*1 ROSE, CLARK WARDEN Argued July March 1986 Decided No. 84-1974.

Powell, J., opinion Court, Burger, J., delivered the in which C. White, Rehnquist, O’Connor, JJ., J., joined. Burger, and and C. opinion, Stevens, J., concurring post, p. opinion filed a 584. filed an con- curring judgment, post, p. Blackmun, dissenting in the 585. filed a opinion, Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. in which Brennan and Cody, Attorney

W. J. Michael General of Tennessee, ar- gued petitioner. him the cause for With on the briefs were Jerry Deputy Attorney Kymberly Smith, General, L. and Lynn Hattaway, Attorney Anne Assistant General. argued Larkin, Jr., for

Paul J. the cause the United urging him as amicus curióte With States reversal. Attorney Fried, brief were General Assistant Gen- Solicitor Deputy Frey. Trott, eral and Solicitor General argued filed a Scott Daniel the cause and brief for respondent.* White, Kamp, Steve Attorney California,

*John K. Van de General of Attorney General, and Ronald E. Niver and David D. Chief Assistant Salmon, Attorneys General, filed a State of Deputy brief for the California as amicus curiae urging reversal. curiae Briefs of amici urging were for the American affirmance filed Sims; Burt Neubome and Charles et al.

Civil Liberties Union opinion of delivered the the Court. Powell Justice presents whether the harmless- This case Chapman S. 18 California, error standard of (1967), principles applies that violate the instructions Montana, 442 S. 510 and Francis Sandstrom (1985).1 Franklin,

— Browning Joy Faulk 30, 1978, December Charles On they Browning’s pickup truck were shot to death while sat County, remote of Rutherford Tennessee. Re- area spondent Stanley boyfriend, former Clark, Faulk’s charged with murders. Browning, at trial showed

The evidence introduced *3 3) young (aged and Faulk’s two children 6 and had Faulk, County driving night in on the the mur- been Rutherford According child, ders. to the older another vehicle followed Browning’s Browning pulled truck for about hour. his driveway, private apparently to truck into a let the other ve- Lawyers by for the National of Criminal Defense et al. Kim Association Saltzburg. and A. Stephen Robert Fawcett Johnson, equally In 460 U. was Connecticut v. Court ordinary ap divided on the harmless-error was Compare S., propriate in cases at 84-87 of Sandstrom error. (such (plurality opinion) equivalent “is the error functional of directed intent, only verdict” on and is therefore harmless when the defendant id., intent), (Powell, J., dissenting) (Chapman at 95-99 concedes with error). S., (Stevens, applies 460 U. standard Sandstrom Cf. concurring judgment) (joining in affirmance state-court decision that harmless, ground error Sandstrom could not be but that the decision law). actually plurality one of The and was state Johnson noted that state (collect were in on this n. 1 federal courts conflict issue. cases). Johnson, Due in in ing part to the divided views that conflict has persisted. Compare, F. g., Kemp, e. Tucker v. 2d (CA11 1985) (en banc) (applying Chapman analysis), cert. (CA9 Hamilton, denied, post, p. 1022, 1189, 1190-1191 In re 721F. 2d with 1983) (holding that error only would be harmless if intent was Sandstrom trial). not contested at pass. pulled

hide The driver of the then in vehide second Browning, thereby any blocking behind The exit. driver left up Browning’s vehide, his walked to the cab of and truck, point-blank range. fired four shots at One shot struck Browning in head, two others struck Faulk the head, and the fourth struck Faulk the left shoulder. The killer Browning left the scene his vehicle. Both and Faulk died. help, Faulk’s who children, shot, had been went for (the telling a local resident that “Clicker” nickname which respondent) Browning the children knew had shot their and police night, respondent mother. Earlier that had seen fol- lowing Browning’s respondent, truck. Police soon located apprehended only high-speed him but after a chase. Police weapon, pistol respond- found the murder a .25-caliber respondent’s ent had borrowed from a friend, near home. foregoing At on trial, State relied evidence and showing respondent Joy evidence on Faulk had a stormy affair love that Faulk ended the fall of 1978. Sev- breakup, respondent eral times after kill their threatened to if he Faulk ever found her with another man.

Respondent offered two lines of con- First, defense. he Joy’s Faulk, tended that Sam ex-husband, killed the victims concerning custody dispute of a chil- because the two Faulk by introducing dren. State rebutted this contention evi- dispute dence that no such existed, Sam Faulk *4 when re- Second, elsewhere the murders were committed. argued spondent incapable he insane of that was either or forming requisite argu- support the criminal intent. To this suffering respondent ment, evidence that was introduced he night from the amnesia and could not remember events of the testimony suggested the In that addition, of murders. some respondent drinking heavily day the had been entire before Finally, psychiatrists the murders. defense two testified legally respondent insane at the the murders that time depression concerning were committed because his his recent con- it for him to made Joy impossible with Faulk breakup to law. form his conduct the the the trial,

At of court instructed the close murder. Under second-degree of first- elements both of proof pre- murder law, first-degree requires Tennessee murder deliberation, second-degree while meditation and defined The court’s instructions of malice. requires proof another, intent do to any injury design as “an to malice mind of mischief to another.” doing App. in the formed or planning of require proof premeditation; Malice did not if of sufficed commit- impulse passion” a sudden killing “upon Id., at 187. The court ted intent harm another. with the charged jury: then in the

