*1 GODINEZ, MORAN WARDEN Argued April No. 92-725. June 1993Decided *2 Thomas, J., Court, Rehnquist, in which opinion delivered the of the JJ., I, White, O’Connor, Souter, joined, Il-B, J.,C. and in Parts and and Kennedy, Kennedy, J., JJ., joined. which Scalia and filed an III of part concurring judgment, in in in opinion concurring which J., Scalia, J., p. Blackmun, dissenting opinion, joined, post, 402. filed a Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 409. which Sarnowski, David F. General of Deputy Attorney Chief the cause for With him on Nevada, argued petitioner. Papa, brief were Frankie Del Sue General, Attorney Nielsen, A. Brooke Assistant Attorney General.

Amy L. Wax the cause for the States argued United as amicus curiae the brief reversal. With her on were urging Acting Acting Bryson, Attorney General Assistant Solicitor Keeney, General M. Joel Gershowitz.

Cal by appointment J. Potter III, Court, argued respondent. the cause for With him on the brief Chikofsky* was Edward M. opinion delivered the of the Court.

Justice Thomas presents This case whether the pleading guilty waiving standard for to counsel higher standing than the standard for trial. We hold it is not.

I early August morning, 2, 1984, On in the hours of the respondent Vegas, entered the Pearl in Las Red Saloon *3 patron and the bartender and a four times each Nevada, shot pistol. He then walked behind the with an automatic bar register. days respondent later, and removed the cash Nine apartment opened arrived at the of his former wife and fire target. Respondent on five of his seven shots hit their her; attempted, in the and without then shot himself abdomen respond- the four victims of success, to slit his wrists. Of gunshots, only respondent ent’s himself survived. On Au- gust respondent police hospital summoned to his bed and 13, killings. confessed to the pleaded guilty respondent

After to three counts of first-degree murder, the trial court ordered that he be exam- by pair psychiatrists, ined of both of whom concluded that competent he was to stand trial.1 The State thereafter an- Scheidegger *Kent S. and Charles L. Hobson filed a brief for the Crimi- Foundation as amicus curiae urging Legal nal Justice reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Shapiro, Rust-Tierney, R. Diann Steven Y. by Civil Liberties Union et al. Powell, Winick; John A and Bruce J. Psychiatric for the American Associ- Bergman; James W.Ellis and Barbara E. ation et al. and for the Na- May. Jon Lawyers by tional Association of Criminal Defense psychiatrists slightest that there was “not the One of the stated doubt” respondent was “in full control of his faculties” insofar as he had the defense, “ability to aid assist his own recall evidence and . . . Novem the death On penalty. its intention seek nounced evaluations, 2lk 1984, months after psychiatric ber At trial court. this before the respondent again appeared he to dis the court wished informed time respondent his The his and change pleas guilty. attorneys charge was to respondent, according for the request, reason evidence at his mitigating of presentation prevent sentencing. the trial court basis of the psychiatric reports,

On the found respondent nature and of

“is in that he knew the competent quality from acts, had the determine right capacity of the nature the criminal that he understands wrong; him is able assist in his defense charges against of the of such charges, against pronouncement thereafter; knows consequences judgment to the and that he can entering plea charges; waive his constitutional intelligently knowingly to assistance an 21. attorney.” App. that he had a both to the respondent court advised assistance of counsel warned him self-representation, “dangers disadvantages” self-representation, id., into inquired understanding proceedings *4 and his and had his awareness of asked he chosen why rights, It then himself. waiver represent accepted respondent’s court counsel. The also accepted respondent’s guilty it but before had determined that was pleas, respondent to threats or pleading guilty response promises, he nature understood the him and the charges against that he was aware consequences pleading guilty, testimony if give upon App. psychiatrist called to do so.” The 8. other respondent “knowledgeable being was charges believed that of the made against him”; ability attorney, he had the his in his “assist own defense, desirefd]”; “fully cognizant penal- if he so and that he was Id., ties if convicted.” at 17.

rights giving up, was and that there was a factual basis explicitly respond- pleas. The trial court found that for “knowingly intelligently” waiving ent was guilty pleas ibid,.,and were the assistance of “freely voluntarily” given, id., at 64.2 three-judge January 21, 1985,

On court sentenced re- Supreme spondent to death for each of the murders. The respondent’s Court of Nevada affirmed sentences for the Red murders, Pearl Saloon but reversed his sentence for the mur- imposition der of his ex-wife and remanded for of a life sen- parole. possibility State, tence without the Moran v. (1987). 2d 138, Nev. 734 P. July respondent petition post- for 30, 1987,

On filed Following evidentiary conviction relief in state court. an rejected respondent’s hearing, claim that he the trial court concluding “mentally incompetent represent himself,” clearly examined two that “the record shows that he was competent.” [him] psychiatrists whom declared both of Supreme App. to D-8. The Court of Nevada Pet. Cert. respondent’s appeal, Warden, Moran v. 105 Nev. dismissed certiorari, 2d and we denied S. 874 P. U. (1989). petition

