*1 WILL v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
STATE POLICE et al. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN No. Argued 87-1207. December 1988 Decided June *2 argued petitioner. cause Burnham for With William Cunningham, D. Paul Rein- him on the briefs were Clark gold, Powell, A. Helen and Steven R. Hershkoff, John Shapiro. Attorney Michigan,
George Weller, H. of Assistant General argued respondents. for him on the brief the cause With Attorney Kelley, Caruso, General, Frank Louis J. were J. Casey, General, Thomas L. Assistant Solicitor Solicitor and General.* Land, Jr., Harper, Bradford, K. J. Nor- A. Conrad Stuart *William Redlich, Robinson, L. Antonia Hernandez filed a William brief
man Rights Law et al. as amici Lawyers’ for Civil Under for the Committee urging reversal. curiae were the State of Ten- urging curiae affirmance filed for Briefs of amici Tennessee, Attorney by Cody, General of et al. W. J. Michael nessee Catalano, Attorneys General, Attorney Deputy
Michael W. Siegelman Don of Ala- respective jurisdictions as follows: for their General Arkansas, Arizona, John bama, Steven Clark of Robert K. Corbin of John Colorado, California, Joseph Lieber- Woodard of Kamp of Duane Van de Delaware, Connecticut, Oberly Buttenvorth M. of Robert Charles man of Illinois, Hawaii, Linley Florida, Hartigan Neil F. of Pries III of of Warren Indiana, Iowa, Stephan T. Miller of Robert of Thomas J. E. Pearson of Guste, Jr., of Louisi- Kansas, Kentucky, William J. Cowan of Frederic J. Curran, Jr., Humphrey Hubert III of Min- Maryland, H. ana, Joseph of J. Missouri, Mississippi, William L. Webster of nesota, Moore of Michael C. Montana, Nebraska, Stephen E. Merrill SpireM. of Gt'eely of Robert Mike Thornburg Mexico, Lacy of New H. Hampshire, Hal of of New Stratton Celebrezze, Dakota, Carolina, Anthony North J. Spaeth Nicholas of North Oklahoma, LeRoy of Penn- Jr., Zimmerman Ohio, Henry Robert of Rico, Travis Medlock South of Puerto sylvania, Hector Rivera-Cruz White Justice delivered opinion the Court. presents question This case State, whether a or an offi- acting capacity, cial of the State while his or her official is a “person” meaning within Rev. Stat. 42 U. S. C. §1983. Ray Michigan
Petitioner filed suit in Will Circuit Court al- leging Michigan various violations of the United States and §1983.1 grounds Constitutions as for a claim under He al- leged promotion systems that he denied a had been to a data position analyst Department with State for an Police improper is, reason, that because his brother had been stu- subject squad” *3 dent activist and the of a “red file maintained by respondent. Department Named as defendants were the of State Police and Director of the State Police his official capacity, respondent also a here.2 Michigan
The Circuit the Court remanded case to the Civil grievance hearing. a Service Commission for While the grievance pending, petitioner Michigan filed suit in the Carolina, Roger Tellinghuisen Dakota, A. of South David L. Wilkinson of Utah, Jeffrey Vermont, Amestoy Mary Terry of Virginia, Sue of Kenneth Eikenberry 0. Washington, of Charlie Virginia, Brown of West Don J. Wisconsin, Hanaway Joseph of B. Meyer and of for Wyoming; and the Na- by Solomon, tional Governors’ et al. Association Benna Ruth Kenneth S. Geller, and Andreiv J. Pincus. provides Section 1983 follows: “Every person who, statute, any ordinance, color of regulation, under custom, usage, any Territory Columbia, or of or or State the District of subjects, subjected, or any causes to be citizen of the United or person other jurisdiction deprivation within the any thereof the of rights, privileges, by laws, or immunities the secured Constitution injured party law, shall be liable to the in an equity, action at suit or proper proceeding purposes section, other any for redress. For the of this Congress applicable exclusively Act of to the District of Columbia shall of considered be a statute the District of Columbia.” 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Michigan Also named as were Department defendants of Civil Director, parties Service and State Personnel but those were subse quently dismissed courts. state § essentially raising 1983 claim. an identical of Claims
Court ultimately petitioner’s found Service Commission The Civil peti- promote ruling respondents had refused to favor, App. “partisan 46. On considerations.” tioner because acting judge, finding, in both of that the state-court the basis cases, the Court Claims concluded Court and Circuit petitioner the United had violation of established judge held Court The that the Circuit States Constitution. law but Court was barred Claims action under judge respond- go also ruled that could forward. The action persons purposes for of 1983. ents were Michigan Appeals judgment vacated the The Court Department holding Police, that a State of State person case for de- is not a under but remanded the immunity possible Director of State termination of the liability Supreme damages. Michigan The from for Police granted discretionary the Court of review affirmed Court part. Department part Appeals in Smith v. and reversed W. Health, 410 N. 2d 749 The Pub. Mich. agreed person Supreme that the State itself is not Court acting official in his or her 1983,but that a state held person. capacity also not such a official Michigan Supreme holding Court’s that a State person with a of state- under 1983 conflicts number *4 contrary.3 granted certio- the We federal-court decisions to (1988). U. S. resolve the conflict. 485 1005 rari to 3 position have taken that a State is following the cases the The courts Island, 343, Rhode v. 2d See Della Grotta § 1983. 781 F. person a under University, Texas (CA1 1986); Gay A&M 612 F. Student Services v. 2d 349 v. Univer (CA5), denied, (1980); Uberoi 160, S. 1034 cert. 163-164 (Colo. Colorado, Godfrey, 1986); 894, sity Stanton P. v. 713 2d 900-901 of (Ind. 1981); Bd. 103, Gumbhir v. Kansas State App. 107 415 N. E. 2d of (1982), 507, 512-513, 1078, P. 2d cert. de Pharmacy, Kan. 646 1084 231 Bd., Navajo Inc. v. Bureau (1983); Rahmah School nied, 1103 459 U. S. of Revenue, denied, 302, 310, 1243, (App.), 1251 479 104 N. M. 720 P. 2d cert. (1986). 940 U. S. Michigan Supreme with agreed of have the larger number courts A Estelle, Ruiz v. § 1983. 679 person is not under See State Court 62 City Dept. Services, York
Prior to Monell v. New Social question person whether a State is a U. S. 668 436 (1978), § meaning within of 1983 had been answered this negative. Pape, Court in In Monroe v. 365 U. S. 167, municipality that a (1961), the Court had held 187-191 person being “[T]hat case,” not a under 1983. we rea soned, 1983 not have been intended to include “could parties Fitzpatrick Bitzer, v. defendant.” U. S. 446, 427 (1976). 452 holding Monroe, Monell,
But
Court overruled
municipality
person
was a
at 690.
