*1 PAPASAN, EDUCATION, SUPERINTENDENT OF v. ALLAIN, GOVERNOR OF

et al.

MISSISSIPPI, et al. Argued April July 85-499. No. 1986 Decided *3 White, J., opinion Court, O’Connor, J., delivered the of the in which joined; in I Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Parts and III of which and Stevens, JJ., joined; Burger, J., in II and Part of which Powell C. and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., and opinion concurring filed an in part, concurring judgment part, in in dissenting part, the and in in which Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, JJ., joined, and post, p. 292. Black- mun, J., opinion filed an concurring part dissenting part, in in post, and Powell, J., p. opinion 293. an concurring part dissenting filed part, Burger, J., Rehnquist, J., joined, p. which C. post, 295. argued petitioners.

T. H. Freeland III the cause for With him on the briefs were T. H. Freeland IV and Orma R. Smith, Jr. Lloyd Attorney Arnold,

R. Assistant of General Mis- sissippi, argued respondents. the cause for himWith on respondents Lloyd the Allain brief et al. were Edwin Attorney pro Pittman, General, se, E. Sanders, and Robert Special Attorney Slaughter- Assistant General. Constance Harvey respondents Molpus a filed brief for et al.

Justice White delivered the of the Court. opinion In case, this we consider the claims of school officials and Mississippi they in 23 schoolchildren northern counties that 268 public being unlawfully denied the economic benefits

are granted to of Mis- the United States the State schoollands ago. years Specifically, sissippi we must de- 100 well over are barred the Elev- what extent these claims termine to respect are to those claims that and, Amendment with enth any, complaint is the sufficient barred, if whether not a claim. to dismiss for failure state motion withstand r—i public history lands the United States school years.1 200 Even before ratification back over stretches Congress initi- of the Confederation Constitution, Territory2 regard practice with Northwest ated public that eventu- followedwith most other lands which was par- ally to the Union. In and were admitted became States provided for the ticular, Land Ordinance which Territory, survey “reserved the lot and sale of the Northwest every public township, for the maintenance of 16, of No. township. of United the said ...” Laws schoolswithin (1815).3 portion when the eastern States us on a motion to dismiss under Federal Although this case comes to 12(b), precluded are not in our review of the Procedure we Rule Civil record, taking complaint notice of items such docu grants. lands history of the and other school mentation of the comprise large part allega recited here factual The historical facts disputed by parties; parties complaint and are not dis tions of the legal significance of these facts. agree only on the *4 Territory, by of obtained the United States virtue The Northwest States, original 13 included the of western land claims the cessions Canada, River, of of north of the Ohio east the land south Gates, River, History original the P. of Public Land and west of States. (1968). Development 72 Law 3 practice land-surveying also a The Land Ordinance of 1785 initiated Territory applied to applied the but that was was first to Northwest acquired the thereafter: all territories United States Pennsylvania border, River a point where the Ohio crosses “At run a principal line —a meridian —was to be and base line west- north-south surveyed; parallel longi- lines of geographer’s line —was to be ward —the surveyed, apart, making 6 for were be each to be miles tude and latitude to

269 Territory of Ohio, what is now the State became Northwest previously Congress granted re- the lands that had been Ohio public for use schools the 1785 of served under Ordinance 2 175.4 the State. Stat. example reserving Following for of lands the Ohio “ ‘grants public for com of were made schools, maintenance public-land purposes admit to each of the States mon school years 1846the of 1802 and ted to the Union. Between every grants sixteen, and, thereafter, of sec of section were thirty-six. instances, In some additional tions sixteen granted.’” 446 U. Utah, Andrus v. S. have been sections (1980)(quoting v. Morrison, United States 506-507, n. 7 500, omitted)). (1916) (footnotes Thus, the 192, 240 U. S. 198 respect example all followed with but has been basic Ohio at 522- S., admitted then. 446 U. a of the States since few dissenting). school J., 4 addition n. 523, (Powell, provision Congress designated manner, in this made lands townships pertinent or sections were not in which the section gener Congress Thus, reason or another. available for one missing designated ally sections, for the indemnified States equal allowing to and lands an amount States select g., designated See, e. but unavailable lands. in lieu of the (1826). generally Utah, Andrus v. 83, 4 See ch. Stat. supra, supra, 200-202. Morrison, at 507-508; at 23,040 township Each was to be square or acres. . . . townships miles of Id., at 65. containing mile 640 acres.” square divided into lots one “section,” a so the section 1-square-mile lots was called Each of these schools, was the “Sixteenth Section.” reserved for the numbered unclear, practice but it are somewhat precise for this reasons practice of encour likely they were a combination of an overall seems disposition education, congressional desire to accelerate a aging put public- policy trying to higher price, a and a at western lands original par States terms sort with the on some lands States States, land, portion new large was federal property since taxable Utah, 500, 522, generally Andrus 446 U. S. by them. See not taxable 288-289; supra n. Gates, (1980) J., dissenting); (Powell, P. Land Policies 309-311 Hibbard, History A of the Public B. *5 270

Although pattern grants gen- the basic of school lands was erally consistent from State to State in terms of the reserva- grant specific provisions tion and of the lands, of the grants generally varied State and over time. See B. Hib- (1939). History A bard, of the Public Land Policies 314-318 example, in For Indiana Alabama, the school lands were expressly granted townships to the inhabitants of the di- (1816) rectly. (1819) (Indiana); See 3 Stat. 290 3 Stat. 491 (Alabama).5 grants In most of the other before 1845, the given explic- schoollands were instead to the States but were itly designated townships to be for the use of the in which (1803) they lay. g., e. 2 (Mississippi); See, Stat. 233-234 (1817) (1836) (same); (Arkansas). 3 Stat. 375 58 Stat. The Michigangrant simply in 1836,on the other hand, was “to the State for the use of schools.” 5See Stat. 59. After 1845, type grant Michigan, granting used in the lands to the generally, State for the use of its schools became the norm. (1846) g., (1859) (Wisconsin); e. See, (Oregon). Finally, 9 Stat. 58 11 Stat. 383 grants phrased the most recent are not outright gifts specific as to the States for a use but instead express grants as trusts. These also are stated to be to the support gen- States of the schools those States erally. though, grants In addition, under these the State specifically designated is explicit a trustee, there are re- management disposition strictions on the lands expressly trust, and the Federal Government retains an on- going oversight (1910) responsibility. g., e. See, 36 Stat. 574 (Arizona Mexico). and New history grants Mississippi gener- the school lands

ally pattern Congress follows the thus described. Mississippi Territory, created the which included what is now about the southern third of the States of and Ala- Alabama, however, At least in grant this technical of the lands to the inhabitants of township apparently each interpreted vesting legal was g., e. See, title in the Schmidt, Alabama State itself. 232 U. S. *6 Congress provided In sale 180.3, 1 549.

bama. Stat. Mississippi Territory survey Indian lands to which of all and excepted extinguished number but “the section had title been sup- township for the reserved each which shall be sixteen, port 2 In 1804, Stat. 233-234. of schoolswithin same.” Territory Mississippi to the was extended northward years boundary 2 305. of Tennessee. Stat. Two southern Congress in lieu of un- the selection of lands authorized later, Territory. 2 401 Stat. available Sixteenth Sections (1806). Eventually, in was admitted as a 1817, survey provided Land Act for the and a further Sales State, part of the new in the northern State and sale of those lands by the 1803 Act. The 1817 Act covered that had not been “surveyed provided to be and divided these lands were that surveying by provided law for the of the other in the manner Mississippi territory”; public in the of the United States lands required 16 in “the section No. each town- thus, the Act support ship of schools therein.” for the . . be reserved . shall (1817). lands and lands se- Section 375 Sixteenth 3 Stat. Mississippi. granted to the State of in lieu thereof were lected 51 So. 2d 203 129, 137, 201, 211 State, Lambert v. Miss. See (1951). apply