Respondent in the then filed habeas United District for the District of The Dis- States Court Nevada. petition, trict denied the but the re- Court Ninth Circuit Appeals con- versed. 972 F. 2d Court of cluded that the “record in this case” should have led the trial good [respondent’s] “entertai[n] court to faith doubt about voluntary, knowing, intelligent to make a 2During lengthy exchange, the course of this the trial court asked re alcohol, spondent drugs whether he was under influence of know, respondent they in, give you answered as follows: “Just what me Id., inquiry. medications.” at 33. The court made no further The “med respondent prescribed ications” to which referred had been to control his seizures, byproduct App. which were a of his cocaine use. See to Pet. for *5 Cert. D-4. id., that the Due 265,3and at rights,” of constitutional

waiver to hold a hear- the court “required therefore Process Clause ... competency [respondent’s] and determine to evaluate ing counsel discharge his decision it accepted before ibid. argument Rejecting petitioner’s his change pleas,” the postconviction was “cured by error the trial court’s that ibid., determination and that hearing,” under 28 deference entitled to was hearing followed that “the state held Court of 2254(d), Appeals § U. S. C. on the wrong was premised ruling court’s postconviction 2d, at 266. “Compe- 972 F. of competency,” standard legal to the Court according constitutional to waive tency rights,” mental functioning level of “requires higher of Appeals, is com- trial”; while to stand than that required and factual under- if he has “a rational to stand trial petent his of assisting capable the proceedings standing counsel plead waive a defendant counsel,” competent for ‘reasoned choice’ if he has “the only capacity Ibid. The to him.” Court alternatives available among court had “erroneously that the trial determined of Appeals to stand the standard for evaluating applied standard,” id., choice’ trial, instead of the correct ‘reasoned when examined “in 266-267, at and further concluded did not standard,” the record sup- of the correct legal light capable was respondent “mentally finding port of constitutional valid waiver reasoned choice required id., at in- The Court Appeals accordingly 267.4 rights,” upon Appeals which the Court of specific features the record attempt; discharge his his attor respondent’s relied were suicide desire neys prevent presentation mitigating evidence sentenc so as questions; ing; “monosyllabic” responses to the trial court’s sought he at the time to waive his fact that was on medication 2d, plead guilty. 972 F. at 265. counsel and holding respondent competent In to waive his constitu respondent heavy emphasis on the fact that rights, placed tional the court attorneys discharge sought was on medication at the time he id., plead guilty. at 268. See

395 structed the District to issue the writ of Court habeas corpus within 60 days, “unless the state court allows [respondent] to withdraw his enter new guilty pleas, pleas, proceed Id., to trial with the assistance of counsel.” 268. Whether standard for competency pleading guilty or to counsel is than the waiving right higher competency standard for trial is a that has divided the standing Federal Courts of and state courts of last re- Appeals5 6 Circuit, While the Ninth Circuit and the District of Columbia see Masthers, United States v. 721, App. 242, 247, 176 U. S. D. C. 539 F. 2d 726 (1976), employed pleas, have for guilty the “reasoned choice” standard every other Circuit that has considered the issue has determined that the competency competency pleading guilty standard for is identical to the Helgemoe, See Allard 1, standing standard for trial. v. 572 F. 2d 3-6 Valentino, States v. United (CA1), denied, (1978); cert. 283 858 curiam); McGough (per (CA2 1960) United States ex rel. 634, F. 2d 635 v. Hewitt, Martin, (CA3 Shaw v. 339, 342, 1975); 304, 2 528 F. 2d n. 733 F. 2d Malinauskas v. United (CA4), denied, (1984); 314 cert. 469 U. S. 873 States, Harlan, (CA5 United States 649, 1974); 505 F. 2d 654 v. F. 2d 480 United States ex rel. 515, (CA6), denied, (1973); 517 cert. 414 U. S. 1006 Franzen, Solem, Heral v. (CA7 White Hawk v. 633, 1981); 667 F. 2d 638 (CA8 825, 829-830, 1982), denied, (1983); F. n. 693 2d 7 cert. 460 U. S. 1054 States, v. United (CA10 United States v. 443, 1970); 430 F. 2d 444 Wolf Simmons, (CA11 (1993). 1992), denied, 961 F. 2d cert. 507 U. S. 989 Circuits, however, Three of those same competency have indicated that the waiving standard for “vaguely higher” to counsel is than the Konigs- see United States ex rel. competency trial, standing standard for Vincent, berg (CA2 131, 1975), v. denied, 526 F. 2d 133 cert. 426 U. S. 937 McDowell, United (1976); States 245, (CA6), v. denied, 814 F. 2d 250 cert. Armontrout, Blackmon v. (1987); 484 U. S. 980 164, (CA8), 875 F. 2d 166 denied, cert. (1989), 493 U. S. 939 and one of them has stated that the two Campbell, United States v. “may always standards coterminous,” (CA1 1989). 838, 874 F. 2d Only 846 applies the Ninth Circuit the “rea- soned choice” only Circuit, standard to waivers of the Seventh Clark, see United States v. 775, (1991), 943 F. 2d pending, 782 cert. No. 92-6439, has held that waiving standard for counsel is identical to the standing standard for trial. The Fourth Cir expressed cuit has the view that the two “closely standards are linked.” McGinnis, United States v. curiam), (per (1967) 384 F. 2d 877 cert. (1968). denied, 390 U. S. the conflict. to resolve certiorari We granted sort.6 S.U.