1983. 436 U.
then,
Since
various members of
Court have debated
person
meaning
whether a
is a
within
see
State
1983,
Finney,
Hutto v.
(1978)
678,
(Brennan,
700-704
(Powell,
concurring);
concurring
id.,
J.,
J.,
n. 6
708,
1115,
(CA5),
(1982),
grounds,
F. 2d
1137
modified on other
63 has never ex- in but this Court dissenting part), part that issue.4 dealt with pressly here, Court Michigan Supreme courts, including
Some Jordan, 440 U. S. Quern v. decision our have construed is not a per that a State (1979), by implication as holding 332 Department Health, Pub. Smith v. under 1983. See son g., e. supra, State v. also, 2d, 410 N. W. at 767. See 581, Woodbridge (Alaska Green, 633 P. 2d v. 1981); 1381, 1382 Hospital, 44-45, 7,n. State 423 38, Worcester Mass. Edgar State, Wash. 2d (1981); n. 7 782, 786, E. 2d N. denied, 444 U. S. (1979), cert. P. 2d Quern held a (1980). does not override §1983 that a immunity, holding Eleventh Amendment State’s to the effect dicta” suggested “patently concurrence con J., is not a person, a State (Brennan, curring judgment). state § 1983 actions Michigan filed the present
Petitioner
is a person
whether
State
court,
question
which places
Eleventh Amend-
us since the
before
under
1983 squarely
have
from this Court that he asserts
of cases
cites number
Petitioner
include ones in which
person. Those cases
that a
is a
State
“assumed”
Thiboutot,
1983, see,
g.,
e. Maine v.
by name under
been sued
State has
(1980),
various
(1980);
California, 444 U. S.
Martinez v.
448 U. S.
agency,
Maine v.
attorney’s
against a State or a
awarding
fees
eases
cases
Thiboutot,
Finney,
and various
Hutto v.
437 U. S.
supra;
see,
States,
immunity by
Eleventh Amendment
discussing the waiver of
Graham,
159, 167, n. 14
Edelman v.
Kentucky v.
473 U. S.
g.,
e.
(1974).
meaning
Jordan,
did not address the
But the Court
64 apply Thiboutot, ment does not state courts. Maine v. (1980). 448 For 1, 9, follow, U. S. n. 7 the reasons that we today prior reaffirm what we had concluded to Monell and implicit what in Quern: some have considered that a State is § person meaning not a within the of 1983. initially “person”
We observe that if a is a within State the meaning saying 1983, the section is to be read as that “every person, including any State, who, under color of regulation, usage, any statute, ordinance, custom, or State Territory subjects or Columbia, or the District of . . . .” decidedly way expressing That in- would be a awkward an subject liability. very least, tent to At the States reading way clearly the statute this is not so indicated that provides depart often-expressed it reason to from the under- standing usage, ‘person’ that “fin the term does common not sovereign, employing [and] [word] include the statutes ordinarily are to exclude it.’” construed Wilson v. Omaha (1979) (quoting Tribe, 442 653, U. S. 667 v. United States (1941)). Cooper Corp., 604 U. S. See also United Workers, States v. Mine U. S. approach particularly applicable
This where it is claimed Congress subjected liability has which States they subject had not been before. In Wilson v. Omaha supra, construing phrase Tribe, we followed this rule person” “white contained 25 U. as S. C. enacted including Act of June 1834, Stat. as not the “sov- ereign States of the S., Union.” at 667. This com- usage provides “person” strong mon of the term indication “person” in 1983 used likewise does not include a State.5 Laboratories, County v. Pharmaceutical Assn. Abbott Jefferson relies, petitioner fully with on which reconcilable our
holding present County, in the held that case. the Court Jefferson Act, persons States were that could be sued under the Robinson-Patman 13(a) 13(f). plaintiff §§ 15 U. S. C. at 155-157. But the seeking only injunctive damages against relief and there was State satisfying language falls far short of of 1983also statutory in- ordinary if construction rule of between balance the “usual constitutional tends to alter inten- it must make its Government,” and the Federal “unmistakably language of the stat- clear in the do so tion to Hospital Scanlon, ute.” Atascadero State Hospital Pennhurst School see also State *7 (1984). Atascadero was an Halderman, 89, 465 U. S. approach applied but a similar case, Eleventh Amendment Congress intention “clear in should make its other contexts. powers pre-empt the historic and manifest” if it intends to Corp., Fe Elevator 331 U. S. States, of the Rice v. Santa impose a on the 218, 230 if it intends to condition or Hospi- grant moneys, School of federal Pennhurst State Dakota Halderman, v. 1, tal v. South U. S. (1987). traditionally sensitive Dole, “In 203, 483 U. S. affecting legislation balance, the re- such as the federal areas, legislature quirement that the has of clear statement assures bring critical issue, into faced, in fact and intended to judicial v. in decision.” United States matters involved (1971). Bass, 336, 404 U. S. “person” is not a within that a State
Our conclusion by Congress’ purpose meaning in en- of 1983is reinforced Alabama; University the Dis- defendant, of Board of Trustees of the damages as barred plaintiff’s claim had dismissed the trict Court Id., present 1983 action n. 5. Had the Eleventh Amendment. court, disposition would have resulted. in a similar brought federal been course, be faced with a case such the Court would never Of Jefferson because the federal courts County that had been brought in a state court the federal antitrust laws. jurisdiction over claims under exclusive have County Moreover, §§ the Court 15 and 26. 15 U. S. C. Jefferson competing purpose for the of holding purchases to “state to limit its careful at 154. retail market.” private enterprise ... apply the Act to Congress did not intend deciding without “that It assumed functions,” governmental in traditional purchases consumption for ibid., may “affec[t] it well question because presents which a more difficult (1971). Bass, 336, 349 404 U. S. the federal balance.” See United acting Congress Rights the statute. enacted 1 of the Civil precursor shortly Act of 1871, 17 Stat. .to after response widespread the end of the War “in Civil to the deprivations rights civil of the Southern States and the in- ability unwillingness pro- or authorities those States to rights punish wrongdoers.” Casey, tect those or Felder v. (1988). Although Congress did not estab- remedy lish federal courts as the exclusive forum to these deprivations, plain “Congress assigned ibid., it is to the paramount Patsy federal courts a role” in endeavor, this Regents Florida, Board provides remedy many
Section 1983 a federal forum to deprivations provide liberties, civil but it does not a federal litigants remedy against forum for who seek a a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh Amend ment bars such suits unless the State has waived its immu nity, Dept. Highways Welch v. Texas and Public Trans (1987) portation, (plurality opinion), 472-473 power or unless has exercised its undoubted *8 §5 immunity. of the Fourteenth Amendment to override that Congress, § passing That in 1983,had no intention to disturb immunity the States’ Eleventh Amendment and so to alter respect the federal-state in balance that was made clear in principal purpose our decision in Quern. Given that a be § provide hind the enactment of 1983was to a federal forum rights Congress provide for civil claims, and that did not rights against such a federal forum for civil claims States, we accept petitioner’s argument Congress cannot that intended against nevertheless to create a cause of action States to be brought precisely in courts, which are the courts Con gress sought rights through to allow civil claimants to avoid §1983. petitioner suggests, mean,
This does not that we think scope scope that the of the Eleventh Amendment and the separate Certainly they 1983are not issues. are. But in deciphering congressional scope intent as to the of 1983,the
67 we scope consideration, Eleventh of the Amendment disregards adopt reading it.6 1983that decline holdings supported in our conclusion further Our Congress enacting not intend to override well- §1983, did immunities under the common law. established or defenses important assumption underlying the Court’s decisions “One Congress famil- of the 42d were in this area is members principles, including previ- with defenses iar common-law they ously recognized ordinary litigation, tort and that likely principles obtain, these absent intended common-law provisions contrary.” Newport specific v. Fact Con- (1981). Stump Sparkman, certs, v. Inc., 247, 453 S. 258 U. (1978); Rhodes, v. 416 435 S. 356 U. S. U. Scheuer (1967); Ray, Pierson v. (1951), Tenney Brandhove, v. also to S. are sovereign immunity was a famil- this effect. doctrine of elementary principle is at common “The iar doctrine law. con- cannot be in its own courts without its that State sued (1880). Tennessee, v. sent.” Railroad Co. jurisprudence” principle an It is sovereign “established in its own courts without its con- cannot sued Arkansas, 20 How. We can- sent. Beers disregard intended to the well- not conclude that immunity being from sued without its established a State consent.7 argues that would not have considered the Elev
6. Petitioner
yet
enacting §
this
1983 because
Court had
enth Amendment
federal-question
held that the Eleventh Amendment barred
cases
argument
attempt
is no more than an
to have
federal court. This
Jordan,
Quern
we de
which
this Court reconsider
to do.
