*1 CO., INC., OIL v. EDMONDSON LUGAR et al. 25, 1982 1981 Decided June Argued December No. 80-1730. *2 White, J., opinion Court, delivered the of the in which BRENNAN, Mar- JJ., joined. Burger, shall, Blackmun, J., Stevens, C. filed a dis- senting opinion, post, p. dissenting Powell, J., opinion, filed a which Rehnquist O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 944.

Robert L. Morrison, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

James W. Haskins argued cause for respondents. Millner, brief was H. Victor Jr. With him on the delivered the of the Court. opinion Justice White The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides in part:

“No State shall make or enforce law which shall any abridge privileges or immunities of citizens person any deprive any State nor shall States; United process property, liberty, law; due nor without or life, jurisdiction equal pro- any deny person its within laws.” tection it can States, is directed at the be Amendment

Because the may fairly only by characterized as be conduct violated “state action.” provides remedy deprivations C. 1983

Title U. S. rights laws of the Constitution and United secured place any deprivation color of takes “under when States usage, regulation, or State ordinance, custom, statute, ,”1 relationship Territory This concerns the be- . . case . *3 § requirement color of of action under state tween the 1983 requirement of Amendment state Fourteenth law and the action.

I truckstop petitioner, lessee-operator of a in Vir- a In 1977, supplier, ginia, Edmondson Oil Inc. to his was indebted Virginia court. Ancil- in sued on the debt Edmondson lary pursuant law, to state Edmondson to that action and petitioner’s sought prejudgment of certain of attachment (1977).2 prejudgment §8.01-533 property. Code Va. procedure required allege, only Edmondson that attachment disposing petitioner parte petition, a in an ex belief might dispose property in to defeat his cred- or of his order upon petition, Acting a of the state court Clerk itors. by then executed attachment, which was issued writ of effectively sequestered petitioner’s County Sheriff. This the in question, provided in full: at the time Title U. S. C. ordinance, regulation, any statute, “Every person who, under color Territory, subjects, causes be sub- or custom, usage, any or State or jurisdic- the person within United or other jected, citizen of the States immunities se- deprivation any rights, privileges, tion thereof to the injured in laws, the an shall be liable to by the Constitution and cured for redress.” law, proper proceeding equity, suit or other action at was codified as question, this section the attachment At the time of (1973). §8-519 Va. Code property, although possession. it was left his Pursuant to hearing propriety statute, on the of the attachment and levy Thirty-four days levy, was later conducted. after the judge trial ordered attachment dismissed because statutory grounds Edmondson had failed to establish the for alleged petition.3 attachment subsequently brought Petitioner this action under 42 against president, U. S. C. 1983 Edmondson and its His complaint alleged attaching property respondents his jointly deprive prop- had acted with the State to him of his erty process without of law. The lower courts due construed complaint alleging process a due violation both from Virginia procedure statutory a misuse of the and from the procedure sought compensatory punitive itself.4 He damages specified allegedly financial loss caused improvident attachment.

Relying Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, on 436 U. S. 149 (1978), alleged held that the District Court actions of the respondents required did not constitute state action as complaint Fourteenth Amendment and that the therefore did upon granted not state a claim which relief could be §1983. appealed; Appeals Petitioner for the sitting banc, Fourth en with three diss Circuit, affirmed, enters.5 F. 2d 1058 *4 principal proceeded The on the entry judgment action then to the of in petitioner’s property

debt favor of Edmondson and was sold some of judgment. of execution 4In respondents’ grounds his answer to motion to dismiss on abstention petitioner validity question stated that of the “[n]o of the constitutional Motion Opposition State statutes made.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum “[D]espite to Dismiss 3. The responded District Court to this as follows: plaintiff’s protests only read as contrary complaint to the . can be . . challenging constitutionality App. Virginia’s of attachment statute.” 1058,1060, to Pet. for Appeals agreed. Cert. 38. The Court of 639 F. 2d (CA4 1981). n. 1 originally argued three-judge panel. The case The Court was before a however, rehearing en Appeals, acting of sua the matter for a sponte, set banc. rejected Appeals reliance the District Court’s

The Court finding requisite state action Flagg that the Brothers on participation missing of state officers case. this sufficiently distinguished levy executing from case Appeals Flagg stated the issue as The Court Brothers. follows:

“[Wjhether by private litigant institution the mere judicial proceedings, without presumptively valid state subsequent any prior or concerted or collusion action proceed litigant then the state officials who with adjudicative, administrative, or executive enforce- with proceedings, constitutes under color ment of the contemplation of 1983.” 639 F. 2d, within of state law (footnote omitted). at 1061-1062 directly chargeable distinguished between the acts The court larger respondents acts and the context within which those levy by including peti- on the direct officials occurred, property. While the no doubt amounted to tioner’s latter clearly former was not so action under color action, The court held that a acts under of state law. meaning only of 1983 when color of state law within the usurpation corruption power by the there is a of official private litigant judicial power to or a surrender of enforcing litigant way independence in such a that the compromised significant degree. Be- officer has been to a thought present court none of these elements was cause the complaint allege here, the conduct under color failed to state law.

Because this construction of the under-color-of-state-law prior requirement appears decisions be inconsistent 937 (1981). granted of this we certiorari. 452 U. S. Court, II Although Appeals correctly perceived im- portance Flagg proper case, of this Brothers to a resolution *5 It also

it misread that case.6 failed to sufficient give weight cases, to that line of beginning Sniadach v. Fi- Family in (1969), nance which the Corp., Court consid- due ered constitutional in process requirements the context actions garnishment prejudgment attachments. See Di-Chem, North Inc. v. Georgia Finishing, Inc., 419 U. S. T. Co., Mitchell v. W. Grant (1975); U. S. 600 (1974); Shevin, Fuentes v. 407 U. S. 67 Each of these cases of state action as an finding involved a implicit predicate of the due standards. application process Brothers Flagg them on the each distinguished ground there was official involvement the overt, property deprivation; there no such a overt state officer Brothers. Flagg S., at 157. U. case falls on the Although Sniadach, and not Brothers, side of this Flagg distinction, and attachment Appeals thought garnishment cases to be Fuentes because none but arose under 42 irrelevant §1983 U. S. C. and because Fuentes was distinguishable.7 suggests opinion that our is not “consistent with the Justice Powell Post, of inquiry prescribed mode our cases.” at 946. We believe the just situation to opposite. rely upon ground be We precisely majority itself put Flagg distinguish forth in Brothers to from case the earlier prejudgment attachment cases: “This total absence of overt offi plainly distinguishes cial involvement this case from im earlier decisions posing procedural restrictions on creditors’ remedies.” 436 U. at 157. point at no Justice aspect Flagg mentions this Powell Brothers decision. The inquiry method of adopt suggested by we is that Adickes v. S. H. (1970), Kress & 398 U. S. 144 seemingly approved Flagg Brothers: Joint action with a accomplish prejudgment state official to deprivation of a constitutionally protected property support will interest against 1983 claim private party. Appeals

7 The Court of held Fuentes v. Shevin not to be relevant be cause the defendants in Attorney General, that case included the State well as view, creditor. In the presence court’s of a state “private party official made the merely defendant. . . a nominal injunctive the action for 2d, relief.” 639 F. Judge n. 22. Butz- ner, dissent, found Fuentes directly to be controlling. *6 928 because the them all of ignore it could

It determined action, but was state there was whether this case issue in of state law. under color acted respondents rather whether so easily cannot be two however, concepts it, As seewe not, the state- are identical they Whether disentangled. are ob- requirements action and the under-color-of-state-law did not this Court Indeed, recently until related.8 viously at all. two between requirements distinguish

