*1 In (S. No. Bank. Feb. F. 1967.] HILL IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION et al., RUSSIAN Respondents, v. BOARD PERMIT OF Plaintiffs THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN OF APPEALS Appellants. al., FRANCISCO et *2 O'Connor, City Thomas M. Attorney, Kenealey, Robert A. Deputy City Attorney, Pillsbury, Sutro, Madison & John B. Bates, Gregory Feeney Noble K. and Thomas E. for Defend Appellants. ants and Heller, Ehrman, McAuliffe, Caspar White & Weinberger W. Popofsky Respondents. and M. Laurence for Plaintiffs and present TOBRINER, J. controversy involves an at- tempt by the Board of Permit to authorize con- building struction of rise to over twice height permitted maximum governing ordinances City County and San Francisco. granted directing The trial court a writ of mandate permit purporting board to revoke authorize con- contending permit in appeal, that the struction. Defendants meaning granted” within the “lawfully sec question was Planning City San Francisco1 time Code of tion operation proposed project from the to immunize height limitation.2 Since the newly enacted Ap pending before the Board of Permit application peals still height effective, we limitation became hold the new when granted” “lawfully to confer time permit was not properly and the trial court immunity under section permit revoked. ordered the

T public private agencies Beginning a number of possible height por- investigated limitations for the northern public hearings in late holding Francisco. After tion of San Planning and the 1964, the early Commission Committee of the Buildings, Lands and Supervisors approved enactment of an ordinance to buildings legal height 105 feet for a maximum establish litigation. area involved this constructed Development HAP January 22, 1964, Company, HAP On Haynie Corporation & Development Partnership, Haas *3 developers”) (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the (hereinafter Permit Bureau to filed with the Central referred application bureau”) permit, an for a permit site as “the seeking apartment 235-foot-high a permission to construct building of Polk and Streets San corner Greenwich at the permit February while the bureau was still On Francisco. developers’ application, Super- the Board of considering the by City Plan- recommended the enacted ordinance visors the Buildings, Lands and ning the Commission By height Planning terms, its the ordinance Committee. the structure March 1964. Since effect on was to take 1 “Any building (d) provides: or for use subdivision Section lawfully granted prior permit to the effective date of has been Code, City Planning date is the where such an to amendment may May completed and used in with the be accordance to diligently approved plans, provided prosecuted that construction started Building completion 304 of the in accordance Section to building Code, deemed be a law or shall thereafter be use building (Amended 200-60, approved April existing fully Ord. or use.” legal Height 2Special No. the maximum 35-64 limits District Ordinance (See City question height Planning property the to 105 on feet. structures 214, 250, proposed 280-283.) here §§ The structure 130 feet that maximum. rise above developers proposed which the would rise far above the max- height permitted newly-enacted imum at that location the ordinance, the Director recommended that developers’ Notwithstanding application the that denied. recommendation, City Planning the voted on Commission approve application. 12 to the March just days four On March before the effective date the height new limitation and several its weeks after endorsement mayor,3 the the bureau entered order which approved developers’ application the and transmitted to them “permit subject a document described its face on as a issued days appeal Appeals.” within Board expense the document admonished to incur no un- right appeal lapsed. til the had Improvement Hill (herein- Plaintiff Russian Association after to as “the association”) timely referred filed a but Appeals protest- unsuccessful Board of Permit ing order; May bureau’s on 4 the board denied application rehearing.4 association’s On the associa- petition, superior developers’ tion’s court ordered the site permit revoked. theory

Defendants contest the order of revocation on the that Board of Permit properly testing acted permit application under the law which inwas effect when approved application bureau on March 19. operative Plaintiffs concede that no law then rendered the By bureau’s action unlawful.5 the time the matter had however, governing reached the of Permit Appeals, clearly prohibited develop law structure described application. ers’ had Since the bureau made no 3 "by signed Mayor tío. 35-64 Ordinance on oí San Francisco February 21. 25; appealed April 4The association on March on 20 the Board of concurred bureau’s March 19 order. The applied rehearing April 28; May association for a on on 4 the board application denied that vote of two. three to 19, however, properly 5Even on March bureau could have deny permit application ground its discretion to exercised on illegal by the structure described therein would soon rendered pending *4 (Brougher (1928) ordinance. v. Board Public Works 205 of 487]; Harney, Ap Cal. 426 P. Charles L. Inc. [271 v. Board Permit of (1961) peals Cal.App.2d 442, 870].) Cal.Rptr. 195 446-447 The case [15 ‘ ‘ manifestly before us not one in which the enactment of the ordinance [any] attempt developers’] plans.” stemmed from to frustrate [the (Sunset Cemetery (1961) Cal.App.2d 115, View Assn. v. Kraintz 196 Cal.Rptr. 317]; (1957) 123-124 see Munns v. [16 also Stenman 152 Cal.

