*1 INC., al., FARMS, et BOGLE

Plaintiffs-Appellees, BACA, of Pub- Commissioner

Jim New

lic Lands for the State of Defendant-Appellant.

Mexico, 21,259.

No.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Sept. *2 Udall, General, Attorney

Tom Bridget A. Jacober, Walker, Christopher Louhannah M. Sehatzman, Special Attorneys G. Assistant General, Fe, Appellant. Santa for Jones, Snead, Wertheim, Wentworth & Jaramillo, P.A., Wertheim, Jerry James G. Whitley, Clifford, Fe, A. Carol Santa Appellees. Firm,

Jennings Jones, Roswell, Law A.D. for Amicus Curiae N.M. Lands Coun- Public cil, Inc.

Hinkle, Cox, Eaton, Hensley, Coffield & P.L.L.C., Nibert, Roswell, Gregory J. signatory Amicus Curiae N.M. title attor- neys.

OPINION RANSOM, Justice.

1. The Commissioner of Public Lands appeals partial summary from a judgment twenty-six plaintiffs favor who seek declaratory judgment their installment contracts for the trust do lands not reserve sand and state. The trial court ruled that Com collaterally estopped missioner is ar guing mineral reservations effectively included within the contracts re gravel rights served sand and to the state. proper The court certified this as a case for interlocutory appeal under NMSA 39-3-4(A) (Repl.Pamp.1991). Section jurisdiction accepted appeal pursu over the (Repl. ant SCRA Pamp.1992). issue High rel. arises State ex 517, 521, way Department, denied, cert. 106 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d 693 this Court ruled because spe contract and a did not cifically reserve sand and state, pur passed title to items along chaser with the surface estate. prior opinion In a filed this case August majority of this Court collaterally es- concluded that Roe does not top litigating the Commissioner from wheth- obligations and payment fulfilled their within the are minerals er sand containing specific res- patents mineral reservations received meaning rehearing, Plain- trial court to order the question. motion for ervation asked the On do patents new that Roe estab- Commissioner issue urged tiffs us to conclude plaintiffs Those *3 to affirm not contain reservation. property a rule of and lished decisis, making payments of were still asked principles under stare who trial court Commissioner, upon re- notwithstanding inapplicability of the col- to order the court patents not ceipt payment, our of full to issue withdrew lateral-estoppel doctrine. We specific containing the reservation. the Commissioner prior opinion and directed rule-of-property ar- to respond Plaintiffs’ summary partial for 6. Plaintiffs moved Eaton, Hinkle, Cox, and gument. CofSeld asking judgment, the trial court determine P.L.L.C., curiae Hensley, filed an amicus mineral reservation in the that attorneys. title of New Mexico brief on behalf and purchase contract did not include sand reargued before the full Court. The ease was request their gravel. Plaintiffs based on and remand with instructions. We reverse conversion, arguing equitable that doctrine of are proceedings. Plaintiffs 3. Facts and gave equitable purchase contracts them in inter- original purchasers of or successors specifically property title to all interests not by the of est to land sold Commissioner reserved, thus, full upon of the and execution pursuant installment con- Public Lands contract, each was entitled to purchase early Each tracts executed 1960s. conveying legal title to such patent an original prior entering into purchaser, alternatively based their interests. Plaintiffs contract, signed under oath installment request the doctrine of offensive collateral on application for which recited estoppel, contending that the Commissioner purpose for the application “this is not made argue opportunity fair had full and mineral, including obtaining title to but of mineral issue Roe. reservation gravel ... ... with limited to sand and but partial sum- 7. The trial