*2 BENCH, ORME, Before JACKSON and JJ.

OPINION ORME, Judge: Epperson, Petitioner Lamont a retired City firefighter, Salt Lake seeks review of a final order of the Utah State Retirement Request Board that dismissed his for Board By Request, peti- Action. means of sought declaring tioner an order that his spouse, Epperson, former Verla is entitled to his death. dismissing petitioner’s Request, the Re- by filing Request for Board Action Ann. decision that Utah Code Board ruled The Board held spousal with the Retirement Board. creates á (Supp.1996) § 49-5-704 at 14 and 1996. On hearings is married on November only if a retirant Therefore, the Retirement Board a December retirant’s death. time of the eligi- petitioner’s Request for Board could become dismissed the retirant’s *3 approved the the Retirement Board’s if Action and spousal ble spousal regarding his the as of the time of initial determination has remarried retirant petition for review en- that the Retire- death benefit. This We conclude or her death. interpretation of 49-5- sued. section ment Board’s its incorrect and reverse order.

704 is dispositive issue before us is whether The correctly construed the Board Retirement FACTS preclude a retirant’s section 49-5-704 to for- Epperson were petitioner The Ms. receiving any part of the spouse mer from 13, 1992, after more than April on divorced statutory unless the retirant marriage. petition- The forty-three years of her death.2 at the time of his or remarried City firefighter worked as Salt Lake er during virtual- Epperson Ms. was married to STANDARD OF REVIEW the Fire De- employment his with ly all of Epper- During marriage, Ms. partment. statutory agency’s We review employed outside the home was son question of law under a construction as a financially de- sporadically and was therefore unless the correetion-of-error standard stat September petitioner. On pendent agency expressly impliedly grants the ute or 1, 1992, six after the di- less than months statutory interpret lan discretion vorce, from the Fire- petitioner retired Retire guage. v. Utah State See O’Keefe began receiving retirement Department and Bd., Ct.App.1996), ment retired, petitioner After the benefits. P.2d 683 granted, rt. ce Qualified court entered a appropriate district Bd., Allred v. Utah State (QDRO), awarding Relations Order Domestic Ct.App.1996). petitioner’s Epperson of the Ms. one-half case, grant does not this the statute all of the pension benefit and discretion, such and there Retirement Board petitioner’s retirement under benefit for cor fore the Board’s decision we review provision plan.1 the death benefit Under 1115; O’Keefe, 929 P.2d at rectness. See 49-5-704, would there- Epperson Ms. section Allred, correc at 1174. “Under pay- pension 75% of the fore receive standard, court affords no tion-of-error petitioner’s time of the death. at the able interpretation agency’s deference to 49-5-704(l)(a) (Supp. Code Ann. See Utah Allred, 914 statutory terms.” application of 1996). P.2d at August the Retire- Subsequently, that, Epperson un- Ms.

ment Board notified ANALYSIS 49-5-704, interpretation its der interpretation of section proper The petitioner’s former Epperson, as the Ms. impres an issue of first presents be entitled spouse, would not section, the Re phrased as when The plan un- sion. the retirement benefit under decision, provid rendered its tirement Board by the time petitioner has remarried less the ed as follows: appealed the petitioner The of his death. argues petitioner that the Retirement City also Fire The that the Salt Lake