cline
*9
7
Services,
City Dept.
York
recognition Monell v. New
Social
Our
of
(1978),
§
fully
municipality
person
that a
is a
Construing remedy as a for “officialviolation of feder- ally protected rights” does more than no confirm sec- that the tion is directed state action—action “under color of” suggest state law. It does not that the State was a itself person subject liability. intended
Although sharp there were debates, heated the discus- present sion bill, of the which contained the was although respects impact not extended. And in other on sovereignty suggested was much talked no about, one subject damages that 1 would the States themselves to a suit under Quern, federal law. 343. There complaint subject would state officers to dam- ages liability, suggestion expose no but that it would also Cong. Cong., the States themselves. Globe, Sess., 42d 1st regularly imposing specific duty held that in municipality on the either statute, its charter or impliedly city’s the State had withdrawn im munity liability from nonperformance for the misperformance or its ob id., and, ligation,” result, municipalities as a had been liable for held “in damages involving previously activities, multitude cases” immune id., at 646-647.
69 nothing leg- substantial We find 366, history in- believe that that leads us to islative “person” in 1983 included the States word that the tended surely nothing in the debates rises to And of the Union. necessary permit clearly expressed legislative intent construction. (the 1871, §2, 16 25, the Act of Feb. Stat.
Likewise, Act”),8 supra, “Dictionary Monell, relied in on which we contrary conclusionhere. As 688-689, does not counsel a adopted prior 1 the while Quern, Act, noted we §2 adopted Rights after of the Civil Act of was Civil Rights de- Act which of the 1871 Act was from disagree Moreover, we rived. n. 11. Dictionary Act the time the with Justice that at Brennan phrase politic corporate’ passed was un- “the ‘bodies and was Post, Rather, an ex- to include the at 78. derstood States.” suggests phrase of the era that the amination of authorities (mu- private public corporations, and used to mean both nicipal), view, include the States.9 our and not to Dictionary provided Act
8. The ‘person’ may ap- passed . . . the word extend and “in all acts hereafter corporate . . . the context that such plied politic bodies and unless shows Feb. intended to be used in a more limited sense.” Act of words were §2, 16 Stat. 431. Abbott, Fox, 1 B. Dic See United States English Jurisprudence or tionary and Phrases Used American of Terms (“most (1879) corporation”); W. Ander expression” “public for exact (“most (1893) son, expression public Dictionary A exact for Law government”); Law corporation corporation having powers of Black’s or (1891) applied corporation, Dictionary (“body politic” is “term to a ” ‘body corporate politic’ par “is usually designated and and which is powers and du ticularly appropriate public corporation to a invested with Burrill, Dictionary Glossary 212 government”); 1 A. A Law and ties of 1871) (2d (“body politic” applied corporation, to a which is ed. is “term politic”). public corpora A usually designated body corporate as a and tion, ordinary municipal corporation, for a usage, was another term Abbott, towns, cities, counties, supra, but not States. See included
Dictionary legislative history, Act, like 1983 itself its congressional fails to evidence a clear intent that States be *11 held liable.
Finally, contrary. prior Monell itself not to the True, municipalities Monell the had Court reasoned that -if were persons surely Fitzpatrick not then States also were not. v. Bitzer, 427 452. S., Monroe, U. at And Monell overruled undercutting logic. But it does not followthat if munici- palities persons protected are then so are States. States are by municipalities the Eleventh Amendment while not, are consequently Monell, n. U. at and we limited holding government our “to Monell local units which are part considered the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” Conversely, holding ibid. our here does not cast any applies only govern- Monell, doubt on to States or mental entities that are considered “arms of the State” for purposes. g., Healthy Eleventh Amendment e. See, Mt. Bd. (1977). Doyle, Ed. v. U. S. 274, alternatively, Petitioner asserts, that state officialsshould “persons” though acting be considered under 1983 even capacities. petitioner their official case, this named as de- only Michigan Department fendant not of State Police but capacity. also the Director of State Police his official 347; Anderson, 264-265; Black, 278; at at supra, Burrill, at supra, supra, at 352. Justice precise BRENNANappears to confuse this definition
phrase Black, with way,” its use “in a rather supra, loose see at (as State). to the opposed refer to a This confusion most is revealed clearly in Justice Brennan’s reliance on 1979 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, “body politic which defines corporate” compact or social “[a] by which people citizen, the whole covenants with each and each citizen people, with the whole all governed by shall be certain laws for the Post, good.” common at 79. To the extent Justice Brennan’s citation confusion, other authorities not suffer does from the same those authori- suggest phrase ties best ambiguous, which still renders the Dictionary incapable necessary Act of supplying clear intent. persons. literally
Obviously, are But a suit state officials capacity against official is not in his or her official a state against is a suit the offi- but rather the official suit Holt, Brandon cial’s office. against the State itself. from a suit no different such,
As it is Kentucky g., Graham, 165-166 See, e. supra, We see no reason to Monell, n. 55. particularly present adopt context, in the rule different petitioner to circumvent con- allow a rule would when such pleading gressional a mere device.10 intent acting in their nor its officials that neither State We hold judgment capacities “persons” 1983. The are official Michigan Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Marshall,
Jus-
Brennan, with whom Justice
Justice
Blackmun,
join, dissenting.
tice
and Justice Stevens
brought
court,
the Court
Because this case
inapplicable
is
here.