38 ,6 19 underlying March the reasons its record of order suspended operation law,7 had of the since that order controversy necessarily the Board Per came before of entire question facing Accordingly, the Appeals ele novo. the mit granted, whether the should was whether board had been lawful. bureau suspended of the the order Ap Board of Permit do novo review the Since permit procedure,8 the peals integral part the entire is an of discretionary broadly with board, agency entrusted as an apply ordinarily ordi power, bound to deci administrative at of the in force the time nances final pre the time at of effect sion, rather than the ordinances proceedings bureau.9 liminary before 150, by contend im permits changes outstanding munizing ordinances, exception uniformly an created to this principle law. As recognized of administrative defendants in section, statutory immuni terpret it clothes by a ty is issued lawful order of the moment change notwithstanding any governing- permit bureau, permit application by pending do novo law review contrary, public hearings 67].) App.2d [314 543 P.2d On preceded which the enactment of the new ordi official recommendations filing permit application placed nance and "fully power proceeding to exercise on notice [the] ultimately adoption in the ordinance . . ." [resulted] which . (Fla. 275-276; (Sharrow City 1955) 274, Note, 83 v. Dania see So.2d Pending Subsequently Proposed (1958) Building or Permits—Effect of Building Permits, Legislation Applications and Enacted on 34 109, 112.) Dame Notre Law. (1943) Lindell Co. v. Board Permit 23 6As we noted in 4], nor P.2d neither the San Francisco Charter the the Cal.2d San Francisco [144 findings provides for of fact or law permit bureau. 7"Pending Appeals, Permit the action from decision Board of suspended." (Municipal pt. . . is taken . shall be III, 1, 8.)§ art. Superior (1959) County Court San Francisco v. 8See & Cal.Rptr. 294]; Lindell Co. v. 248-249 347 P.2d [1 Cal.2d Appeals, supra, Contrast the more 23 Cal.2d 313-315. narrowly Appeals in the variance of the Board confined role Improvement Club v. Board Cow Hollow area. 610].) Cal.Rptr. (1966) Cal.App.2d 169-171 [53 that, general rule, change pend "a of law as a 9Defendants concede hearing ing future acts. trary in relation to must be followed an administrative body con would issue orders Otherwise (Ziffrin, existing legislation." 78 Inc. United v. States 465]; Esperdy see Fassilis v. U.S. L.Ed. S.Ct. also (2d Cir. 1962) 429, 432.) 301 F.2d

39 Appeals.10 concluded, however, We have Board requires departure 150 that section from traditional principles law since that of section contem- plates only protection those which have at- of finality process.11 tained the administrative