By these Acts did not however, terms, their own by Mississippi that were held in northern the lands essentially comprising an area Nation, Indian Chickasaw This 23 counties State. northern came to be the what 1832, when it until was held Chickasaws land was Treaty of Pontitoc Creek. States ceded to the United Treaty provided Although that the land 381. 7 Stat. surveyed same manner and on the “in the and sold would be id., other lands,” as the terms and conditions same were lands reserved sale. Section 382, no Sixteenth 464, City 31, 57, Miss. 87 So. Robertson, Corinth remedy Congress attempted this 1836, In 465-466 by providing reservation of lands lieu oversight for the vesting for the of the title lands the Sixteenth Section Mississippi, “in for the use of schools lands the State these Cession] [the 116. said State.” 5 Stat. within Chickasaw acres, Lands, 174,555 Cession Lieu some These Chickasaw App. given to the State. 36, were selected and by Congress, authority expressly given however, with (1852), legislature sold these lands the state Stat. App. approximately proceeds, $1,047,330, invested the Laws, railroads. 1856Miss. ch. 56. to the State’s 8% loans them, investment in unfortu- and the State’s These railroads subsequently destroyed during nately, the Civil War were *7 replaced. and never practice current circumstances, these historical the

From regard to lands has with Sixteenth Section directly. are law, lands, Under state these which evolved large part by apparently State, held in the “constitute still property of the schools held trust for the benefit §29-3-1(1) treated as such.” Miss. Code Ann. and must be (Supp. 1985). providing operation trusts, In for the of these legislature historical tie of these lands to has retained the townships particular in terms of both trust administration beneficiary delegated Thus, status. the State has through management property this to local school boards lands lie within a out the State: Where Sixteenth Section originally appropri Lieu Lands were schooldistrict or where township that lies within a school district, ated for a jurisdic of that district has “control and board of education arising any trust lands and of all funds tion of said school ” disposition thereof heretofore or hereafter made. Ibid. general respect, the board of education is “under the su this pervision Further, state land commissioner.” Ibid.6 of the prescriptions forth certain for has, statute, the State set management generally of these lands. See Miss. Code (1972 1985). §§ Supp. im Ann. 29-3-1 to 29-3-135 Most §7-11-4, 1, 1980, January Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. effective “secretary land commissioner” mean of state.” See note fol words “state 1985). § (Supp. lowing Miss. Code Ann. 29-3-1 purposes portant this is Miss. Code case, however, for § 1985), provides: (Supp. Ann. 29-3-109 which expendable from sixteenth section

“All funds derived to the school districts lieu lands shall be credited or may township in lands which such sixteenth section any sections lieu lands or to which sixteenth located, be may belong. except expended not be Such funds shall purpose children of for the of education educable they belong, or as otherwise the school district which may provided by law.” be

Consequently, proceeds and Lieu all from Sixteenth Section directly specifictownship in which Lands are allocated apply. With or to those lands lands are located which these respect counties, no lands to the to which Chickasaw Cession paid years belong, legislature has for over 100 the state now principal acquired from the sale those on the lost “interest” appropriations to the Chickasaw in the form of annual lands Originally, 8%, rate was but since 1890 schools. Cession §212. Const., Art. rate has been 6%. See Miss. App. 37. $62,191. until 1985was annual amount many years been a dual treatment has The result this disparity in from Sixteenth Section the level of school funds *8 schools as are to the Chickasaw Cession lands that available compared In in of the State. the remainder the schools legislative appropriation example, the Chick- for the 1984,for pupil average per in an resulted estimated Cession asaw appropri- substitute the Sixteenth Section income relative to average pupil. per in- Sixteenth Section The ation of $0.63 comparison, estimated to State, was in the rest of the come disparity per pupil. which Id., at It is this 44.7 be $75.34 present gave rise to action. the Appeals, the state 1985, pending in the Court of this case was In while ap Section providing for increased Sixteenth passed a statute

legislature Laws, Miss. House schools. 1985 for Cession propriations the Chickasaw appropriated statute, million to be this was $1 ch. 23. Under Bill No. by million each $1 to increase purpose and this amount was this petitioners, In 1981,the local school officialsand schoolchil- dren from the Cession, Chickasaw filed suit in the United Mississippi States District Court for the Northern District of against respondents, an assortment of state officials, challenging disparity in Sixteenth Section funds. The petitioners’ complaint history traced the school Mississippi, characterizing illegal lands several of the being actions that resulted in there now no Sixteenth Sec- particular, tion lands in the Chickasaw Cession area. petitioners asserted that the sale of the Chickasaw Cession proceeds schoollands and unwise investment of the from that abrogated obligation sale the 1850’shad the State’s trust hold those lands for the benefit of Chickasaw Cession school- perpetuity. children The result of actions, these said the petitioners, disparity support was the between the financial available to the Chickasaw Cession schools and other schools disparity allegedly deprived in the State, which in turn minimally adequate Chickasaw Cession schoolchildren of a equal protection level of education and of the of the laws. allegations, petitioners sought Based on these various regarding forms of relief for breach of the trust the Chicka- saw Cession equal Sixteenth Section lands and for denial of protection.8 Specifically, complaint sought a declaration year until it reached a maximum of year $5 million for the fiscal 1989-1990 so, and thereafter. Even offices of the State Auditor and Secretary of State estimated in 1984 that additional firnds of over $7 million required bring would be the Chickasaw funding Cession to the level of average Sixteenth funding Section in the rest of per- the State on a pupil App. basis. 38. complaint alleged also process, a denial of due unconstitutional im pairment of obligations, taking contractual just without compensation, and a Ninth Amendment claim. claims, Of these additional petitioners press only the contract-clause claim here. Since this claim in is all essen respects petitioners’ tial the same as the trust claim for Eleventh Amend purposes, ment infra, disposition claim, our of the trust 276-281, gov *9 erns this claim as well. implement legislation purporting the sale of

that the state unenforce- lands void and the Chickasaw Cession school was legislative by appropriation other- or establishment able; perpetual of a fund in a suitable amount to be held wise making plaintiffs; or in trust for the benefit the alternative plaintiffs Lieu Lands of the same value available to original Sixteenth Section lands. Chickasaw Cession holding complaint,

The District Court dismissed by by applicable of limitations and statute claims barred Constitution. Amendment to the United States the Eleventh Papasan Appeals affirmed, Fifth Circuit The Court of for the (1985),agreeing that the re- States, 756 2d 1087 United F. v. by requested complaint the Eleventh was barred lief Noting not dismiss that a federal court should Amendment. remedy complaint “seeks one because it a constitutional plainly appropriate Holt Civic one,” another rather than (1978), however, the Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. Club equal protection Appeals claim to assert deemed the Court disparate ongoing, of state funds distribution current, remedy support which would for schools, of local for so, it Even the Eleventh Amendment. not be barred complaint proper since such of the to be found dismissal funding under this was not unconstitutional differential Independent Dist. v. Antonio School decision San Court’s (1973).9 Rodriguez, 411 S. 1 U. (1985), granted and now va- 474 U. S. 1004 certiorari,

We Appeals remand judgment Court of cate proceedings. further various fed sought relief from complaint, petitioners also In their promise to fund the Chickasaw Cession officials, alleging breach of

eral wasting from the trust keep the State of and failure to trust by sovereign as barred these claims The District Court dismissed assets. appeal laches, petitioners’ immunity, of limitations. and the statutes Thus, no joint stipulation. is dismissed this dismissal was itself remain in the case. involving the federal defendants sues *10 276

II firstWe consider whether the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioners’ required complaint. claimsand dismissal ofthe

A provides: The Amendment power

“The Judicial of the United States shall not be any equity, suit in or construed to extend to law com- prosecuted against menced or one of the United States by by Subjects State, or Citizens another Citizens or any Foreign State.” language encompasses only expressly brought This against suits by State,

a State citizens of another but this Court long ago against held a that the Amendment bars suits State by citizens of that same State as well. Hans Louisi See v. (1890). “[I]n 134 U. S. 1 ana, absence of consent a suit agencies departments or which State one of its or is proscribed by named as defendant is the Eleventh Amend Hospital State and ment.” Pennhurst School v. Halderman, (1984).10 465 100 This 89, U. S. bar exists whether re legal equitable. sought lief is Id., or at 100-101. agencies depart-