II compe unless he is not be tried defendant may A criminal Robinson, (1966), and Pate S. tent, he does unless to counsel plead guilty waive Zerbst, Johnson and intelligently,” so “competently *7 Brady States, United v. S. (1938); accord, 458, 468 U. S. Dusky States, v. United 362 U. S. 402 In 742, 758 curiam), (per for (1960) compe we that the standard held “sufficient the defendant has stand trial is whether tence to with a reasonable consult lawyer with ability present as has “a rational well understanding” of rational degree him.” understanding proceedings against as factual Ibid, Drope omitted). (internal Accord, marks v. quotation Missouri, (1975) (“[A] mental whose 420 S. person U. to understand the such he lacks the capacity condition is him, the to consult object proceedings against nature and assist his defense with and to in preparing trial”). the While we have described subjected we trial, however, to stand have standard for competence a standard for never articulated competence expressly or waive the to the assistance of counsel. right plead guilty in our in v. decision Westbrook Relying large part upon curiam), (per Arizona, 384 (1966) the 150 Ninth Circuit U. S. for adheres to the view standard plead- or to counsel is than the ing guilty waiving higher Sieling for trial. standard See v. standing Eyman, (1973) (first 211, 478 F. 2d 214-215 Ninth Circuit 6 Sims, 1236, Compare, e.g., 210, 215, State v. Ariz. 575 2d 1241 118 P. State, (1978) and Pickens v. plea); (heightened guilty standard for 96 (1980) 549, 601, 567-568, (heightened Wis. N. W. 2d 2d 610-611 stand Herat, People counsel), 329, 334, Ill. ard for waiver of with 2d (1976) (identical 34, standing N. E. for pleading 2d standard Reason, trial); 353-354, People 37 N. Y. 2d 334 N. E. 2d (1975) (identical trial). waiving standing standard for counsel standard). heightened applying Westbrook, In decision per opinion, two-paragraph we the lower curiam vacated affirming judgment petitioner’s conviction, be- court’s hearing petition- [the issue of there had been “a on the cause inquiry competence hearing er’s] but “no trial,” to stand into the of his to waive constitutional issue S., to the of counsel.” 384 U. at 150. assistance implication” “clear Circuit has reasoned Ninth high Dusky not “a formulation is Westbrook is enough determining whether a defendant standard” right. Sieling, supra, competent to waive constitutional has read much into think the Ninth too at 214.7 We Circuit applying different Westbrook, think it two and we errs competency standards.8

A adopted Ninth Circuit is whether The standard plead guilty has or waive counsel defendant who seeks among capacity for “reasoned choice” the alternatives (much *8 this is from available How standard different him. than) higher Dusky the defend- the standard —whether less proceedings understanding” a not ant has “ratioial —is readily respondent opposed apparent In to us. himself fact, ground the two on the that the difference between certiorari merely “terminology,” Opposition of Brief in standards is one space a he little in his brief on merits to 4, and devotes the g., standard, see, of Brief for defense the Ninth Circuit’s e. 7 rights pleads he A criminal waives three constitutional when defendant trial, self-incrimination, right privilege against jury the the to a guilty: Alabama, Boykin v. U. S. and the to confront one’s accusers. 395 (1969). 238, 243 8 Although by way corpus, comes to us of federal we do this case habeas dispose ground heightened competency of on standard is it the Lane, Teague (1989), purposes “new rule” v. 489 U. S. because a Teague petitioner did a in the lower or in his not raise defense courts 20, 26 (1992); Raley, U. S. petition for certiorari. See Parke v. Collins Youngblood, (“Due Arg. Respondent 17-18, see also Tr. Oral 27, 32; higher requires [it] process require [a] a standard, does not assuming separate inquiry”).9 there is some But even capacity meaningful for “reasoned distinction between understanding” proceedings, choice” and “rational plead guilty reject or to notion we by must be measured standard to counsel waive from) (or Dusky higher than even different is standard. plea. begin guilty A defendant who stands with the

We presented likely entail relin to be with choices that trial is by rights relinquished quishment that are a de of the same pleads guilty: ordinarily will have to decide who He fendant against compulsory “privilege waive self- whether (1969), Boykin Alabama, incrimination,” U. S. may taking option by he stand; available, if the witness “right jury,” trial to decide whether to waive have may with he have to de ibid,.; and, in consultation “right [his] accusers,” to waive his to confront cide whether by declining prose to cross-examine for the ibid., witnesses pleads guilty, moreover, A defendant who faces cution. strategic In his attor still other choices: consultation with may upon among things, ney, be to decide, called other how) (and put on a defense to raise whether and whether In de one or more affirmative defenses. all criminal sum, merely plead guilty may fendants —not those who be re — important quired proceed to make decisions once criminal plead ings And while have been initiated. the decision to undeniably complicated profound it is one, no more than the sum total decisions that a (The upon during to make called the course deci trial. *9 plead guilty period sion to made over is also a shorter of 9 phrase the describing compe We have used “rational choice” in Peyton, necessary petition, tence withdraw a certiorari Rees v. curiam), (per (1966) 312, 314 opinion but there is no in that that indication phrase understanding.” something means different from “rational trial.) This of a and burden the distraction

time, without higher demanding being of no basis can conceive so, we plead choose to competence who for those defendants level of adequate Dusky for defendants guilty. standard is If the adequate necessarily who for those guilty, plead it is who guilty. plead right to waives his who that a defendant do we think

Nor competent than a be more counsel must the assistance to believe is no reason since there not, who does appreciably requires an waive counsel the decision to functioning to waive decision than the higher mental level of suggests rights. Respondent that a constitutional other necessary a defend because higher is standard “ powers greater represents have himself ‘must ant who be neces judgment, than would reason comprehension, ” attorney.’ Brief for sary aid of an trial with the to stand Competency (quoting Mental Respondent Tullís, Silten & (1977)). Hastings Proceedings, L. J. in Criminal Defense Criminal Association Brief for National Accord, argument has But this Lawyers 10-12. as Amicus Curiae required a de competence is premise; a flawed compe seeking is the to counsel to waive fendant represent right, to waive the tence (1975),we 422 U. S. 806 California, In Faretta v. himself.10 Moore, Massey on the dissent’s reliance reason that It is for this Massey “[o]ne (1954), When we said misplaced. is U. S. 105 standing incapable of trial being in the sense of might not be insane counsel,” id., benefit of trial without yet capacity to stand lack the question from the quite different answering is we were Wainwright, in Gideon Prior to our decision in this case. presented only required in those (1963), counsel was appointment S. id., present, were see “special in which circumstances” prosecutions state Massey J., question in (Harlan, concurring), at 350-351 compels trial competent to stand finding that a defendant whether justifying appoint “special there are no circumstances” conclusion that a defendant who question here is not whether ment of counsel. appointed; it is to have counsel stand trial has no competent *10 choosing self-representation must do that a defendant held intelligently/’ we made “competently 835, at but id., so knowledge” legal “technical the defendant’s it clear com- he is whether the determination to “not relevant” is petent right and we id., 836, at counsel, to to waive “may although conduct his emphasized ultimately choice detriment, his his own defense own “[i]t is undeniable while id., Thus, honored,” at 834. be must prosecutions could better defendants in most criminal by guidance unskilled their own than with counsel’s defend represent ability to defendant’s ibid., a criminal efforts,” bearing upon choose self- no himself has representation.11

