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People v. Fuller
791 P.2d 702
Colo.
1990
Check Treatment

*1 agree majority’s holding I at cause with

p. clearly 12 that the record establishes Seeley’s discharge in accordance

that was personnel promulgated manual

with case, uphold the

the Sheriff in this I would summary granting

district court’s order

judgment county in favor of the and not decide whether Sheriff

basis

Brown bound the terms of the

personnel adopted. manual he

I am authorized to state that Justice joins special in this concurrence.

LOHR Colorado, of the State of PEOPLE

Plaintiff-Appellee, FULLER,

Douglas Burt

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 89SA288. Colorado,

Supreme Court

En Banc.

May 1990. Rehearing Amended on Denial of

As

July *2 counsel, rights to

ance of his constitutional law, process and his constitutional due rights against self-incrimination. also contends that his deferred *3 by receiving must be reinstated for theft since the deferred sentence was revoked on Woodard, Atty. Gen., B. Duane Charles of We affirm the basis invalid convictions. Howe, Atty. Gen., Deputy Richard H. Chief remand part, part, in reverse in and with Gen., Krause, Forman, and John Sol. J. directions. Denver, Gen., Atty. plaintiff-ap- for Asst. pellee. 30, 1987, July approximately 2:00 On at a.m., a young a man robbed convenience Defender, Vela, Public and