“All are to be malicious ab- presumed homicides which rebut the implied pre- sence of evidence would if the has a rea- Thus, proven State sumption. it occurred, . . then sonable . doubt a killing maliciously. the was done But presumed killing or cir- by be rebutted either direct presumption of evidence, both, regardless cumstantial or whether by Defendant, the same be offered or exists the Ibid. evidence of the State.” jury found murder for respondent guilty first-degree Faulk and murder for

killing second-degree killing Browning. affirmed Appeals

The Tennessee Court Criminal convictions, respondent’s argument rejecting the burden of instructions had shifted as impermissibly proof to malice.2 then habeas relief in Respondent sought corpus that, immediately Appeals The Court Criminal noted almost follow instruction, judge charged: ing “presumption” alleged killing was done with malice is for “The case, you you from should look all of the determine the entire developed by facts and circumstances the evidence to determine whether proven beyond has . . . a reasonable doubt the existence of State killing you alleged If have a malice. reasonable doubt to whether

575 the Middle District of The Tennessee. District Court held respondent’s right that the malice instruction had violated to guilt proved beyond have his a doubt, reasonable as that right was defined Sandstrom v. Montana.3 The court went on to find that error could not be deemed harmless respondent upon because had “relied a mens rea defense” (1983). contesting guilt. Supp. his 611 F. 302 Appeals of Court for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.4 The agreed that court the malice instruction was unconstitutional Turning under Sandstrom. to the whether the harmless, error was the court reasoned that re- because spondent malice his an trial, contested erroneous burden- shifting governing instruction could be harmless under precedent. App. (citing Engle Pet. for A-5 Cert. (CA6 1983), equally Koehler, 707 F. 2d aff’d (1984)). U. Court, divided S. 1 The court reached “despite petitioner’s conclusion substantial evidence of guilt,” and added: writing slate,

“Were we on a clean we would our direct inquiry suggested by (dissenting) to that Powell Justice Johnson, Connecticut 460 U. S. at 97 5: “ inquiry dispositive ‘the is is so evidence say beyond reviewing intent court can reason- malice, guilty done with then Defendant cannot murder in App. degree you acquit must him of offense.” second Appeals The Court this instruction adequately of Criminal reasoned that jurors proof informed the on malice remained burden on to A-39. App. at all times. Pet. for Cert. A-37 State Sandstrom we held that an instruction creating presumption In proof on shifting the burden of intent malice that has the effect In re Winship, process the rule of defendant violates due under Montana, (1970). Sandstrom at 523-524. Sandstrom Supp. shortly respondent’s trial commenced. 611 F. was decided before (1983). 294, 296, n. 3 reported at 762 2d Appeals’ judgment The Court of is F. unpublished. opinion The court’s

576 unnecessary it have found

able doubt that would rely presumption.’ to might question be

“If in this case ... we that were App. respond Pet. for in affirmative.” to able to Cert. A-6. granting the order habeas affirmed court nevertheless granted

corpus to limited certiorari relief. We analysis Appeals’ of harmless-error the Court (1985). 474 U. S. 816 correct.5

H-< A Chapman 386 S. 18 this Court California, In v. U. rejected argument that errors of constitutional dimension necessarily require reversal of criminal convictions. And repeatedly princi- Chapman, “we have reaffirmed since ple conviction not set aside that an otherwise valid should confidently say, reviewing on if the court the whole beyond a that the constitutional error was harmless record, Arsdall, Delaware v. Van 475 U. S. reasonable doubt.” (1986). applied principle That to a 673, has been wide 681 (failure variety g., id., errors. E. of constitutional concerning bias); permit witness Rushen cross-examination (1983) curiam) (denial Spain, (per 114, S. of v. trial); present Hasting, right United States v. to be (1983)(improper comment on U. S. 508-509 defendant’s testify); Illinois, v. failure to Moore (1977) (admission in of witness identification obtained viola- counsel); Wainwright, right Milton 407 U. S. 371 tion (1972)(admission right in of confession obtained violation of counsel); Maroney, 52-53 Chambers v. whether, context, We do consider taken the instructions thus Sandstrom Francis permissible our and in were under decisions Franklin, purposes For our harmless-error analysis, Appeals properly held that the in we assume the Court structions were unconstitutional.

(admission of evidence obtained violation the Fourth Amendment). Hopper Evans, See also 456 U. S. 605, (1982) (citing Chapman finding prejudice no give from trial court’s failure to lesser included in- offense struction). application Our harmless-error denigration these cases not reflected a of the constitu- rights emphasized tional Instead, involved. as we earlier this Term: recognizes principle

“The doctrine *7 purpose that the central aof criminal trial is to decide guilt the factual theof defendant’s or innocence, (1975), Nobles, v. 422 225, United States 230 and promotes public respect process by for the criminal fo- cusing underlying on the fairness of the trial rather than virtually presence inevitable of immaterial error. Traynor, R. Cf. The Riddle Harmless Error (‘Reversal regardless judg- error, for of its effect on the litigants encourages judicial process ment, abuse the it’).” public and bestirs the to ridicule Delaware v. Van supra, Arsdall, at 681.