court entered object obtaining title the sur- the sole of mary judgment, determining that Com- face of the land.” “collaterally estopped under missioner was plaintiffs have of the fulfilled Several litigating grav- ] from [Roe payment obligations and re- their contractual minerals, as that term is used el patents from the Commissioner trans- ceived lands,” purchase contracts for state but also ferring legal patents title. In these the Com- determining that was free the Commissioner specific included a reservation missioner pursue regarding his counter- all issues plaintiffs, gravel rights. One of In its or- claims and affirmative defenses.1 Helm, complained purchase con- that the Joe expressly that the collat- the court stated der not included a reservation tract had controlling “a estoppel eral issue involved requested and of sand and law to which there is a sub- question of spe- all delete from his Commissioner opinion for and ground stantial difference expressly cific reservations that not been appeal an immediate from this decision purchase contract. The Com- stated in the may materially the ultimate order advance refused. missioner litigation.” This termination of the many brought against has times 5. Plaintiffs this action addressed Commissioner, fall within claiming that sand whether sand in a land general mineral mineral reservation were not within the opinions inconsis- contracts and contract. Our have been their tent, leaving room for debate on issue. declaratory judgment their seeking consequently agreed with the trial court’s patents include a should not reserva- granted the plaintiffs who assessment and Commissioner’s tion of sand Those damages. complaint He asserted the affirmative the Commis- also In his answer to laches, acquiescence, estoppel, ca- defenses of asserted counterclaims rescission sioner waiver, mistake, consideration, fraud, merger, pacity, capacity, lack of want based on mutual consideration, acceptance. and for reformation failure kind, appeal oil, sand, application interlocutory including gas, er commercial issue. and caliche.” General Information & Regulations: Relating Rules & Rules summary judgment 8. Partial as an ef- Sales, Office, State Land N.M. State Land case-management tool. The Commis- fective (Jan. 22, 1965) added). (emphasis Rule argues partial summary judgment sioner The Commissioner contends that the defini- improper trial court because the did tion of “mineral” this rule reflects the law consider his counterclaims affirmative disputed in effect at time contracts defenses; here, but, partial summary judg- governs were executed and that this law case-management ment was an effective tool meaning reservation, because it allowed define relying part County Board Commis- litigation. primary A course issue in this *4 Good, 495, sioners v. N.M. 105 P.2d 470 is holding case whether this in Roe is Court’s (1940). In this Good Court considered the estoppel entitled to collateral effect. If Roe appropriate damages measure of in- in an effect, is entitled to collateral proceeding verse condemnation when the rely Commissioner cannot out- evidence state has land entered and removed caliche. purchase side the contract’s determining In the trial court should reservation to resolve a purported ambiguity received and considered evidence of the in of a favor reservation of sand and upon value of the caliche taken based all uses gravel, “For State reserve sand and sand, put, it which could we stated that provision specifying so in must included gravel, ordinary clay, Roe, and caliche fall within purchase [the contract].” 103 N.M. at the term Id. “mineral.” 105 P.2d at Alternatively, 710 P.2d at 88. if there is 472. estoppel, no collateral the Commissioner meaning litigate the in the term “mineral” 11. The Commissioner also cites and, contract, each if individual he were Attorney opinions three in General