David State in of Greeley. store In the course the Lord, Deputy De- Kathleen A. State Public clerk, robbery, put he grabbed the store a fender, Denver, defendant-appellant. for the knife to her throat and demanded con- the Justice ERICKSON delivered register. tents of the store’s cash The Opinion the of Court. gave money reg- from the clerk him the ister, twenty defendant, Fuller, approximately which dol- Douglas was Burt was The lars, aggravated robbery,1 give money of second and offered to him the convicted also, degree kidnapping,2 pursuant and to purse. the from her from store’s safe and 16-11-309, (1986), 8A C.R.S. of two section refused, The robber and with the knife still sentence enhancement counts. violent crime throat, the clerk out at the clerk’s took sentenced to consecutive sen- Fuller was side of front door and toward the dark twenty years aggravated on the tences of building. pair While were still front thirty years robbery and on the conviction store, pulled into the store’s of a ear degree kidnapping conviction. As a second away parking lot and the clerk broke kidnapping and con- result of the captor. her After a brief confrontation victions, deferred on a Fuller’s car, the robber with driver of the fled by receiving3 prior for theft was conviction pursued bicycle on a and the driver him to and he was resentenced to a term revoked nearby park. Twenty minutes a trailer la- Department custody of the of Cor- ter, police he stopped Fuller while was appeal,4 Fuller that: rections. On claims park riding bicycle his of the trailer and out (1) mandatory sentencing consecutive him store clerk detained until was provision 16-11-309 his of section violates brought to The clerk the scene. identified right equal protection of to constitutional Fuller as the man who robbed her took law, (2) there was insufficient evidence her out of Fuller was searched. the store. degree support to his conviction second produced money, The search a knife and (3) the trial court erred de- kidnapping, including a two dollar bill from the marked challenges pro- for cause nying his to two register. cash store’s (4) improper- trial spective jurors, court charged aggravated Fuller was with rob- ly eye- his tendered instructions on denied kidnapping and bery, second two (5) identification, the trial court witness counts of violent sentence enhancement sentence, in imposing discretion abused its crime, to arraign- section 16-11-309. Prior (6) providing the de- the statute for ment, challenged Fuller the constitutionali- impaired mental violated condition fense statutory requirements rights ty of Colorado’s effective assist- constitutional 18-4-302, (1986). validity challenge of section tutional to the 16- 8B C.R.S. 1. Section impaired condition 11-309 and the mental stat- 18-3-302, (1986 & 8B C.R.S. Section utes, -122, C.R.S. 8A sections 16-8-101 Supp.). Supp.), appeal transferred to & 1989 according sppreme sections court 13-4- 18-4-410, (1986). 3. 8B C.R.S. -110, (1987). 102(l)(b) and 6A C.R.S. 4. initially appeal was filed in the court presents appeals. defendant Since the a consti- E.g., v. Calvare similarly mental condition.5 situated. the defense of si, 277, 281, statutory- court found the After the trial crimes Statutory classification of constitutional, Fuller did not as- provisions differences based on substantial must be impaired mental condi- the defense of sert reasonably relat that are based on fact and tion. Id. at legislation. purposes ed to the guilty aggrava- jury found Fuller 281-82, at 318. that call Statutes degree kidnapping and robbery, second ted penalties for the same conduct for different crime of violence. two counts of protec equal violate defendant’s Department of Cor- was sentenced to People Young, tion of the law. thirty consecutive terms rections for Calvaresi, *4 (Colo.1988); kidnapping conviction and years P.2d at 318. How 188 Colo. at aggravated twenty years on the “ ever, Assembly free to General [is] ‘[t]he addition, re- the trial court conviction. punishments for con prescribe different on the theft the deferred sentence voked may rationally perceived to duct it resentenced Fuller receiving conviction and degrees reprehensi of social have different years to served consecu- to a term of six be ” Thatcher, People v. bility.’ sentences. tively to the other Johnson, (Colo.1981) (quoting People v. (1978)). More 578 P.2d 226 I. over, presumed to constitu a statute is be mandatory Fuller contends that person challenging the statute tional and a sentencing provision of section consecutive proving that the statute has the burden his constitutional 16-11-309 violates beyond a reasonable is unconstitutional law. Section equal protection of the French, People v. E.g., doubt. 16-ll-309(l)(a) provides part in that “[a] 1369, 1372 separate two crimes of person convicted of Assembly could have ration- The General incident arising out of the same violence that violent crimes committed ally decided crimes so that for such shall be sentenced pose greater part of the same incident as consecutively rather sentences are served criminal society than the same threat that concurrently.” Fuller contends than separately in different committed conduct 11—309(l)(a) pro equal violates section 16— view, the episodes. In our violent criminal requires con it tection of the law because have a reasonable differing punishments crimes of violence sentences for secutive crime, prevention relationship to not incident” and arising “from the same governmental pur- legitimate which is a separate violent a defendant commits when is based on a pose. the classification Since incidents, in which case in different crimes reasonably relat- distinction and rational may a defen sentencing court crime, the consecutive prevention of ed to in terms its discretion. to concurrent dant of section 16-11- sentencing provision Riveland, See, e.g., Brinklow 309(l)(a) the constitutional does not violate that (Colo.1989). Fuller asserts equal protection of requirements punish a defen legislative decision law. arising of one crimes out commits dant who harshly than a defendant more incident crimes, II. sepa but commits identical

who incidents, reasonable relation bears no rate the record does asserts that inter any legitimate governmental ship to degree conviction of second support not his est. was no evidence kidnapping since there that the that established presented at trial the law re protection of