Despite strong support interests that the harmless- Chapman recognized doctrine, error the Court that some require regard constitutional errors reversal without to the particular evidence in the case. 386 U. at 23, 8,n. cit (1958) (introduction ing Payne Arkansas, v. 356 U. S. 560 confession); Wainwright, v. coerced Gideon S. U. (1963) (complete right counsel); Tumey denial of v. (1927) (adjudication by judge). Ohio, 273 S. 510 U. biased recognizes necessarily This that some ren limitation errors fundamentally der a trial unfair. The State of course must impartial judge, provide Turney a Ohio, trial before an v. supra, help against with counsel to the accused defend charge, Wainwright, supra. Compare the State’s Gideon Holloway (1978), Arkansas, 435 U. 488-490 475, S. with (1980). Cuyler Sullivan, S. 348-350 U. Without reliably protections, a criminal trial these basic cannot serve guilt or determination of inno- function as vehicle for its Alabama, 287 S. 45 and no cence, see Powell v. U. fundamentally may regarded punishment fair. criminal presupposes a at which trial, thus Harmless-error may present represented counsel, evidence defendant, impartial judge jury.6 argument Del- before an See (constitutional supra, Arsdall, errors aware v. Van may factfinding on “in terms of their effect be harmless trial”) added); (emphasis Chapman, supra, process (error beyond a it “did not if, doubt, is harmless reasonable obtained”) added). (emphasis to the verdict contribute analysis presumably Similarly, would not prosecution apply if a verdict for the in a a court directed by jury. judge have stated that “a trial criminal trial We entering judgment prohibited from of conviction or direct- regard- ing jury to . . come forward with such verdict. overwhelmingly point in the evidence less how Supply Co., Linen direction.” United States v. Martin omitted). (1977)(citations Accord, S. Car- penters States, v. United This from clear rule stems the Sixth Amendment’s command to af- *8 jury trials in criminal cases. See Duncan v. ford serious (1968). right Louisiana, 391 145 is U. S. Where that alto- deprivation gether denied, the State cannot contend harmless because evidence established the defend- was guilt; wrong entity in ant’s the error such a case is that the judged guilty. the defendant emphasized, however, are

We have that while there some Chapman apply, they not errors to which does are the ex- Hasting, ception supra, and not the rule. States v. United Chapman examples Each cited of errors that could never process, Payne Arkansas, trial v. harmless either aborted basic (use confession), Gideon altogether, or denied it U. S. 560 of coerced (1963) (denial Ohio, Wainwright, Tumey counsel); v. (1927) (biased adjudicator). S. 510 Accordingly, if the defendant had counsel and was impartial adjudicator, strong

tried an presump- is a there any subject tion that other errors that occurred have are analysis. many to harmless-error The thrust of the constitu- governing tional rules conduct criminal trials is to judgments. ensure that those trials to fair lead and correct reviewing developed aWhere court can find that the record guilt beyond trial establishes doubt, reasonable the inter- judgment in fairness est has been satisfied and the should be repeatedly affirmed. As we have stated, “the Constitution perfect entitles a criminal trial, defendant to a fair anot one.” Arsdall, Delaware Van atS., 681; United States v. Hasting, 461 U. atS., 508-509.

B Applying principles these to this case not difficult. Re spondent opportunity put received a full on evidence and argument support make his claim innocence. He was by fairly impartial jury, supervised by tried impartial selected, Apart

judge. challenged from the malice instruc clearly tion, the case this instructed that it had to respondent guilty beyond every find a reasonable doubt as to second-degree both element of first- murder. See also supra. context, Placed erroneous malice instruc compare tion does not with the kinds errors automati cally require of an reversal otherwise valid conviction.7 We counsel, judicial Unlike errors such as bias or denial of error composition did not affect the of the record. Evaluation of case respondent prejudiced require any error thus does difficult in concerning might been, not, quiries placed matters that but were have Arkansas, Holloway in evidence. Cf. difficulty evaluating no Consequently, there is inherent whether the prejudiced respondent Frady, in this case. See United States v. error *9 (1982) 152, (evaluating prejudice 171-174 Sandstrom error for under U. Wainwright prejudice” Sykes, v. the “cause and actual standard of (1977)). S. 72 U. instruction find the error at issue here—an that therefore proof impermissibly on malice—is shifted the burden that can be a fair that it never harmless. basic to trial” “so Chapman, U. atS., Cf. purpose rule v. Montana of Sandstrom behind logical

supports Sandstrom was a extension this conclusion. holding Winship, in In re 397 U. S. 358 of the Court’s “every necessary prosecution prove con- fact to must that the charged” [the defendant] is crime with be- stitute the which yond Id., Sandstrom, 442 364; at see a reasonable doubt. Franklin, S., Francis v. 471 U. only at 313. 523; S., guilty purpose of rule is to ensure that are The criminally punished. Term in As the Court stated last Fran- “protects Franklin, the ‘fundamental value cis v. rule society,’ given voice in determination of our Justice Harlan’s Winship, ‘it is far worse to convict an in- concurrence ” go guilty quoting Ibid., to let a man free.’ nocent man than (Harlan, concurring). supra, Winship, J., When guilty in a in which verdict of reached case Sandstrom error beyond correct a reasonable rever- doubt, was committed is nothing promote of the conviction does the interest that sal the rule serves. equivalent to a