Amendment
concedes, the Eleventh
guest
leave,
who would not
Like the
at 63-64.
ante,
See
capacity, when sued for
in his or her official
a state official
Of course
relief,
“official-capacity
§
person
1983because
injunctive
would be a
under
against the
as actions
State.”
prospective relief are not treated
actions for
167,
14;
Graham,
S.,
parte Young,
Ex
n.
U.
Kentucky
at
v.
(1908).
“commonplace
sovereign
immu
123,
is
This distinction
159-160
3-27,
190,
§
Tribe,
p.
Law
n. 3
doctrine,”
nity
L.
American Constitutional
(2d
19th-century
1988),
foreign
have
to the
Con
would not
been
ed.
and
443,
1983, see,
Ayers,
506-507
g.,
§
re
123 U. S.
e.
gress that enacted
(1882);
Lee,
196,
Liqui
(1887);
219-222
Board
United States
of
McComb,
531,
v. Bank
United
Osborn
dation v.
U. S.
Bruno,
States,
City
Kenosha
(1— Rights Section of the Act of Civil U. S. C. “persons” deprivations 1983, renders certain liable for rights. question presented constitutional is whether the “person” in word this statute includes the state of- acting capacities. ficials their official might expect statutory question gener- One that this would analysis thorough language, legisla- ate a careful and of the history, general background tive If 1983. this is expects, disappointed by however, what one one will be to- day’s decision. For this case is not decided on the basis of ordinary statutory our construction; method of instead, disposes statutory Court of it means various rules of in- terpretation question that it summons to its aid each time the Specifically, following looks close. the Court invokes the in- terpretative principles: “persons” ordinarily the word con- sovereign; congressional strued to exclude the intent to affect the federal-state balance must be “clear and manifest”; and abrogate immunity intent to Eleventh States’ Amendment appear language must in the of the statute itself. The Court apparently believes that each of these rules obviates the need analysis language history. Prop- for close of a statute’s erly applied, only interpretative however, the last of these *13 principles principle pertinent effect, has this and that is not to the case before us. “often-expressed The Court invokes, first, the under- “
standing” usage, “person” ‘in common the term does sovereign, employing [and] not include the the statutes ordinarily [word] are Ante, construed to exclude it.’” (1979). quoting Tribe, Wilson v. Omaha argument This rule that the lan- is used both to refute the §1983 guage in- demonstrates an intent that argu- cluded as the defendants, ante, and to overcome Dictionary “person” Act’s definition to ment based on politic corporate, ante, and at 69-70. It is include bodies say interpre- this least, that the Court chooses ironic, to why Dictionary explaining decisive, Act is not tive rule only “persons” relevant when the word has since the rule is origins statutory considers the and definition. When one no guideline, interpretive one realizes moreover, content of this applied, inapplicable if even would defeat and, that it is here approach support and result. rather than the Court’s ordinarily “persons” excludes the The idea that the word principle sovereign that the to the “familiar be traced can any King by Parliament he be act of unless is not bound by special particular words.” Dollar named and therein (1874). Savings As States, Bank v. 19Wall. United principle suggests, interpretive passage however, this this applies only enacting sovereign.” United States to “the (1936). also See California, Jefferson County Assn., Laboratories, Inc. v. Abbott Pharmaceutical explained Furthermore, as 150, 161, n. Herron, 20 Wall. even the United States sovereign applied enacting principle is not without pub- act of Parliament is made for the limitations: “Where an religion justice good, advancement of and or to lic as for the king by wrong, prevent injury act, is bound such though particularly therein; named but where statute right, thereby any prerogative, general, title, or inter- is king, king in such case the est is or taken from divested him the statute is made to extend to bound, is not unless imagine express a statute words.” It would be difficult good,” prevent clearly designed public and “to more “for the injury wrong,” than 1983. principle interpretive were relevant to this
Even if this exclusion of care- invocation of it case, the Court’s analysis statutory clear, As we have made error. ful merely principle construction of “an aid to consistent this sovereign purpose enacting is in when their of the statutes *14 74 require fairly
doubt, but it does not that the aim of a statute disregarded explicitly to be inferred be because not stated.” supra, United States v. California, 186. Indeed, immedi- ately following passage quoted by today, the Court ante, using “person” 64, to the effect that statutes the word are “ordinarily sovereign, construed to exclude” the we stated:
“But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, subject legislative matter, the context, the history, interpretation and the executive of the statute may by are aids to construction which indicate an intent, bring term, the use of the state or nation within the scope of the law. by
“Decision is not to be reached a strict construction by application of the Act, words of the nor of artifi- contrary, cial canons of construction. On the we are to statutory language ordinary read the in its and natural light, sense, and if remain, doubts resolve them in the only policy by of the intended to be served the enact- ment, but, well, all other available aids to construc- Cooper Corp., tion.” United States v. 600, U. S. (1941). 604-605 (“There supra,
See also Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,
at 667
is . . . ‘no hard and fast rule of exclusion,’ United States v.
Cooper Corp., [312
[(1941)];
600,]
604-605
and much
depends
subject
legislative
on the context, the
matter,
his
tory,
interpretation”);
and executive
India,
Inc. v.
Pfizer
(1978);
U. S.
315-318
Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v.
Guaranty
Surety
Title
(1912);
&
Co.,
U. S.
(1875);
Lewis v. United States, U. S.
Green v.