B competent trial, finding to stand is that a defendant A permit necessary that is before however, is not all right guilty In addition plead to counsel. or waive his ted to plead determining who seeks that defendant satisfy competent, itself must a trial court counsel is waive knowing rights is his constitutional the waiver of (1992)(guilty Raley, voluntary. 20, 28-29 Parke v. 506 U. S. counsel). (waiver supra, In this plea); at 835 Faretta, to counsel that competent to waive whether such a defendant Gideon) (after has. he under all circumstances incompetent prohibition against trial of de that the We note also Blackstone, see Medina Cali v. fendants dates back at least to time Missouri, 162, 171-172 Drope v. (1992); fornia, 505 U. S. (CA6 1899) States, Youtsey v. United (1976); (collecting “com 97 F. time, authorities”), “[b]y of that law and that the common law mon self-representation but that was representation it was not counsel California, crime,” Faretta practice prosecutions for serious (“self- id., S., 823; accord, (Blackmun, J., dissenting) at 850 at common, century English and representation required, was if not in 18th say that a prosecutions”). American It would therefore be “difficult capa designed standard which was to determine whether a defendant chooses to conduct his defending “inadequate ble of himself” when he Reason, People 2d, 2d, N. Y. 334 N. E. at 574. own defense.” sense there is a standard for “heightened” pleading guilty but it is not a height- and for waiving *11 of ened standard competence.12 is what we had in mind in This West- two-part inquiry13 we between brook. When distinguished “competence trial” and to waive constitutional stand “competence [the] 384 counsel,” S., to the assistance of U. at we were right waive” as a shorthand for the “intelli- using “competence waiver” and Johnson v. gent competent requirement Zerbst. This much is clear from the fact we quoted the from Zerbst after very language immediately noting trial court had not determined whether petitioner S., to waive his to counsel. See 384 U. at competent right (“ ‘This the serious and protecting duty imposes weighty the trial whether judge determining responsibility upon waiver the ac- there is an and intelligent competent by 465). ”) Zerbst, at S., cused’ Johnson v. 304 U. (quoting stands for the unremarkable Thus, Westbrook only proposi- capacity; mental competency inquiry The focus of a is the defendant’s ability proceedings. he has the to understand the whether Missouri, (defendant Drope supra, if incompetent See v. at 171 he “lacks capacity object proceedings to understand nature and of the added). him”) against (emphasis purpose “knowing and volun contrast, tary” inquiry, actually is to determine whether the defendant does understand significance consequences particular of a and decision California, supra, See Faretta and the decision is uncoerced. v. whether (defendant waiving dangers counsel must be “made aware of the disadvantages self-representation, will so that the record establish ”) doing eyes open’ that ‘he knows what he is and his choice is made with McCann, Adams United States ex rel. (quoting (1942)); v. 317 U. S. Alabama, (defendant Boykin S., pleading guilty v. at 244 must have understanding plea consequence”). “a full of what the connotes and of its course, suggest, required We do not mean to that a court is to make competency every determination in case which a defendant seeks to plead guilty any case, or to waive his to counsel. As in criminal necessary only determination is when a court has reason to Missouri, Drope supra, competence. doubt the defendant’s See at 180- Robinson, 181; Pate to coun- waive seeks to that when a defendant tion competent to stand trial is he is determination that sel, a voluntary- intelligent enough; also must be the waiver accepted.14 it can be before

Ill competent has a Requiring a criminal defendant capacity to has the ensure that he modest aim: It seeks proceedings assist counsel. While and to understand classify psychiatrists find it useful scholars degrees competence, and while States kinds various adopt that are elabo- more standards are free to Dusky the Due Process Clause formulation, than the rate requirements. impose Medina additional Cf. these does *12 judgment S. 446-453 California, Appeals the case is remanded reversed, of the Court opinion. proceedings this consistent with for further ordered.

So joins, with whom Justice Scalia Kennedy, Justice judgment. concurring part concurring in agreement am in full with the Court’s decision that I pleading guilty waiving competency standard for competency is the same the test of to counsel as part about trial. As I have some reservations one stand opinion path and take a somewhat different the Court’s my appropriate it is to make some further conclusion, reach observations. types by compares the

The Court of decisions made one goes required plead guilty who to trial with the decisions comparison and waive the to counsel. This seems to suggest heightened have there been standard explicitly respondent In case court both that this the trial found supra, voluntary. were competent knowing and that his waivers See at 392-393. if the deci- required Due Process Clause

competency equivalent. about that I have serious doubts were sions de- discussing for a criminal standard proposition. In affecting case, decisions to make fendant’s standard with confuse the content we should application. its for occasions any question whether a case in this must leave aside