II 150, permit Prior to the enactment of section even which finality had could achieved administrative be revoked on the per change basis of a laws.12 The " ’’ immunity post win from such ex mittee could facto revoca only portion by constructing tion a substantial of the struc upon in good ture his faith authorized reliance prior permittee delayed law.13 A who construction in the face impending might of an amendment laws find progressed enough qualify that he had not far time to proceeded immunity;14 unseemly one who ran haste might stigma risk that his conduct bad bear the of faith.15 No permittee facile formula informed the how to strike the deli immunity. cate balance which would afford the desired 150, immunity provides prior 10As defendants read section which finality merely conditional; only urge to administrative defendants that ignore the section authorized the Board of Permit the 105- height limitation, required foot not that it the board to do fn. so. infra.) finality only right 11A achieves such rvlien the to invoke the discretionary reviewing authority of the Board of Permit has been exhausted. Thus a issued bureau becomes 10-day period following final at the conclusion of the the order which permit, appealed issued that if such order has not been that time. Otherwise, 40-day becomes final at the conclusion of the period filing timely following appeal. (Municipal pt. III, of a I, 8, 14; §§ Appeals, art. 2d supra, Lindell Co. v. Board 23 Cal. of 303, 323.) Brougher Works, v. supra, 12See Public 205 Cal. 432- 435; (1925) Miller v. Board Works 195 Cal. 477 P. [234 ; Am.Jur., Zoning, § 185; C.J.S., 38 Zoning, A.L.R. 58 1479] 243; 101 § (1963) Comment Zoning, “Ex Post Facto” 31 Ford.L.Rev. 545. County Diego (1951) 13See San v. McClurken 37 Cal.2d 691 972]; Corp. P.2d [234 (1948) see also Trans-Oceanic Oil v. Santa Barbara Cal.App.2d 776, 148], 85 784-788 [194 P.2d and cases there cited. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d 1965) 14See 8 25.157, §§ ed. 25.158; C.J.S., Zoning, 244; Note, 101 Zoning The Administration Flexibility Explanation Devices: An Recent Judicial Frustration (1965) 973, 987-990; Note, op. 49 supra, Minn.L.Rev. cit. 34 Notre Dame Law. 117. Township (1966) Penn v. 15See Yecko Bros. Pa. A.2d [217 171]; see also Stowe v. Burke 255 N.C. 534-536 S.E.2d 374], cited; there Corp. City eases cf. Trans-Oceanic Oil v. Santa Barbara, supra, Cal.App.2d 776, 784, uncertainty To eliminate waste inherent municipalities rules, a number of enacted ordinances these predicated immunity upon revocation some municipal clearly agency.16 defined action of a Under section granting” permit. was the action “lawful history slightest Nothing in lends support protect suggestion designed that it hope ultimately pending permit application mere approval. long held that is not receive final yet We have one who municipal pro *6 to presently armed with a effective license that, risk “before ceed with construction must assume the (Brough application” final action been taken on [has] [his] Works, 426, 435), the er v. 205 supra, Board Cal. require application might changed to be law be so as that his 229 (See, (1964) Cal. e.g., Anderson v. Council denied. Cal.Rptr. App.2d 79, ; v. Teeters 88-90 O'Rourke [40 41] Cal.App.2d 349, 983].) P.2d otherwise, suppose suggested reason, historical or to have contemplated departure this estab a that section lished rule. argu- developers acknowledged in oral As counsel for the to 150 is court, purpose central of section ment this before permittee’s rights may a definite date as of which set a certainty. permit has “law- a Thus, with once ascertained meaning 150, that sec- fully of section granted” within the permittee complete the automatically empowers to tion diligent subject requirement approved only to a structure granting” aof “lawful performance.17 To constitute right, a fixed not sub- confer permit, an must therefore action ac- Yet the pursuant legislation. ject to future divestment to issuing cannot itself a permit bureau in tion of the states, Zoning, Am.Jur., matter lias been In some 16See Laws, 40A, (Mass. § 11 by ch. governed Gen. statute. One such statute (1954)) a from revocation a immunizes permittee only question issued before if the amendment acquired developers proposed in the instant The of the amendment. notice any requirement. not, course, fn. such have met case could supra.) (d), permittees protects render who subdivision 17Section Building timely performance with section 304 accordance computes of the final action which in turn the Board of timeliness “from the daté permittee Appeals,” on which the the date effectively pro proceed The to fact entitled with construction. upon hinge “final action’’ tection of the statute is thus made to board support our was never meant lends further to conclusion statutory permits to had not achieved to afford a shield whose finality prior the effective date of a amendment. to right. a Even after lawfully- confer issued a has been bureau, the Board of Permit necessarily discretionary power retains to order that the denied change a pending because of law.18 most, therefore, At permit by lawful issuance the bureau can confer a immunity, hardly conditional kind contemplated of shield designed fix rights permittee a statute upon certain date. If we were to construe the statute to afford this sort of partial protection permit applicants in addition to the protection undeniably provides

total which have become which it final, nothing germane we would achieve purposes of section 150. Such a construction would simply arm discretionary authority ignore laws which become during effective application. pendency aof option addition of this already discretionary weapons broad arsenal of avail- only compound able to the board would uncertainty all parties, interested a result which would subvert rather than legislative purpose. subserve the