United States,
The second that the Court invokes comes from Corp., cases such as Rice v. Fe Santa Elevator (1947); Hospi- U. S. Pennhurst State School and (1981); tal v. Halderman, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 207-208 and United States v. *15 (1971), require Bass, which a “clear and expression congressional change intent to manifest” some aspect Ante, of federal-state relations. at 65. These cases permit not, substitution of an absolutist rule of however, do statutory analysis. statutory thorough In- construction for deed, in each of these decisions the undertook a careful Court statutory history analysis language and detailed particularly inapposite Rice is under consideration. a source today interpretive employs, for the method that the Court according pre-emption since it conventional that, observes analysis, pre-empt a “clear and manifest” intent state “purpose” legislation may appear in or of the the “scheme” at 230. federal statute. See 331 U. only statutory employed by principle of construction justify perfunctory and inconclusive
the Court that would analysis language history of a statute’s is one that is irrel- This is “that if in- evant to this case. the notion the ‘usual constitutional balance tends alter between in- Government,’ and the Federal it must make its ‘unmistakably language in tention to do so clear of the quoting Hospital Atascadero Ante, statute.’” State 234, Scanlon, notes, As Court case; Atascadero was an Eleventh Amendment the “constitu- which Atascadero refers is that struck tional balance” to interpret the Eleventh Amendment as this Court has cometo apparently Although wishes it were otherwise, it. the Court interpretation principle that Atascadero announced is the unique involving Amendment. to cases Eleventh applies, Where the Eleventh Amendment Court has principle robust than its re- a clear-statement more devised clarity any just quirement Indeed, other situation. prin- today, has intimated that this clear-statement the Court discerning congressional ciple simply a means of intent. is not may post, (concludingthat Muth, Dellmuth v. at 232 one See rely “permissible lan- on a inference” from statute’s immunity); post, finding abrogation guage and structure dissenting); Pennsylvania J., 238-239 but see (Brennan, p. brought ante, Union 1. Co., Gas Since this case was drafting requirement however, court, this strict has no application hardly here. The Eleventh can Amendment “a ante, at consideration,” a suit to which it does not apply. generated uniquely daunting require-
That this Court has
clarity
explains why
ment of
in Eleventh Amendment cases
Quern v.
In analysis thorough permits to avoid a careful and the Court history principle language and is the clear-statement 1983’s apply in Amendment that this has come to Eleventh Court principle state-court action. that is irrelevant to this cases—a my analysis 1983leads to view, a careful and detailed meaning “persons” within the are conclusion of that statute.
II provides: Section 1983 *17 any
“Every person statute, color of ordi- who, usage, any regulation, Ter- custom, or of State or nance, ritory subjects, or causes to Columbia, of or the District any subjected, or other of the United States citizen deprivation jurisdiction person thereof to the the within privileges, any rights, immunities secured or of injured party liable to the laws, and shall be Constitution pro- equity, proper in other law, suit or an action ceeding for redress.” “person,”
Although we not define the term 1983itself does “Any statutory this word. definition of are not without analysis ‘person’ meaning in 1983 . . . the word of the of Dictionary begin New Act.” Monell v. . . . with the must (1978) City Dept. Services, 658, 719 Social York just dissenting). Passed two months be- J., (Rehnquist, fore 1983, and designed “suppl[y] rules of construction for ibid., all Act legislation,” Dictionary provided: “That all acts hereafter . . word passed . the ‘person’ may extend and be to bodies and applied politic corpo- rate . . . unless the context shows that words such were intended to be used a more . . limited sense . Act 25, 1871, §2, Feb. 16 Stat. 431. In Monell, we held this definition to be merely allowable but mandatory, requiring word be con- “person” strued to include “bodies and politic unless the corporate” statute “by under consideration its for a terms called devi- ation from this 436 U. practice.” 689-690, n. 53. Thus, concluded, we nothing where of a “context” par- ticular statute for a restricted “call[s] of the interpretation word of that ‘person,’ language should prima [statute] facie be construed include ‘bodies politic’ among the enti- Ibid. ties that could be sued.”
Both before after the time when the Act Dictionary passed, were the phrase politic “bodies and cor- g., e. porate” was include understood to See, States. J. Bouvier, 1 A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution (11th and Laws United States America 185 ed. W. 1866); Shumaker & G. Longsdorf, Cyclopedic Dictionary Georgia, Chisholm (1901); Law 104 v. 2 Dali. 419, 447 (1793) (Iredell, J.); id., at 468 v. United Cotton J.); (Cushing, States, (1851) How. (“Every sovereign State is of politic, or artificial person”); Poindexter v. necessity body Greenhow, 114 U. McPherson v. Blacker, (1885); S. McCall, Heim S. (1915). See also United v. Maurice, 2 Brock. (CC J.) 1823) (“The Va. (Marshall, C. United States is a gov- ernment, and, consequently, body politic corporate”); Van Brocklin Tennessee, (1886) (same). *18 Indeed, very legislators passed § who 1 referred to States g., See, e. in these terms. 42d Cong. Globe, 1st Cong., (1871) Vickers) (Sen. (“What Sess., 661-662 is a State? Is (Sen. id., Ed- and at corporate?”); a politic it not body munds) (“A is a corporation”). State is corporate” are “bodies and politic why reason can only is an act corporation entity as a simple: just a corporate body, is political “[t]he its State through agents, only and can laws.” agents, by act command only through can Greenhow, See also Black’s supra, Poindexter 288. (5th 1979) cor- (“[B]ody politic ed. or Law Dictionary whole cov- which the compact by people “A social porate”: with citizen, with and each citizen the whole enants each laws for the com- by certain governed that all shall people, a and falls As a State good”). “body politic corporate,” mon Act’s definition of a Dictionary “person.” within the squarely politic it “bodies and certainly phrase While true that see public corporations, referred corporate” private into ante, does draw question n. this fact 69, and also to the this States. phrase applied the conclusion Indeed, multiple have referents. course, Phrases may, cited the Court accords dictionary and every each and most cases ex- comfortably, broader realm —one this than sovereign phrase includes plicitly, —to Dictionary 1 B. of Terms Abbott, it See gives today. Court Jurisprudence in American or English Phrases Used (“[T]he used (1879) often politic general term body or sovereign power, the state or meaning way, in- distinct express without implying any city government, (1893) A of Law 127 Anderson, Dictionary W. corporation”); a city “The governmental, sovereign power: (“[B]ody politic”: (1891) Dictionary (“[Bjody poli- Black’s Law State”); or used, way, “It is in a rather loose designate often tic”: of a or the sovereign power, government state or nation or ex- any county distinctly connoting or without municipality, A Law Burrill, 1 A. charter”); corporate individual press (2d 1871) ed. Glossary (“[B]ody politic”: Dictionary and framed by policy”', “[pjarticu- succession, “A take body to *19 sole”); id., books, old to a at corporation the larly applied, sovereign England). sole” includes the (“[Corporation of this were phrase I that both uses recognize Because deemed 1983 and the Act were Dictionary passed, valid when me definition precise the Court accuses of “confusing] [the] ” its use ‘in a rather “to refer way,’ with loose phrase [this] Ante, to to State).” (as at n. quot- opposed supra, me, It at 143. had never occurred how- ing Black, definitions counted as valid ones. ever, that only “precise” we face is what at- meaning Congress Where the question word or we phrase, usually prop- tached to a particular —and meant loath to conclude to use the erly —are in a sense unless it said so. hypertechnical word or phrase “the state” and “a distinction Nor does the Court’s between I it, State” force. The take is that the any suggestion, have refers to nations phrase corporate” only “bodies politic within a then the nation; rather than to the states but Court I must so of the sources have refer why many quoted explain to nations. states in addition In an so de- opinion utterly it moreover, voted to the of the States as rights sovereigns, between indeed to find Court surprising distinguishing our States and our Nation. sovereign sovereign what the “bodies phrase politic corporate” deciding I do not see the relevance of the mean- means, furthermore, ante, 69-70, of the term See ing “public corporation.” n. in the Dic- 9. That is not the chosen phrase by Congress and the Court’s this tionary Act, suggestion phrase phrase corporate” coterminous with the “bodies politic whether the latter one includes States. begs question Nor I of this Court’s decision significance do grasp Fox, United States in which the ques- York, the State of New by including “per- tion was whether of those to whom sons” and within the class “corporations” devised, land had intended to authorize devises to could Ante, 69-70, Noting “[t]he the United States. n. 9. York],” be determined the laws of [New is to question require express held that it would “an Court definition” to “persons” hold that word included the Federal Govern- “corporations” ap- ment, and that under state law the term only plied corporations created under the laws of New *20 pertinence S., York. 94 U. at 320-321. The of these state- questions today escapes law to the issue before us me. Not only entirely do we confront an different, statute, but federal express Dictionary we also have an in statement, Act, §1 “person” politic that the word in includes “bodies and corporate.” India, See also Inc. v. S., at 315, Pfizer n. 15. Rights