Equal greater risk subjected to a clerk was who are store of all those quires like treatment may (1986), exception inform 16-8-103.5(1), that the defendant re- C.R.S. 8A 5. Section prior to trial or her inten- at time indicate his court of that intention quires a defendant to impaired mental good assert the defense shown. tion to cause arraignment, with the time of condition at the challenges her to two denying of harm when Fuller forced out of the for cause dire, knifepoint. prospective jurors. During voir one store at that, prospective juror stated because 18-3-302(1), 8B C.R.S. job in a laundromat where at times she her Supp.) provides “[a]ny person who know safety, sympathized feared for her she ingly any person and carries seizes victim in this case and that she with the another, place his consent one without promise sympathy could not that this justification, and without lawful commits Upon would not affect her decision. subse- degree kidnapping.” jury second quent questioning by judge, the trial how- given this case was an instruction on sec ever, she said that she would decide the kidnapping ond that tracked the case on the merits and would not let her satisfy language of the statute. To sympathy influence her deci- for the victim degree kidnapping, elements of second sub challenge sion. After his for cause was movement of the victim is not re stantial denied, peremp- Fuller exercised one of his quired. prosecution must establish tory challenges prospective that to exclude that the victim was moved and juror. prospective juror stated Another substantially increased the risk movement that he had been a victim of vandalism Apodaca People, of harm to the victim. *5 persons that he that theft and believed 467, 475 Fuller ar 712 P.2d too much accused of crimes were accorded gues prosecution that the failed estab by the protection. On further voir dire asportation lish the element of second de court, juror that stated that he believed an gree kidnapping taking since his conduct in proven guilty accused was innocent until expose the clerk out of the store did not the on the and that he would decide the case substantially greater clerk to a risk of presented request- at trial. Fuller evidence harm. juror prospective ed that the second be review, appellate a conviction On based the court denied excused for cause and trial jury upheld a verdict be if there is on must challenge. per- Fuller did not have a the record, in evidence viewed substantial emptory challenge available to exclude the light prosecu in to the most favorable prospective juror juror that sat second and tion, supports People that the verdict. v. jury. as a member 411, Schoondermark, (Colo. P.2d 414 699 determining The test for whether 1985). We will not set aside a conviction disqualified prospective juror a should be of evidence because a conclusion for lack person will render for bias is whether by jury different from that reached impartial according to the a fair and verdict might be reached on the same evidence. trial. presented law and the evidence at 423, 427, Rosenberg, 194 Colo. People v. (Colo. Drake, 1243 People v. (1978). prosecu 1214 1988); 16-10-103(1)(j),8A C.R.S. see also § presented in case evidence that the tion this (1986). given The trial court is broad dis by taken from the store store clerk was challenges cause ruling cretion in on for being night Fuller at and that she was not overturned un and its decision will be building. side of the taken to the dark appears in less a clear abuse of discretion evidence, jury have could From Drake, People 748 P.2d at the record. placed the clerk was fairly concluded that bias, deciding question 1243. In substantially greater risk of harm. at a credibility appearance of veniremen and evidence, light in the most fa viewed by are observed the trial court. Nai best prosecution, supports Full vorable to 30, 32, 612 P.2d People, lor v. degree kidnap of second er’s conviction 80 ping. jurors were prospective The two who III. displayed challenged may cause opinions gener- crime in robbery preconceived about attacking aggravated However, jurors convictions, prospective stat- kidnapping al. both and second the case based on by they ed that would decide argues that the trial court erred

707 sentencing and on crime statute in effect at the evidence submitted at trial sentenced,6 requires sen given on the instructions time Fuller was a law based Russo, aggravated P.2d 2 People felony court. tence for a class in the See (Colo.1986) (“[I]t trial range twenty-four forty-eight years. is the court’s weight to prerogative give robbery felony, considerable a Aggravated class juror’s fairly 18-4-302(3), that he can presumptive assurance section with a case.”). impartially on the The deni- serve range years. sentence of four to sixteen challenges al of the for cause this case 18-1-105(1)(a)(IV). Section 16—11— not an of discretion. abuse 309(1) a class 3 calls for a sentence on range

