering judgment doruks after that once the dis- support our conclusion in favor of Gabler and the Fredrickses. boundary by trict court determined have found no supporting We caselaw established, practical location was damages award of to a landowner to com recognized have should pensate for the value of interest land Matthews, v. boundary. See Matthews by long-term surrendered the landowner’s (1973) 1, 5, 110,118 (holding Ala. 288 So.2d acquiescence practical to that granted party equity that to a “relief boundary. differs from the recorded The of the issues as scope must be within the principles require same the district by pleadings”); v. framed Van court to afford the full Kieffer land-transfer reme Leeuwen, 430, 436-37, 355 Mich. 94 dy disseizing proof to landowner after (Mich.1959) 793, (finding that boundary by limit practical location when it entered an erred authority effectively district court’s a life estate granting plaintiff order remedy by requiring payment withhold the simple jury instead of the fee Ehle, for it. Minn. at See to); Joseph entitled D. plaintiff found the (stating N.W.2d at 459 that divestment of Shein, Myers, Pa.Super. P.C. possession title adverse “bars rem (1990) (“Having 576 A.2d edy of the (emphasis owner” add record breakaway attorneys’ that the ed)). decided be- We hold that the district court legal havior met the test and constituted by awarding damages abused its discretion interference, tortious [the court] to the Fedoruks after determined required recognize carry and to out the acquiesced had in the relocation of decision....”); of this Brown effect established loca Evarts, 128 Vt. 258 A.2d 475 tion. We need not address the additional (Vt.1969) (“[T]he damages decree must follow the award rests on argument errors, requested result demanded find- various other such as the Fedo- the fact ings.”). plead damages, ruks’ failure to *10 fully litigated, or doctrine derives from the damages recognition were not that damages dispense were miscalcu- that without it the effort to the claim equal justice lated. under law would all too

often be frustrated.... DECISION are dealing We here with the re- that the district court erred We hold quirements equity practice with a and judgment recognize its failed when background of years several hundred finding to its and conclusion give effect history.... equity juris- The essence of had that Gabler and the Fredrickses es- diction power has been the of the Chan- boundary by practical a location tablished equity cellor to do and to mould each acquiescence. hold that through We also particu- decree to the necessities of the the district court exceeded its discretion Flexibility lar case. rigidi- rather than damages. when it awarded the Fedoruks ty distinguished has it. The qualities of We reverse and remand for the district mercy practicality equi- have made court to amend its consistent ty adjustment the instrument for nice opinion issuing with this order and reconciliation public between the recognizing the where the dis- private interest and needs as well as trict court found it was established competing private between claims.... location. E.I. United States v. du Pont de Nemours

Reversed and remanded. Co., 316, 357-58, & 366 U.S. 81 S.Ct. (1961) 1266, 6 L.Ed.2d 318 (quotations JOHNSON, Judge (dissenting). omitted); Grupo see also Mexicano de De respectfully opinion I dissent from the Fund, Inc., sarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond sitting equity the court. A district court 308, 336, 1961, 1976, 144 527 U.S. 119 S.Ct. “ equita- broad discretion to fashion an has (1999). L.Ed.2d 319 ‘Since all or almost particular on the facts of ble based discretionary, all are remedies case, In given case. this balancing equities hardships granted the Gablers appropriate guide almost case as a ” easement would allow them to contin- to the chancellor’s discretion.’ Tennessee using ue connects their Hill, Valley Auth. v. U.S. public

home to the nearest road. I would (1978) 2279, 2301, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 S.Ct. conclude that court did not (1973)). Dobbs, (quoting D. Remedies granted discretion when it abuse broad A district court’s discretion to fashion an equitable remedy and de- Gablers equitable remedy includes the discretion to clined to the broader rem- order a narrow instead of a broad edy of a location. remedy, if plaintiff proved even a has facts describing