Where the State itself or one of its or ments not is named defendant and where a state officialis instead, named the Eleventh suit Amendment status is straightforward. parte Young, (1908), less Ex 209 U. S. 123 enjoin held a suit as unconstitutional a state official’s by holding action not barred was Amendment. This was based a an on determination that unconstitutional state en- any is actment void and that state action a official that purportedly is authorized that enactment cannot be taken capacity in an official since the state authorization for such nullity. explained Young action As is the Court itself: Barnard, consent to be may A federal court. Clark State sued Here, however, U. S. it is clear has expressly declined Laws, such consent. See 1984 Miss. Gen. eh. §3(4). Attorney

“If act state seeks to which the General Constitution, be violation of the Federal enforce proceeding con- under such enactment comes into officer superior authority Constitution, of that flict with the representa- stripped official or he that case his is subjected person in his to the con- tive character is sequences his The State has no individual conduct. *11 immunity responsibility power impart any to him to authority supreme Id., at to of the United States.” 159-160. capacity, may although acting in official

Thus, official, his supra, at Pennhurst, 102, in federal court. See also be sued (1978). Finney, U. 692 Hutto v. 437 S. 105; Young, not from Eleventh Amend- however, does insulate challenge every suit in which a state official is the ment original In its rationale, accordance with named defendant. upon only underlying Young applies authorization where illegal. to official acts is asserted be See the named which (1982). Cory not And it does foreclose White, 457 U. S. challenge action the official Eleventh Amendment where an illegal alone. to as a matter state law See is asserted be supra, case, at a federal su- 104-106. such Pennhurst, acting implicated premacy is not because the state official is only. contrary law to state types formally of cases also described certain

We have acting requirements Young incon- a official of state meet the sistently far stretch that case too law but that with federal upset interests that it and state the balance of federal would Young's,applicability to has tailored conform been embodies. specific possible it precisely situations which as to those as “necessary permit to vindicate federal the federal courts is supreme responsible rights to ‘the au- hold officials state supra, thority Pennhurst, at 105 the United States.’” 160). Young Consequently, supra, Young, (quoting has at law a violation federal on cases in which focused been opposed ongoing in which fed- cases state officialis period eral law has been violated one time or over a of time past, against as on cases in as well which the relief directly the state official ends violation of federal law as opposed indirectly to cases which that relief is intended encourage compliance through with federal law deterrence or directly third-party compensation. to meet interests such as designed continuing As we have noted: “Remedies to end a necessary violation of federal law are to vindicate the federal assuring supremacy compen interest of that law. But satory or deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.” Green v. Mans our, (1985)(citation omitted). 474 U. S. compensate party injured

Relief that in essence serves to past by capac an action of a state officialin his official ity illegal that was under federal law is barred even when the state official is the named defendant.11 This is true if the expressly damages. g., (cid:127)relief is See, denominated as e. Ford Department Treasury Indiana, Motor Co. v. 323 U. S. It is also true if the relief is tantamount to an *12 damages past award of for a violation of federal law, even though styled something g., See, as else. e. Green v. Man supra, sour, at Edelman 69-70; Jordan, 415 651, U. S. (1974). directly 664-668 hand, the other relief that On serves bring present to an end to a violation of federal law is not by though accompa barred the Eleventh Amendment even by ancillary treasury. nied a substantial effect on the state Bradley, (1977); See Milliken v. 433 U. S. 267, 289-290 supra, Edelman, at 667-668. purposes, per

For Eleventh Amendment the line between prohibited “[T]he mitted and suits will often be indistinct: type difference between the of relief barred the Eleventh permitted parte Young Amendment and that Ex under will ” many day night. not in instances be that between and Edel supra, Compare, g., man, at Quern 667. e. v. Jordan, 440 11When a state official sued capacity, is and held liable his individual however, may damages Rhodes, even be awarded. See Scheuer v. 416 U. S. 237-238 (1979), supra. Mansour, with Green v. discern-

U. S. particular ing falls, case look on side of the line a we which sought, than to the form of the relief the substance rather to guided by g., supra, Edelman, and will be see, e. parte Young. policies underlying in Ex the decision B grants petitioners lands claimthat the federal school Mississippi perpetual trust, with the created a to the State Rely- schools. for the benefit trustee, State as ing Arizona, 424 U. Land Cattle Co. v. S. on Alamo & (1976), Highway ex rel. Arizona Lassen v. Arizona (1967), petitioners Dept., that contend 385 U. S. “[sjchool impose specific obligations burdens lands trusts officialswho act as trust- states, well as the state on the corpus, maximizing preserving in- ees, which include corpus wrongfully, is lost or converted and, where the come, indefinitely.” continuing payment appropriate income obligation that this last 13. The idea Brief for Petitioners any prior judicial gleaned construction not from exists is alleged grants federal common- but instead school lands petition- govern purportedly trusts. The such that law rules contending continuing obligation rely on this asserted ers remedy, permis- injunctive only prospective, they seek that requiring Young, parte officials meet state Ex sible under providing obligation continuing the Chicka- federal appropriate trust income. with saw Cession schools begin that the school lands it not at all clear with, To is binding respond- trust. The grants created given school lands were that the ents, fact, contend binding obliga- simple no federal absolute and in fee State *13 imposed. 168 Schmidt, v. 232 U. S. Alabama tion was See (1856).12 (1914); Cooper 173 even How. But Roberts, 18 authority trust, point petitioners the to no binding a Even if there was support of trusts their contention to lands relating specifically school though corpus even the trust pay income continues obligation to that the addition, 24-28. In even their Brief for Petitioners been lost. See has imposed be as a matter of common obligation should such an assertion that petitioners’ legal accepted, if characterization their the is trust claims are barred the The Eleventh Amendment. obligation continuing part a distinction between on the of the ongoing liability past trustee and an of for breach trust is essentially rejected a formal distinction of the sort we Appeals upheld There, Edelman. the Court of had an award “equitable against requiring of official, restitution” the state payment plaintiff the wrongfully to the class of “all AABD benefits 415 U. 656. S., found,

withheld.” We to the contrary, monetary the “retroactive award of . . relief. practical indistinguishable aspects many is effect from an damages against award the State.” 668. Id., at legal wrong The in that characterization case the the as continuing withholding very of accrued benefits is similar to petitioners’ legal wrong characterization of here as continuing obligation comply the breach of a to with the trust unsupported. may beneficiary It normally law is be true that a trust is not suing time barred from a for corpus trustee breach trust and loss of the expressly repudiates See, until such time g., trustee e. the trust. City, Benedict v. New York U. S. But this does not continuing mean that a obligation part there is affirmative on the respect corpus with to opposed merely trustee the trust and income as to liability past may upon. for a breach of trust that still be acted Restatement, example, adopt seems to the latter view: “If a trust is property exist, created the whole of the trust ceases to trustee longer anything no holds In trust. such a case the trustee is personal liability a beneficiary under to if he committed breach of causing allowing trust in property exist, or the trust to cease to or if he sold property himself, the trust to himself or lent being permitted trust funds to to do so terms the trust. such a case if the trustee should be beneficiary priority insolvent the is not general over the credi- entitled mean, however, tors of the This trustee. does not he owes no duties beneficiary except creditor, the duties which debtor to his owes or person wronged. a tortfeasor to fiduciary he has He is still in a rela- beneficiary. purchase tion to the properly He cannot the interest of the beneficiary making without full disclosure all circumstances known affecting transaction, him fair, and the transaction must or be the bene- (Second) ficiary 74,§ can set it c, aside.” Restatement of Trusts Comment (1959) (citations omitted). p. 194 *14 obligations. We discern no substantive difference between a liability not-yet-extinguished past for a breach trust and continuing obligation responsibilities meet trust as by petitioners. In the trustee is cases, serted both re corpus, quired, past loss the trust to use because of the its place corpus take the or the lost in own resources to corpus. petitioners Even if the here were come from only seeking payment equal of an amount to the income corpus,13 payment merely the lost such would be sub corpus is, for the return of the trust itself. That con stitute corpus tinuing payment of the income from the lost is essen tially equivalent in economic terms to a one-time restoration corpus award, the lost itself: It is substance the as con “ tinuing lump income rather than as a ‘an accrued sum, liability.’” monetary Bradley, Milliken v. 433 U. at 289 S., 664). (quoting we hold Edelman, S., Thus, U. rejected petitioners’ like claim we claim, trust may Edelman, not be sustained.