felony aggravated conviction in the IV. thirty-two years. Theft of sixteen to felony if receiving is a class 4 the value that the trial court Fuller contends property greater involved is that three refusing jury any to the erred to submit than ten thousand hundred dollars but less eyewitness one of the three instructions 18-4-410(4). A dollars. Section he tendered to the trial identification that felony a on a conviction of a class has so, doing urges he us to overrule court. years. presumptive range eight of two to that, held a line of cases in which we have theory of the case when the defendant’s The sentences on Fuller’s convictions for identity, jury need not be was mistaken degree kidnapping aggravated second eyewitness credibility on the instructed aggravated sen- were within given where an instruction is identification tencing ranges required by 16—11— section credibility general. on the of witnesses required to im- 309. The trial court was Vigil, See aggrava- in the pose consecutive sentences *6 (Colo.1986). Here, properly the trial court degree kidnap- range ted on Fuller’s second credibility of jury the on the instructed ping aggravated robbery and convictions. and Fuller’s claim is without witnesses 16-ll-309(l)(a). im- The sentences Section merit. aggra- end of the posed in the lower were the range and were consistent with vated V. pre- in contained Fuller's recommendations the trial court Fuller, Fuller claims that the report. sentencing In sentence by sentencing him to discretion abused its trial court considered the seriousness years thirty terms of on his consecutive crimes, the deterrent effect on the com- the conviction, kidnapping twen second community, munity, safety of the and the robbery convic ty years aggravated on his on a deferred the fact that Fuller was tion, conviction for years and six on his time of the commission of sentence at the receiving. particular, In by theft robbery kidnapping. The trial the and placed excessive em claims the trial court court stated: the crimes and phasis on the seriousness of Defendant The crimes of which the his rehabilitative failed to take into account The defen- was convicted are serious. potential. away leading the victim from dant was robbery a dark and the scene of the into degree kidnapping is a class Second par- Had third relatively a secluded area. person kidnapped is victim felony if the intervened, 18-3-302(3). customers who The ties not the robbery. of a Section the offering opportunity the for up a con drove range for a sentence on presumptive only speculate escape, one can eight from to victim to felony a class 2 viction for might come to the to harm years. Section 18-1- as what twenty-four that harm the fact 105(1)(a)(IV), 16- victim. Whether 8B C.R.S. Section (1986), the victim because of 11-309(1), didn’t come to 8A violent C.R.S. change applies acts committed on or amendment to was amended to 6. Section 16-11-309 aggravated range July in the to sec. minimum sentence after 1988. Ch. range. Sess.Laws, 679, midpoint presumptive of the 11—309(1)(a), Supp.). C.R.S. 8A 16 — Only intervention fact the court in uphold and the victim was must the sentence. point escape exceptional able at that to an appellate doesn’t mean cases will court that these crimes judgment aren’t serious and that substitute its for that of the trial something easily this is can be sentencing People court matters. passed by. Vigil, case, this con- section 16-11-309 mandated placed in should not be fear for personal aggravated secutive sentences safety