A Price, States n. 794, (1966), United 7 787, v. In “In were identical: stated that the requirements we explicitly has been 1983, consistently § ‘under color’ of law cases under the ‘state same action’ thing required treated as the In of Amendment.”9 this support proposi the Fourteenth Allwright, 321 tion the Court cited Smith 649 (1944), v. U. S. Terry v. Adams, (1953).10 345 461 In both U. S. of these 8 recognized Appeals of itself it in of Court when stated that two patterns litigation §of 1983 which three basic the defendant is a —that is a public official and that in which he is no distinc —there Only tion and action under color of state law. between state action when officials, stated, joint parties there and state the court action requirements. could distinction arise between these two 9 “allege[s] part We also stated that if an indictment conduct on the of the action,’ ‘private' alleges] defendants ‘state [it which constitutes U, § [18 C.] ‘under color’ law within S. 242.” 383 U. n. 7. In Pape, (1961), Monroe v. 365 S. 185 the Court held that “under U. meaning of law” the same S. 242 it color has 18 U. C. as does cases, Supreme Besides these two the Court cited a number of support proposition lower court cases in that the constitutional con cept statutory requirement action under color state action satisfies Hospital, v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Simkins state law. F. 2d (CA4 (CA6 1964); Inns, Hamp Holiday Smith v. 1963); 336 F. 2d (CA5 1962); Jacksonville, Birming Boman City ton v. 304 F. 2d 320 (CA5 1960); Free v. Enoch Pratt Li ham Transit Kerr 280 F. 2d 531 (CA4 1945). brary, litigation 149 F. 2d 212 of these cases involved Each private parties plaintiffs alleged dis between which the unconstitutional case, only private-party inquiry crimination. In each whether met the Fourteenth Amend- requirement defendant the state-action challenged cases black voters Texas their exclusion from party primaries aas violation of the Fifteenth Amendment (1946ed.).11 §43 sought relief under U. S. C. In each problem case, the Court understood the before it to be *7 discriminatory policy private political of a whether the associ- characterized as “state action within ation could be the mean- ing supra, Smith, Fifteenth Amendment.” of the 664.12 Having state action under the Constitution, found there was inquiry political into whether the action of no further statutory requirement met the associations also of action “under color of state law.” §

Similarly, brought against it is clear that in a 1983action statutory requirement official, a state of action “under requirement color of state law” and the “state action” of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical. The Court’s conclu- (1941), v. Classic, 299, sion States 326 United possessed by power, “[m]isuse virtue of state law and only wrongdoer possible made because the is with the clothed authority taken of’ law, of state action ‘under color parte in Ex law,” was founded on rule announced Vir- ginia, (1880), 100 346-347 that the actions of a U. S. authority state officerwho exceeds the limits of his constitute purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 met, granted ment. the relief requirement Once that was the courts sought. (1946 ed.) § §43

11 Title 1983 in 8 U. S. C. was as 42 U. S. C. reclassified 1952. Terry v. Adams. opin All opinion There was no for the three Court question in support pose ions of the reversal of the court decision lower question, as to whether private political the action of the association Jaybird Association, purposes of Democratic state action for constituted Amendment suggests the Fifteenth a Fifteenth Amendment. None be support violation cause of action might association prove cause of a failure to of state law. action under color rather, United States Classic it in directly; § did not involve (1940 (then ed.)), is the terpreted §242 §52 which U. S. C. 18 U. S. C. supra, on the rela counterpart § criminal of 42 1983. See n. U. S. C. § tionship between 18 C. 242 and 42 U. S. C. U. S. Appeals misreading rests on Court decision distinguished Flagg In that case two Brothers. 1983action:

elements they “[Plaintiffs] show that have been first bound to are right by the Constitution and deprived of a ‘secured They secondly must show States. of the United laws’ right deprived acting Flagg them of this Brothers of the State of New York. It statute’ ‘under color separate denote two elements two that these is clear inquiry. H. Adickes v. S. Kress & areas (1970).’’ 155-156. 144, 150 U. S. requirement. on the first Because foundered Plaintiffs’ case alleged process because the Due a due violation only protects governmental from individuals Process Clause plaintiffs action, from had demonstrate *8 and not by goods accomplished of their was state action. that the sale although by authorized sale, The concluded that the Court under the law, state did not amount to state Four- Ap- the of Amendment, teenth and therefore set aside Court peals’ contrary judgment. Flagg no Brothers to address the

There was reason in question of state law. whether there was action under color expressly deciding that re- The Court eschewed whether by by quirement private action was satisfied authorized state Although Id., under- law. at 156. the state-action and requirements “separate of in- color-of-state-law quiry,” are areas suggest Flagg ac- that state Brothers did not hold nor § might requirement present, satisfy if of tion, not the of Nevertheless, conduct of law. under color state Appeals Flagg in this case relied on Brothers to conclude is not neces- state action under the Fourteenth Amendment § sarily purposes of 1983. action under color of law for state agree. doWe §1983 two-part approach re- action,