C Appeals petitioners’ that the held, however, The Court of equal protection claim was not barred the Eleventh complaint agree ruling. Amendment. We with asserted: depri-

“By past, present future their aforesaid and the Plaintiff class of the vations of and to Plaintiffs and ' Lands, and of their Sixteenth Section while use benefits granting securing time to and to all other at the same school children the State of Missis- school districts and sippi perpetuity the use and benefit of their Sixteenth deliberately, Defendants have Lands, the State Section design intentionally, purposefully, denied to with protection equal and the Plaintiff class the Plaintiffs 13 fact, sought merely such income but also restora petitioners not past received and in corpus the award of income not tion of the trust App. that income. 28-29. terest on rights their the Four-

the laws violation of secured teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United *15 App. 20. States.” petitioners alleged

The also that these same actions denied rights minimally adequate them “their to an interest a opportunity or reasonable education, therefor,” id., level assuring right at such to the other schoolchildren in 21, while complaint alleged present disparity the the a State. Thus of the from the the distribution benefits State’s Sixteenth lands. Section alleged ongoing unequal

This constitutional violation—the by distribution the State of the benefits of the State’s school precisely type continuing lands—is the violation for which remedy may permissibly Young. a be fashioned under It may disparity directly that the current results be the past subject petition- same actions in the that are the equal protection claims, ers’ trust but the essence of the alle- disparity gation present is the in the distribution of the bene- past and not the fits of state-held assets actions of the State. remedy disparity, remedy A to eliminate this current even a might require expenditure funds, the of state would en- “ ‘compliance in the sure with substantive federal- future ” question determination’ rather than an bestow award for ac- monetary liability. supra, (quoting Milliken, crued at 289 668). supra, Edelman, is, fact, This claim in in all essen- respects equal protection tial the same as claim for which approved Consequently, agree relief was Milliken. we Appeals that the Eleventh with Court Amendment necessary not relief to correct a would bar current violation Equal may Protection and that Clause this claim not properly be dismissed on this basis.14 respondents petitioners

14 The further contend that have not sued any grant requested, state officials who could the relief see Brief for Re note, however, spondents respondent 17-19. Allain et al. We is, statute, Secretary by responsible super “general of State state vision” of the administration the local school officials of the Sixteenth

283 (—Í HHI—I equal petitioners pro question remains whether although Amend claim, tection not barred Eleventh legally properly is insufficient and was dismissed for ment, 12(b)(6). Rule Proc. failure to state claim. See Fed. Civ. purposes this We are for the review take the bound allegations complaint well-pleaded true. factual County, (1977);Kugler Hel DeKalb 438 S. 25 v. Miree v. U. (1975); 232 Rhodes, S. 117 Scheuer v. U. S. U. fant, (1972); (1974); Toilet Beto, 405 U. Gardner v. Cruz S. (1957). Construing these facts Assn., 387 U. S. Goods light record and relevant facts obtained from the petitioners, ascertain whether most favorable we must granted. they a claim could state on which relief be *16 A upheld protection Rodriguez, against equal In the Court an financing public challenge system schools, Texas’ its under public from two which funds for the schools were derived Approximately came from main half the funds sources. Program, pro- a state the Texas MinimumFoundation School guaranteeing gram minimum edu- at a certain level of aimed S., at 9. Most cation for all children State. U. came from local sources—in of the remainder of funds particular property at 21. As a Id., taxes. n. result local system, specifically funding as a most result of this dual property taxes, amounts collected local differences expenditures disparities in interdistrict school “substantial varying throughout degrees [were] the State.” found ... Id., at 15. dispari examining equal protection these status of any scrutiny heightened apply to

ties, the Court declined §29-3-1(1) 1985). (Supp. Ann. Lieu See Code Section and Lands. Miss. Secretary acting in manner respondent of State is a To extent that the Clause, may enjoined such be Equal Protection actions that violates Young, 209 U. S. 123 parte under Ex suspect based either on wealth as a classification or on edu right. cation as fundamental As to the latter, Court recognized importance education but noted that among rights explicit protec “is education not afforded tion under our Id., Federal Constitution.” at 35. The possibility not, Court did foreclose the however, “that some quantum constitutionally pro identifiable of education is a prerequisite meaningful [the tected right to the exercise of either speak right vote].” Id., or the at 36.15 Given the opportunity, absence of such radical denial educational it financing was that the concluded State’s school scheme would relationship if be constitutional it bore “some rational to a legitimate purpose.” state at Id., 44.

Applying system standard, this the dual Texas was reasonably separate deemed structured to accommodate two forces:

“ ‘[T]he society desire members of to have educational opportunity family for all children, and the desire of each provide the best education it can afford for its own children.’ assuring every

“.. . While a basic education for child permits encourages large the State, it measure of participation in and control of each district’s schools at (quoting the local Id., level.” Coleman, J. Fore- 15Instead, the Court noted: *17 present have no

“[W]e indication that the expendi- levels of educational provide tures Texas an education hypothesized that falls short such [of a prerequisite]. appellees’ constitutional Whatever argument merit might financing system have if a State’s occasioned an absolute denial of educa- children, opportunities any tional of argument provides its that no basis finding for an rights only interference with fundamental where relative spending differences levels are involved and where —as is true in the present fairly charge system case—no could be pro- made that the fails to opportunity vide each child an acquire with the basic minimum skills necessary enjoyment rights speech for and participation of full political process.” S., 411 U. at 36-37. Strayer Haig, Financing The of Educa- R. to G. &

word (1923)). of New York vii tion in the State that the mere the Court concluded basis, Given this rational vary quality might “happenstance” that the of education varying property within values district to district because system as to “so irrational the districts did not render par- discriminatory.” invidiously at S., 411 U. 55. be “any taxation— that scheme local ticular, the Court found very governmental local existence of identifiable indeed jurisdictional requires bound- the establishment units — arbitrary.” inevitably at 53-54. Id., that are aries again years considered the later, the Court Almost equal protection administration of Texas status of the to the State’s decision time relation schools—this expend any of children funds on the education not to state “legally United not admitted” to the States. who were Plyler not, The Court did how- Doe, 457 U. S. approach measurably change in Rodri- articulated ever, right guez. education is not a fundamental It reiterated that suspect not a aliens were and concluded that undocumented it concluded Nevertheless, at 223-224. S., class. 457 U. justifications offered the discrimination that the “wholly light involved costs were insubstantial State Id., 230. State, and the Nation.” children, to these B simply complaint that the in this case asserted not right minimally petitioners to a ade- had denied their been right quate was fundamental also that such education but infringed right had State’s been that because scrutiny. App. strict be reviewed under here should action yet Plyler Rodriguez indicate, this Court has not 20. As minimally questions definitively ade- whether settled the right quate and whether a statute a fundamental education is infringe discriminatorily right be ac- alleged should equal protection heightened review. corded *18 require Nor does this case resolution these issues. Al- though purposes for the of this motion to dismiss we must allegations complaint all take the factual true, as we accept legal are not bound to true a conclusioncouched as a allegation. g., e. See, factual Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F. 2d (CA7 1981), grounds, 713, 723 aff’d on other U. S. 325 (1983). generally See 2A J. Lucas, Moore & J. Moore’sFed- p. petition- eral Practice ¶12.07, 12-64, and n. 6 The allegation funding disparities that, ers’ the reason of relat- ing they deprived lands, the Sixteenth Section been have minimally adequate just allegation. of a education is such an petitioners allege do not that schoolchildren the Chick- taught they asaw Counties are allege or write; not to read do not they that no receive instruction on even the educa- they allege support tional basics; no actual facts of their they deprived minimally assertion that been have ade- quate education. As see it, we we are not bound to credit may disregard allegation petitioners the that the have minimally adequate been denied a education.