Nor is Sandstrom error directed verdict for jury presume When instructed malice State.8 predicate it find facts, from still must the existence of those Johnson, Connecticut facts a reasonable doubt. (1983) dissenting). In J., U. S. (Powell, many predicate conclusively cases, intent, facts establish jury no could find that the com- so that rational defendant presumption does not remove issue of intent from the “Because consideration, jury’s distinguishable it is from other instructional errors Johnson, considering Connecticut prevent from an issue.” Virginia, Cf. Jackson dissenting). n. 3 (Powell, 307, 320, (suggesting that failure to instruct a harmless). reasonable-doubt standard cannot

581 mitted the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury. See, e. Lamb v. g., 683 F. Jernigan, 1332, 2d (CA11 1342-1343 1982), (1983). cert. denied, U. S. 1024 In that event the erroneous instruction is simply superfluous: in jury found, words, Winship’s fact “every neces sary” to establish every element of the offense beyond a rea sonable doubt. Johnson, See Connecticut v. supra, at 97 J., Jeffries & dissenting); Stephan, Defenses, Pre (Powell, sumptions, Burden of Proof in the Law, Criminal 88 Yale (1979). 1325, L. J. 1388,

No one doubts that the trial court properly could have in- structed the that it could malice from respondent’s infer Franklin, conduct. See Francis v. supra, 314-315; Ul- ster Allen, Court v. County U.

Indeed, the many cases where is there no direct evidence intent, that is exactly how intent is established.9 pur- For poses of this it deciding case, enough that recognize some cases inference is overpowering. See Hopper Evans, 456 U. at 613.10 S., It would further neither justice (CA11 1985)

9 SeeBrooks Kemp, (Kravitch, 762 F. 2d J., concurring dissenting) juries (emphasizing that are free to infer intent conduct). from Evans, In Hopper v. constitutionally we held that States are not re juries quired to instruct about lesser included offenses where such instruc tions are not warranted the evidence. The defendant that case claimed that trial court should have instructed the as to uninten during robbery. tional homicide the commission of a We concluded: extraordinary perversion “It would be say law that intent to kill is felon, not established engaged robbery, when an armed admits shooting only his victim in the back .... supported evidence not respondent claim victim, affirmatively to kill the intended but ne- gated any claim did kill that he not intend to An instruction on victim. killing during the offense of unintentional robbery was therefore not (citation omitted). S., warranted.” Hopper suggests, defy As it would common sense to conclude that an execution-style killing aor violent was committed uninten- torture-murder tionally. Johnson, See Connecticut v. n. (Powell, purposes rule to reverse convic- of the Sandstrom nor Chapman’s accordingly We hold in such a case.11 tion applies this one.12 in cases such as standard *11 rely an erro- jury no would need to on dissenting). It that rational follows Id., at and malice such cases. presumption instruction to find neous 5.n. Court, wrong dissent, and answers the not the “asks We think the J.). Post, agree We Blackmun, (opinion at 596 of in this case. question” innocence, according to the standard guilt of or determination that the jury than by Winship progeny, is for the rather proof required and its of analysis a dif at addresses post, See 593. Harmless-error the court. that, theory, be about a trial error question: what is to done ferent case, prac jury but in may on which the decided have altered basis applies question This clearly no effect on the outcome? tice had may violations, errors that have affected merely but to other to Sandstrom it considered —includ jury heard or the record the instructions the either evidence, or com admission of unconstitutional ing errors as mistaken such silence, limitation of a defendant’s or erroneous ment on a defendant’s prosecution All of these errors alter the of a witness. cross-examination innocence, guilt or jury the defendant’s under which the considered terms having theoretically impair interest in a all the defendant’s and therefore argument Amendment his case. The dissent’s Sixth jury decide —that impact a trial error the out reviewing a court to decide the of on forbids such immune come, post, logically implies at that all errors are 593-594— analysis. repeatedly held to the Yet this Court from harmless-error (1986) (limita Arsdall, contrary. g., 475 U. S. 673 E. Delaware v. Van cross-examination); Hasting, United 461 U. S. tion on defendant’s States (improper testify); failure to Moore comment on defendant’s (1977) (admission Illinois, improperly witness obtained identification). Indeed, California, U. Chapman v. S. 18 cases, analysis an error beginning applied harmless-error of this line Id., jury. (finding placed improper argument before the at 24-25 that harmful). Evans, 456 Hopper See also comment on defendant’s silence S., finding instructions (citing Chapman, error harmless). dissent, decisions, support strongly ignored These analysis in error. application of the context of Sandstrom jury’s respondent to convict The dissent contends that the decision only “aptly why harmless- premeditated illustrate^] murder one count of Post, at inappropriate” in intent is at issue. analysis error is cases where J.). The argument This without merit. (opinion of is Blackmun, respondent guilty beyond a doubt reasonable determined