Ill seriously disputing Without this analysis, defend independent arguments ants advance two support of their interpretation They suggest of the section. view, that, first unless adopt encourage repeated petitions their we shall *7 rehearing Appeals by before the Board of Permit those who postpone granting wish to of a until a new ordi operative. argument upon nance has become This relies defend unsupported Ap ants’ peals assertion that of Permit empowered grant rehearings to without limitation as contrary abrogate right 18A conclusion would of all interested parties, by secured section 39 of the San Francisco Charter and Municipal Code, part III, urge article sections 14 and to in formal hearings Appeals issuing impropriety before the Board of Permit of zoning change, notwithstanding a the change. in conflict with an imminent issuing of such a before the effective date of that lawfulness (See 5, supra.) fn. Any interpretation statutory of section 150 which would defeat this right discretionary authority to Ap- invoice the of the Board of Permit peals clearly light unacceptable would be of the fact that the Central Bureau, board, (Cf. obliged Permit opposing unlike the is not to accord parties any rights 6, supra.) Accordingly, whatever. fn. defendants preserve discretionary jurisdiction construe the section so as to of Appeals the Board of supra.) Permit in this area. fn.

42 point fact, In of the Board of

to time.19 possesses authority. part III, such 8 and 14 Sections of Municipal provide Code of the both the Board article final Appeals must enter its order not later than 40 of Permit appeal. filing it of the first days after the secondly suggest that the “issue” and words They “grant” synonymous. insist that those words are are interchangeably in the San Charter and Mu Francisco used that, they linguistic as a nicipal Code, matter, and conclude protect permits they read to as soon as 150 should be ap lawfully “issued” bureau.20 In have been proaching argument, recall the admonition of Learned we this “ of the surest indexes of a and is one mature Hand: [I]t jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the developed (2d (Cabell 1945) Markham dictionary. v. Cir. 148 . . .” Markham v. (1945) nom. 326 affd. sub Cabell F.2d 193].) 66 S.Ct. L.Ed. 404 U.S. [90 rigidly level, however, defend formalistic on its own Even Contrary proves be untenable. position ants’ portions Fran assertions, the relevant of the San defendants’ do not use words cisco Charter instead, they employ interchangeably; “grant” “issue” departmental concept the initial to describe “issuance” Appeals, the Board of Permit but is reviewed action which disposition concept “granting” for the of reserve final evidently Lindell Co. v. Board misread 19Defendants have Contrary assertion, supra, Appeals, to defendants’ 23 Cal.2d say grant hi Lvndell that the Board could did time”; rohearings rehearings “without limitation as we said ‘ ‘ granted grounds as to without limitation could (23 (Italics added.) at Cal.2d thereof.” jurisdictions 20Although interpret in other have courts had occasion analogous immunity provisions (see, e.g., City to that of section 150 (1929) 124]; City 109 422 New Britain v. Kilbourne Conn. A. [147 (1926) 427]; Shreveport v. Dickason 160 La. 563 Alexander v. So. [107 (1966) Building Inspector Provincetown 370 350 Mass. N.E. [214 Fleming Realty Co., (1952) 876]; v. Moore Bros. Inc. 363 Mo. 305 2d 8]; (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1963) Rathkopf Remsen Co. v. Street S.W.2d [251 336]; Supply App.Div.2d re Rose N.Y.S.2d In W. P. Builders [238 (1932) 462]; S.E. Hauser v. [163 202 N.C. State Co. 42]), question N.E. none these cases involved the Ohio “lawfully validly regarded grant issued should be as whether finality. note, however, attained administrative before has We ed” court, construing protected when that one ordinance required “lawfully finally issued,” spolce of the act the ordi “granting permit.” (City New Britain v. Kil nance as the (Italics 422, 424-425.) added.) bourne, supra, 109 Conn. *8 pursuant to the board’s orders.21 the matter correctly Ap- note that the Board of Permit “grant” permit peals can direct the cannot but itself quite permit They add, if properly, bureau to do so. that permit appealed, bureau were not that action order of any action taken the Board rather than granting final would constitute the decision relative to the or permit question. Although denial of the this observation might ques- interest if were concerned be of some we with the agency may grant permit, light tion it casts no problem presented by us, upon the the case before since we are granted permit here concerned with who not but with granted. issue, statutory language when it was On that strongly inconclusive; suggests, however, that a has “lawfully granted” meaning not been within the of section jurisdiction 150 until the of the Board has been exhausted.22