prevail, the trial court would not reach Attorney position General’s Office stated its Commissioner’s counterclaims or affirmative gravel that sand and were “minerals” within scenario, defenses. Under either substantial meaning the common of that term. See litigation may through entry be avoided (1961) N.M.Att’y Gen.Op. 61-12 (stating partial summary judgment. gravel were term minerals as that History gravel litiga 9. was used in a reservation clause New Mexico. When New Mexico contained in a of Material “Grant Site” issued statehood, government attained highway department); N.M.Att’y federal (1952) government Gen.Op. (stating transferred to the state control that the State over vast land. Inspector jurisdiction areas of This land was to be of Mines has over sand gravel pits gravel held trust for schools and other because sand and are 20, 1910, jurisdiction Act of inspector institutions. See June eh. and the has minerals Act). § (Enabling naming); N.MAtt’y Gen.Op. 36 Stat. all over mineral (1945) authority dispose (noting majority The state has this that a of cases land “in in part” long gravel trust whole or as as it had are determined sand uses the opining gravel value received therefor a manner minerals Act. Enabling Operating consistent with the were included in mineral reserva contracts). authority, under this en found in Commissioner tions state land However, Attorney opinions tered into con several installment General do not tracts, subject Court, some of opinions which are the bind this one dispute. cited the Commissioner —No. 4816—the Attorney fil General’s Office recommended By time en- the Commissioner judgment ing declaratory action to defini contracts, disputed into tered the New tively gravel resolve whether sand and were promulgated Mexico State Land Office had minerals. governing rules the sale of state trust lands. required specifically Under these rules the state 12. This Court addressed rights reserve in a “[a]ll minerals whatsoev- whether the term “mineral” as used Id. contract. gravel for the reservation included sand 147-48, 538 P.2d at 419-20. Highway ex rel. State first time Trujillo, v. Commission decision, reaching its the Burris by Champlin Pe overruled P.2d that whether sand and Court held Lyman, troleum Co. according minerals “is to be resolved Basing our and the facts of each applicable statutes Stock-Raising on a review of the Federal P.2d at 419. ease.” es- (1982) Act, §§ 43 U.S.C. Homestead sence, Court determined that whether 1976), part concluded that (repealed we term “mineral” includes sand and government did not intend the federal inherently factual to be decid- is an gravel within the term include sand and case-by-case ascertaining on a basis ed patent. used in a federal “mineral” it was parties. Court distin- the intent of 696-97, 487 at 124- Trujillo, 82 N.M. at Trujillo where- guished its earlier decision indi The United States provided had not evidence rectly this conclusion Watt overruled showing an intent include sand Nuclear, Inc., 36, 55, 103 Western general reservation of the federal within the (1983) (de 76 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. parties in Burris patent. Id. Because termining was included within evidence, provided we that the such held *5 in scope of the mineral reservation contained gravel. sand and term “mineral” included patent a issued under the Stock- federal Burris 15. After this Court decided Rick- Act). Watt, Relying on Raising Homestead Inc., Constructors, elton v. 91 Universal in Trujillo expressly this Court overruled (1978), 479, P.2d 285 in which a N.M. 576 Co., Champlin wherein we deter Petroleum brought certain landowner suit cancel mineral mined that caliche was “a similar and gravel leases entered into between sand limestone,” sand, Champlin gravel, clay, and 479, the state and a contractor. Id. at 576 Co., 409, P.2d at 103 N.M. at 708 Petroleum the did P.2d at In Rickelton record not 285. 321, included within the and therefore signed that the owner had contain evidence pat a general reservation of federal purchase containing a application for dis- an 410, ent, at 708 at 322. id. rights. gravel and id. at claimer of sand See 480-81, P.2d at 286-87. The Court reit- 576 1975 this Court first addressed 13.In sand and “[w]hether erated the rule that purchased an owner land gravel ‘minerals’ as that term is used in a pursuant the to contract was entitled state grant depends upon mineral reservation or damages the condemnation after inverse specific facts in each case” and deter- the Highway Department entered the land State it, that, under facts the mined the before gravel. and Burris and removed sand sand parties did not intend to include and Comm’n, Highway rel. State ex State in gravel definition of “minerals.” Id. at the 146, in 538 P.2d 418 overruled N.M. 481, at 287. 576 P.2d Roe, 521, part by N.M. at 710 P.2d at 88. Highway in did purchase contract at issue Burris 16. Commis The Jensen State sion, 630, 1089, and 642 P.2d cert. de specific not include reservation sand nied, 74 L.Ed.2d gravel. application purchase, An howev U.S. S.Ct. for er, the appli the Court revisited issue contained a statement which the recover inverse con purchase did intend to whether an owner could cant swore that he Highway damages the gravel2, patent demnation after sand and issued min entered the land and removed contained a of “all Commission Trujillo gravel. Relying on Id. at 538 sand and erals of whatsoever kind.” that, Rickelton, determined absent 419. on documents and the Court P.2d at Based contrary, evidence, sand this Court deter reservation to other relevant gravel not “minerals” as that term parties intended to include were mined general mineral reservations gravel general mineral was used sand and within the purchase language purchase language in the contracts contract and The original purchase purchase applications this case. application identical Burris is purchase preclude contracts. Id. at application contained of collateral es- plaintiffs toppel. 642 P.2d 1090. Because the purchase contract did contain actually 19. —What Roe necessarily reservation, held that the Court decided. was an inverse condemnation did include not intend to and, appeal, action like the instant it involved