In traditional principles of justify remedy. In that would the broad law, American Supreme United States situations, some a district court even that, Court has said as a matter of “com- any equitable remedy. decline to order As prehensive application,” leading explained, treatise has “After ... equity balancing equities hardships

courts of are clothed with deny all relief to large judg- might [equitable] discretion to model their [or, exigencies partic- plaintiff alternatively,] simply ments to fit the limit forget forget equities ular case.... To it is to relief in accord with its view of the Dobbs, equity’s sig- hardships.” function 1 Dan B. special and historic Law of ed.1993). (2d nificance. The transcendence of this Remedies 113 Stated differ- *11 may recognize plaintiffs party against estoppel urged.” the whom is ently, “courts it, right, yet and refuse to enforce or en- Id. ways,” in or “narrow the force it limited importance equitable The of discretion remedy something than the to reflect less boundary-dispute cases is reflected with,”

right began the even in the plaintiff Johnson, Wojahn v. 297 N.W.2d 298 equitable of an defense. Id. at absence (Minn.1980). fixing After the location of a 109,113. boundary, enjoined the district court Supreme The Minnesota Court has rec plaintiffs trespassing from on the defen- sitting equi that a court ognized district property. appeal, supreme dants’ On ty determining has broad discretion when held that it error for was reversible remedy. equitable County an Nadeau v. the district court to have entered an in- (Minn. 520, Ramsey, 277 N.W.2d of junction as a matter of course without 1979). discretionary Sometimes consider considering a more equitable resolution. ations are embedded within the enumerat The court wrote: equitable theory ed elements an of re ordinary It is true that in the run of Synergistic Sys., lief. See v. Tech. Olson “[p]ermanent injunction a cases is (Minn.2001) (dis Inc., 142, 628 N.W.2d proper remedy to a continuous restrain cussing equitable nature of promissory es- repeatedly trespass.” threatened including element, toppel, third whether However, injunction is an promise prevent “the be enforced [must] remedy, involving equitable juris- injustice”). But sometimes the discretion court, injunction an diction ary equitable theory relevant to an factors be be should not issued where it would pertinent are are considered after the facts grossly inequitable to do so.... example, party determined. For “A does [Wjefeel balancing equities that a specific not have an automatic just is more than the automatic performance as a for breach of a contract; injunction an typically as is the case. the district court must balance equities of the case and determine added) (emphasis Id. at 307 (quotations equitable remedy specific whether the omitted). supreme The court remanded performance is appropriate.” Dakota case so the district court could Blackwell, County H.R.A. v. 602 N.W.2d granting consider an easement to the (Minn.1999) 243, 244 (citing Boulevard plaintiff, plaintiffs which would allow the Plaza Corp. Campbell, 254 Minn. using as well as the defendants to continue (1959)). anoth As driveway. Wojahn Id. 307-08. The judicata er example, doctrine of res opinion court has illustrates defined enumerated elements must broad discretion to fashion Brown-Wilbert, proved, be see Inc. v. boundary-dispute in a case based Co., Copeland Buhl & 732 N.W.2d particular on the facts of the case. (Minn.2007), but nonetheless remains a case, In this the district court issued “flexible,” “equitable doctrine must be thorough 12-page order and memoran- applied in light of the facts of each individ part, dum. In relevant the district court T.F., ual case.” R.W. concluded as follows: (Minn.1995). 872 n. Accordingly, after through considering proved Plaintiffs have clear the evidence each convincing evidence that are judicata, enumerated elements of res inquire whether the doctrine’s entitled to either ease- “application injustice would work an on the ment for or a bound- use *12 their own lot. This is a classic example location. As this Court ary by practical proved discretionary entitlement a court’s Plaintiffs have district consider- finds theory, must Court the equities fashioning under either ation of when an case, In the context of this choose one. equitable remedy. just the most resolution the Court feels majority passage The extracts a short a ease- prescriptive to Plaintiffs is Henricksen, from Moore v. 282 Minn. land. This enti- ment over Defendants’ (1968), majority which the driveway in Plaintiffs to use the tles dicta, acknowledges adopts to be it as they historically manner have same as passage a rule of law. The cannot be Defendants, it, unimpeded by while used interpreted to preclude equitable relief Defendants to maintain title to allowing awarded the district court this case. the land itself. supreme merely The referred to the a analysis court’s reflects de- The district court, having fact that the district ruled in equities and a weighing of liberate plaintiffs favor on two other theories of appropriateness attention to the conscious relief, elected not to expressly consider the remedy. The district court’s of its chosen plaintiffs theory. third The district court in- recognized both the Gablers’ apparently analysis that an believed continuing driveway to use the terest theory unnecessary. third was The Moore imposed on the' Fedo- and the burdens hold, suggest, court did not and did not property interests. The ruks’ that a district court not simultaneous- remedy that was' suffi- court selected ly boundary by the issue prac- consider accomplish to cient to allow Gablers tical location and the issue of them primary goal providing their remedy easement and fashion a based on rights. appropri- It is property additional the latter but not the former. to consider costs ate for a district court None of the other cases on which the an fashioning equitable and benefits when majority relies is inconsistent with the remedy remedy and to seek a is effi- long-recognized discretion of a district analysis complete cient. “No remedial equitable court to balance considerations until the costs and benefits have been remedy equitable and award a narrower

