*1 NORTH CITY, v. CITY OF BESSEMER ANDERSON CAROLINA 19, March 198 4 Decided Argued 83-1623. December
No. *2 White, J., opinion delivered the Court, Burger, which J.,C. and Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Con- nor, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 581. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 581. argued
Jonathan petitioner. Wallas the cause for With him on the briefs Nockelby, were John T. J. LeVonne Chambers, 0. Peter Sherwood, Schnapper. and Eric
Carolyn argued S. Corwin the cause for the United States et al. urging as amici curiae reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor Deputy Lee, General Solicitor General Johnny Wallace, Philip Butler, J. B. Sklover.
Philip Hoy argued M. Van the respondent. cause for With him on Eugene the brief were Gressman and Arthur C. III* Blue opinion delivered the of the Court.
Justice White In Pullman-Standard v. (1982), Swint, 456 U. 273 S. we held that a District Court’s discriminatory intent in brought an action under Rights Title VII of the Civil Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, §2000e as amended, U. seq., S. C. et is a factual be appeal only overturned on if it is erroneous. In this case, the Appeals Court for the Fourth Circuit concluded that there was clear error a District Court’s of discrimination and reversed. reading Because our of the record convinces us that the misapprehended misapplied clearly- and the erroneous standard, we reverse. Bertin, *JoanE. E. Larson, Richard Burt Neubome, and Isabelle Katz
Pinzler filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
H Early respondent City, m officialsof Bessemer North set about to hire a Carolina, new Recreation Director for the city. Although position the duties that went with the were precisely the delineated, new Recreation Director was to responsible managing city’s be for all of the recreational developing programs facilities and for recreational —athletic city’s and otherwise—to the serve needs residents. by Mayor respon- A five-member committee selected choosing sible for the Recreation Director. Of the five four were members, men; one woman on the committee, chairperson. Mrs. Auddie Boone, served as Eight persons applied position for the of Recreation Direc- 39-year-old Petitioner, tor. at the time a schoolteacher with college degrees in social studies and was the education, among eight. woman The selection committee reviewed applicants briefly the resumés submitted inter- jobseekers. Following viewed each of the the interviews, the committee offered the Mr. Kincaid, Donald 24-year-old recently graduated college who had from awith degree physical All education. four men on the committee job voted to offer the to Mr. Mrs. Kincaid; Boone voted for petitioner.
Believing passed that the committee had over her in favor qualified solely of a candidate less because she was a woman, charges filed discrimination with the Charlotte Equal Employment Opportunity District Office of the Com- (five July years In mission. after filed the *4 charges), the EEOC’s District Director found that there was petitioner’s charges to believe that reasonable cause were parties peti- attempt true and invited the a resolution of grievance through proceedings. tioner’s conciliation The proved peti- in due unsuccessful, course, EEOC’s efforts and right-to-sue a tioner received letter. in
Petitioner then filed this Title action the United VII States District Court for the Western District of North 2-day during Carolina. After a trial which the court heard petitioner, from Mr. Kincaid, and the five mem- bers of the selection committee, the court issued a brief setting peti- memorandum of decision forth its that judgment tioner was entitled to because she had been denied of Recreation Director on account of her sex. laying In finding, addition to out rationale for this requested petitioner’s memorandum pro- submit counsel posed findings expanding upon of fact and conclusions of law those set forth in the memorandum. Petitioner’s counsel complied request by submitting lengthy with this a set of proposed findings (App. lla-34a); requested the court then response setting respondent’s received a forth in detail objections proposed findings to the 36a-47a) objec- {id., at — by petitioner’s tions that were, turn, answered counsel 48a-54a). lengthy reply in a somewhat less {id., at After receiving these findings submissions, the court its own issued of Supp. fact and conclusions of law. 557 F. 413-419 (1983).