1. It is uncontroverted to admit state when it refused Board erred legislator's Department opted out of the federal Social has legis- testimony evidence of offered as consequently Security system. history we decide this and intent. Because lative Security by virtue to Social benefits not entitled plain language the stat- upon the case based petitioner's employment the Fire De- with ute, whether such reach the issue of we need not partment. legisla- actually testimony admissible constitutes history. tive (l)(a) Except provided in Subsection erwise would create a new and unfunded (3), payable depen- to a the death benefit spouses.4 death benefit in former dent after death of the retirant is a petitioner argues that the Retirement monthly equal amount to 75% of the allow- conditioning Board erred his former being paid the retirant at the time ance spouse’s entitlement to the death benefit on of death.... his marital status at the time of his death. petitioner contends (3)(a) In the event of a court order com- 49-5-704(3) guage permits of section a retir- 49-1-609, plying with Section a former ant’s former to receive benefits when of a retired member entitled to QDRO, regard- divorce court so orders in a designated the court share of the retirant’s less of whether the deceased retirant is re- monthly retirement benefit and the court married at the time of his or her death. We designated *4 share agree petitioner. with the benefit. (b) supersedes This conflict- subsection statutes, interpreting “When this ing subsections of this section. guided by long-standing court is rule that § (Supp.1996).3 Utah Ann. 49-5-704 Code a according statute should be construed to its The Retirement Board determined that Thus, plain language. statutory where the under section 49-5-704 a retirant’s former language plain unambiguous, and we will spouse spousal is entitled to beyond legislative not look it to divine in only if the retirant is remarried at the time Sign, tent.” Dep’t Utah Inc. v. Utah of of the retirant’s death. More specifically, 632, (Utah 1995) Transp., 896 P.2d 633-34 Board asserts that the effect of section (citations omitted). Accord Brinkerhoff 49-5-704(3) split is to allow for the of a (Utah 685, Forsyth, 1989); 779 P.2d 686 payable, death benefit otherwise and City Draper, 1044, Brendle v. 937 P.2d of split that such a can occur if the benefit Allred, Ct.App.1997); 1047 914 P.2d at 49-5-704(l)(a). first exists under section 1175. See also Johnson v. Utah State Re spousal all, For the death benefit to exist at Bd., (Utah 1988) (“A 93, 95 argues, the Board the retirant must have a principle fundamental statutory construc “spouse” at the time of his or her death and unambiguous tion is that language in the spouse simply “spouse.” not a former may interpreted statute itself not be so as to Thus, argument goes, if the retirant has plain meaning.”). contradict its spouse death, at the time of his or her there is no death meaning benefit to which the retir- and effect of subsection (3)(a)’s lay ant’s can language plain. claim. The are A hearing former Board contends that to may read statute oth- a domestic relations matter order5 that 3. Section 49-5-704 had been amended in at the time of death. If retirant chooses not becoming July remarry, with the amendment effective the former cannot receive the year. curious, indeed, that The 1994 amendment added the Leg- benefit. It islature, be would if the (3)” guage "[e]xcept provided intending give spouses as in Subsection former bene- fit, (l)(a) (l)(c) beginning availability of subsections and were to and condition the of the bene- (3) entirety. Compare remarriage. they added subsection in its fit on someone else's If had (1994) mind, § Utah Code Ann. 49-5-704 such an with id. unusual scheme in it would be doubly § (Supp.1996). they After the curious if left it for inference rather case, spelling quite clearly Legisla- Board issued its order in than it out in the amend- again ture amended section 49-5-704. ment. The 1997 percentage" amendment substituted "same for 49-1-609, designated” satisfy the second "court 5.The order subsection must (3)(a). which, 49-5~704(3)(a) (Supp.1997). pertinent § part, See id. states that provide board retirement shall for the divi- theory 4. While the Board’s is not without some sion of a member's retirement allowance or logic, Legislature responsi- semantic it leaves the refund of contributions termination to illogical policy objectives adopt- spouses family ble for rather pursuant former members ing competent jurisdiction 1994 amendment: A former will to an order of a court of eligible be respect to receive a retirant's death benefit if with to domestic relations matters on the retirant has remarried and remains married file with retirement office. emerges from a interpretation we conclude to re- spouse is entitled a retirant’s reading of the statute’s straightforward bene-' portion ceive some “It axiomatic that a statute language. as fit, in subsection is identified which given the allow- be a reasonable and sensible equal to 75% of should “monthly amount legislature not time of construction and that the did the retirant at the being paid to ance Ann. intend an absurd or unreasonable result.” Code retirant’s] death.” [the 5—704(1)(a) Corp., (Supp.1996). other State v. GAF § 49— 1988) omitted). (citation (1) Accord Perrine v. words, identifies subsection amount, Mining Corp., 911 P.2d while subsec- Kennecott and its (3) Corp., Millett v. Clinic retirant’s former Clark explains how a tion (observing that to the death ben- spouse can entitled become “statutory to be so construed Any lingering of it. enactments are portion some efit or parts relevant and interplay two as to render all thereof súbsec- doubt about interpretations definitively by meaningful, subsection and that are resolved tions is (l)(a)’s part of a recognition applies be avoided which render some express absurd”). (3),” The Re- provision nonsensical or “[e]xcept provided (3)(b), interpretation of section explicitly which states tirement Board’s by subsection (3) unreasonable; conflicting there is no ration- “supersedes 49-5-704 is that subsection justification conditioning a retirant’s section.” Id. 49-5- al subsections of this *5 704(l)(a) (3)(b). spouse’s right to a death benefit & marry to someone else. the retirante decision single re- Epperson has satisfied the Ms. light in of the reasons especially This is true (3): Following the quirement of subsection spouse’s claim to the supporting a former Depart- from the Fire petitioner’s retirement place. in the first ment, awarding Ms. QDRO was issued entirety of the Epperson the example, For one rationale therefore be would benefit. spouse to re permitting a retirant’s former in the amount of entitled to the death benefit benefit, as ceive the benefit is that the peti- being paid to the 75% of the allowance component firefighter’s pen a valuable of a of his death. tioner at the time accrued, plan, property which in whole sion subject part, during marriage or in and is only plain language Not does by court. po equitable distribution the divorce support petitioner’s section 49-5-704 benéfits are a form sition, interpretation of or retirement petitioner’s “[P]ension but the employer,” compensation by the con of deferred 49-5-704 is the reasonable rights to those benefits were ac by parties.6 Contrary and if the struction offered marriage, the court must quired during suggestion wrong that it is Judge Bench’s equitably in distribut those benefits of our consider consider the basic reasonableness statute, v. ing the marital assets. Woodward Wood we believe do interpretation of the 1982).7 (Utah ward, 431, 432 656 P.2d appropriate an double-check on ing so is Lytle, 49-l-609(3)(a) Progressive Acquisition, v. 806 (Supp.1996). Inc. Utah Code Ann. 239, (Utah Ct.App.1991) (staling "[a]n QDRO 243 undisputed this case P.2d It that in subject plausi- ambiguous to two if it is order is 49-1-609. satisfies section Here, constructions”). because the Retire- ble 49-5-704 is respondent construction of section petitioner offer ment Board’s fact that 4, ambiguity supra exists implausible, note see differing of section 49-5-704 does constructions by the despite differing offered "ambiguous.” constructions We that the statute is not mean capable parties. long "ambiguous” that means have held ” " plausible meanings.’ v. 'two or more Alf 1272, equitable Co., duty to make an trial court’s "[T]he P.2d 1274 Farm Fire & Cas. 850 State added) property a divorce action 'encom (quoting Village division of (emphasis Co., possessed every náture passes all of the assets of Apts. State Farm Fire & Cas. Inn v. 1990)). (Utah by parties, obtained and from whenever Ct.App. Accord Belnorth 583 derived; Comm'n, ... includes source Corp. whatever Petroleum v. Tax ” Dogu v. any pension or insurance.' (stating parties fund Ct.App.) that when such 270 n. (Utah 1982) (quoting Dogu, plausible statutory interpretations, am each offer denied, Englert, exists), Englert biguity 859 P.2d 585 cert. entry Board’s construction of section ed to the Board for of an order consis- opinion. by per- this rationale tent with this 49-5-704 contravenes control, through the mitting the retirant remarry single,