within the definition “mineral.” Id. whether a land sales contract general with a mineral reservation clause had Roe, Finally, gravel rights transferred sand P.2d at this Court decided the issue purchasers. procedural posture The of Roe subject property on the “whether was, however, quite appeal. distinct belongs to the surface estate owner was Watt, There, relying on 462 U.S. at general reserved to the under a min- [state] S.Ct. at United States eral reservation contained in the contract of held purchase patent property.” and the for were included within a mineral reser- plaintiff was a in interest successor to a federally-issued patent, vation in a the trial patent purchase issued after a contract for granted summary judgment. the state paid Although state lands had been full. Roe, N.M. at original as in Burris purchaser had reversing summary judgment, the Roe Court signed application stating that he did not erroneously concluded the trial court buy intend to rights, neither applied federal law. Id. The Court also nor patent contract con- that a determined reservation clause anything than tained more reserva- are, application and a land without Jensen, rights. Relying of mineral more, insufficient to show that the state has language the Court determined reserved sand and Id. at contract or should con- *6 P.2d at 88. application merely trol because “[a]n is a 20. Because the Roe Court had before it request purchase, to provisions and its do not appeal summary judgment, an from it was affect ... at title.” Id. 710 P.2d at 88. necessary only ques- to determine a whether passes “The title that is determined the regarding of fact existed the State’s themselves, conveyances the con- gravel reservation of sand in and that case. patent.” tract and the Id. Because neither no There was need to determine whether the the patent contract nor the con- gravel might State ever reserve sand and tained a reservation of sand and express without an reservation. Nonethe- gravel, summary judg- the Court reversed less, flatly, Court “For the Roe stated the inment favor of the Id. State. gravel, provision State to reserve sand and a specifying so must be included in these con- estoppel ap Collateral does not veyances.” language, Id. this With broad Here, that, ply. the trial court ruled because attempting the Roe have been to unsuccessfully litigat the Commissioner had ambiguity resolve and and the once for all Roe, collaterally ed issue in he the is es- put given rise a rest issue that topped arguing from and sand great litigation. Perhaps sug- deal' it was are “minerals” as that term is used gesting a reservation clause can- deciding land contracts. whether the ambiguous. not be We will shown collaterally estopped Commissioner is purposes appeal this Roe assume litigating the mineral reservation issue necessarily held that are not sand Plaintiffs, against is irrelevant that Plain it reserved unless there is reserva- privy litigation. tiffs were not the Roe See question tion. is The then whether counter- State, Silva v. 106 N.M. vailing against applica- equities militate the 380, 384 first must determine estoppel. tion of collateral “actually necessarily whether decid necessary ed” mineral —Fact-specific the reservation issue. Id. at nature of did, inquiry. foregoing at 382. it P.2d If we then consider As demonstrated the countervailing equities history gravel litigation there whether of sand and New lands Mexico, state trust is has arisen wheth- 23. —Involvement the often militating countervailing equity. includes sand and Also er the term “mineral” Generally, is- against we have resolved this applicability estoppel the of collateral ease-by-case established on a basis. We great public importance sue case is the this Burris, 88 N.M. at principle in see state trust lands. United States Men principle at restated the doza, 154, 162, 104 S.Ct. Rickelton, at 576 P.2d at see L.Ed.2d 379 Court held did not ex- 287. After Rickelton this Court applied should not be rule, pressly restate the but both Jensen litigat government from preclude the U.S. Roe we issue be decided framed the constitutionality ing of a decision to with case. particular terms of the facts See a naturalization examiner draw Jensen, at P.2d at 97 N.M. 1090 Philippines in 1945. The Court reasoned (framing sand “[w]hether the issue as development important questions that the gravel are minerals within policy involving public should of law areas pur- minerals the State contained by freezing as final the be stifled first between Jensen and the chase contract particular particular decision on a issue. Of ” Roe, added)); (emphasis 103 N.M. importance fact that to the Court (framing issue as 710 P.2d at poli differing administrations make different subject “whether the on cy choices. The Court stated: ... belongs to un- the surface estate owner litigation in The conduct of Government der a mineral reservation contained is suffi- the courts of the United States the contract of added)). pri- ciently (emphasis different from conduct property” litigation vate civil in those courts so that case-by-case adopted The rule economy might what otherwise inter- principle that in Burris is based underlying application of col- ests broad give is to contract eases role outweighed estoppel are lateral contracting par effect to intention of affect peculiarly constraints which determine ties. role of the court Government. to include intended E.g., within term “mineral.” 162-63, 104 573-74. S.Ct. at Jensen, 642 P.2d at *7 Supreme 24. Prior to Mendoza the Court (holding not intend to reserve that state did applied principles had similar by because it did not do so acqui equitable doctrines such as laches and contract); specific preclude gov the would not federal escence Burris, 147, 538 P.2d 419 claiming ownership of ernment from the (“[T]he parties the intended issue is whether dispute with the state of ocean basin are, not, to or are be rights. drilling California over offshore minerals].”). primary ... “The [as classified 19, 40, California, 332 United States v. U.S. objective construing is a contract 1658, 1669, 67 91 L.Ed. 1889 S.Ct. label it with definitions or look at Government, “The The Court reasoned: substance, form above but ascertain and here as which holds its interests elsewhere parties by enforce the intent of the as shown deprived people, all not to trust for the be v. the contents of instrument.” Shaeffer ordinary those interests rules 1226, 1229 Kelton, 95 619 P.2d N.M. particularly private disputes designed (1980). The whether sand and determination individually pieces proper over owned gravel are within a mineral included Thus, following ty____” Mendoza and case-by-case be on a reservation must done California, v. federal district United States parties to the intent of one basis because weigh public policy courts must consider may not be same as the intent of contract Thus, against federal applying ations before to another contract. fact- government equitable as non- necessary doctrines such inquiry of the mili nature estoppel. Colorada collateral-estoppel mutual collateral See against giving effect tates Springs v. Farm Credit Prod. Credit Ass’n Roe.