As set forth the formal of fact and conclusions of law, the court’s had been denied by employment respondent because of her sex rested on a subsidiary findings. of number First, the court found that at the time the selection committee made its choice, qualified had been better perform than Mr. Kincaid to range position. of duties demanded The court based petitioner’s experience this on as a classroom teacher responsible supervising for schoolchildren in recreational and employment athletic hospital activities, her as a recreation in the director late 1950’s, her extensive involvement in variety organizations, of knowledge sports civic her ac- quired high both as a school athlete and as a mother of chil- organized dren involved in public athletics, her skills as a speaker, experience handling money (gained her in the community course her activities and in her work as a book- keeper group physicians), for a knowledge and her *5 and crafts. The court found that Mr. Kincaid’s
music, dance, experience principal qualifications were his as a student youth league, teacher as a coach in a local his basketball knowledge acquired sports, of team and individual extensive lifelong a his in and his athletics, as result of involvement college. training physical major a formal as education Noting position that of Recreation Director involved management programs, more than the of athletic the court petitioner’s greater experience concluded that breadth of qualified position. made her better for the the court found that the male committee members Second, against petitioner a had fact been biased because she was finding part woman. The court based this on the testi- mony it of one of the committee members that he believed job would have “real hard” for a woman to handle the been perform and that he to have to would want his wife of the Recreation The of bias found duties Director. support in additional evidence that another male committee applicant, of the Kincaid, member had told Mr. vacancy the successful applications also from three other and had solicited job. attempted any men, but had not to recruit women for its Also critical to the court’s inference of bias was job, petitioner, among applicants for the had that alone night job involve been asked whether she realized would approved of her work and travel and whether her husband applying job. The that the committee for the court’s pursued inquiry had this line of with testimony questions had based on the that these testimony been asked of her and the of Mrs. Boone applicants. questions similar had not been asked of the other Although during Mr. Kincaid’s Mrs. Boone also testified that regarding the to him interview, she had made “comment” taking reaction of his new bride to his this comment Director, Recreation the court concluded that merely inquiry, remark was not a serious prompted by but a “facetious” only petitioner annoyance Mrs. Boone’s questioned spouse’s had been about her reaction. The court also declined to credit the of one of the male *6 committee members that Mr. Kincaid had been asked about feelings his way” wife’s “in testimony and the of another applicants committeeman all questioned that had been re- garding willingness their night to work at and their families’ night reaction to work. The court finding concluded that the petitioner only that seriously questioned had been about her family’s suggested reaction that the male committee mem- bers special believed family women responsibilities had that employment made certain inappropriate. forms of Finally, the court found that the reasons offered the male committee members for their choiceof Mr. Kincaid were pretextual. rejected The court proposition the that Mr. degree physical justified Kincaid’s education his choice, suggested as the evidence that where male candidates were concerned, experience the committee valued highly more training physical than formal education.1 The court also rejected the claim of one of the committeemen that Mr. Kincaid had been hired superiority because of the of the programs planned implement he .recreational if selected job. for the The court credited of one of the other committeemen who had voted for Mr. Kincaid that programs by petitioner outlined and Mr. Kincaid were sub- stantially identical.
On the basis petitioner of its that was the most qualified candidate, that the committee had been biased against hiring a woman, and that explana- the committee’s tions for its choice of Mr. pretextual, Kincaid were the court 1The evidence established that the committee members initially had fa vored a candidate, third Bert Broadway, and had decided not to hire him he because stated that he unwilling was to move to City. Bessemer Broadway Mr. years had experience two as a community recreation di rector; petitioner, like but he college lacked a degree in physical education. petitioner establishing her
concluded had met burden that she had been denied the of Recreation Director having of her sex. conceded that order- because ing Petitioner city inappropriate remedy to hire her would be an petitioner under the the court awarded circumstances, attorney’s backpay in amount of and fees of $30,397 $16,971.59.
The Fourth
the District Court’s
Circuit reversed
(1983). In
discrimination.
II
sug-
at the
the Fourth Circuit’s
We must deal
outset with
scrutiny
[was]
gestion
in
case
“close
of the record
this
prepared,”
by
opinion
justified
in
the
the manner which
adoption
peti-
by
of
is,
at 156—that
the District Court’s
id.,
proposed findings
and conclusions of law.
tioner’s
of fact
many
had on
occa-
The
recalled that the Fourth Circuit
court
announcing
practice
a decision and
of
sions condemned
findings
party
leaving
prevailing
of fact
to write the
it to the
Biggers
g.,
e.
v.