decision to or remain wheth- JACKSON, J., concurs. er his or her former ever receives this property. BENCH, Judge, concurring in result: Further, nothing there is inherent agree petitioner’s position I sup- that remarry retirant’s decision to which should ported by plain meaning of Utah Code suddenly entitle a former to receive a First, (Supp.1996). §Ann. subsec- death benefit to which he or she is not other- states, expressly “Except pro- tion wise entitled. Such an outcome is irrational. (3).” Next, vided in Subsection Rather, spouse’s a former claim to the death (3)(a) provides, “In the event of a court order springs spouse’s from the former ... a former of a retired member is relationship marital with the retirant and not designated entitled to ... the court share of from the retirant’s choice to enter into a Finally, death benefit.” subsec- relationship similar with another at some (3)(b) provides, super- tion “This subsection time the future. conflicting sedes subsections of this section.” Consequently, plain reading of the statute There is no rational reason for the con- clearly provides death benefits for a former Board, by struction offered the Retirement spouse of a retired member where a statuto- presume Legislature will not and we that the rily complying place. order is intended such an irrational result absent crystal-clear language indicating that did. Because we have accorded this statute its supra note 4. The reasonable con- plain meaning, any commentary about rele struction of section 49-5-704 is the one of- policy vant considerations or the reasonable by petitioner. agree fered And we ness of our construction is unwarranted. See *6 compelled by plain construction is Sign, Dep’t Transp., Inc. v. Utah guage (“[W]here 1995) statute. the stat

utory language unambiguous, we beyond will not legislative look it to divine CONCLUSION intent.”); Therapy see also Salt Lake Clinic Frederick, 1017, 1020 (B) permits Subsection of section 49-5-704 (“ language unambiguous, ‘When is clear and a court to order a retirant’s former expresses, it must be to mean held what spouse is entitled to receive all or some ”) (quot room is left for construction.’ portion death benefit identified ing 127, 135, Burbidge, Hanchett v. 59 Utah the statute. The Re- (1921)). 202 P. I therefore concur in construing Board erred only in the result. 49-5-704 to condition a former enti- tlement to the death benefit the retir- remarriage

ant’s at the time of his or her requirements

death. The of section 49-5- present have been satisfied case

and, long QDRO so as the remains unmodi-

fied, would be entitled to the upon petitioner’s death.

Accordingly, the Retirement Board’s order

dismissing petitioner’s Request for Board reversed,

Action is and matter is remand- Woodward, 1978)). part during marriage. 656 P.2d at 432-33 craed in whole or in ("The determining [in essential criterion whether right To the extent that the has so accrued it is subject equitable a resource is distribution.”). distribution] subject equitable right whether a to the ac- asset has