Concentrating disparities on instead terms Six- complaint teenth Section lands benefits that fact al- leged and that are documented record, we are persuaded Appeals properly that the Court of determined Rodriguez applicable dictates standard of review. alleged equal The differential treatment here constitutes an protection only rationally if violation it not is related legitimate state interest.

Applying Appeals test, this Court of that, concluded petitioners’ historical aside, roots the essence of the claim Mississippi’ssystem financing public an was attack on edu- inevitability disparities cation. And it reasoned managed in income derived from real estate administered locally, Rodriguez, supplied dispari- as in a rationale alleged. begin disagree with, ties To we with Court of Appeals’ apparent understanding petition- of the crux of the complaint, petitioners ers’ claim. As read their we do *19 pub- organization Mississippi challenge of the the overall not challenge financing program. is re- Instead, their lic school aspect program: The that Section stricted to one of Sixteenth allegations funding. in com- All of the and Lieu Lands disparities plaint in the distribution of these center around concerning allegations disparities particular benefits, and no funding programs public included. in school are other Consequently, very different than the claim this is a claim Rodriguez, Rodriguez. In the contention was that made in system funding unconstitutionally of was State's overall discriminatory. the Court examined the basic struc- There, rationally system it re- concluded that was ture of that reaching legitimate purpose. that conclu- lated a state necessarily funding disparities found that sion, the Court acceptable resulting in from local taxes were be- differences goal allowing of a measure of effec- to the state cause related funding Rodriguez levels. did tive local control over school funding purport that to validate all variations not, however, might funding public school decisions. result from State’s allowing merely that resulted It held that the variations funding property public local tax local control over constitutionally permissible in that case.16 schools were goes petitioners’ overall neither Here, the claim component system funding that ad valorem nor to the local solely system. goes it to the Sixteenth Instead, Section public funding. portion school Lands State’s Lieu Rodriguez unpersuaded that re- claim, are And, as to this we equal protection question in favor the State. solves complaint allegations distrib- are that the State is of the system that the fact the overall Powell contends that Justice Rodriguez approved by financing the Court in here is similar that school Post, petitioners’ dismiss the claims. reason” to provides “another however, merely upheld the Rodriguez, structure 301-302, 6. overall n. allowing component system financing and the of that public school of Texas’ Rodriguez fundings to local taxation. We do not read due for variations system might occur that has an overall validating disparities all as approved in case. to that structure similar uting the income from Sixteenth Section lands or from Lieu unequally among Lands or funds districts, school to the detriment of the Chickasaw Cession schools and their stu- dents. The Sixteenth Section and Lieu Lands granted were to and held the State itself. Under state property these law, lands “constitute held trust for the benefit of the schools and must be treated such,” 29-3-1(1) § (Supp. 1985), carrying Miss. Code Ann. but out management the trust, the State has vested the of these throughout lands in the local school boards the State, under supervision Secretary of State, and has credited *20 the income from these lands to the “school districts of the township may in which such sixteenth section lands be lo- any may cated, or to which sixteenth section lieu lands be- long,” purpose educating such income to be used for the of may pro- the children of the school district or as otherwise be 1985). by §29-3-109 (Supp. vided law. Miss. Code Ann. very Rodriguez, This case is therefore different from where financing the differential available to school districts was traceable to school district funds available from local real es- tate not taxation, to a state decision to divide state resources unequally among rationality school districts. The of the dis- parity Rodriguez, in therefore, which rested on the fact that funding disparities differing based on local wealth were a necessary adjunct allowing meaningful local control over funding, constitutionality school does not settle the of dis- parities alleged in this case, and we differ with the Court Appeals respect.17 in this

17Justice any discrepancies asserts that Powell in Sixteenth Section funding and Lieu Lands cannot be unconstitutional because “the Sixteenth payments insignificant Section . . . are an part of payments the total from Post, Mississippi’s all sources made to school Thus, districts.” at 299. seems to envision that some sort of threshold level of ef Powell Justice fect terms of overall necessary school revenues is Equal before the Pro tection Clause’s strictures become binding. petitioners, however, have limited challenging themselves to discrimination in the Sixteenth Sec funding program. tion and Lieu Lands program This separated is fact from other sources of funding by school the State itself in adminis- question Nevertheless, the remains whether the variations Sixteenth in the benefits received school districts from allegations complaint are, on the or Lieu Lands the Section rationally legitimate related to a state law, and as matter pursue that we not believe, however, interest. We should remand the for further this issue here but should instead case parties proceedings. Appeals Neither Court nor protection equal think it is addressed the issue we have posed by has this case: Given that State title assets granted use of the to it the Federal Government Equal permit schools, does the Protection Clause it to State’s unequally among benefit of these assets distribute the districts as it now school does? resolving

A crucial consideration this issue is whether requires federal law the State to allocate the economic townships in of school lands to schools which benefits If, law, are located. as matter federal those lands complaint matter, has whether the State no choice protection depends equal on fed- an claim whether the states policy If is, itself of the Clause. it State eral is violative policy. enjoined implementing may properly be such if is and the State is Contrariwise, the federal law valid *21 funding by provides it a rational reason for the it, then bound parties disparity. nor the have ad- Neither the courts below protection equal in issue these terms.18 Another the dressed (1972 1985), seq. Code Ann. 29-3-1 et tration, Supp. § for see Miss. g., e. see, Department of accounting Educa- purposes, State tion, Report Superintendent of Public Education 1986 Annual of the State any levels of received is there indication that the benefits 48 Nor any in to funds received from the lands are manner correlated school 1985). et seq. e. Miss. See, (Supp. § g., Ann. Code 37-19-1 other sources. situation, 300-301, In dissent’s invita- post, at n. 5. this we decline the Cf. append receipts We decline to to the look at school overall. also tion to requirements equal protection of action an additional general of an cause requirement. effects threshold 18 only following The question, make the observations. As to this we any starting point question of this must be federal consideration 290

possible resolving equal protection in consideration issue require management is that school lands and that the State assigned has this task to the individual districts which the themselves, grants for it clear that is the interest transferred to the State depends on the federal laws that transferred that interest. See California (1982) States, 273, ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United 457 U. S. 279 Consolidated, (1935)). (citing Angeles, 10, Borax Ltd. v. Los 296 U. 22 S. provided If the law for an interest, federal the transfer of fee absolute by hand, outright owned lands are the State. On the other if the federal trustee, law trust created a with the State as is comply State bound to the terms of that with trust. possible