We responsibility due to criminal is absolved any acts and criminal time he committed state at the mental minimum has the the defendant whether later about undergo necessary is at What competence his sentence. compe- has sufficient the defendant here is whether issue proceeding part and to make in a criminal to take tence imply that throughout This is not to course. its decisions only aspect state of of a defendant’s is the mental proceedings. during Whether criminal is relevant mind that intelligent, knowing, and volun- has made the defendant during the tary fundamental choices make certain decision to subject judicial proceedings another criminal course of any implicated might questions inquiry. That both inquiries point, cease given not mean that the however, does only us, this case involves as it comes to And to be discrete. determining competency. the standard stand the standard for set forth This Court (1960) (per Dusky cu- States, 362 U. S. 402 trial in v. United riam): defendant] [the has suf- “[T]he must be whether ‘test *13 lawyer ability present with a rea- with consult ficient understanding degree he whether rational of sonable —and pro- understanding of the well as factual a rational as has my ceedings against view, In both the Court Ibid. him.’” “competency Appeals respondent to stand trial” read of suggested not the We have in too narrow a fashion. during applies of, the course Dusky competency standard applicable Instead, that standard before, trial. but through arraignment the return of a verdict. from the time of “ability Dusky Although to consult refers to standard inquiry component lawyer,” [a] is the the crucial of with degree possession of rational of “a reasonable defendant’s Dusky understanding.” focus words, In other functioning, particular level of mental on a formulation is identify. pos- helps ability The to consult counsel which required sibility for the occur is not that consultation will purpose. If a elects to stand its standard serve acting as his own coun- course of trial and take the foolish any require added de- the law not for that reason sel, does gree competence. 399-400, n. 10. ante, See at stand- Due not mandate different

The Process Clause does stages competency for different de- of or ards of various proceedings. during That was cisions the criminal made take ex- law, and it would some never the rule at common single traordinary showing inadequacy of a standard employ require heightened for us to States 505 U. S. 446- standards. Medina v. California, See only Nevada’s use Indeed, we should overturn “ justice single principle if it some of a standard ‘offends people and conscience of our as so rooted in the traditions Ibid, (quoting Patterson v. to be ranked as fundamental.’” (1977)). York, New supports treatment of Ne- historical English single standard has its roots in common law. vada’s Writing century, Blackstone described the effect the 18th incompetence proceedings: of a on criminal defendant’s memory capital “[I]f a man in his commits of- sound arraignment mad, before he fence, it, for becomes ought arraigned he not to be because it; for he is plead able to to it caution he with advice and ought. pleaded, prisoner And if, after he has be- mad, comes he shall how can make tried; not be 4 Blackstone, his defence?” W. Commentaries *24. Pleas Accord, Hale, M. Crown *34-*35. *14 between madness for

Blackstone drew no distinction pur- madness to trial. purposes pleading going poses in the Crown Court in 1865 indicates arising An case English to assess at standard was single applied a the time of and through- the time of arraignment, pleading, Fin. v. Fos. & Southey, out the course trial. See Regina 1865) (“As- (N. 864, 825, 828, n. a P. 872, a, 176 Eng. Rep. n. at insane the time arraignment, be suming prisoner for, counsel, without even all, with or cannot be tried at time when he counsel at a that he has assuming appointed tried, as he cannot fit he should be sane, was it is not and so un- nor the evidence, understand the proceedings, if he authority or to withdraw his able to instruct id., 877, at do”); always a acts as prisoner improperly, (“[I]f be so defendant] a at n. a, [the n. Eng. Rep., of the proceedings, as the nature insane understand he cannot plead”). also referred American cases

A number of 19th-century stand there was single in manner that suggested insanity throughout to be assessed which ard by 32 Mich. See, People, e. Underwood g., legal proceedings. held common (1875) discovered, was at when (“[I]nsanity, whatever steps against prisoner, law to bar further any 553, 556, State, 60 Wis. Crocker v. stage proceedings”); (“At (1884) if a after law, common person, 19 N. W. insane, he was crime, arraigned became committing until such but was remitted prison his insanity, during he be same was true where was removed. incapacity trial”); of not and before came insane after plea (“It (1889) Reed, 581, 582, 7 So. 132 41 La. Ann. State tried, or con or be that a man cannot plead, elementary See also sentenced, while a state of victed, insanity”). or on Law of Criminal Procedure Commentaries J. Bishop, 1872) (“[A] (2d tried, cannot sen §§ 664, ed. prisoner he is tenced, “mentally competent unless punished” defense”). make a rational

.406 by which the standard American cases describe

Other supports way the competency a to measured in is in single parallel articulated to that standard, a idea that pro- during legal point Dusky, applied at what no matter is example, For competency question arise. ceedings should (N. 1847), was held: “If People, it 2 Y. 4 Denio in Freeman v. capable understand- arraigned of person crime, is for a

... going against proceedings object on ing the nature in rightly comprehends reference his own condition him; if he in a proceedings, rational conduct his defence and can to such being purpose to be deemed tried, is, for the manner, he question competency Id., Because the at 24-25. sane.” posed was to be time the defendant in Freeman at the conception arraigned, of com- court’s id., 19, at the Freeman single petency standard to be was that of a to stand trial throughout. applied prin- explicit common-law recitation of this

An even more (Ala. 1946). In ciple 2d 186 State, is found in Hunt v. So. opinion a discussion case, in that thebe was course of the competency regarding defendant’s common-lawrule legal proceedings: part to take any if at time while

“The rule at commonlaw ... is that against person proceedings pending ac- criminal are observation crime, cused of a the trial court either from brought upon suggestion of counsel has facts sanity defendant, which raise a doubt attention steps question should be settled before further are The broad be determined then taken. . . . capable understanding whether the defendant proceedings making defense, and of and whether he impartial full, Id., have a fair and trial.” (citation omitted). attempt apply law,