I—I H-t1—4 Although Appeals acknowledged the Court of that Sand- might strom error some cases harmless, its square Chapman. of the issue cannot with The court con- cluded Sandstrom error could never be harmless App. where defendant contests intent. to Pet. for Cert. A-5. But our harmless-error cases do not turn on whether the defendant conceded the factual issue on which the error “Chapman Rather, bore. we have held that mandates con- prior reversing sideration the entire record a convic- tion for constitutional errors be harmless.” United Hasting, States v. S., [is]

whether, “on the whole . . . record . error . . harm- Id., less a reasonable doubt.” at 510. See also (“[BJefore Chapman, 386 U. federal constitutional *12 error can harmless, be held court must be the able to declare beyond doubt”); a belief that it was harmless a reasonable Johnson, Connecticut v. (Powell, (in dissenting) inquiry error, cases of “the Sandstrom is dispositive the whether viewing evidence was so of intent that a re- say beyond court can a reasonable doubt that the jury unnecessary rely presump- would have found it tion”). respondent Thus, denied the fact that that he had “intend[ing] Joy purpose.” to take the life” of “with cool App. Faulk (trial charge defining premeditation). jury court’s The then determined respondent malicious, guilty premeditated, was but not murder Browning. only of Charles The alleged error these instructions was the malice presume trial court’s instruction that could killing. from a (and dissent’s) Respondent’s theory proper is that a instruction on the proof neither malice nor might burden of on malice led to find have argument premeditation killing. implausible Faulk’s is This on its face.

We leave the the error this case was harmless beyond Appeals a reasonable doubt to the on Court remand. We do suggest killings way different for the two sup- verdicts no Sandstrom port respondent’s contention that error in this case prejudicial. any App. injury 186, does not another,” do

“an intent to question. dispose the harmless-error authority” “plainly Although to decide have the we particular a constitutional case, of a on the facts whether, Chapman “do standard, we so harmless under error was supra, Hasting, The sparingly.” at 510. United States Chapman yet applied Appeals to the facts of has not Court for determina- remand to that court therefore this case. We case was harm- error committed this tion whether doubt.13 a reasonable less

IV Appeals judgment vacated, and the of the Court proceedings for further consistent with remanded case is opinion.

It is so ordered. Burger, concurring. Chief Justice although join opinion, I no need for re- I see the Court’s analysis. application manding for of harmless-error respondent stalked The evidence in this case showed trapping by After the vic- car for about an hour. the victims driveway, private respondent fired four shots truck in a tims’ young girls, point-blank range killing victims. Two both slaying. aged in the truck and witnessed the 3 arid were murder, victims. After the Their mother was one of the police respondent apprehended left the scene but was *13 my high-speed view, In such evidence over- after a chase. whelmingly respondent with demonstrates that acted malice. scope parties disagree to the relevant evidence that must The as Chapman. particular, petitioner argues In that evi under be assessed day murders, amnesia, respondent’s drunkenness on the dence of Respondent disagrees. are, These insanity is irrelevant malice. instance, course, in the and we need not issues of Tennessee law first whether, express any assuming them here. Nor do we view to resolve malice, in this case in is relevant to the error was all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. nevertheless harmless concurring judgment. Stevens, Justice in the correctly The Court concludes that the harmless-error Chapman (1967), ap- standard of California, 386 U. S. 18 plies to the erroneous instructions in this I case. do not agree, regarding however, with the Court’s dictum the na- analysis. ture of harmless-error According toCourt, “if the defendant had counsel and I impartial adjudicator, strong pre- was tried there is a sumption any may other errors that have occurred are subject analysis.” Ante, at 579. This sharp analysis statement stands in contrast with the Court’s Chapman itself. principal question presented Chapman was “whether there can ever be harmless constitutional error,” questioning at 20. S.,U. Without the view that con- always sufficiently pre- stitutional error is serious to create a sumption in favor of reversal, Court refused “to hold that regardless all federal constitutional errors, of the facts and always circumstances, must Id., be deemed harmful.” at 21. announcing any general principle Far from that harmless- exception, error is the rule rather than the the Court holding language: stated its in this “We conclude that there setting be some constitutional errors which of a particular unimportant insignificant they case are so may, consistent with the Constitution, Federal be deemed requiring harmless, not the automatic reversal of the convic- Id., at 22. tion.” opinion, emphasized

Thereafter its the Court that the showing burden of that constitutional error is harmless is showing ordinary heavier than burden of trial error original is harmless. The Court noted that “the common-law put beneficiary harmless error rule the burden on the prove injury error either to that there no or to suffer a *14 judgment.” erroneously Id., at 24. obtained of his reversal its rule reference to its constitutional It then fashioned Fahy Connecticut, decision earlier stating: any, statement if difference between our little,

“There is Fahy there is a reason- about 'whether v. Connecticut complained might possibility that the evidence able requiring the to the conviction’ and contributed have beneficiary beyond prove a error of a constitutional complained of did not error doubt reasonable We, do therefore, obtained. verdict contribute meaning Fahy of our case than adhere to the no more do, a federal con- hold, as we now that before when we harmless, the court must be error can be held stitutional it a rea- a belief that was harmless able to declare ordinarily appellate courts do not While sonable doubt. original applying a is fa- test, such it task have adoption its courts, all and we believe miliar standard to although provide standard, achiev- a more workable will Fahy ing in our result as that aimed at case.” the same presumption creating broad, new favor than Rather merely rejected analysis, Chapman then, harmless-error always impermissible notion that such determining rigorous for standard articulated a presumptively prejudicial be deemed could, fact, error harmless.