Each of support these conclusions finds some this Court’s prior Roberts, 173, Cooper (1856), cases. 18 How. 181-182 for exam- ple, approved the Court granted the sale of school lands to the State of Michigan Congress expressly sale, even where had not authorized such a stating grant directly, that “the is to the State without limitation of its power, though imposed obligation public there is a sacred on its faith.” adopted reasoning Schmidt, Court this same Alabama v. 232 S.U. (1914), 168 approved application which the Court of Alabama’s ad- possession verse against argument laws school lands an that the State’s extinguished interest could not be in that manner under the terms of the grant and longer that when the lands were no support used for the schools title would revert Relying Cooper, the United States. on gift absolute, Court concluded although, “[t]he to the State is no doubt, in Cooper, obligation as said a imposed ‘there is sacred on its obligation faith.’ But honorary S., is . . .” 232 . U. at 173-174 omitted). (citations Easton, (1898) 383, See also Stuart v. 170 U. S. (cited 174) (“ by Schmidt, supra, expression Court ‘the mere aof ”) purpose will not of and itself (quoting Camp- debase fee’ Kerlin v. (1850)). bell, Thus, interpretations 15 Pa. St. 500 the Court’s of some of grants grants earlier of those conveying conceived feea interest to (1927) Koonce, curiam), the States. See also Brooks v. (per U. S. 486 aff’g Blytheville Special Sloan v. School Dist. No. 169 Ark. (1925) W. (relying Cooper S. on and Schmidt to challenge dismiss proceeds local school board to use of from local Sixteenth Section for lands large). benefit the State at hand, grants On the other interpreting cases more recent have found an explicit obligation, trust although noting it is worth that none of these grants provision here; they included provided similar that at issue *22 general lands for the However, benefit of the schools in the State. in States, (1919), Ervien v. United example, 251 U. S. the up- Court supervision by subject the State. located, are lands any, equal protection significance, this alloca- if terms of assigning exclusively justifying the income of duties tion management perform it to function and none of the who those any enjoining a breach of trust use court decision held a lower proceeds for of Sixteenth Section Lands Commissioner Public New Mexico Thus, grant. purposes enumerated than one of purpose other phrase of trust” “breach these circumstances that under the Court held lands, impose States, could being grantor “that the United meant performance of use, right to exact the and have the upon their conditions Ari- recently, in Lassen v. Id, More the Court at 48. conditions.” (1967), inter- S. 460-461 Highway Dept., U. rel. Arizona zona ex noting grant, lands the Arizona school the terms of and enforced preted Attorney requires the Gen- expressly . . . involved here grant “[t]he that may neces- proceedings be whatever States to maintain of the United eral Arizona, v. Land & Cattle Co. also Alamo sary its terms.” See to enforce 424 U. S. did not grants lands that some school Thus, has indicated the Court trusts, grants did create such held that other express trusts and has create provision at issue provision such as the enforced a although it has never these two relationship between has never discussed The Court here. stems from the any variation results cases, possible that but it is sets of Lassen, over time. See grants have varied terms of the that the facts give the grants did Thus, be that the earlier it could at 460. supra, actual interests, grants created while the later fee absolute grantee States petitioners hand, may that the are it be the other trusts. On enforceable grants is the same. of all of these asserting the substance correct (1910) (referring Sess., Cong., 2d 18-20 Rep. No. 61st See S. Enabling Act as and Arizona in New Mexico provisions express trust many years it has been noting that “[f]or principle,” “nothing new grants lands are made to which purposes for specify the custom to dispos- upon the mode of place express restrictions and to incoming states being in the them”). viewed as they properly are all perhaps Or ing of analogized to a ways may be in some agreement’ which “a ‘solemn nature of S., Utah, at 507. 446 U. parties.” Andrus private contract between by the are still enforceable grants then, conditions Perhaps, may parties. This be the by third States, although possibly not United below, position this disavowed federal defendants though the case even cases are and that our recent control Cooper and Schmidt arguing See, g., Reply e. they express trusts. involve because distinguishable (ND Miss.), pp. 60-62. in No. 81-90 Defendants for Federal Brief *23 manage that have to matter those districts no lands is a in is best addressed the lower courts the first instance. judgment Appeals Accordingly, the the Court of is af- petitioners’ as it firmed insofar affirmed dismissal of respect breach of and related claims. With trust the af- equal protec- firmance of the District Court’s dismissal of the judgment Appeals Court claim, tion is vacated, proceed- and the case is remanded to that court for further ings opinion. with consistent this

So ordered. Brennan, Justice with Justice Marshall, whom Jus- join, concurring Blackmun, tice and Justice Stevens in part, concurring part, judgment dissenting in in and in part.

Although join opinion I Parts I III of and the Court’s and agree join result in I II-C, with the Part do not Parts II-A my II-B for the reasons stated dissent in Atascadero (1985) Hospital State (Brennan, U. S. Scanlon, 258-302 dissenting). J., principles

The Court a valiant makes effort set forth the particular that determine whether a by claim is is or not barred my the Eleventh Amendment. at ante, See 276-279. To simply mind, the Court’s restatement im- underscores the plausibility clearly venture, of the entire for it demonstrates jurisprudence that the Court’s Eleventh Amendment con- unmanageable sists of little than a of ad more number hoc and bearing any rules little or no relation to one another or to framework; coherent the Court’s indeed, best efforts to im- pose produced only order on the cases area has this “[f]or purposes, conclusionthat Eleventh Amendment the line permitted prohibited between suits will be often indis- hodgepodge produces positive 278. tinct,” ante, This no society. only impair prevent benefits Its effect is to or highly unlikely effective law. It enforcement federal is having system that, created a in which law federal was to supreme, be Framers of the Constitution or the Elev-

enth Amendment nonetheless intended for that law to be un- enforceable the broad class of cases now barred this precedents. I fact, Court’s as demonstrated last Term thing. Atascadero, the Framers intended no such magnitude only in- of the Court’s mistake has been by changes place creased have taken our law and our *24 (1890), society Hans 1 Louisiana, since v. 134U. S. took the step path, first down this ill-advised for the National Gov- play important in ernment and federal law a much more role protecting rights today. Only of individuals stare de- support cisis can the Court’s continued adherence to this decisis is unfortunate doctrine. Stare indeed force to be although particu- reckoned the Court has not felt itself with— larly by expanding protective in constrained stare decisis sovereign immunity, mantle of see Pennhurst State School & (1984) Hospital Halderman, 89, 165-166, v. 465 U. S. n. 50 dissenting); Hospital Atascadero J., State v. (Stevens, dissenting). supra, J., at 304 Scanlon, How- (Stevens, Taney authority observed, the ever, as Chief Justice ultimately construction of the Constitution “de- the Court’s reasoning by pend[s] altogether on the force of the which it (1849) Passenger supported.” Cases, 283, 7 How. 470 is (dissenting opinion). ju- The Court’s Eleventh Amendment history by supported by legal risprudence is not or sound great reasoning; simply In matters of such it is bad law. yield. importance stare decisis must this, institutional and in Blackmun, dissenting concurring part Justice part. today petitioners’ holds that breach of trust

The Court by Eleventh Amendment. I cannot are barred claims agree. Mississippi legal claim that breached ob- Petitioners by agree ligations placed I on it federal law. with Justice Eleventh Amendment was never intended that the Brennan 292-293 Ante, J., at judgment concur- to bar such suits. (Brennan, part, dissenting concurring ring part, normally part). if the Eleventh Amendment would But even 294 against by that, I when citizens, its believe a State

bar suits willingly accepts benefit from Fed substantial a State immunity under the Eleventh it waives its Government, eral the intended beneficiaries consents to suit Amendment g., Mansour, e. v. See, Green of that federal assistance. (1985) dissenting); J., Atascadero 64, U. S. (Blackmun, (1985) (Black Hospital Scanlon, 234, 473 U. S. State v. dissenting); 415 U. S. Jordan, 651, Edelman mun, J., (1974) dissenting). J., 688-696 (Marshall, very Enabling gave Act the benefits including protections afforded statehood, Elev- incorporated expressly the Northwest Amendment, enth Or- required the of Sixteenth- dinance of which reservation for the benefit of education. See Act of Section lands giving Act 349. And the Missis- 1, 1817, Mar. Stat. expressly provided sippi Cession Lieu Lands the Chickasaw “upon the and condi- that those lands held same terms be respects, as said State now holds the lands tions, in all *25 of for the use schools said State.” heretofore reserved § July 116. 2, Act of Stat. Appeals nor the ad-