their or for life. their range. light of the fact They that Fuller shouldn’t be terrorized someone felony a on a deferred sentence at the time with knife. robbery of the of the and kid- commission out, attorney points theAs district it is napping, considering of the and the nature important message to send the com- crimes, court did its the trial not abuse robbery munity kidnap- that armed imposing discretion in consecutive sen- ping things are not that will be tolerated. aggravated robbery tences and second for At least for the time the defendant’s in degree kidnapping. custody community is safe at least conduct. Fuller also that the trial maintains regard potential With to Fuller’s reha- for failing court erred to set forth reasons bilitation, the stated: trial court year for the imposed six sentence for might Whether or not the Defendant by receiving theft conviction claims an rehabilitation, subject to be Court’s requiring abuse of discretion in that sen willing subject community not consecutively tence be served to his other having the risk of the Defendant out and that, during The record sentences. shows wandering potential around with the hearing, sentencing the trial court did committing these kind of crimes at underly separately not address the reasons time in the near future. ing imposed theft on the On review appellate of a sen rea receiving conviction. trial court’s tence, sentencing court decision record, soning, in the as shown relates must be accorded deference because of the imposed aggravated sentences judge’s familiarity with the trial circum degree kidnapping con and second *7 Watkins, the People stances of case. v. victions. 234, (Colo.1984). P.2d A trial 684 239 The judge imposing six-year imposed has broad discretion when sentence on the sentence, imposed by receiving and the sentence theft conviction the will was within presumptive range felony. in the absence of a clear for a 4 not be overturned class However, exercising for imposing of discretion. Id. sen no reasons the six abuse discretion, year tencing consecutively a trial court must con sentence to the other offense, appear the the in the The trial sider the nature of charac sentences record. potential by failing of court to set ter and rehabilitative the of erred forth the basic fender, development respect imposition of reasons for the for sentence crime, receiving by and the deterrence of and the on theft Pur- law conviction. 18-1-409(3), protection public. E.g., People of the suant to section 8B C.R.S. 221, Bruebaker, (1986), year P.2d that the six 189 Colo. 539 we order 18-1-102.5, (1975); imposed by 1279 see also on Fuller’s conviction for theft § (1986). sentencing concurrently with the receiving 8B C.R.S. court be served imposed on record the basic on his for must “state reasons sentences convictions aggravated robbery imposing People sentence.” and second kid- for Watkins, 163, 168, 633, napping. Accordingly 613 we with in- 200 Colo. P.2d remand If sentence is within the to amend mittimus to cause structions law, year receiving required appro by is on the six sentence for theft range based concurrently to be the sen- priate considerations as reflected in the served with record, factually supported by aggravated robbery tences for and second case, degree kidnapping. an appellate circumstances of case, In this VI. impaired did not assert the mental Fuller the stat Finally, Fuller claims that arraignment or condition defense at his the defense governing the assertion of ute 16-8-103.6. “It is not thereafter. See § mental condition is unconstitu impaired presump- function to ‘overturn statutes our that the particular, Fuller tional. claims strength specula- tively valid on the section 16—8— requirements of disclosure conjectures of counsel as to what tions and ” 103.6, (1989 Supp.), violated his 8A C.R.S. might happen under them.’ assistance of counsel be right to effective (Colo.1982) Mason, (quoting to attorney was uncertain as cause his Employ- Bayly Mfg. Department v.Co. during Fuller statements made whether ment, (1964)). P.2d 216 examina pre-arraignment the course of a injury from the Fuller did not suffer actual privileged.7 Fuller maintains tion would be statutory provisions complains. of which he uncertainty, compounded that this Accordingly, part, affirm in reverse we issue, so refusal to rule on the trial court’s part, and remand with directions attorney’s investigation into “chilled” his the mittimus to cause the sentence amend men impaired a defense of the existence of concurrently by receiving to run for theft constitu in this case that his tal condition consecutively with the sentences and not assistance of coun tional to effective kidnapping. Additionally, con violated. sel was 16-8-106(2), 8A C.R.S. tends that section (1986), on his constitu imposed a burden dissenting: Justice LOHR against self-incrimination privilege

tional majority holds that the defendant noncoopera it allows a defendant’s because challenge constitu- standing lacks of a court-ordered during tion the course 16-8-103.6, tionality 8A C.R.S. of section admissible in the defen examination to be governing waiver Supp.), the statute impaired mental the issue of dant’s trial on incident to confidentiality privilege or condition.8 impaired mental condi- the assertion of respectfully I dissent. tion defense. raise the defense of

Fuller did not subsequent impaired mental condition argues that the statute’s The defendant challenge of the constitu attorney the denial of his prevented his provision waiver impaired mental condition tionality mental con- investigating an standing Fuller does not that his attor- statute. defense. He asserts dition constitutionality of appeal unwilling investigate to attack the this de- ney was person and -106. A that the results of 16-8-103.6 he feared sections fense because *8 constitutionality state would not challenging any psychological of examination legally The defendant con- injury actual to a remain confidential. action must show result, French, amendment 762 that as a his sixth protected People interest. v. tends of counsel was 1372; Community right to effective assistance Bd. P.2d at State of Olson, v. violated. Occupational Educ. Colleges & psychologist any physician who has exam- provides: or Section 16-8-103.6 7. such mental treated the defendant for ined or places his condi- A defendant who mental condition. by asserting the defense of tion at issue ... pursuant sec- impaired condition to mental 16-8-106(2) provides: Section any claim of confi- ... waives tion 16-8-103.5 dentiality privilege communications or as to privilege against a defendant shall have The by physician psychologist in a or made him to during ex- the course of an self-incrimination or treatment for course of an examination The fact of the under this section. amination any purpose condition for psychiatrists such mental noncooperation with defendant's hearing the issue of such mental conducting trial or personnel the examina- and other both the court shall order condition. The may defendant's trial be admissible in the tion exchange the prosecutor and the defendant to insanity, competency, or im- on the issues of names, addresses, reports, statements of and paired mental condition. 710 challenge, I the substance of this to raise his constitutional