The relevance of the fact that 2 of the Civil Act Stat. 27, model for 1 the 1871Act—was —the passed Dictionary similarly before the Act, ante, see Congress “person” eludes me. chose to use the word passed Dictionary pre- 1871 Act even after it had Act, sumptively including politic corporate” “bodies and within category “persons.” Its decision to do so—and its fail- Dictionary pre- ure to indicate in the 1871Act that the Act’s sumption apply was not to did —demonstrate “persons” politic corpo- indeed intend to include bodies and Dictionary “person” In addition, rate. Act’s definition of dropped sky. Many no means from the of the authorities predate Dictionary cited above both the and Act the 1866 indicating “persons” ordinarily that the Act, word thought politic corpo- would have been include “bodies and Dictionary rate,” with or without the Act. point helps why explain
This last
it is a matter of small
importance
Dictionary
“person”
that the
Act’s definition of
as
including
politic
corporate
retroactively
bodies
and
with-
drawn when the federal
statutes were revised
1874. See
Report
Durant,
T.
Joint Committee on Revision of Laws
(1873). Only
presumptively designating
two months after
politic
corporate
“persons,” Congress
bodies
and
chose
“person”
Rights
the word
for
of the Civil
Act. For
purpose
determining Congress’
using
intent
this
years
that,
it
it
term,
later,
cannot be decisive
three
with-
presumption.
majority
fact,
drew this
both the
and dis-
emphasized
Dictionary
sent in Monell
the 1871version of the
Act, but neither saw fit even to mention the 1874revision of
(opinion
this
688-689,
statute. 436 U.
and nn.
Court);
dissenting).
for the
id.,
J.,
at 719
(Rehnquist,
statutory
Even in cases, moreover, where no
definition of the
“persons”
word
we
available,
have not hesitated to include
politic
corporate
category.
bodies
within that
See Stan-
(1893)(“[T]he
ley Schwalby,
‘per-
U. S.
word
body politic
[the States]
son’in the statute would include
as a
corporate”);
Helvering,
Ohio v.
Shirey,
255, 257,
United States
n. 2
question
presumption
Thus, the
before us is whether the
“person”
Rights
that the word
in 1 of the Civil
Act of
politic
corporate
1871 included bodies
*21
hence the
—and
by anything
language
States —is overcome
in the statute’s
history. Certainly nothing
statutory language
in the
presumption.
explicitly
overrides this
The statute is
di-
rected at action taken
law,
“under color of” state
and thus
supports
“persons”
rather than refutes the idea that the
men-
tioned in the statute include the
Indeed,
States.
for almost
(1961)
century
Pape,
Monroe v.
Unimpressed by arguments, simply such the Court asserts reading “person” “States” where the statute mentions “decidedly would be awkward.” Ante, at 64. The Court perceives, does not describe the awkwardness that it but I objection take it that its is that the under-color-of-law requirement if be redundant States were included would necessarily act under color of state the statute because States persons, well to natural law. But 1983extends as who do necessarily they act; so order to ensure that would only they so, the statute needed the under- be liable when did only way requirement. remove the re- color-of-law dundancy would have been to eliminate that the Court sees phrase “person” altogether, separately de- the catchall category possible defendants and the circum- scribe each they might I be liable. cannot think of a stances under which involving however, Amendment, situation not the Eleventh unforgiving drafting imposed an re- which we have such quirement Congress. on might
Taking example we have ob- case, closest to this clumsily if in- in Monell that written it served may only municipalities, these, act too, cluded since authority. Nevertheless, color of we held there that apply municipalities. S., at 690. the statute does U. statutory Similarly, have construed the term “white we companies, “‘corporations, persons” associations, to include joint companies, partnerships, stock firms, societies, Tribe, see Wilson v. Omaha individuals,’” well as § despite quoting the evident awkward- 1 U. S. C. virtually every doing time we construe Indeed, so. ness corporate “person” enti- include or other artificial the word persons, individual, flesh-and-blood some ties that are not given Monell But cases like and Wil- awkwardness results. *22 why linguistic awk- understand mere it is difficult to son, good accept reason to control where there wardness should reading of a statute. the “awkward” history background legislative of the statute con- and The by Dictionary presumption Act was firm created that the Act, that, even without in of the 1871 not overridden “person” plain presumption, in Act the 1871 it is such a legislative in I detail the discussed must include States. judg- concurring my opinion history in the statute in of this in Quern ment Jordan, 357-365, and I shall ground again say not cover that here. Suffice it to in that, my history legislative provision, though view, the of this spare, Congress recognized accepted demonstrates that the fact that the statute directed at the them- selves. One need not believe that the statute satisfies this heightened principle, Court’s clear-statement for reserved Eleventh cases, Amendment order to conclude that the language legislative history of 1983show that the word “person” must include the States. general background
As to the more historical §1, we easily forget, existing too I think, the circumstances in this country early rights passed. when the civil statutes were “[V]iewed passions the events and time,” United States v. Price, I have little Rights doubt that 1 of the Civil Act of 1871included States “persons.” following description brief of the Re- period illuminating: construction April “The Civil War had ended in 1865. Relations be- Negroes increasingly tween and whites were turbulent. governmental had taken control of the entire process in former Confederate States. It had declared governments the gal in 10 ‘unreconstructed’ States to be ille- up military
and had set federal administrations place. Congress representatives their refused to seat they adopted from these States until had constitutions guaranteeing Negro suffrage, and had ratified the Four- teenth Amendment. Constitutional conventions were Congress’ called 1868. Six of the 10 States fulfilled requirements in 1868, the other four 1870. years Republicans
“For a few ‘radical’ dominated the governments Negroes played of the Southern States and political a substantial role. But countermeasures were organized by swift and violent. The Ku Klux Klan was organization ap- southern whites 1866 and a similar peared Knights with the romantic title of the of the *23 In 1868 a wave of murders and as- White Camellia. including designed was launched assassinations saults polls. keep Negroes from the The States themselves helpless, despite resort some of them to were ex- making legal it treme measures such as hunt down and any disguised man. shoot Congress pressures period in
“Within the mounted and 1870 the end of the war for drastic meas- between A after the ratification of the Thir- ures. few months Congress, 6, 1865, teenth Amendment on December on Rights April the Civil Act of 1866 .... 9, 1866,enacted pro- Fourteenth Amendment was 13, 1866, On June July February posed, in 1868. and it was ratified proposed, it was 1869the Fifteenth Amendment was February May En- 31, 1870, ratified 1870. On Id., forcement Act of 1870 was enacted.” at 803-805 (footnotes omitted). “ altering
This was a in the midst of the ‘balancebe- Ante, tween the States and the Federal Government.’” Hospital quoting Scanlon, Atascadero State doing fighting it Union, so, at 242. It was to save system. therefore, It is difficult, transformed our federal Congress did not intend to include believe that this same might among for the those who be liable under 1983 States threatening very deprivations this Nation at that that were time.