At common therefore, no was made to stages different standards to different of crimi- proceedings variety nal toor of decisions that a defend- during proceedings. must make the course of those See ant 1905); (Ky. 1061, 88 S. W. Woelfel, Commonwealth (Tenn. 1911); State, 327, 135 W. 328-329 State Jordan v. S. (La. 1927); Seminary, 370, 371-372 ex 115 So. State Bushong, 272, 65 N. 2d 271, rel. Townsend v. Ohio St. E. (1946) curiam); (per Hunter, Moss v. 167 F. 2d (CA10 1948). agreed 684-685 have Commentators trial, standard of to stand which common-law *16 Dusky applied throughout parallels standard, has been just proceedings, to the formal criminal not trial. See Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 428- H. (1954)(“It long has been the rule of the commonlaw plead person required an indictment that a cannot be to to mentally or be tried for a crime while he is so disordered as defense”); incapable making Brakel, a rational to be of S. Mentally Parry, Disabled and the Law Weiner, and A. J. (3d 1985) (“It traditionally presumed has been 695-696 ed. partici- competency competency to stand trial means including pretrial pate phases process, in all of the trial such plea deciding plead, participating how to bar- activities as gaining, deciding whether to assert or waive counsel”). adopt heightened compe-

That the did common law tency readily standards is understood when one considers the difficulties that would be associated with more than one applicable given point standard. The standard at a in a trial instance, could be difficult to ascertain. For if a defendant change plea decides to after a trial has com- might apply one court menced, standard for undergoing might trial while another court use the standard pleading guilty. among addition, In the subtle nuances likely different differentiate, standards are to be difficult to any as evidenced the lack of clear distinction between understanding” a “rational and a “reasoned choice” in this ante, case. See at 398. stands trial instead true, course, that if a defendant

It is of guilty, pleading for the trial there be more occasions will of of the defendant determine to observe the condition court obligation competence. of courts have mental Trial conducting hearing sufficient doubt con- a whenever there is Drope cerning competence. Missouri, a See defendant’s by which com- The standard S. 180-181 change. Respond- petency however, does not assessed, argument, during mak- as much oral ent’s counsel conceded contrary position ing attempt of defend the the Court no (“This g., Arg. Appeals. a is not See, e. Tr. of Oral (“We standards”); heightened argue id., at didn’t case argue heightened heightened standard. We did necessarily argue nor did we Circuit, to the Ninth standard case”); heightened any juncture id., in this at standard (“Due process require higher standard, but does not this inquiry”). requires separate single applied throughout A standard “ proceedings any ‘principle jus- not offend

criminal does people so in the traditions and conscience our tice rooted *17 ” Medina, 505U. 446. S., as to be ranked as fundamental.’ Nothing compels contrary in law conclusion, our case and setting varying competency adoption of a rule out standards stage proceeding and of a criminal for each decision would orderly disrupt standpoint the course of trial from the and, parties, prove appel- both at trial and of all unworkable on late review. comparisons engaged

I would in the avoid difficult my process preclude view, In due does not Court. Nevada’s single competency aspects of a use standard for all proceeding. Respondent’s plead guilty criminal to decision grave and his decision to waive counsel were him choices for make, to but as the Court Part II-B, demonstrates in there heightened standard, is a albeit not one concerned with com- petence, that must be met before a defendant is allowed to make those decisions. judgment in I concur in and observations,

With these opinion. II-B, III the Court’s I, Parts and whom Blackmun, joins, with Justice Stevens Justice dissenting. competence

Today, majority that a standard of holds ability with designed to consult to measure defendant’s preparing his defense is constitution- and to assist counsel competence ally adequate to waive assess a defendant’s to doing, represent In so and himself. to counsel person majority upholds whose deci- the death sentence present plead guilty, discharge no de- sion to product men- of medication or have been the fense well analysis contrary majority’s to I tal believe the illness. longstanding Therefore, case law. both common sense I dissent.

I preliminary under which the circumstances matter, aAs respondent to an at- waived his Richard Allan Moran pleaded guilty capital torney elaboration. murder bear to exposition although majority’s of the events is accu- For, relegated significant facts are omitted or the most rate, footnotes. killing people wounding August after three

In charged attempt suicide, Moran in an commit himself capital three counts of murder. court with in Nevada state charges, pleaded all and the trial court He stage, psychiatric this evaluation. At Moran’s ordered a represent not at himself was issue. psychiatrists him fo- who examined therefore The two solely upon capacity trial stand with assist- cused Jurasky “in found Moran Dr. Jack A. ance counsel. *18 ability his to aid coun- insofar as full control his faculties give and defense, in evidence sel, assist his own recall Jurasky, App. testimony upon if to do so.” 8. Dr. called observing: “Psy- express reservations, did however, some speaking, legally man, this because perhaps chologically,and guilt, feeling remorse expressing considerable he is own de- his towards less effort to exert be inclined circumstances, Dr. under the Nevertheless, Ibid. fense.” was not depressed of mind Jurasky state that Moran’s felt D. major Ibid. Dr. William “necessarily consideration.” “very depressed,” as Moran also characterized O’Gorman talking tearing about remarking in much that he “showed par- present incarceration, up episodes led to his talking Id., at 15-16. But ticularly his ex-wife.” about ultimately knowl- “is that Moran concluded Dr. O’Gorman against charges being him” and “can edgeable made Id., attorney, he so defense, if desires.” in his own his assist at 17. just his suicide at- months after three

In November discharge seeking appeared tempt, in court Moran plead guilty public defender, waive charges capital asked to ex- When murder. all three change action, course of plain in his chosen the dramatic represent responded himself be- that he wished Moran pur- His opposed a defense. efforts to mount all cause any presentation prevent specifically, of mit- pose, was to sentencing phase of the igating at the on his behalf evidence judge inquired Moran was proceeding. whether The trial any drug alcohol,” and “presently or influence of under the you they give replied: know, medi- in, me what Moran “Just Despite answer, affirmative Moran’s Id., at 33. cations.” regarding judge him further trial failed dosage, he re- type, “medications” to which effect of the judge discov- so, he would have the trial done ferred. Had simultaneously being four administered ered that Moran was drugs phenobarbital, prescription dilantin, inde- different — numbing effect later testified to ral, vistaril. Moran really stating: guess drugs, didn’t care about “I I these anything very anything about concerned I wasn’t .... *19 everything proceedings and going the as far as on ... was going.” Id., at 92.1 were mounting disturbed