Neither the District Court Court nature of the conditions the Federal Government dressed the Mississippi’s placed upon as But, of the Lieu Lands. use discussing petitioners’ equal protection claims, Court notes may have intended bind Missis- the Federal Government to solely sippi the lands to benefit the schoolchildren to use origi- particular township which school lands were nally 287-289, Moreover, at and n. 16. Ante, attached. apparently Mississippi of state concluded, has as matter property in trust for held law, that school lands “constitute as such.” and must be treated the benefit schools 1985). §29-3-1(1) (Supp. Thus, fuller Miss. Code Ann. the Federal Gov- actual on consideration terms which might conveyed Mississippi re- the Lieu Lands to ernment immunity from suit. veal that the State waived its complaint Absent an Eleventh Amendment bar, the should survive a motion to dismiss. Petitioners have made several allegations fairly, suggest which, read did solely not use the Lieu Lands for the benefit of Chickasaw They Cession schoolchildren. claimthat the State leased the Lieu Lands for a minimal sum, converted the leaseholds into outright ownership payment without the of additional con- proceeds generated by sideration, invested the entire dis- position of the Lieu Lands in railroad stock, and then decided pay only hypothetical 6% interest on the fund created to replace proceeds. the lost Lieu Lands I believe these asser- stage pro- tions, which must be taken as true at this ceedings, sufficiently legisla- articulate a claim that the state speculators, ture acted to aid the interests of land railroads, development and the economic of the entire State at the ex- pense of the Chickasaw children, Cession violation of its obligation. trust impress

If the Federal Government intended to a trust upon the Lieu Lands with the State trustee and the Chick- asaw Cession schoolchildren as the beneficiaries, those chil- right against dren should have a of action the State for breach its'fiduciary duty. recognizes, damages As the Court are proper remedy fiduciary duty for a breach of when the corpus entirely of a trust been has lost. See ante, at 280-281. expressed by Thus, for the reasons Justice Marshall Edelman v. Jordan, S., 691-692, U. at I believe that petitioners damages they proved would be entitled if they alleged. trial the breach of trust have I therefore would Appeals’ petitioners’ reverse the Court of dismissal of trust- based claims and remand this issue for fuller consideration. *26 The Powell,

Justice with whom Chief Justice and Rehnquist join, concurring part dissenting in Justice part. in petitioners’ equal protection

The record refutes disparities funding claims that the from various school detrimentally lands affects students and schools dis- school from Missis- the Chickasaw Cession. Statistics within tricts Department sippi’s the statewide of Education show State expenditures per pupil. ranking in terms of of school districts ranking, scat- districts are In this the Chickasaw Cession widely among More- 154 school districts. the State’s tered funding being of school “critical element over, far from by petitioners, Mississippi,” alleged the Sixteenth Section as provided only for 114%of overall funds for lands account assumption no I find basis therefore schools.1 prove petitioners in Chickasaw Cession dis- can that students detrimentally differential, this affected tricts have been petitioners equal an have asserted I not believe that and do protection a motion to dismiss under claim that can survive 12(b)(6).2 Procedure Federal Rule of Civil M history litiga- procedural helpful putting m this A is brief county group perspective. Petitioners include a tion superintendents and individual boards, education, school residing in the Cession counties schoolchildren, all Chickasaw Mississippi. petitioners sued in north June numer- attacking officials, the difference be- ous federal and state payments one from tween, hand, on the Sixteenth Section area) (the and, on in other school districts Chocktaw lands Mississippi’s payments the State of hand, the other within the Chickasaw Cession trust fund to school districts place from the Chickasaw school lands. income “illegalities” alleged complaint as far recounted back Territory sought It the Northwest Ordinance 1785. “purport authorize, vali- have various federal statutes or of the Sixteenth Section lands declared date confirm” sales Education, Report Annual Department State B, infra, A and Superintendent of Education Tables State Public Report, pp. respectively. 144-146 and are taken from this agree petitioners’ claims barred

2 I with the Court that most of are Amendment, join Part II of the Court’s the Eleventh therefore opinion. *27 including limited unenforceable, and but not

“unlawful, void (b) (a) May July 19, 1852; the Act of 4, 1936; the Act of to (d) (c) any Congress other acts of 3, 1857; the Act of March (citations omitted). having App. 16 said effect.” complaint alleged the federal and state The also that both binding obligations perpetual and had defendants breached by express/constructive the federal defendants “an trust”: through permitting trust various stat- the State to breach the (e. Ordinance), Territory g., and the the Northwest utes by unlawfully selling properties the relevant state defendants ill-advisedly investing proceeds of that sale. and process by complaint alleged violations of due denial further appropriate public to education” and—of relevance of “free equal case as it stands before this Court—violations by disparate protection of certain funds and distribution rights” suspect upon infringement of “a the “fundamental Finally, minimally adequate level of education.” to “a class” obligation alleged impairment complaint of contract just compensation. taking and without including convey sought wide-ranging relief, Petitioners money equivalent properties or of a value ance to them of compensation for the relevant school lands and to that of the petitioners present that “would have re income from 1832to prudent subjected if lands had been such ceived ... such sought management.” Petitioners also reasonable use and may “which lost, as substitution for those to obtain new lands rights.” gas mineral Peti and other oil, include offshore additionally sought “enjoin” and “direct” the de tioners of such value” as was “a fund or funds fendants to establish perpetuity” necessary provide “in annual “hereafter” and Finally, peti school districts. income to Chickasaw Cession steps to defendants take other demanded that the tioners guarantee compensate and and for the future “eliminate against protect . . . denials the Plaintiff class Plaintiffs and rights process deprivations and to to due of law their equal protection laws.”3 *28 against the held that the claims Federal The District Court sovereign immunity, by laches, and barred were Government appealed. was not limitations. This order statutes of any monetary separate the Court held that order, District by holding remedy the Eleventh Amendment—a was barred today. Appeals I and this Court the Court of affirmed disposition. agree I not the also would reach issues with this right” by allegations the a “fundamental to denial of raised minimally adequate I ante, See holding at 285. do education.” “a petitioners’ agree that however, with the Court’s not, regarding disparate protection allegations equal distri- present a claim of sufficient substance to bution of funds to Federal Rule of Civil Pro- a motion dismiss under survive 12(b)(6). cedure

HHI—I petitioners’ equal protec- begins The the discussion of Court appro- by acknowledging it ante, 283-292, at that is claim, tion priate notice of “relevant facts obtained for Court take light peti- most to the record favorable from the figures Ante, at The recent available 283. most tioners.” rarely sweeping allegations is as in its and as complaint sees a One question requests Apparently, its for relief. no was raised duplicative in signing this com by respondents the District Court as to whether or complied 11 of plaint, petitioners for with Rule the Federal Rules counsel pertinent part: signature “The That Rule reads in of Civil Procedure. by him he attorney party or a certificate has read of an constitutes motion, knowledge, pleading, paper, or that to the best of his other information, inquiry grounded it is well and belief formed after reasonable by existing good argument law a faith for the in fact is warranted or and modification, law, extension, existing and that it is inter or reversal of not any purpose, unnecessary as posed improper for such to harass or cause litigation.” in the delay or increase cost needless complaint, only alleged equal Despite wide-ranging denial of funding protection respect Cession school is with Chickasaw swpra, only at these funds are 172%of overall districts. As noted elementary secondary funding schools within the State. Department Mississippi, from the State of Education of read light, fatally petitioners’ protection equal in such a undercut claims. alleged accepted It is here as there is true —that —and

disparity payments between the from the Sixteenth Section payments lands the Chocktaw districts from the Mississippi’s State of trust fund to Chickasaw districts.4 The complaint disparity “unjust, inequi- this characterizes as an deprivation rights table and unconstitutional of the App. children Chickasaw Cession counties.” 2. The complaint unequal alleging Court reads the that this distri- bution of such funds acts “to the detriment of the Chickasaw Cession schools and ante, their students,” 288. com- plaint, however, contains no factual than assertions other this *29 disparity support allegations, conclusory these nor is there any believing proved. for basis a detriment ever could be As per pupil expenditures peti- shown in Table A, the various in comparable tioners’ school are districts in some to, and cases higher average than, the for districts within the Chocktaw payments figures And area. the Sixteenth Section the—as beyond argument insignifi- in B Table demonstrate an—are part payments cant of the total from all sources made to Mis- sissippi’s school districts. question