429 (D.Colo. Admin., 1475, Here, F.Supp. strong public 666 there is a 1987) requires protection interest in (agreeing that Mendoza con of state land and its products, public Enabling as reflected policy sideration of issues before im Act’s requirement disposal that “no sale or other against posing estoppel govern collateral ment). productions] [of state land or its natural shall be made for a consideration less than the A number state courts also have [appraised 20, true] value.” Act of June judicial against policy apply noted “a sound 1910, 310, 10, 557, § ch. 36 Stat. 564. The ing estoppel collateral which eases concern duty nondelegable State has a to hold as important public matters of interest.” Chern products trustee state lands and their —as America, 866, v. Bank 15 Cal.3d 127 Cal. well proceeds as the sale of state 113, 1310, 110, (1976); Rptr. 1313 products lands and the develop their —for Adler, see also N.Y. White public ment of schools and other insti Const, (1942). Hence, City N.E.2d 798 Berke XXIV, § tutions. See art. ley Superior County, Court Alameda (providing leases and land sales con Cal.Rptr. may royalties Cal.3d 329 n. tracts reserve to the state “as denied, provided legislature”). act n. of the cert. U.S. presented has Commissioner some evi S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 48 dence if are not includ California ruled that reservations, ed within cer state, upon attaining statehood had properties tain been sold less than succeeded to title in all within tidelands its appraised their value violation of the trust public, borders as trustee for the was not public policy. strong pub Because such estopped arguing private parties issue, lic interests are the need reexam granted who had been title certain tide question outweighs ine this the interests of subject public lands held such title judicial economy embodied collateral Likewise, in City trust. v. Pub of Plainfield estoppel Therefore, doctrine. the Commis Co., lic Electric Service & Gas 82 N.J. arguments sioner’s that sand and Jersey 412 A.2d New included within mineral reserva Supreme Court held that the doctrine of tions at here are issue not barred relitigation collateral bar would not estoppel. doctrine of collateral validity required of a contract which utility provide electricity municipal property. 27. Rules decisis. —Stare buddings charge. without Because a New rehearing argue the motion for Plaintiffs Jersey prohibited “unjustly statute discrimi that, notwithstanding inapplicability natory utility prefer rates and unreasonable estoppel, specific-reservation ences,” decision and because earlier requirement adopted given in Roe should potential upon “a impact adverse creating stare decisis effect to avoid title *8 interest,” issue, court that the reasoned the Brown, uncertainty. In Duncan v. 18 N.M. law, only question which a of involved should 579, 585-86, 139 140, 141 P. this Court finally, be reconsidered. Id. And in Ed judicial affecting stated that title decisions Commissioners, County wards v. Board of real not or estate “should be disturbed de (Ct.App. 888 P.2d parted except cogent for the rea most 1994), Appeals upheld our of a trial principle sons.” reiterated this En precluded application ruling court that of Sanchez, glish v. and allowed Bernalillo proper and held that “the County relitigate validity zoning of a departure prece [court initiative for a (Sec generally ordinance. See Restatement convey dent com that contracts to ond) (1982) 28(5)(a) (stating § Judgments of munity joined by property real not both relitigation precluded of an not issue is spouses effect] are void and of no lies with when a new determination is needed “be legislature.” Relying on Duncan and impact potential English, argue cause of of the adverse Plaintiffs that Roe established interest”). public specific-reservation on requirement determination as a principle sons, as where the evils of cogent no reasons property” and that “rule injurious to the down will be more departing therefrom. laid exist a community possibly result from than can has rule-of-property doctrine an- 28. The grounds of change, upon or the clearest Kent, roots, 1 James Commentaries cient see error. (14th ed.1896), Law *475-76 American recognized this Court and was first § Courts at (quoting Id. Am.Jur. Chacon, That McDermott, 1 N.M. 269 Arellano v. (1941)); Barrows v. see also appeal lies from (1882) case considered (stating rule Me. 448-49 of an election contest. a court determination “it been not be when has should overturned ultimately previous This Court overruled upon by the largely and acted accepted so appeals. had allowed such decision which fraught it community as that would be law Court, Writing for Chief aside”). The it Abbott with mischief to set Benedict stated: Justice ultimately city’s reli- concluded that court, overruling decision of this rule-of-property doctrine was upon ance discouraged ... in our sense of misplaced, reasoning we are “that defendants have heavy duty and im- upon any ‘long the reflection line of cases’ relied property per- portant interests as to adopting charter amendments here either protection, attack, grown up, fluctuating under the failing pay sons have under decision, plaintiffs, virtue which our or in pensions than rather fixed disturb, embarrass, present rulings system would its certain bene- adding pension destroy. have No such interests aris- fits.” P.2d had, they long have en. If we would hesi- pronounced a Insofar as Roe discussed, touching let tated estate, it did rule that affects title real may. opinions they as our have been Cir- we adopt property.” a “rule of Whether exist, when cumstances sometimes as matter stare adhere to Roe should adjudications pass previous court should decisis, however, mere involves more than though they may book” “sealed espe phrase. of a talismanic invocation erroneously beginning. made been in importance cial of stare decisis cases Id. at 278-79. First, property rule volving a is twofold. Supreme Court ex- 29. The California anti-majoritarian generally, the na and more plained property role of a rule of judicial system ture makes adherence City application of stare decisis Abbott precedent promote public con essential Angeles, Los Cal.2d in the fidence law its administration. (in bank). (1958) There, City (1860) Burnett, 15 Cal. Hart argued decision to Angeles Los its consistency “the (noting importance of pensions to fixed decisions, switch from variable stability in uneasi [court] police departments its and fire members of uncertainty changes them ness and which property mind”). was a and thus should not be Second, rule produce explained the disturbed. The court rule-of- affecting property or specific to rules more property transactions, doctrine thus: prece adherence to commercial in, titles long necessary stability of land acquiesced which con- dent