The ato cause of Flagg ferred from Adickes to in was derived Brothers, Adickes Kress H. & S. 144, S. 398 U. was a based against private party, on a brought §1983 action in violation discrimination Protec- Equal claim racial Fourteenth Amendment. stat- Although Clause tion show both must that he has been § 1983 plaintiff that the ing secured the ‘Constitution and laws’ of right “of deprived defendant acted “under color the United States” ibid., we any State,” ... of held that the statute pri- with a state in a official con- vate party’s joint participation both would constitute “state action es- to discriminate spiracy a direct violation of Fourteenth petitioner’s to show sential and action “‘under rights” equal protection Amendment Id., In of the statute.” at 152.14 for purposes color’ law statement, following 14 The Adickes opinion contained may necessary to show has person be that a n. 23: “Whatever else also it es statute’ for ... we think purposes [a] ‘under color of acted knowledge pursuant to that statute.” sential that he act with obviously was meant neither to establish the definition of This statement law, a distinction between action under color of nor to establish statutory standard action. requirement and constitutional of state response argument made in that the discrimina statement was an pursuant trespass was statute and tion to the rejected satisfy requirements that this of 1983. The Court would had showing no that the defendants this because there had been factual of, pursuant to, It in this con knowledge acted with this statute. was text, that this statement made. in Adickes Brennan, suggest writing separately,

Justice did *9 alone, private “when establish that party a acts must be shown... to more authority to he acts state than is needed ‘under color of’ a statute or other Id., at (footnote omit- show that his action constitutes action.” state ted). view, however, conjunction party private Even in his when a acts of the official, requirement with a state whatever satisfies the state-action requirement Fourteenth Amendment satisfies the under-color-of-state-law rested, a part, at on position least the Brennan’s statute. Justice in the “state action” much less of what would constitute strict standard any In adopted by majority. the area of than that racial discrimination the case, adopted by position articulated has never been he there Court. to held have party a private that conclusion of our

support be under “can liable Amendment Fourteenth violated Price, States v. United part that cited ibid., we §1983,” concluded that which we had in7, n. S., at law are same of state color action and action Adickes provides 928). no for the support supra, (quoted §of 1983.15 novel construction of Appeals’

B difficult to reconcile is the Court of Appeals The decision attachment and prejudgment garnishment with the Court’s enacting congressional purpose with the cases and Finance Family Corp., with Sniadach Beginning held that con- consistently has (1969), the Court U. S. to apply garnishment of due process requirements stitutional officers whenever attachment procedures and prejudgment discussion of Adickes confuses the two counts of the Powell’s Justice alleged conspiracy count which There was a complaint in that case. “(1) police conspired had To de respondent private party officer —a —and right equal in a [petitioner] enjoy her to treatment and service prive (2) accommodation’; to her arrest ‘on false and cause place public Id., respect count, vagrancy.’” It was with to this charge of at 149-150. custom, any allege unconstitutional statute or that the Court which did police joint party officer was suffi held that action against count of her support party. cient to suit other alleged complaint was a count in which she that the act substantive community pursuant segregate of discrimination was a “custom of the rely eating places.” did not on public races Here the Court “joint theory, “petitioner abridgment but held that would show an action” protection right, proves if equal of her she that Kress refused her service Id., because of custom.” 173. Justice Powell state-enforced Adickes wrong holding is when he “a acts summarizes conspires ap under color of law when he officials to secure the with state plication plainly enjoy presump aof state law so unconstitutional as to no validity.” Post, conspiracy tion This at 954-955. confuse argues substantive counts at issue in Adickes. Unless one that the no vagrancy argument law was one made unconstitutional —an law, count of Adickes did not joint Adickes —the involve a state “plainly whether unconstitutional” or not. *10 with a creditor in act the jointly securing State prop- North Sniadach and Georgia in Finishing,

erty dispute. Di-Chem, Inc., Inc. v. (1975), U. S. involved state- Mitchell v. W. T. Grant procedures; created garnishment (1974), involved Co., 416 U. S.. execution of a vendor’s In each of property. lien to secure these cases disputed creditor in the the securing state aided agents disputed prop- case the federal but each issue arose erty; litigation and debtor the state courts and between creditor no state Nevertheless, as a party. official was named each case the and the adjudicated Court entertained defendant-debtor’s claim that the under which the procedure creditor private secured the violated federal property constitutional disputed standards of due Necessary that conclusion is process. the use of the holding private state challenged proce- dures with state officials constitutes state help of the Fourteenth purposes Amendment. Shevin,