See,
of law.
Cuthbertson
and conclusions
(1983);
v. Federal Reserve
F. 2d 454
EEOC
Bros., Inc., 702
(1983); Chicopee Mfg.
batim. the vice of the court, findings already in the trial court’s after it had solicitation adoption announced its decision and the court’s petitioner’s proposed findings. “substance” of adoption We, too, have criticized courts for their verbatim findings prepared by prevailing parties, particularly of fact findings conclusory when those have taken the form of state- unsupported by g., ments citation to the record. e. See, United El States v. Paso Natural Co., 651, Gas U. S. (1964); Bancorporation, 656-657 United States v. Marine (1974). poten- 602, 615, U. S. n. 13 We are also aware of the overreaching exaggeration part tial for and on the of attor- neys preparing findings they already of fact when have been judge informed that the has decided their favor. See Wright, Nonjury Preparing Findings J. The of Fact, Trial— Opinions, Newly Conclusions of Law, Seminars for Appointed (1962). Judges United States District 159, previous subject suggest Nonetheless, our discussions of the judge adopts proposed findings that even when the trial verbatim, the are those of the court and be only clearly reversed if erroneous. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, supra, at n. 13; United States v. El supra, Paso Natural Gas Co., at 656-657. any
In event, the District this case does not appear uncritically accepted findings prepared to have with- judicial guidance by prevailing party. out The court provided proposed findings itself the framework for the when *8 preliminary it issued its memorandum, which set forth its findings petitioner’s essential and directed counsel to submit findings a more detailed set of consistent with them. Fur- respondent provided oppor- ther, was and availed itself of the tunity respond length proposed findings. to at to the Nor simply adopt petitioner’s proposed did the District Court findings: findings ultimately particularly the it issued—and findings regarding petitioner’s qualifications, the crucial the questioning subjected, to which and bias on part vary considerably orga- the of the committeemen—
573 by petitioner’s submitted from those and content nization to no reason circumstances, we see these Under counsel. repre- by findings the District issued that the doubt is no There judge’s conclusions. own considered the sent stringent appellate findings subject ato more those to reason applicable rules. for the is called than review I—IHHHH finding ais finding discrimination of intentional a Because appellate district governing of a review the standard fact, of in Federal forth finding is set of discrimination court’s 52(a): “Findings not be fact shall of Procedure Rule of Civil regard be shall clearly due erroneous, and aside unless set judge of the to court the trial given opportunity of to the question us, then, before credibility The witnesses.” of the holding District the erred the Court is whether clearly erroneous. to be discrimination Court’s “clearly is phrase erroneous” meaning Although govern- principles general apparent, immediately certain not power to overturn appellate court’s ing of the the exercise cases. from our be derived findings court of a district itself Circuit principles, the Fourth as these foremost of The ^clearly when erroneous’ “[a] is recognized, is that reviewing support court it, although to evidence there is firm con- definite with the is left entire evidence on States United committed.” has been that a mistake viction (1948). Gypsum 364, S. Co., U. v. States United reviewing court a plainly entitle does This standard simply it is because of fact the trier reverse differently. the case decided have that it would convinced duty oversteps under itsof reviewing the bounds court The 52(a) duplicate the lower the role of undertakes if it Rule to the standard applying erroneous “In court. jury, appellate sitting without court of a district is not constantly function their in mind that have must courts Corp. v. Radio Zenith de novo” issues factual to decide (1969). If the S. Research, 395 U. Inc., Hazeltine *9 574
district court’s plausible account of the light evidence is entirety, record viewed in its appeals may the court of not though it reverse even convinced sitting that had it been as the trier of weighed fact, it would have the evidence differently. permissible Where there are two views evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 (1949); U. 338, S. 342 see also Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives (1982). Laboratories, Inc., U. S. 844
This is so even when the
findings
district court’s
do not rest
credibility
on
determinations, but are
physi-
based instead on
documentary
cal or
or
evidence
inferences from other facts.