IV by holding that Finally, “lawfully grant- is not respect ed” until all administrative action with application completed, preserve municipal power has been prevent newly the circumvention of enacted laws. objective nonconforming “Given to eliminate uses, throughout generally country courts follow a strict hearing investigations . 21"After . . and such further as the Board [of may necessary deem . . . the Board concur Appeals] may issue, the action of the authorized department transfer or revoke the or the action permit, may overrule of said department and order that granted, or restored, to be permit the case denied, permitted as transferred, (Municipal 14.) (Italics added.) may § be.” art. Code, pt. III, ‘ ‘ On the issuance of any any ... . . . who permit, deems person that his or . . interest . will be property adversely affected . . . may (Municipal §30.) the Board of Permit Appeals.” Code, pt. art. Ill, “ (Italics added.) Board] [The may concur the action of the depart to issue ment authorized such license or by the permit, or, vote of four may overrule the action of such members, department order that granted, (San or license be or refused.” restored, Francisco (Italics added.) Charter, 22Both the San Francisco Charter and the afford numerous indications in addition to those noted above that the “issu “granting” ance” are not to be viewed as equivalent. Thus, section 39 of example, the San Francisco Charter authorizes Permit Appeals to “order that the permit ... . . . (italics added), revoked, it be as would have refused” granted” more if the appropriate were deemed “lawfully as soon as the bureau had issued it. agency when a Moreover, subordinate is authorized ini- “grant” tially which an applicant seeks, an appeal from the *9 enlargement omit- their extension or policy against [footnote Diego supra, 37 McClurken, San v. Cal.2d (County ted].” of policy, light we loathe to of this basic are 683, 687.)23 In all statutory immunity to who obtain the lure of extend approval during preliminary the inevi- permit bureau’s the zoning a ordinance the enactment of interval between table interpretation of section Yet the and its effective date. precisely promise that would hold out espoused defendants encourage thus eleventh-hour eva- protection and would zoning of the laws. sions protect only By interpreting section to those the municipalities final, however, enable which have become through majority efforts to race of last-minute deter the vast ordinarily authority suspend the action under does not exercise of such review but only stays proceedings that in furtherance of action. For 302(d) example, of to Francisco Charter and section of the San section 117.3 Zoning City Planning expressly the authorize Administrator the Code ‘‘ ’’ grant appli requested he the when has determined that a variance criteria; appeal prescribed certain an his therefor meets cation merely stays to the Board of all granting of a variance Zoning (San proceedings in furtherance of the Administrator’s action. City 303(a).) Charter, § 117.3; § Yet Francisco that, pending eases, appeal Municipal action from which provides “the Code ’’ (Munici suspended. taken . . . an is shall (Italics added.) pt. III, pal Code, § must art. One torture the Municipal permit, supposedly it is to conclude that of the Code words bureau, “granted” rather than the action that bureau issuing “suspended” pending temporarily permit, appeal. is which ‘‘ ’’ issuing plausible per inference is that the initial act of a The most something less under the Code and mit constitutes than Charter “granting” permit. the ultimate a developers in this connection that the structure 23Defendants insist though build, limit, proposed constitute this over twice as tall as lawful would not “non-conforming building.” Regardless accuracy a of the obviously characterization, principle Indeed, it evades the at stake. dispositive, put if the defendants would be labels were deemed hard upon present explain that section 150 in their reliance case: The title of Buildings “Non-conforming Uses, is General.” matter, however, purely argument a technical Even as defendants simply here advance ning incorrect. The relevant section Plan “existing building provides that conforms to height regulations floor use but exceeds the or area ratio limitations non-conforming building, not be a of this Code shall be deemed to but building enlarged structurally or no such as shall hereafter altered so height (City Planning Code, 120, its bulk.” to further or increase 35-64, February 10, 1964.) (Italics as Ordinance No. enacted amended suggest added.) yet that not section does not structure existence “conforming” building notwithstanding be deemed a its conflict should height contrary, governing expressly limitations. On the it with the states that " building part or structure or thereof o shall be con [n] reconstructed, altered, structed, permitted relocated or otherwise regulations height bulk set forth herein use exceed the height (Ibid.) passing in which it is located.” We note districts permit procedures. upon gamut Thus, the enactment of municipality ordinance, may new simply set the effective date of that ordinance so that opera will become any permit tive before thereafter issued becomes final.24 Sure ly, section 150 was not intended to frustrate this method of delays discouraging exploitation inherent in the municipal legislative process. Under circumstances of this developers case, private interest of the must therefore “yield public interest compre the enforcement aof plan.” (County Diego San McClurken, hensive v. 683, 690.) supra, 37 Cal.2d Special Height District Ordinance No. 35-64 effec- became date, tive March 1964. On that on which the sought yet had granted; after date, lawfully grant agency could it. Were the Board of Permit *10 Appeals empowered so, tightening to do zoning regula- always by legislative tions decree could nullified admin- istrative fiat. compel We here the summarize considerations which our permit “lawfully granted”

