*1 of Mr. The acts and omissions England violate follow- attorneys: DEA 1.1 rules providing discipline (a) ing dishonesty; acts of moral and involving turpitude 1.1(c) violation of his oath and duties an attorney; involving violation of the Canons Profes- and, involving 1.1 (j) Canon 11 with trust Ethics, dealing sional particular Canon and concerning punctuality expedi- and property tion. establishes violation conclusively

The evidence supports and canons and amply of these rules each board that Jack W. disciplinary recommendation attorney disbarred as England permanently and it is so ordered. Washington, state of C.J., Finley, Hunter, Hamilton, Rosellini, Hale, Tern., JJ., J. Pro and Ryan, Brachtenbach, Wright, concur. April 5, En Banc. 1973.] 42469.

[No. v. Verle R. Company, Respondent, Falls Glen al., et Petitioners. Vietzke *2 Ager, respondent. Guttormsen, & Scholfield, Willits Burgess by Merrick, & H. Roland Hofstedt, Hofstedt, petitioners. unpublished opinion J . This is a of an review Hunter, Appeals (6 1017) reversing App. the Court Wn. declaratory judgment

trial in court’s decision action. The plaintiff herein), (respondent trial court held that the Glen Company, obligated Falls defend, liability, against (peti- limits its a suit tioner) Sunny’s doing , Verle R. Vietzke, as Truck- business ing, hereinafter referred to as the defendant. dispute are facts not in as and can be summarized 9,

follows. On March 1966, into a the defendant entered operation written contract to lease a backhoe with personnel maintenance Com- defendant, the Austin pany. Said contract contained a “save-harmless clause” favor of the latter. Thorpe, employee 18, 1966,

On March Richard injuries performing defendant, sustained while certain services under the contract in which the defendant leased Company. the backhoe to the Austin on Thorpe

Thereafter, 12, 1967, December commenced against Company suit employer, and its They Boeing Company. upon in turn made demand the de- fendant to assume the defense of the action under the “save-harmless clause” of the contract between the defend- Company. ant and the Austin The defendant forwarded the plaintiff demand to the who had issued the defendant a liability policy on or about 1966. insurance policy contained an issued the defendant bodily injury provided lia- contractual endorsement which bility as follows: pay which the on of the insured all sums To behalf by liability by him under assumed insured, any reason designated above, in the schedule contract written damages legally obligated pay because shall become of including bodily injury, disease, at death sickness or resulting by any person

any and therefrom, sustained time by accident.

caused provided: The endorsement also agreed such as is afforded this It is endorsement apply pro- written shall Company furnishes the insured vided of the effective date contract within such agreement and failure to do so will invalidate contractual agreement. this *3 dispute case centers around the de- in the instant The any plaintiff to time, at submit the a failure, fendant’s Company. plaintiff copy The of contract with his or not it this determine whether was instituted action obligated defendant since the defendant to defend the comply provisions of the with the endorsement. failed provision the of the reasoned trial court The coverage days, provided insurance for 30 endorsement provided irrespective the the or not insured of whether 'any written contract. Since the with was, 30-day period, plaintiff the within accident occurred against obligated the action the defendant. to defend reasoning Appeals court, reversed trial The Court 30-day comply pro- failure to that the defendant’s coverage abrogated the afforded in endorsement vision the. Appeals’' by From the Court ab initio. endorsement petitioned this court for review,, decision ... granted-. which we provision;in is in-this case whether central issue coverage for the provides defendant question automatic

125 days the first one of his is contracts in existence. We agree holding provision trial with the court’s that the in the provides endorsement first 30 one of regardless the defendant’s contracts in existence copy a whether contract is ever forwarded to the company. Myers Physicians Kitsap v. We stated Serv., (1970), Wn.2d 288,474 P.2d 109 that: language [T]he anof insurance contract should in fact interpreted way “be in accordance with the it be would average purchasing understood man insurance.” (1966). Ames Baker, 713, 415 v. 68Wn.2d P.2d 74 (Italics ours.) average purchas- it

We find hard to believe that the man ing type contemplate this of insurance would that he would required copy plain- to furnish a of the contract to the plaintiff tiff, contends, in order to avoid forfeiture coverage provided by all the endorsement where the acci- 30-day period. dent occurred within the It is conceivable average furnishing copy that the man would consider 30-day period the contract within the after the accident had purpose occurred, would serve no useful and would abe useless act. provides

The endorsement that the was to be on effective 14, 1966. On that date the obligated provide coverage. the defendant with coverage, endorsement also states that the as heretofore recited apply provided

shall written the insured *4 Company furnishes the with of the contract within days agreement 30 of the effective date the and failure agreement. to do will invalidate so this insurance Upon reading provision, the above one not is sure when agreement the becomes First, invalid. the endorsement coverage states that there is 14, as of 1966. Then provision the above to states failure fulfill the above condi- agreement. tion will the condition, invalidate Does the if coverage inception unfulfilled; invalidate the from the 126 policy, or does the failure to-fulfill the condition invali-

the 30-day coverage period the after the allowed for fur- date providing nishing in the the interim? fairly policy susceptible a different inter- When two interpretation pretations, most case, as in instant the that though applied, a to the insured must be even favorable meaning may have been intended the insurer. different (1966). Baker, v. 68 415 P.2d 74 Ames Wn.2d plaintiff’s, to the construction Furthermore, follow any coverage deny endorsement would be purpose con- the inconsistent with which would be the parties. intent of tract and the deposition into admitted defendant, in his which was

evidence, stated: got specified I have what A: I the insurance we When floating

they policy, words, a in other where call Company through I was machine that rented automatically. was our That covered one of That was discussion. my lot of I did rent a discussions, main because Geary they machinery. told be Don me would automati- cally covered at all times. n Geary, plaintiff’s agent, the also stated: Mr. coverage provision.

A: . . . is an automatic This supra Baker, v. at 717: stated in Ames We according interpreted contracts must be policy parties. . . . intent of the evident with It must construed read in vacuum. be cannot be background existing eye the in- facts between sured and the insurer. inescapable the defend

It is that the agent coverage in instant case ant’s intended that days. question has No been for the first automatic authority. agent’s If the insur lack of the raised as to the provide ance wished retroactively be no and that there would cover cancelled comply upon age during failure 30-day provision, contends, have so it now it should as public policy, such limitations As a matter stated. *5 case contends exist in the instant must be clear specificity. spelled and out with stated,

For reasons hold that de- heretofore we automatically fendant was covered under the endorsement the first 30 existence. contract was judgment the trial court is affirmed. Court Appeals is reversed. C.J.,

Hale, Rosellini, Hamilton, Brachtenbach, and JJ., concur. (concurring my specially) judgment, J. cer- Finley, —In language phraseology agreement

tain and insurance quite ambiguous leave it unclear or Mr. as to whether doing Sunny’s Trucking, Vietzke, business as did did or liability not period have insurance and what any. time, if I think this court should state that company agreement, insurance drafted the that as a matter public policy the insurance re- will held sponsible ambiguity agreement, for the and, under the circumstances and the case, facts in this that the insurer estopped deny Mr. Vietzke.

For the reasons I indicated, concur in the result reached majority opinion. in JJ., concur J.

Stafford, Wright, Utter, Finley,