Disregarding evidence of Moran’s the judge accepted waiver Moran’s the trial state, mental ques- posing guilty pleas routine a series of after and counsel legal rights understanding the and regarding of his tions monosyllabic largely gave answers. offenses, to which Moran responses, purported ac- string Moran of affirmative In waiving import knowledge his constitu- the that he knew against charges him, rights, understood that he tional charges. part One fact, of those was, and that highlights char- exchange, the mechanical however, of this questions. trial When to the answers acter Moran’s “deliberately, ex-wife judge he killed his him whether asked aforethought,” Moran unex- premeditation and malice with I responded: mean, wasn’t pectedly I do it—I “No. didn’t up In- at 58. looking Id., dead.” but she ended her, to kill simply repeated judge probing further, the trial stead again acted deliber- inquiring had question, whether Moran replied: mean, I I ately. again, “I don’t know. Moran Once pulled deliberately. you by Imean, I mean what don’t know you doing plan purpose, it; trigger I on but didn’t on ambiguity Ignoring the Id., I mean?” at 59. know what judge responses, reframed the trial Moran’s previously stating: “Well, I’ve answer, elicit an affirmative premedi- you explained is meant deliberation what you at or determined means that arrived Deliberate tation. weighing thought the consideration of careful as a result Physician’s records, conjunction with the Desk read in Moran’s medical (46 testimony concerning 1992), the medica corroborate his Reference ed. upon him. The records show impact he received and their tions dilantin, may antiepileptic an medication Moran was administered may antiarrhythmic cause confusion; inderal, a beta-blocker cause hallucinations, disorientation, depression, light-headedness, mental vistaril, drowsi loss; depressant cause memory short-term tremors, ness, App. 97-98. and convulsions. Did do that?” you action.

for and against proposed “Yes.” Ibid. Moran time, responded: This collo- through plea Moran It after only prodding *20 concluded that he that trial judge in manner this quy he voluntarily stand trial and to was competent Accordingly, to counsel. had waived his intelligently without coun- appear plead guilty was allowed Moran defense, Moran no hearing. presented sel at his sentencing on his no evidence and offered witness, mitigating called no he was sentenced death. Not surprisingly, own behalf. II of an in is now that criminal prosecution It axiomatic by Process Clause of the defendant offends Due competent Medina California, v. Fourteenth Amendment. See Riggins Nevada, (1992) (1992); 504 U. S. v. U. S. Drope Missouri, J., concurring); (Kennedy, Robinson, (1966). The Pate 383 U. S. (1975); nor does it dispute does not this deny principle, majority trial set stand with standard that has been for competence whether accused “the the assistance counsel: possesses nature and object proceed to understand the capacity to consult with and to assist in him, ings against Drope, atS., Accord, his defense.” 171. preparing Dusky States, 362 U. S. 402 v. United My disagree turns, then, ment another standard— with majority upon the one for defendant’s waive competence assessing counsel and himself. represent

The the notion that “reject[s] majority competence or to waive the to counsel must be meas- plead guilty (or ured a standard than even different higher from)” stand trial the standard articulated competence Dusky Drope. Ante, in But 398. the standard for to stand trial is to measure designed specifically a defendant’s to “consult with counsel” and to “assist ability in his defense.” A a defendant preparing finding only capable competent that he is establishes to stand trial making attorney re- aiding the critical decisions in reliability negotiations. plea quired The at trial or finding when its basic vanishes relevance of such even present The premise to exist. counsel will be —ceases —that proceed longer question the defendant can whether is no attorney, proceed alone and un- he can an but whether with place an excessive burden I not believe we do counseled. inquiry specific by requiring upon it to conduct a court trial juncture whose when a defendant at the into that questioned already seeks to waive been has represent himself. counsel majority need for such there is no concludes competent to stand

hearing found who is because a defendant competent ipso is, facto, of counsel with the assistance trial *21 major- represent discharge himself. But counsel and to apply “competent” it in a ity the term cannot isolate person specific who is A context. from its vacuum, divorced thereby “competent” play “competent” is not to basketball approach majority’s to monolithic play The the violin. to Competency life nor the law. competency to neither is true necessarily competency to purpose translate does for one Competence purpose. of Crimi- Bonnie, See for another 10 Behav. Reformulation, A Theoretical Defendants: nal Compe- (1992); Golding, & S. R. Roesch 299 Sci. & L. (1980). with this tency Consistent Trial 10-13 to Stand always recognized our cases have notion, commonsense to more be relevant mental condition “a defendant’s governed legal rules reflect- distinct issue, each than one Drope, policies.” See ing quite S., at 176. U. different end, To this 715, Indiana, 406 U. S. Jackson spe- competency required evaluations to be has this Court proceeding. purpose cifically of a to the context tailored (1966)(directing Peyton, court Rees v. 384 U. S. See pres- competence [petitioner’s] in the mental “to determine things”). posture ent (1954), example, Massey for Moore,