[Decisions into in upon or and commercial transactions entered rules of trade stitute based, of the law. reliance on the settled nature important rights should *9 758, Inc., disturbed, Royalty, Adobe 235 Kan. though a Giles v. even different (1984) 406, (declining give if 413 might 684 P.2d have been reached conclusion one, ac “[s]uch retroactive effect because question presented open inas- decision were of the title uniformity certainty in force a re-examination much rules would as estate”); to all Kansas Bott Commis important more real property of often Michigan, 415 Natural Resources than correctness. sion desirable technical of of (1982) 838, 45, (stating Thus, affecting the Mich. 327 N.W.2d 849 judicial decisions busi- strictly is to observed country of that “stare decisis ness should not be interests prop- ‘rules except cogent past establish of the most rea- where decisions disturbed

431 reliance”); erty that induce Returning City Berkeley, extensive see of Oman, City Vegas also Las Supreme which the California Court over of (not (Ct.App.) 796 P.2d 1129 prior opinions turned two that had held that particular ing force decisis in of stare by deeds issued the California of Board Tide cases which seek to overturn affect decisions pursuant Land Commissioners to an 1870 denied, ing property rights), 110 cert. legislative conveyed act title to the absolute 282, 795 P.2d 87 grantees, 337-38, Cal.Rptr. at 606 P.2d (overruling Kearney, at 372-73 Knudson v. then, inquiry, 31. The crucial (1915) 152 P. Cal. and Alameda proposition when it advocated that a must Alameda, City Conservation Ass’n v. of property, be adhered to as a rule of is like Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. cert. First, wise twofold. to what extent has the denied, S.Ct. proposition property cited as a rule of be (1969)), pub L.Ed.2d 217 we note there is come or settled fixed? As the California aspect rejection lic-interest of stare decisis explained in Hart: rejection as estop well as to the of collateral then, “The rule property,” is not nec- of There, pel. the court concluded that “most essarily created or shown the mere cogent overturning reasons” existed for decision, or two or of three decisions Cal.Rptr. decisions. Id. 162 settled, fixed, It is prin- Court. stable First, deprive the decision would not ciple regulating titles and the estimate of anyone entirely; rather, of title “some land validity their and value in the minds of predecessors owners whose interest men, practical who draw their conclusions acquired property under will ... the 1870 act judgments which common- have been subject public hold it to the Id. Fur trust.” law, ly acquiesced in as settled ther, the two decisions that were overturned affirmed, they titles only opinions issue, were the it “and passed beyond dispute. contention and apparent was from the face of the Knudson Second, at 609. Cal. we must assess the opinion although public’s right which proposition extent to as a cited rule large of Bay tracts tidelands in was at persons of has induced to enter into stake, as rights the state trustee of those transactions actual or demonstrable reli- party Finally, the action.” Id. ance thereon. virtually court stated Knudson was de expression rights Nor is the loose “that reasoning void that both Knudson and decisions, have vested” under such to be “wholly Alameda Conservation were er supposed, construed the sense if this Therefore, ror.” Id. the court concluded: phrase vesting be meant any rights judgment under a limited consequences pat- —however of allowing persons in extent or the number claim- ently erroneous decisions to stand ing principle therein asserted present peo- would deprive —makes case be to irreversible; probably judgment no ple many the state of full control over such this is ever without some effect on acquired by acres of thousand tidelands therefore, property; the transfer if the time them at of statehood. In these criterion, judgment were the every circumstances, ... we do not that it doubt affirming protected. a title would be injurious more in- would be 609-10; Bott, perpetuate terest to the error Knudson Id. at see also 327 N.W.2d at (refusing reject and Alameda Conservation than to over- log-flotation and com- turn decisions. mercial-shipping those navigability tests of favor recreational-boating