To be sure,
various
Courts
have on occasion
theory
asserted the
appellate
that an
court
exercise de
findings
novo review over
not
credibility
based on
determina-
g.,
tions. See, e.
Higgins,
(CA2
Orvis v.
1950);
180F. 2d 537
Lydle v.
(CA6
United States, 635 F. 2d
1981);
765, n.
Swanson v. Baker
(CA8
Industries, Inc.,
The rationale for original deference to the finder of fact is superiority limited judge’s of the trial make credibility. determinations of judge’s major The trial role is the determination of experience fact, and with fulfilling expertise. that role comes Duplication of the trial *10 very likely appeals
judge’s in con- efforts the court of would accuracy only negligibly of fact determination to the tribute huge judicial In addition, in at a cost diversion of resources. already parties appeal have been forced to to a case on persuading energies on concentrate their and resources judge one; the facts is the correct trial that their account of judges appel- persuade requiring three more at the them to requiring much. As the has stated a late level is too be “the ‘main context, different the trial on the merits should ‘tryout Wainwright than a on the road.’” event’. . . rather (1977). Sykes, 90 these review reasons, v. 433 U. S. For findings clearly-erroneous standard— of factual under the not the rule, its deference to the trier of fact—is with exception. findings regarding the are based on determinations
When 52(a) credibility greater even witnesses, Rule demands judge findings; for the trial to the trial court’s deference the variations demeanor and tone of voice can be aware of understanding heavily of and so on the listener’s that bear Wainwright v. Witt, in what is said. See U. S. belief (1985). may suggest judge trial This is not to that the by denominating them from review credi- insulate his bility for factors other than demeanor and determinations, go or not to believe a inflection into the decision whether objective may or evidence contradict witness. Documents may internally story; story itself be so or the the witness’ implausible on its face that a reasonable fact- inconsistent or present, are not credit it. Where such factors finder would appeals even in a well find clear error the court credibility g., purportedly e. See, determination. based on supra, Gypsum Co., at 396. v. United States United States judge’s finding on his decision to a trial is based But when witnesses, of two or more each credit the of one facially story plausible that a coherent and of whom has told finding, by if evidence, extrinsic is not contradicted virtually internally never clear error. can be inconsistent, Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. America, 148 F. 2d (CA2 1945); Higgins, supra, 416, 433 Orvis v. at 539-540.
I—I> Application foregoing principles of the to the facts of the lays case bare the errors committed the Fourth Circuit employment clearly-erroneous in its of the standard. In detecting peti- clear error the District Court’s qualified tioner was better than Mr. Kincaid, the Fourth improperly Circuit conducted what amounted to a de novo weighing of the evidence in the record. The District Court’s essentially undisputed regard- was based on evidence *11 ing respective backgrounds of and Mr. Kincaid position and the duties that went with the of Recreation considering Director. The District after Court, the evi- position dence, concluded that the of Recreation Director City responsibilities Bessemer carried with it broad for creating managing program involving a recreation only ages athletics, but also other activities for citizens of all petitioner’s and interests. The court determined that more employment background varied educational and and her ex- variety tensive involvement of civic activities left her qualified implement program better such a rounded than background Mr. narrowly Kincaid, whose was more focused on athletics. reading
The Fourth Circuit, the same record, concluded duty that imple- the basic of the Recreation Director was to program, qualification ment an athletic and that the essential applicant for a successful would be either education or ex- perience specifically Accordingly, related to athletics.2 it