In compe found had been that a who ruled defendant the Court have counsel should with the assistance of to stand trial tent represent given hearing him to as to his a been being might “[o]ne sense of insane in the not be because self capacity standing yet incapable lack the to stand trial and v. Ari And in Westbrook benefit of counsel.”2 trial without require (1966), the Court reiterated zona, 384 U. S. competency be of a defendant’s ment that the determination observing: question, particular capacity in to the tailored “Although hearing petitioner the issue of a on received appears have no competence been to stand there trial, competence hearing inquiry waive into issue of his pro of counsel the assistance his constitutional See also Me did, as to conduct his own defense.” ceed, (distinguishing between claim dina, S., 446-448 U. insanity); incompetence plea by reason of and a (dis concurring) Riggins, J., S., at 140-144 (Kennedy, competence competence tinguishing between functional trial). to stand

Although explicitly has the Court never articulated represent determining oneself, standard for Peyton, supra, it has hinted at its contours. In Rees v. it required designed evaluation that was an necessary for a measure the abilities defendant make analogous cap decision under In that case, circumstances. petition ital who had certiorari ordered filed *22 attorney petition forgo legal his to further withdraw the proceedings. petitioner’s The the counsel advised Court conscientiously psychiatric so a could do without examination of his client because there some as to doubt to distinguish Massey pre-Gideon v. Wain majority’s attempt as a ante, wright, (1963), case, 399-400, simply 372 U. S. 335 at n. is irrele Massey For, concedes, majority only vant. the for prop as itself stands the inquiries two osition the are to stand trial with different — equivalent proceed the assistance of counsel is to to alone. circumstances, those mental Under client’s competency. his to an as inquiry lower court conduct the this Court directed the to “capacity appreci defendant possessed to whether the with to respect a rational choice make position ate other or on the litigation further abandoning continuing disease, disorder, is from a mental suffering whether he hand in the affect his substantially capacity or defect which may added). Certainly S., (emphasis 384 U. at premises.” for defendant proceed competency required capital the or in negotiations counsel at trial plea without the advice of for capital less the competency required should no than to with the advice counsel against proceed . The standard the for certiorari. applied draw petition choice” standard— in this case —the “reasoned Ninth Circuit set forth choice” standard the “rational approximates closely in Rees3 and Massey, the Westbrook

Disregarding language plain silentio4 those cases sub in overrules the effect majority estab the self-representation constitutional From (1975), the ma in Faretta v. S. California, lished ability rep that “a criminal defendant’s jority extrapolates to choose has bearing competence himself no upon resent phrase . . According majority, no indication . to the “there is something understand different from ‘rational means [‘rational choice’] ” Ante, that, majority is in recognize n. What the fails to ing.’ 9. possesses understand who a “rational the distinction between a defendant choice,” to make a “rational proceedings one who is able ing” of capacity passive and involvement active the difference between lies proceedings. only for “Westbrook stands the unremark According majority, to the competence to trial is not stand proposition” that determination able must counsel; “the waiver also be intelli sufficient waive Ante, accepted.” at 401-402. But gent voluntary it can be before competency to waive majority’s attempt a case about the to transform needlessly compli into a waiver counsel a case about the voluntariness Perhaps rights incorpo waive this area of law. cates necessary link between inquiry, into a but there no rated voluntariness concepts. the two *23 But Faretta Ante, at 400. does not

self-representation.” incompetent a constitutional right defendant an confer upon was Faretta himself Indeed, his own defense. to conduct the record understanding,” “literate, competent, free his informed exercising voluntarily that “he was showed need not a defendant S., “Although at 835. will.” U. Faretta’s lawyer,” skill and experience have the himself those who are able to is confined of self-representation Ibid. The and intelligently.” to choose it “competently must Faretta Court that the record to was careful emphasize “ he is ‘knows what doing the defendant establish that Ibid., Adams quoting is made with eyes open.’” his choice McCann, rel. ex v. United States that is that “the competence required asserts The majority to counsel is to waive his right of a defendant seeking right, to waive the to rep- not the competence competence Ante, But this assertion is simply at 399. himself.” resent to extricate the compe- majority’s attempt The incorrect. to to counsel from waive the right tence to because the former decision is unavailing, oneself represent the latter. It is obvious that defendant entails necessarily Moran, himself. Even counsel must represent who waives defend himself to during who pleaded guilty, required And a who the penalty phase proceedings. his own defense cannot be of conducting utterly incapable decision, make such a more to any considered “competent” out of a who chooses to window leap than a person can be considered to make “competent” belief that he can fly such a choice. rise in this case doubts gives grave regard-

The record counsel and ability discharge rep- Moran’s ing respondent a few months after he attempted resent himself. Just volunteered himself for suicide, essentially commit Moran execution: He to waive sought plead and to murder, presentation capital prevent re- evidence on his behalf. any mitigating psychiatrists’ *24 ports supplied explanation for Moran’s self-destructive one testimony deep depression. own his And Moran’s behavior: being suggested fact that he administered another: the simultaneously prescription medications. It different four drugs possess recognized side ef- that such often has been “compromise criminal of medicated fects that by rendering him unable to receive a fair trial... Riggins, unwilling S., counsel.” assist aug- plea colloquy only concurring). Moran’s J., (Kennedy, by suggesting the manifold causes concern ments against charges him were not to the waivers and assent voluntary intelligent Upon truly fashion. in a rendered judge the trial evidence, be no doubt that this there can de- evaluation have another should conducted capacity to counsel waive termine Moran’s upon psychiatrists’ relying represent himself, instead reports the assistance able to stand trial with that he was of counsel.5 helpless punish him- try, to defend one so

To convict, principles im- fairness and self fundamental contravenes system. justice I cannot integrity pugns criminal of our inquiry, the accept, further without the decision condone deeply medi- person who was so “choice” self-destructive mentally severely ill. might well have been who cated I dissent. waiver of counsel and implies that Moran’s same Whether this evidence Cf. Miller v. Fen- involuntary seen. were remains

guilty pleas also (1985) (voluntariness of law and fact ton, a mixed U. S. 104 review). independent federal entitled to