test the for- because Cal.Rptr. 606 P.2d at 373. applied “long enough tests had mer two been give rise to a conception —Application fixed law to public’s navigational rights” and because was decided in suit and this facts. savings “landowners ha[d] invested their or was 1992. As we initiated discussed *10 in long-established history gravel litigation wealth reliance on a defi- and section of sand navigability”). prior nition of opinion, of this to Roe this Court had anyone Obviously, purchasing land in mineral reser- held Burris that a a gravel. purchase a contract or a with While at under vation included sand least, would original pur- be bound very at the time the If there not a into in terms of that reservation. is chase were entered contracts reservation, court must look trial 1960s it unclear whether sand was face the contract to reserva- outside the of were included a evidence tion, applica- meaning for the term original purchasers sign determine intended did been disavowing when that term has shown tions an intent obtain sand and “mineral” ambiguous. importantly, a under the circumstances to be gravel rights. More under involving in inter- analysis, original pur- those cases successors rule-of-property they original purchasers, inqui- est to the relevant hardly can claim that entered chasers ry to which the on Roe. will be extent into contracts reliance interest, on Roe. Absent such we have made reliance As their successors reliance, parties any is evidence issue whether not been referred to record original that of which the contract intended the State indicating the number contracts original may into If the been entered in reliance on reserve sand and have specific-reservation requirement. purchaser did not the Roe State, rights purchaser property may of from the could Reliance on Roe as a rule be conveyed a respect of the not have a factual issue with to some regardless purchaser, in- question. subsequent interests in tent, notice, good or faith of the lack of polestar of deed con 34. The parties See to the later transaction. 7 Pow- parties’ 6A Richard struction is intent. ¶ 938.21[5], ell, supra, (stating 84D-31 ¶ 899[3], Powell, Property R. Powell Real than what as- assignees not take more ed.1994). (Patrick J. Rohan 81A-108 reliance, signor possessed). any ef- Absent light principle, and title to of this because hereby is fect of Roe a rule conveyed by lands not state trust should overruled. implication, City Berkeley, see 162 Cal. Collateral does 36. Conclusion. (stating Rptr. 606 P.2d at 369 apply not to this case because the purporting to abandon the “statutes are “minerals” as construed; strictly trust to be the intent that term is mineral reserva- used clearly expressed must be abandon ease-by-case is to be answered on a tions necessarily implied”), we now retreat by examining parties of the basis intent suggests the statement Roe which we public policy considerations here because disregard the mutual of the con will intent against application of collateral es- militate parties instead for certain tracting look against government. toppel offensively required language. If we were to hold that property, there As far as a cannot rule of “minerals” out the definition set long been reliance on line settled contracts, applied all land we would sales original purchasers. Reli- decisions form in indeed exalt over substance. The in interest is factual ance successors contracting parties tent would abro entry summary court’s issue. trial gated by rule of law favor of strict reversed; judgment pro- we remand for however, legal history, fa definition. Our opinion. ceedings consistent with this form, thus we vors substance over will IT IS dispense with the intentions of con SO ORDERED. parties by to a defini tracting them C.J., BACA, and FRANCHINI accept. they did not will not MINZNER, JJ., concur. parties gain something to a allow contract they bargain did and for which for which concurs). McKINNON, (specially J. away they pay. take did not Nor will we McKINNON, (specially Justice mutually right agree concurring). Thus, meaning of the contract. terms evidentiary proceed I concur Justice Ransom’s well-reasoned we remand case guidelines. opinion primarily emphasize and write ings following under *11 gov dispute here was between private parties. ernment and Because