Rather than reach claim, the defen majority holds that would then reach the merits. standing. majority reasons dant lacks attorney The defendant contends that his did not assert that because the defendant investigating refrained from whether defense, he impaired mental condition impaired men- defendant suffered from an injury actual could not have suffered sure, giv- tal condition because he was not This alleged its constitutional deficiencies. 16-8-103.6, psychological that a en section reasoning ignores the substance of the de confidential. examination remain would challenge, which is that the con fendant’s result, The defendant contends that as a pre stitutional deficiencies of this defense right to effective as- his sixth amendment raising it. interested defendants from vent pros- of counsel violated. The sistance compromising A need not risk defendant contends that under section 16-8- ecution challenge the consti his defense order only waives a claim to 103.6 the defendant tutionality of a statute. Doe Dun See confidentiality of the examination to be or- 1297, (D.Colo.1970). bar, F.Supp. 320 1300 pursuant to section 16- dered the court standing, person To a must show 8-103.5(4), Supp.). 8A C.R.S. As far legally protected inter “injury in fact to a concerned, examinations are as other French, est.” names, only the prosecution contends that (Colo.1988). litigant standing A has 1372 reports and of these other exam- addresses alleged challenge a statute when the prosecution iners need be disclosed. adversely affects the constitutional defect concludes, therefore, that the statute does Brown, litigant. People v. rights. not violate the defendant’s Tumbarello, (Colo.1981); People v. contentions, evaluating I these would (Colo.1981). evaluating interpret first section 16-8-103.6. standing, person’s all of that an individual’s 16-8-103.6, (1989 Supp.), pro- 8A C.R.S. must be as of material fact averments pertinent part that: vides in true. As sumed to be Colorado General (Colo. Lamm, 700 P.2d sembly v. places who his mental con- defendant [a] 1985); City Friends Chamber Music asserting at issue ... the af- dition Denver, P.2d County firmative mental defense pursuant to section 16-8-103.5 condition confidentiality any waives claim of or ... case, asserts an In this the defendant privilege made as communications injury. He contends that he was actual physician psychologist in the him to a or through procedure that denied convicted an or treatment course of examination right to effective as- sixth amendment purpose for the for such mental condition the defen- of counsel. Whether sistance hearing on the issue of trial or amendment was violated dant’s sixth The court shall such mental condition. By question. in this case is a substantive prosecutor order both the defen- violation, however, the defen- asserting the names, addresses, exchange Having dant standing.1 de- dant has established any physician standing reports, and statements of defendant has termined that the *9 "designed impaired When the standing mental condition statute. doctrine is to ensure 1. The statute, only power judicial upheld exercised defendant that the district court controversy.” Colorado a case or context of requested the court to rule whether the district Assembly, A defen- 700 P.2d at 515-16. General psychiatrist communication with a defendant’s therefore, dant, standing would lack to chal- entry plea prior of a would be to the defendant’s impaired mental lenge 16-8-103.6 if the section privileged. court refused to issue The district to that defen- defense were irrelevant condition ruling. pretrial These motions also add such a pre-trial motions filed dant's defense. plausibility the defendant's claim that case demonstrate the seri- defendant in this ambiguity chilled the exercise of his statute’s investigating this de- of his interest in ousness right to effective assistance of sixth amendment arraignment filed the defendant fense. Prior counsel. constitutionality challenging a motion