counted,” “judges will want to consid- justified by the evi might than have been inflicting er the alternatives before rem- In none of the cases cited dence. edy more to the defendant than that costs majority supreme did the court or this at plaintiff.” it is worth to the Dobbs a district court that had court overrule 35-36; generally also id. at 36-50. see that was fashioned The district court’s chosen not possible narrower than the broadest form only made a distinction between owner- descriptive, cited are of relief. The cases and an easement but also between a ship only prescriptive, describe area. larger geographic and a smaller in this the tendencies of district courts prevented latter distinction the Ga- The if a certain form of type of case. Even of their lot expanding blers from the width favored, it is typical relief is driveway and the in the area between the Wojahn, 297 N.W.2d not automatic. See lake, have added to their which would (with (stating equitable remedy contrac- corresponding shoreline if “it would be should not be ordered length tion of the Fedoruks’ shore- so”); line), inequitable Lindquist to do grossly due to the actions of the Gablers’ Weber, (Minn.App mistakenly predecessors-in-interest, who .1987)(“Mindful proceeding to ac- the boundaries of built a outside Furthermore, equita- mechanically. simply it is rights to land is quire prescriptive nature, agree unnecessary impose tight with the trial court such con- ble in we deny highly inequitable that it be equitable pow- would straints on district court’s *13 respondents’ claim under facts this ers. It has not been demonstrated that (Minn. case.”), many review denied June the caselaw that has existed for 1987). unjust often years It be that district courts is unworkable or on a broad utilize their discretion when fully do not scale. mean equity, in but that does not sitting Having concluded district court do not have that man- that district courts by awarding did not abuse its discretion supreme As the ner of discretion. easement, I the Gablers a also stated, party bringing “a has would conclude that the district court did action must maintain on by awarding its discretion abuse fail, though prove even he grounds payment money to the Fedoruks to cause of action at law on the trial.” good compensate prop- them for the value of the St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v.

First Div. erty interest that was transferred to the (1878). Rice, Minn. money damages Gablers. The award of light In of the broad discretion histori Wojahn, in support has where the courts, cally afforded to district an abuse- that, remand, supreme court stated ap of-discretion standard of review should court could award “the district Nadeau, ply to this case. See 277 N.W.2d compensate for damages [to] [defendants] (“Granting equitable at 524 relief is within in plaintiffs’ future use of the sound discretion of the trial court. ingress nature of an easement for Only a clear abuse of that discretion will egress to their home.” 297 N.W.2d 308. reversal.”); City in result Claussen supreme The court further stated that “the (Minn. Lauderdale, damages measure of such should be the App.2004) (applying abuse-of-discretion in prop- difference value the defendants’ involving in ad standard of review case erty with or future use.” Id. Sexton, Block property); verse claims reasons, I affirm For these would (Minn.App.1998) judgment of the district court. (holding that “district court acted well by limiting within its [ease discretion width”). majority opinion The ef

ment’s]

fectively deprives court of district fashioning

discretion this sitting A

type case.

equity obligated should not be to act so