( hH >— about the “rule of harmless-error The Court’s statement adequate neither an ex- it, the reasons for review, and judgment planation nor a sound about current case law our jurisprudence should be. harmless-error what inquiry recognizes, remains the Court As inappropriate matter constitutional violations no for certain *15 strong guilt may

how the evidence of Ante, be. 577-578. Chapman, sug- See also 386 U. S., 23, n. 8. The Court gests inapplicability that the of harmless error viola- to these reliability accuracy, tions rests on concerns about and only that such concerns are the relevant in de- consideration termining applicability of harmless error. Ante, at 579. In rights fact, however, violations of certain constitutional subject analysis not, are and should not be, to harmless-error rights protect important because those values that are unre- truth-seeking lated of the function trial. Thus, racial grand juries in discrimination the selection of is intolerable guilt if subsequently even the defendant’s established in a petit fair trial.1 Racial in discrimination the selection of a jury may require any inquiry a new trial without into the ac- impact practice.2 tual of the forbidden The admission of a (1986) Vasquez (“[Ijntentional v. Hillery, 1 See dis crimination of grand jurors grave selection is a constitutional tres only pass, possible authority, under color wholly of state within the power prevent. Thus, remedy the State to we have embraced for century only over a remedy effective for violation —is dispro not —the deter”). portionate to the evil that Vasquez, it seeks to In the Court ex rejected plicitly suggestion grand jury dissent’s discrimination subject should to harmless-error general principle because of a that “a conviction should be reversed for constitutional error where Id., prosecution.” the error did not affect the outcome (Powell, dissenting). Mitchell, also See Rose 443 U. S. 545 (“If (1986) Kentucky, See Batson v. 476 U. S. the trial court establish, prima facie, decides that the facts purposeful discrimination and prosecutor does not come explanation forward with neutral for his reversed”). action, our precedents require petitioner’s conviction be Murray, also Turner v. (plurality opinion) See (“The inadequacy possibility of voir dire prejudice] [about the of racial requires petitioner’s this case death sentence be vacated. . . . Our judgment unacceptable preju this case is that was án there risk of racial infecting capital sentencing Turner, proceeding”). dice In the Court explicitly rejected suggestion the dissent’s that the death sentence should jury prejudice no stand because actual was evident from the record. See though the be harmless even can never coerced confession completely process evi- fair and the trial was otherwise basic overwhelming.3 re- guilt short, In as the Court dence cently emphasized, justice and our criminal Constitution,

our reliability system, protect besides the other values guilt A harmless- coherent innocence determination.4 or similarly respect jurisprudence those values. should error inadequate respect giving to constitutional In addition presumption reliability, adopting a broad values besides *16 impact ad on the error also has a corrosive of harmless favor application justice. An automatic ministration of criminal for error after case, in case after review prosecutors only encourage the in to subordinate error, can id., (Powell, (“Nothing suggests in this record dissenting) 47 at deliberations”). any jurors’ played role in the racial bias 3 (1958) (“[TJhis Arkansas, S. 568 Court has Payne v. 356 U. See evidence, may uniformly though have been sufficient that even there held confession, conviction, support judgment a to apart from the coerced evidence, objection, the coerced confession vitiates the in over admission the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth because it violates judgment Payne Amendment”); (citing U. as “coerced Chapman, 386 may not be example of constitutional error confession” case and harmless). Fenton, S. Miller v. deemed See also (“This interrogation techniques, in long held that certain either Court has particular unique suspect, of a applied as characteristics isolation or to system justice they con must be are so offensive to civilized Amendment”). of the Fourteenth the Due Process Clause demned under ante, (“By Hardy, serving a criminal defendant’s Allen v. See may in Batson procedures, the rule have interest in neutral selection truthfinding deci bearing function of a criminal trial. But the some holding Our ensures that States do not serves other values well. sion judgment in against summoned to sit against citizens who are discriminate public in the strengthens race and confidence ad a member of their own Batson, therefore, designed in justice. The rule ministration of ends,’ impact on multiple only first which have some ‘serve (“The Illinois, ante, privilege against self- truthfinding”); Allen v. designed enjoined by Amendment is not to enhance the Fifth incrimination determination; it reliability factfinding stands the Constitution reasons”). independent entirely for respecting ever-present terest the Constitution to the always powerful obtaining interest in conviction particular particularly striking compare case.5 It is apparent willingness forgive Court’s constitutional errors prosecutor’s that redound to the benefit with the Court’s give determination to conclusive effect to trivial errors that ability obstruct a defendant’s to raise meritorious constitu arguments.6 tional proper respect range

Both a for a of constitutional values approach and the interest in an evenhanded to the adminis- justice tration of convince me that the Court’s dictum about a sweeping presumption in favor of harmless-error review is only unnecessary, but also unsound.

I—I HHI—I particular primary In this case, however, the constitutional protected by holdings value our Montana, Sandstrom v. (1979), and Francis Franklin, is an accurate determination of the defendant’s guilt my opinion, or innocence. In this is also not the kind of inherently imprecise error with such an effect that harmless- inquiry error is ill advised.7 It follows that the Federal *17 Constitution does not command a rule of reversal, automatic Appeals and that the Court of should review the entire rec- 5 Jackson, (CA7 1970) 1368, (Clark, Cf. United States v. 429 F. 2d (‘“Harmless J., sitting by designation) swarming error’ is 7th around the stung, suggested Circuit like bees. Before someone is it pros that the police obey ecutors enforce Miranda to the letter and the it with like dili gence; otherwise the presently alarming courts have to act to correct a situation”). Lane, 438, 450-451, See also United States v. 474 U. S. nn. 13 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting criticizing authorities impact expansive the of the Court’s recent jurisprudence). harmless-error (1986). See, g., Murray, e. Smith v. 477 U. S. 527 Arkansas, Holloway (1978) (harmless-error 475, 7 Cf. v. 435 U. S. analysis inappropriate assessing repre in joint the constitutional error of part inquiry requires sentation in such an “‘unguided specula because Lane, J., tion’”); United States 474, (Stevens, and n. 16 dissenting). it to declare a

ord to determine whether is able belief error was harmless a reasonable the constitutional doubt.8