2The Fourth Circuit inconsistency thus saw no between the statement of the male they preferred committee members that Broadway Bert because experience they his and their claim that had selected Mr. Kincaid over petitioner because formal training. supra. 1, of his See n. In the view Appeals, of the Court this demonstrated that Broadway Mr. had experience relevant and Mr. Kincaid had education, relevant while petitioner had neither. Appeals Mr. seemed evident to the Court of that Kincaid was petitioner. qualified in fact better than reading say on of the cannot that record, Based our own we implausible. interpretation illogical of the facts is or either support in that be drawn from the Each has inferences interpretation in the and if either had been record; facts by court on the record before would us, drawn a district we clearly question find it erroneous. The not be inclined to is not the Fourth Cir- answer, however, we must whether clearly interpretation erroneous, cuit’s of the facts was but finding clearly whether the District Court’s erroneous. (1954). 20-21 States, McAllister v. United U. S. See The District Court determined that was better qualified, such a is above, as we have stated and, notwithstanding it on entitled to deference that is not based credibility the record is examined determinations. When apparent light appropriately standard, of the deferential it is nothing it contains that mandates a that the District conclusion was erroneous. Court’s raised the Fourth different concerns are Somewhat peti- the District treatment of Court’s Circuit’s among applicants Rec- tioner, alone for questions regarding spouse’s her reation was asked Director, application position. feelings her for the Here the about give of the was its failure to due error *12 ability interpret regard of the District Court to and to credibility testimony. of oral The Court of discern the rejection of rested its of the District Court’s interpretation testimony on its differential treatment own very testimony, by in the whose Mrs. Boone—the witness supported finding. In the the District Court, view of testimony eyes that she Circuit, Mrs. Boone’s of the Fourth feelings of made a to Mr. Kincaid about the had “comment” Court) (a judged “facetious” the District his wife comment perhaps conclusively and other Kincaid, that Mr. established questioned applicants the feel- well, as had been about male ings spouse. of his testimony point,
Mrs. Boone’s on this which is set forth margin,3 certainly ambiguity. is free from But Mrs. Boone several times stated that other had not candidates questioned been about the reaction their least, wives—at petitioner. “not the same context” as had And after even recalling calling to the attention of the court that she had subject made a Kincaid, comment on the to Mr. Mrs. Boone denied that she had “asked” Mr. Kincaid about his wife’s reaction. Mrs. Boone’s on these matters is not 3“Q: question Did the committee members ask that same kind of the applicants? other I
“A: Not that recall. “Q: you deny applicants, Do that the other plaintiff, aside from the were prospect asked working night position? about the at in that my knowledge. “A: Not to
“Q: you saying they Are were not asked that? They asked, they “A: were not not in the context that were asked of Phyllis. they I don’t know whether were worried because Jim wasn’t going get supper know, goes ways. his or what. You both
“Q: you Phyllis Did tell Anderson Donnie Kincaid was not asked night about work? night
“A: He wasn’t asked about work. “Q: question. Now, That answers one let’s answer the other one. Did you Phyllis that, tell Anderson that Donnie Kincaid was not asked about night work? Yes,
“A: day sometime, after the interviews —I think the next or and I something? I answer know — “Q: question asked; If otherwise, it’s that has been up no. It’s to the Judge say. if any question
“A: You asked there was asked about —I think Donnie just married, and I think I personally made the comment to him —and your new bride won’t mind. “Q: So, you yourself asked him about his own wife’s reaction? No,
“A: no.
“Q: you just That is what said. Objection,
“Mr. Gibson: Your Honor. rephrase “[The] Court: Sustained. You don’t have to the answer.” App. 108a, 120a-121a. *13 theory
inconsistent with the that her remark was not a seri- inquiry approved ous into whether Mr. Kincaid’s wife of his applying position. judge’s for interpreta- Whether the actually impossible tion is paper correct is to tell from the easy imagine record, but it is to that the tone of voice coupled which the witness related her comment, with her questioned immediate denial that she had Mr. Kincaid on the subject, might conclusively have established that the remark agree was a facetious one. We therefore cannot that the judge’s clearly conclusion that the remark was facetious was erroneous.