711 expert or psychologist who has examined other of his own choice connec- or any proceeding the defendant for such mental tion with under arti- treated this cle, court, timely motion, upon condition. shall order that the examiner chosen statutes, interpreting primary our given opportuni- defendant be reasonable task is to determine and effectuate ty to conduct the examination. legislature’s intent. Kane v. Town of Park, 412, (Colo.1990). P.2d (2) Estes 786 415 copy any report A of examination so, doing statutory first to the we look of the defendant made at the instance of P.2d language. People Morgan, the defense shall be furnished to the 1294, language of prosecution a reasonable time in advance imply a waiver of the this section seems to of trial. confidentiality regard claim to defendant’s provisions These demonstrate that the stat- ing any physician psychologist or consulta contemplates psychiatric utory scheme or preparation tion in for trial. We should psychological examinations conducted scheme, statutory also look to the entire experts requiring defense as well as however, interpret provision this in a be, may It court-ordered examination. way harmonizes it with the other ele that therefore, that the section 16-8-103.6 waiv- of the relevant statutes. ments confidentiality apply er of was intended to Court, (Colo. 713 P.2d District to the court-ordered examinations conduct- 1986). provisions Several other are rele 16-8-103.5(4) pursuant only. ed to section 16-8-103.5, vant. Section 8A C.R.S. Supp.) provides: & 1989 In interpreting statutes we also seek an interpretation that avoid constitu would (1) If the defendant intends to assert the Coins, tional defects. Exotic Inc. v. Bea impaired affirmative defense of mental com, (Colo.1985), condition, ap 947-48 intention he shall indicate that 892, 106 dismissed, peal 474 U.S. S.Ct. prosecution to the at the to the court and interpretation An arraignment; except 88 L.Ed.2d time shown, court, permit good require cause shall section 16-8-103.6 that would the court and the defendant to inform to confidential defendant to waive his prosecution of his intention to assert ity regarding conversations with a defense impaired defense of men- the affirmative amendment.2 expert would violate the sixth prior condition at time to trial. tal People, See Hutchinson (Colo.1987); Miller v. District Court of Denver, City County (4) in- defendant indicates his When the hold, (Colo.1987). I would there 838-39 the defense of tention to assert fore, only 16-8-103.6 was in that section condition, an mental the court shall order privilege of confiden tended to waive pursuant examination of the defendant during a tiality arising from communication shall or- to section 16-8-106. The court made for the court-ordered examination defen- prosecutor and the der both hearing pursuant trial or purpose of a addresses, names, exchange the dant to 16-8-103.5(4). section reports, persons, other and statements experts subject provi- to the medical than that remains is whether the The issue 16-8-103.6, whom the sions of section ambiguity of section 16-8-103.6 none- intend to call as witnesses with parties the defendant’s sixth theless violated of im- regard to the affirmative defense right to effective assistance of amendment paired mental condition. 16-8-103.6 is am- counsel. Because section 16-8-108, (1986 & 1989 8A C.R.S. may have reason- biguous, the defendant Supp.), provides: to choose ably that he was forced believed *10 impaired mental con- asserting an

(1) to be exam- between If the defendant wishes maintaining the confi- or dition defense and psychiatrist, psychologist, ined Const, VI. U.S. amend. dentiality might opportunity communications he dant a reasonable assert defense of mental condition. psychologist. have with a Section 16-8- thereby effectively 103.6 chilled his sixth QUINN, C.J., KIRSHBAUM, J., amendment to effective assistance of join this dissent. counsel. Accordingly, I would vacate the defen-

dant’s conviction and remand the case for

retrial, with directions allow defen-

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Fuller
Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado
Date Published: Jul 9, 1990
Citation: 791 P.2d 702
Docket Number: 89SA288
Court Abbreviation: Colo.
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