Accordingly, judgment. I concur Blackmun, with Justice Brennan and Justice whom join, dissenting. Marshall Justice Stanley deprived rights: right guar- Clark of two was by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend- anteed prove beyond compel to to the State Tennessee rea- ment every element of crimes with he was doubt which sonable charged, right guaranteed by and the the Sixth Amendment jury peers had have a of his determine whether State Today, entirely met that burden. Court focuses on the right disregards totally reviewing A the latter. former support that the record would a conviction court’s conclusion bearing jury by properly has no instructed right a defendant was denied the to have the actually him tried make that determination. “To con- process [defendants are] law, form to due entitled to have validity appraised on their convictions consideration case ... as the issues were the trial court.” determined Arkansas, A trial that Cole fundamentally place, it took because was unfair the time constitutionally compelled perform its re- fundamentally quired role, cannot be rendered fair retro- spect nothing appellate what than re- amounts more sufficiency I of the therefore dissent view evidence. holding from the Court’s should applied. 8 State, course, apply free A remains not to harmless-error review protections. Ars of state constitutional See Delaware v. Van a matter dall, J., dissenting); 475 U. S. Connecticut (1986) (Stevens, Johnson, judgment). (Stevens, concurring 460 U. *18 with Appeals the Court of for the Sixth Circuit more familiar Because the are, appropriate law than we it is for court to consider Tennessee subject. Tennessee on this state of law Stanley Clark charges first-degree was indicted on I Joy Browning. pleaded

murder of Faulk and Charles He guilty charges. every to both At trial, Clark contested ele- argued ment of the crime. He that he had not committed the killings, any that he could not recall, due to amnesia, event killings, alternatively, connected with the and, that he was incapable forming any culpable intent due to mental illness opening and intoxication. Defense counsel’s statement and testimony psychiatric experts persons close to put possessed requisite Clark whether Clark directly jury. mental state before the jury At the close of trial, court instructed the that mal- any injury necessary ice, “an intent to do another,” was a second-degree App. element of first- as well as murder. jury, 186. The trial court then instructed the which for days testimony raising three had heard doubts about Clark’s capacity requisite to form the intent, that “if the State has proven beyond killing a reasonable doubt that a occurred, presumed killing maliciously. then it is that the was done presumption may But this Id., be rebutted . . . .” at 187.1 jury voluntary The trial court went on to instruct the manslaughter killing is a Id., without malice. at Appeals

The District found, Court and the Court for the agreed, Sixth Circuit that the instructions were con- stitutionally infirm under Montana, Sandstrom v. S.U. (1979).2 App. to Pet. for Cert. A-l, A-7. The sole 1 The trial wording pre court’s of the definition of malice and of sumption first-degree of malice for murder slightly differed that it from gave second-degree murder, presented for in the text. Because these dif immaterial, ferences are the courts below treated the if instructions as identical, they App. A-10, were A-12, see to Pet. for Cert. as does the majority. Sandstrom, mandatory Under both conclusive presumptions, which presumed remove the element from the case once proved the State has predicate fact, mandatory presumptions, rebuttable require which presumed to find the element unless the pre- defendant rebuts *19 question error can ever be the Court is whether such before Sandstrom, the Court held ante, at 576. In See harmless. question burden-shifting jury in- instructions on the process re- the due here, violate tent, like the instructions Winship, recognized quirement in In re 397 U. S. only proved if the has valid State

that a conviction is every the crime. element of a reasonable doubt majority was clear con- assumes, there Thus, as the at 521. ante, 576, 5, see at n. and trial, in Clark’s stitutional error only whether that error was the Court is before harmless.

II recogni rule stems from this Court’s The harmless-error sufficiently tangential to the trial errors are tion that some fairly may Chapman they process overlooked. trial (1967). But the Court also 18, 386 U. S. v. California, recognized errors of a class of constitutional the existence fundamentally “necessarily ante, unfair,” render a trial analysis. to harmless-error thus are not amenable at and according majority, “pre analysis,” to the “Harmless-error supposes represented by defendant, trial, at which argument may present im before an evidence counsel, judge jury.” partial Ante, errors that Thus, at 578. process” deny can “never be “the basic trial a defendant archetypal examples n. 6. The Ante, harmless.” right to counsel and trial before acts are denial of such Wainwright, judge. ante, v. 577-578; Gideon biased See (1927). (1963); Tumey Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 372 U. S. examples share is that effective feature these The salient judge play impartial central roles and an defense counsel process. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amend trial the basic entity. equally clearly central as an ments establish today opinion fails to ante, at 578. What Court’s Cf. Montana, See Sandstrom sumption, are unconstitutional. Franklin, 307, 314, Francis (1979); type. latter This case involves the

comprehend is that the instruction case interfered fundamentally jury’s performance so with the of its constitu- tionally analytically role that the mandated error involved is indistinguishable inappro- from those errors Court finds priate analysis. for harmless-error *20 protect primarily by