Ill
holding is to dem-
of the Court’s
To describe
breadth
“persons”
If
within
are
onstrate its unwisdom.
they may
meaning
not be sued under
then
they
regardless
have consented to suit.
of whether
statute
formally
explicitly con-
if,
words,
Even
other
a State
court,
or state
no
sented to suits
it
federal
plaintiff
proceed against
are not
it because States
could
possible
category of
defendants.
within the statute’s
*24
This is indeed an
Not
exceptional holding.
does it de-
only
Alabama v.
our
Pugh,
part from
suggestion
438 U. S.
(1978),
§
that a State could be a defendant
1983 if
under
it
Quern
v.
Jordan,
supra, suit,
consented to
see also
it also
but
renders ineffective the choices some States
See, e.
have made to
such suits
them.
g.,
permit
Della
(CA1 1986).
Island,
Grotta
Rhode
part by did enacting Congress intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common law.” Ante, at 67. question But the §1983 whether are “persons” separate distinct from the they whether question may assert a defense of common-law sovereign our immunity. decisions prior immunities, common-law have involving we not held that the of an immunity existence defense excluded the relevant state actor from category “persons” liable under see, e. White, Forrester g., U. S. 219 is a and it mis- take to so today. do Such an entrenches the effect approach of common-law immunity even where itself immunity has been waived.
For I my part, would reverse the below and re- judgment mand for resolution of the question whether would Michigan assert common-law immunity sovereign defense to this suit and, so, if whether that assertion of immunity would preclude
the suit.
Given
suggestion
the court below that Michigan
no
enjoys
common-law immunity for violations of its own
Health,
Smith v. Department
Constitution,
Public
(1987)
Mich.
641-642,
N.
410 W. 2d
793-794
(Boyle,
J.,
there is
concurring),
certainly
possibility that
court would hold that the State
lacks
also
immunity against
§ 1983
for
suits
violations of the Federal Constitution.
if
court decided that the
Moreover, even that
State’s waiver
immunity
apply
suits,
to 1983
there is a substan-
did not
Michigan
question
could so discriminate between
tial
whether
only
virtually
ground
on the
identical causes
action
a federal one.
Testa v.
was a state suit and
other
Cf.
one
(1947);Martinez v.
Katt,
California,
Legal d’etre flourish after their raison doctrines often sovereign immunity perished.1 rests on has The doctrine of wrong.”2 “King premise can no do the fictional though plot I in the exe- to assassinate James Even very familiar to the student of very phenomenon, and one “A common customs, beliefs, primitive history, needs of a time estab is this. The or belief, custom, In or a rule or a formula. the course of centuries lish gave to necessity The reason which rise disappears, but the rule remains. inquire ingenious and minds set themselves forgotten the rule has been of, policy thought which ground of how it is to be accounted for. Some things; present state of explain to reconcile it with the seems to it and it, which have been found for adapts to the new reasons then the rule itself content, old form receives new enters on a new career. The meaning which it has received.” to fit the time even the form modifies itself 1963). (M. Holmes, Howe ed. The Law 8 0. Common (“The moreover, Blackstone, king, *246 See W. Commentaries thinking wrong; he can of only doing wrong, but even incapable improper thing”). never mean to do an I in 1649,
cution of Charles and the Colonists’ reaction to George stamp Ill’s tax made rather clear the fictional charac- underpinnings/ subjects ter of the doctrine’s British found a gracious compelling King obey means the law rather simply repudiating They than the doctrine itself. held his agents responsible.3 advisers and his our administration of we have also relied on fic- protect sovereign tions to the illusion that a State, absent may consent, not be held accountable for its delicts in fed- eral court. Under a settled course decision, contexts ranging desegregation provision public from school to the 3In chapter History the first of his classic England, published Macaulay Thomas wrote: was, English early
“Of these kindred constitutions the period, from an justly reputed prerogatives sovereign best. of the were undoubt- edly extensive. power, though ample,
“But his great was limited three constitutional principles, say exist, they so ancient that none can when began potent so development, many their natural through generations, continued has produced things the order of under which we now live. “First, King legislate could not without the consent of his Parlia- Secondly, impose ment. he could no tax without the consent of his Parlia- Thirdly, ment. he was bound to conduct the executive administration ac- *26 cording land, and, laws, to the laws of the if he broke those his advisers and agents responsible.” his were 1 Macaulay, History T. England of 28-29. well, the United States as passage the time of the Rights of the Civil 1871, Act against of agents actions of sovereign by were the means State, which despite its immunity, required obey own the law. See, Greenhow, (1885) (“The g., e. 270, Poindexter v. 114 U. S. fancied inconvenience of an interference with by the collection of its taxes govenment Virginia, against collectors, of suits its tax vanishes at once upon suggestion possible, such except interference is not when government contrary seeks to enforce the collection of its taxes to the State, law and contract of the and in violation of the Constitution of the States”); (1873) (“Where 203, United Gray, Davis v. 16 Wall. the State concerned, party, the State should be made a if it could done. That it it, cannot be done is a sufficient reason for the omission to do and the court may proceed against to decree respects the officers in of the State all as if record”). party the State awere to the prison systems assistance benefits to the administration facilities, other state we have held States liable under through 1983 for violations their constitutional artifice naming party. public a nominal officer as Once one strips away overlay applied the Eleventh Amendment to ac- apparent in tions court, federal it is that the Court in these party cases has in treated the State as the real interest both purposes granting prospective ancillary for the relief denying brought and of retroactive relief. When suit inapplicable, court, where the Eleventh Amendment is directly party it follows that the State can be named as a under 1983. official-capacity typical way