public policy role as considerations its lands, government

trustee for the collaterally estopped

could not be High

decision in State ex rel. Roe v.

way Department, 103 N.M. 710 P.2d 84 denied,

(1985), cert. 106 S.Ct. claim an L.Ed.2d though

interest in sand and even expressly contracts did not reserve Similarly,

these materials. the rule of law

requiring reservation under Roe applicable;

should not be instead the inten controlling.

tion of the should be

However, public policy considerations present disputes

are not in similar between Thus,

private parties. private grantor for a gravel, provision

to reserve land so specifying must continue to be included Jackson, Jr., Lunas, J. Los Feldon Pro Se contract. for Petitioner. Udall, General, Fe, Attorney

Tom Santa Respondent. OPINION RANSOM, Justice. P.2d granted petition Feldon J. JACKSON, Jr., Feldon J. Petitioner- Jackson, Jr. under 12-501 Rule NMRA Petitioner, (1996) for a writ of certiorari review the decision the Second Judicial District Court denying illegal Jackson’s motion to correct an Mexico, Respondent- STATE of New (1996) under NMRA sentence Rule 5-802 Respondent. habeas-corpus procedure (governing the No. 23386. illegal). determine whether a sentence is first-degree was convicted of Jackson Court New Mexico. murder, felony § NMSA 30-2-1A Sept. (Repl.Pamp.1994), underlying felony and the robbery deadly weap- while with a armed

on, § (Repl. NMSA 30-16-2 1978, § Pamp.1994); (Repl. NMSA 31-18-16 prece- with the Pamp.1994). accordance Stephens, this Court in State v. dent set 458, 462-63, 93 N.M. given Jackson sentences to consecutively first-degree for both fel-

served underlying felony. ony murder and the claims that retroactive effect should Jackson Contreras, given our in State There, ... one’s conduct is we held “when