conclusion that a is not in the sense 150 until envisioned section all administrative action language exception building this of section makes no for the case of a permit lawfully granted” (City Planning Code, “for which a has been (d)). “lawfully subd Since have concluded that no ’’ developers granted Planning case, City to the in this we need not decide whether Code as in section amended was intended to abro- gate by City exception Planning the created Code section subdivision (d), as in 1960. enacted case, example, 24In the instant even if the bureau had February day issued a on the after the new height enacted, filing ordinance had been of an within the following days finality postponed would have of the bureau’s order days (see thereby supra), any preventing for another 40 permit fn. becoming By providing final before March 23. operative ordinance would become of after on March the San Francisco Board effectively Supervisors guaranteed that no issued the bureau height enacted, subsequently the new limitation had been chal lenged Appeals, possibly before the could become final escape operation in time to of the new ordinance. Supervisors might proceeded might The Board of have otherwise: It ‘‘ ’’ adopt have chosen to interim ordinance to freeze the issuance of building permits portion all in the northern of San Francisco until new law had become Hunter effective. v. Adams 180 Cal. Works, App.2d Cal.Rptr. 776]; Miller cf. v. Board supra, the 477; see, generally, Note, Stopgap 195 Cal. Measures to Preserve Pending Zoning Comprehensive Redevelopment Quo Status or Urban Legislation (1962) availability 14 W.Res.L.Rev. of that alternative, however, wisdom, certainly does not diminish the cannot negate validity, of the more selective course which the Board of Supervisors pursue in fact to chose on this occasion. permit application completed, has been and that regarding the developers’ permit granted immunity therefore under principles 150: Under traditional of adminis section law, de the Board of its novo re trative apply zoning at the is bound to ordinances in effect view decision, final not those in force at the time of its time of any agency. preliminary proceedings before subordinate De that section 150 of the have failed to demonstrate fendants exception enacted an to this basic rule. Code contemplated Although protection section pursuant permits against revocation final although the changes ordinances, uncertainty previous inherent rules sought eliminate the 150 did post revocation, section “ex facto” governing such pend expectancy that a protection a mere any not ing application create finally approved. might opposition this in arguments two Defendants’ erroneously first assumes that terpretation stand. The cannot indefinitely postpone rehearing could repeated petitions for permit; yet Munic building a valid effective date of fixing the date when a possibility ipal precludes that argu Defendant’s second final must be entered. order “issued” with attempt equate that is ment, an separate treatment ac “granted,” overlooks that is one Charter and those two words corded preliminary departmental connotes a “issuance” there Code: disposition designates final “granting” action, whereas Appeals. by the Board of the matter “lawfully until granted” ruling that a Our review have appropriate channels of circum- last-minute efforts to deter cities to enables exhausted interpreta- broadly, our laws. More changes in the vent *11 non- prevent the proliferation 150 serves to tion of section contrary section A construction conforming structures. which are vital to objectives, both of these subvert would achievement development of modern in the volatile of order centers. urban 150 to reasons, not read foregoing we do For a subordinate appealable order of endow disregard finality premature attribute agency and of that section purpose the basic part. is a of which judgment affirmed. The Traynor, J., Peters, J., Mosk, J., Burke, Peek, J., C. J.,* concurred.

McComb, J., judgment. concur in the I petition appellants Development HAP Co., & Haas Corp. Haynie Development Partnership and HAP for a rehearing denied March 1967. No. In Bank. Mar.

[Crim. 1967.] In re Corpus. WILBUR EUGENE STREETER on Habeas assign sitting Supreme Court under *Retired Associate Justice ment the Chairmanof the Judicial Council.