Once the trial court’s characterization of Mrs. Boone’s accepted, apparent finding remark is it is that the that the seriously questioned male candidates were not about the feel- ings clearly of their wives cannot be deemed erroneous. The judge testimony trial was faced with the of three witnesses, (Mrs. Boone) one of whom stated that none of the other can- (a questioned, didates had been so one of whom male commit- member) tee testified that Mr. Kincaid had been asked such a (another question way,” “in a and one of whom committee- man) subjected testified that all the candidates had been questioning. implausible similar None of these accounts is by any face, on its and none is contradicted reliable extrinsic evidence. Under these circumstances, trial court’s deci- clearly sion to credit Mrs. Boone was not erroneous. accept The Fourth Circuit’s refusal to the District Court’s against that the committee members were biased hir- ing large rejection a woman was based to a extent on its subjected questioning had been applicants spared. that the other were Given that that find- ing was not erroneous, of bias cannot be support termed erroneous: it finds in the treatment in her interview, but also one committee member that he believed it would have been perform job difficult for a woman to and in the evidence *14 applications position that another solicited for the member only from men.4 the Court
Our determination that the District regarding petitioner’s qualifications, the conduct of her inter- not and the of the male committee members were view, clearly bias leads us to conclude that the court’s erroneous against of her that was discriminated on account clearly erroneous. The District Court’s sex was also findings regarding petitioner’s superior qualifications and support the of the selection committee are sufficient to bias position that was denied the of Rec- the inference Accordingly, reation Director on account of her sex. we denying petitioner hold that the Fourth Circuit erred relief under Title VII. knowledge holding,
In do not assert that our of what so we years ago City superior happened Bessemer is to that of Appeals; greater insight the nor do we claim to have Appeals into the state of mind of the men than the Court of rejected petitioner on the selection committee who for the judge, of Recreation Director. Even the trial who directly closely in has heard the witnesses and who is more appeals court the milieu out of touch than with which controversy always him arises, before cannot be confident happened. he he can Often, that “knows” what deter- plaintiff presenting mine has succeeded in an whether likely of the facts that is more to be true than not. account appellate generally Our task—and the task of tribunals —is more limited still: we must determine whether the trial suggestion any dispelled inference of The Fourth Circuit’s that bias was by the fact that each of the male committee members was married to a point marriage in the insufficient woman who had worked at some is clearly Although that of bias was erroneous. we establish employment decline to hold that a man’s attitude toward his wife’s is may question against he be found to have a irrelevant whether bias working women, any may particular the factor have in a case is a relevance bias, weigh in its not the matter for the district court to consideration appeals. court of
judge’s conclusions are erroneous. On the record say they Accordingly, us, before we cannot are. judgment Appeals of the Court of is
Reversed. Justice Powell, concurring. judgment
I do not dissent from the the Court of 52(a) Appeals misapplied separ- Rule this I case. write ately, however, I because am concerned that one read opinion implying the Court’s as criticism of the Court of very engaged comprehensive for the fact that it in a *15 reading may review of the entire record of this case. Such a encourage Appeals simply apply overburdened Courts of 52(a) conclusory Rule in a fashion, rather than to undertake type may appropriate of burdensome review that be some cases.
In arbitrary judg this case, the Court of made no clearly ment that the action of the District Court was errone contrary, meticulously ous. On the the court reviewed the entire record and reached the conclusion that the District easily agree Court inwas error. One could with the Court of Appeals that the District Court committed a mistake in its fragmen of sex discrimination, based, was, as it on tary years exchanges statements made before* in informal appli between members of the selection committee and the cants for the to be filled. On the record before us, fairly however, the factual issue could be decided for either party. Therefore, as the holds, the District Court’s meaning decision was not erroneous within the 52(a). Rule
Justice Blackmun, in the concurring judgment. join opinion, I would like judg- the Court’s I for think its agree ment is I correct, and with most of what the Court *The EEOC, Charlotte branch of with whom filed a complaint, years. took no action for trial, therefore, five The at was based on stale recollections.
says.
join
I,
do not
however,
dictum, ante,
the broad
at 573-
574, to the effect that the same result is to be reached when
wholly
documentary
the district court’s
are based
on
credibility
evidence and do not rest at all on
determinations.
past,
joined
opinion
generally,
In
I
have
at
that,
least one
opposite
Mississippi
is to the
effect. See United
v.
States
(CA8 1960).
Valley Barge Line
285 F.
Co.,
2d
See
Corp.,
also Ralston Purina
v.Co. General Foods
442 F. 2d
(CA8 1971);Frito-Lay,
Chip
389, 391
Inc. v. So GoodPotato
(CA8 1976);
Co.,
I therefore the Court in its opinion. its