The Court does not these data. It instead states petitioners challenging “have limited themselves to dis- program, relying the crimination Sixteenth Section” and, “decline[s] on that limitation, the dissent’s invitation look receipts at Ante, school overall.” at n. 17. 288-289, The thereby ignores undisputed concerning Court facts disparity versus The Court states that this is $75.34 $0.63. The Court Appeals petition give of and the certiorari figures for relevant as $31.25 States, (CA5 Papasan 2d, 1087, United 1985); $0.80. and 756 F. figures Pet. 4. for Cert. The former are derived from ag an unaudited reports by gregation presented school of individual districts in November report on Chickasaw Cession districts from the Auditor State and 12(b)(6) Secretary App. of 35. State. As this case arose from a Rule motion, disparity plaintiffs: I use the most to the $74.71. favorable Mississippi, funding public in- of and education the State analysis equal protection on 114%of the overall its stead bases elementary secondary provided schools funds Equal Clause, The Protection least in the State. funding with sub- schools, is concerned context of a state among funding stance, de minimis variations not with the districts. opinion, Appendix Finances,” to this “School Table A in the are fact dis- Cession school districts that Chickasaw shows ranking throughout financial of all the State’s school tributed Expenditure measure used is “Current whether the districts, Pupil,” Expenditure per Pupil per for Instruction “Current Pupil Expenditure per . Trans- . . Less Cost,” or “Current Specifically, portation.” the state- Table shows expenditure average per pupil $1965.78, was of which wide All but 6 of the towards “instructional cost.” $1,261.09went the Chickasaw Cession districts 39 school districts within per average expenditure; pupil spent all within of the $300 average per pupil spent within instruc- two $200 but per expenditure pupil expenditure. was over tional per pupil lowest in the Chickasaw district with the $1,400 expenditure, district with $2,400 the Chickasaw over light highest expenditure. figures these expenditures per pupil, I cannot believe that $74.71—the average pupil payment alleged per between the difference pay- average per pupil Section lands and the from Sixteenth place trust fund of the Chickasaw ment from the State’s *30 a “detriment” the students and school lands—creates gives thereby rise Cession and schools within Chickasaw equal protection under the rational-relation to a violation standard.5 throughout Mississippi’s equally funds school distributes its State §§ Ann. See Miss. Code 37-19-3 unit[s].”

districts on the basis “teacher many 1985); States, in total (Supp. Arg. Tr. Oral 32. As and 37-19-5 upon depending varies local ad valo- funding among districts in see also San Antonio B; Table taxes other district sources. See rem and are fatal to Although expenditures per pupil the figures a second set of statistics an addi- claims, provides petitioners’ con- tional reason to conclude an claim equal protection alleged Sixteenth Section lands should cerning disparities not survive motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 12(b)(6). B, Procedure As shown Table for “Receipts Public received from Sixteenth Section Schools,” payments for 1984-1985, $16,272,925, lands accounted less than 154% throughout of total for Public Schools” the State. “Receipts payments These Sixteenth Section are dwarfed income funds (totaling from state and federal of over million $752 Schools”). Public among 74% of for Variations “Receipts a small of the total can- receipts school districts of such part of a violation of the Protection Equal not a claim support of education for the children of the Clause provision Cession districts.6 Chickasaw Rodriguez, Discrepan-

Independent School Dist. v. 411 U. S. frequently part entirely lands are offset cies from Sixteenth Section or taxes, funding by ad valorem and the in local other variations sources always greater alleged than Sixteenth lands are almost than the Section Report, supra “disparity” in this ease. See Annual n. at 94-98 relied on sources). (listing receipts by revenue local system petitioner’s There is reason to claims. The another dismiss similarity financing Mississippi’s public schools a substantial to the bears arrangement upheld by financing the State of Texas this Court. San Independent Rodriguez, supra. Rodriguez, Dist. v. al Antonio School elementary secondary funding for and schools most half revenues program provide mini designed from a a basic large came state-funded every supple then mal education in school. Each school district would tax on through property and valorem within ment state federal funds an ad jurisdiction. Similarly, Mississippi provides each district with funds its § See Miss. Ann. 37- support program a “minimum of education.” Code (1972 1985). seq. Supp. funds constitute over half of the 19-1 et and These another receipts public schools; for federal funds constitute 18%. Of the districts, taxes, ad remaining Mississippi’s valorem receipts school districts, vary among, local school account for by, are levied and which B, Mississippi’s financing system, like two-thirds. Table over See infra. “[wjhile Texas, assuring every a basic education for child in the that of encourages large State, permits participation measure of . . .

HH J—I equal protection Petitioners claims cannot survive a mo- 12(b)(6) light tion under Federal Rule Civil Procedure throughout of the distribution of Chickasaw Cession districts rankings expenditures per pupil the statewide of various ,and insignificance of the Sixteenth Section funds relative to receipts Accordingly, the total for education. I dissent. schools,at Rodriguez, control of each district’s the local level.” supra, at 49.

I also note steps has taken numerous to ensure the ade- quacy important of the single most quality factor education: the teachers. The State has established a Commission on Teacher and Admin- istrator training, certification, Education to oversee the and evaluation of throughout Mississippi. school teachers § Miss. Code Ann. 37-3-2 1985). (Supp. guaranteed There is a minimum for teachers’ salaries that may augmented by districts, §§ be 37-19-15, the local 37-19-7 and a scale pay merit, 37-19-7, § guarantee increases based on tenure and of no any supplements salary, 37-19-11, § reduction in local minimum a set of § competency, 37-19-9, standards for teachers’ requirement and a that all employed July 1, 1975, teachers after take the “national teachers examina- tion,” § 37-19-13. *32 POWELL,

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF J. Table A School Finances! *36 Table B Receipts for Public Schools

1984-1985 Source of State Funds: Dept, 9,005,760

State of Ed. $ Capita 490,568,205 Per Program & Minimum 16,269,064 Vocational Ed. 61,454 Chickasaw Exemption 30,916,541 Homestead Payments 2,898,692 EFC 10,290,972 Severance Tax Penalty 555,963 Driver Funds 6,110,596 Textbook 574,624 School Lunch 35,619 Adult Ed. 511,070 Educable Children 985,796 Ed. Reform Act 153,766 Other Funds $ 568,938,122 Total State 56.1% Source of Federal Funds: Ed. $ Dept. 6,293,149

State 3,540,422 Vocational Ed. 3,247,726 National Forest 643,509 TVA 2,657,490 P. L. 874 64,896,618 ECIA Ch. 4,388,330 ECIA Ch. ESEA 107,118 Other 151,860 OEO Comm.) CETA(Emp. 1,677,019 Soc. See. Tit. XX & See. School Lunch & Milk & Nonfood Asst. Sp. 67,638,280 Lunch, Commodities, 12,660,094 School Food 745,079 Adult Ed. Handicapped Education 11,347,044 Act Office) (e.g., 3,403,978 Other CETA Governor’s Funds $ 183,397,716 Total Federal 18.1% of Local Funds: Source 165,985,203 Tax

Ad Valorem $ 86,276 Mineral Lease Tax 1,991,041 Tuition from Patrons 222,585 Transp. from Patrons Fees 16,272,925 Income Sixteen Section *37 12,800,202 on Investments Interest 816,620 Intermediate Source Receipts 25,405,580 & Int. Fund Bond 24,668,351 School Lunch Activity 7,063,639 Student 5,809,634 Other 261,122,056 25.8% Total Local Sources $ Receipts $1,013,457,894 100.0% Total Revenue Receipts: Nonrevenue 33,393,809 Bonds $

Sale of 1,603,699 Sale of Assets 3,383,380 Recovery Loss Insurance 10,357,549 Loans Receipts 48,738,437 Total NonRevenue $ Receipts $1,062,196,331 NonRevenue Total Revenue & SOURCE: Superintendent Public Education State Board of Education, 1986 Annual Report of the State