An suit is the which we have responsible held States for their duties under federal law. “ explained, ‘generally represents] only a suit, Such we have way pleading against entity another an action an of which agent.’” Kentucky an Graham, officer is an 473 U. S. (1985) (quoting City Dept. 159, 165 Monell Newv. York (1978)); Services, Social 436 U. S. n. see also Hospital Pennhurst State School and v. Halderman, 465 (1984). peculiar U. S. In the Eleventh Amendment analysis applied recognized we have cases, to such we have official-capacity reality always against that an action inis par the State and balanced interests to determine whether a type ticular of relief is available. The Court has held that equitable money damages when a suit seeks relief or from injuries past, state officer for suffered the interests compensation insufficiently weighty and deterrence are sovereign immunity. Papasan to override the State’s See (1986); Attain, Mansour, Green v. Jordan, Edelman v. 415 U. although prospective On the other hand, relief “implicate[s] awarded a state officer also Eleventh concerns,” Mansour, Amendment in 68, the *27 “end[ing] continuing in terests a violation of law,” federal outweigh sovereignty justify ibid., in the interests that an 1983 of an injunction operates award under itself. directly against or even State State’s officers Quern Jordan, e. supra, 282; v. g., Papasan, See, Milliken Bradley, v. 433 U. S. U. S. supra, Milliken v. Bradley, for a unanimous example, order the State requiring Court a federal-court upheld $5,800,000 components to fund educational Michigan pay direct and sub- a decree “notwithstanding [its] desegregation Id., at 289 (emphasis the state treasury.” stantial on impact added).4 stated his opinion concurring As Justice Powell been adjudged participant in the “the State judgment, [had] violations, may and the therefore the constitutional State in a other- remedy prospectively be ordered to participate Id., decisions have at 295. Subsequent wise appropriate.” “a remedy that relief —even position equitable adhered to Papasan, funds,” of state expenditure might require future compliance be awarded to ensure supra, may 282— federal determination. with a substantive by question State Jordan, Quern S., at 337. also See 1983 is also treatment of States as “persons” Our relief, ancillary our decisions by holding exemplified fees, directly against be awarded attorney’s may such as merits and have on the explained “liability State. We has hand; fees hand where defendant go for responsibility either because of legal immunity not been prevailed against, (1978): 678, 692, Finney, n. 20 4. We in Hutto v. noted (1977)], we affirmed an order re- Bradley, “In Milliken v. [433 pay litigant, another even quiring a a substantial sum to state treasurer opinion explicitly recognized that ‘this remedial though the District Court’s City Detroit and the State paid taxpayers will of the decree for Cert, Bradley, T. in Milliken v. O. Michigan,’ App. to Pet. for 76-447, 116a-117a, Appeals, in af- pp. though and even Court No. ordered that the State and Detroit firming, stated that ‘the District Court Milliken, Bradley F. relief. pay the costs' of Board each one-half 1976).” (CA6 2d
91 § merits, or 1988 does not authorize a on fee award against Kentucky supra, Graham, v. that defendant.” at Finney, held in v. Nonetheless, 165. we Hutto 437 U. S. (1978), challenging Ar a case the administration of the prison system, that a kansas Federal District Court could directly attorney’s against award fees the State under § id,., Holt, at Brandon 1988,5 700; see v. (1985), attorney’s litigation for and could assess fees bad-faith “ paid Department
under 1983 out ‘to be of Corrections Supreme Virginia funds.’” 437 692. S.,U. at Court of States, Inc., v. Consumers United Union S. 719, for a reaffirmed unanimous Court Justice White against that an award of fees could be entered a State or agency, Supreme state a case State in an in- Court, junctive action under 1983.6 In suits commenced in state independent require par court, in which no there is reason to nominally ties to sue officer, a state we have held that attor explained legislative history We Congress’ evinced intent that attorney’s against fees be assessed the State: legislative history equally plain: “The is intended ‘[I]t that the attor- fees, costs, neys’ directly like other will items of be collected either from official, capacity, agency his official from funds of his or under his (whether control, government from local or the State or agency or not the (1976)(foot- 94-1011, government party).’ Rep. or a p. is named No. omitted). Report greater note The House is in ‘The accord: resources governments provide ample available to an base from which can fees be prevailing plaintiff governmental awarded to the against suits officials 94-1558, Rep. p. or H. R. Report entities.’ No. added in course, a that: 11th footnote ‘Of Amendment is not a bar to the award- Id., Fitzpartick ing governments. against of counsel fees v. Bitzer.’ Congress’ expressed n. 14. was intent in deeds as well as words. It rejected attempts at least two to amend Act and immunize state and Hutto, supra, governments local from awards.” at 694. surely
6 The Court is to a incorrect assert determination that a person unnecessary State is a under to our awarding decisions Ante, attorney’s against fees or state agency. a State If n. 4. there liability agency was no basis for because the party State or state was not it is difficult see how imposition there was basis for fees. be in its own against fees can awarded State name.
ney’s (1980).7 Thiboutot, See Maine 10-11 of 1871 was Rights provide The Civil Act “intended construed, all forms of remedy, official broadly New Monell York violation of federally rights.” protected *29 Services, Social 700-701. City Dept. of at Our be state § that a can offi holdings brought against 1983 action in for cials their official constitutional violations capacity are faithful to that mandate.' properly recognize profound If relief can be awarded state officials prospective against in § 1983 and is the real in interest such under the State party suits, the State be a which can be held liable “person” must § conclusion is under 1983. No other available. Eleventh limit the Amendment to be principles may capacity State’s See Alabama v. Pugh, in court. sued as such federal 438 (1978). those are not appli 781 But since principles Thiboutot, supra, court, in see at n. 7; cable to suits state Hall, Nevada v. (1979), 410 is no need to there re and the sort to the fiction of an suit State official-capacity § in be as a a 1983 directly and should named defendant may action. in however, that concludes, “a state official his Court relief, sued for
or her official
when
would
capacity,
injunctive
ante,
1983,”
be a
under
n.
while
same
person
in
when
capacity
person
sued
the same official
is not
party
this.,,
It
relief.
cites
monetary
support
seeks
plaintiff
States,
v. Bank
cases such as Osborn
United
9
proposition
(1824),
738
in which the Court
Chief Justice
through
Wheat.
a state auditor to recover
Marshall held
an action
action against
did not constitute an
taxes
collected
illegally
states,
authority,
This
“would
the State.
line of
Court
7Indeed,
proper
defendant
questioned that State is a
we have never
joined in
being
consented
its own
when
has
a 1983 action
the State
court,
(1978),
Pugh,
Alabama v.
import question statutory into this construction doctrine protect created sovereign the fiction that one cannot be sovereign. sued in the courts of another Aside from all of holding these reasons, person the Court’s that a State is not a departs long judicial authority from a line of exactly premise. based on respectfully
I dissent.