The chose defendants, Framers to regulating by the of law, substance the criminal but estab lishing procedures certain trial be in a to followed criminal case. See The Thumb on Underwood, the Scale of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Cases, Criminal 86 Yale L. 1299, J. (1977). jury’s obligation 1317-1318 central under the Due Process is to determine Clause whether the State has proved beyond charged each element of the offense a reason supra; Montana, able doubt. Sandstrom v. re See In Win ship, supra. assigns “solely The Constitution this function jury.” duty Sandstrom, to the atS.,U. 523. This can County Allen, not be interfered Ulster with, see Court v. (1979) delegated dissenting), 140, 169 J., nor (Powell, entity. “Findings by judge to another a made cannot cure jury’s finding guilt deficiencies the to the or of innocence resulting a defendant from the to it court’s failure instruct to Johnson, find an element of the crime. Connecticut See v. dissenting).” 73, 95, 460 U. S. and n. 3 J., (Powell, (1986); Bullock, v. Cabana 384-385 see also Arkansas, S., Cole U. at 202. The Constitution does appellate arrogate not allow an itself court to a function defendant, that the the Amendment, under Sixth can demand performed jury. be a jury constitutionally

A a that receives burden- flawed, shifting instruction on intent directed to a is, effect, return against Johnson, verdict the defendant. Connecticut v. (plurality jury pri- opinion). S., at 84 U. Because is a “ mary judge prohibited entering fact, finder of ‘a trial is from judgment directing jury a of or for- conviction to come regardless with ward such . . how verdict. overwhelm- ” ingly quot- may point Ibid., evidence that direction.’ Supply Co., 430 U. S. ing Linen v. Martin States United invites the instruction The erroneous responsibility to decide for jury constitutional its to abdicate every proved the of element of whether State itself jury likely doubt. It reasonable fense to be accept is no reason “there invitation because will deliberately more undertaken the have would lieve evaluating when of intent, the evidence task” of difficult rely presumption, simply opportunity Sand on a fered Johnson, 460 Connecticut S., 13; at strom, U. (plurality opinion). contests a defendant When S.,U. capable rarely reviewing court will intent, the issue deciding the verdict: it the error contributed ques way knowing how the treated have no will Sandstrom, 526; Ulster S.,U. intent. See tion of County Allen, 442 at 175-176 Court (Powell, dissenting).3 *21 why aptly in this case illustrate reached

The verdicts inappropriate in cases where a is mens rea. was Clark contests the element defendant people, first-degree charged who murders of two with the they together killed. The State were in a truck when were prove Faulk as to that Clark killed same evidence to used the Browning. jury prove found Clark Yet the that he killed first-degree guilty and the second- murder of Faulk jury Browning. degree the reached distinct That murder of closely question focused shows that it verdicts culpability, precise issue on which the the mental Clark’s charge. constitutionally gave A review- defective court the jury ing simply fact cannot determine whether court certainly possible It is that instruction. relied on the flawed jury perhaps intent to convict the did not find sufficient it did: intent, course, an Where, a defendant has conceded the use of erro may superfluous, “reviewing a court to intent presumption neous play any jury’s role in the that a error did not can be confident Sandstrom Johnson, S., (plurality opinion). 460 U. Connecticut v. verdict.” See second-degree presumption Clark of murder, and for the but manslaugh- voluntary of malice would have convicted him of required. for ter, which malice was not no value to It is of point any presented to evidence at trial intent; of Clark’s presumption “[a]n disputed erroneous on a the element of crime renders irrelevant the evidence on the issue because jury upon presumption have relied rather than upon that Johnson, evidence.” Connecticut v. 460 U. atS., (plurality opinion). ordinary jury The view is that a ad- Randolph, heres to instructions, Parker v. (1979)(plurality opinion), is no to there reason believe jury “lay enough disregard judge’s that the will know misguides if bad law in fact he them.” Bollenbach v. United States, jury “[w]hen presume

It is true mal- instructed to predicate ice from facts, it still find must the existence those facts Ante, reasonable doubt.” at 580. But point only truism is beside the fact here, where the jury required presump- trigger find order to killing App. tion was that “a has occurred.” The presume qua was instructed criminal non intent, the sine responsibility, body. of criminal from the of a fact dead jury may body, have found fact that there was a but this Winship’s requirement finding, has not met In re be- yond “every necessary doubt, reasonable fact to constitute jury may crime,” at 364:this have never found that Clark acted malice, with essential element of the crimes of which he was convicted. *22 HH

I—IHH recognized years ago The Court a reviewing guilt may spelt court must ask “is not whether by jury guilt of a record, out but whether has found a been according procedures required by and standards” States, Constitution. Bollenbach United properly 614. When has not instructed concern- been charged, ing an element of the offense that been essential has danger deprived exists that the defendant has been right jury- his and Fourteenth Amendment to have the Sixth proved has each element of the determine whether State beyond a offense reasonable doubt. Faced with incorrect general guilty, reviewing verdict of instruction and court simply any adequate deciding lacks basis for whether the performed constitutionally required its function. today I Because the Court asks and answers the believe wrong question, I dissent.