Fuentes 67 (1972), U. S. was a 1983 action both a brought against creditor and the State Attor- General. ney The plaintiff sought declaratory injunctive relief, on due grounds, from continued process enforcement of state statutes authorizing prejudgment replevin. if plaintiff prevailed; Court of were correct Appeals case, there would have been no 1983 cause of action against the private parties. Yet remained they parties, ran judgment them against in this Court.16 16We thus incomprehensible find Justice Powell’s statement that we cite no cases in which a presumptively decision to invoke a valid legal process Post, has been held to Like be state action. at 950. wise, his cases, discussion of 952-953, steadfastly ignores these post, at predicate for holding in each challenge case that the debtor could adequacy constitutional property. creditor’s seizure of his predicate That necessarily principle private part/s that a invoca tion of a seemingly valid prejudgment statute, remedy coupled with the aid of a official, satisfies the requirement state-action of the Fourteenth Amendment and warrants against relief private party.

934 pro- debt collection in state-court debtor

If a defendant process challenge, successfully on due ceedings federal can procedures au- to the grounds, plaintiff resort creditor’s the why to by is difficult understand statute, it a state thorized plaintiff pro- by should not the state-court behavior same that § creditor-plaintiff If the under action vide a cause of by process rights seiz- due debtor-defendant’s violates the statutory procedures, ing property with in accordance his deny to a cause of the latter no reason is little or there § designed provide statute, 1983, under the federal just judicial violations. constitutional redress such language of color of the “under To read the statute” impose way a limit on those as to in such a Fourteenth Act by § may be redressed the 1983 violations Amendment wholly purpose inconsistent with the would be cause of action Rights 13, from Act of 17 Stat. which of 1 of the Civil passed express pur- The Act was “for the is 1983 derived. ‘enforc[ing] pose the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amend- of Lynch Corp., Household Finance U. S. ment.’” history replete with statements of the Act creating remedy indicating Congress thought was it protection the that the Fourteenth Amendment broad as Perhaps the most direct statement affords the individual. manager of the bill Edmunds, this was that Senator the very simple really “[Section is] the so Senate: Cong. Cong., reenact[s] 42d 1st the Constitution.” Globe, (1871). Representative similarly Bingham stated Sess., purpose the bill’s of the Con- was “the enforcement... every Republic stitution on behalf citizen of the individual by rights guarantied him ... to the the the Con- extent of App. Id., stitution.” 81.17 Act, bill fact, throughout congressional In over the 1871 the debate officially provisions of

was as a “to the fourteenth described bill enforce States, pur amendment to the United and for other Constitution g., e. also, describing poses.” See remarks of Senator Trumbull purpose passing passed bill the House of House in Act: “[A]s the Court of is inconsist- Appeals line drawn sum, the

In substantially and would undercut cases our prior ent § 1983 cause action. providing purpose congressional constitutes state ac- respondents conduct challenged If the then decisions, that conduct our prior as delimited tion and will state law suit support color of under also action § 1983.18 *12 body go of that to no by the members was understood it Representatives, rights guarantied which were in the protect persons than to further Globe, States,” Cong. 42d laws of the United and by the Constitution them Shellabarger (1871); Representative Sess., and remarks Cong., 1st Amendment, bill and the Fourteenth 1 of the relationship between on id., App. 68. inconsistent with the statement this case is not Our conclusion and action under [state elements that “these two Flagg Brothers S., at 436 U. separate inquiry.” two areas denote law] color of state satisfying state-action conduct First, although we hold that 155-156. statutory require Amendment satisfies of the Fourteenth requirement law, from that it does not follow of state under color ment of action requirement satisfies the under-color-of-state-law all conduct that If action. requirement of state Amendment satisfy would the Fourteenth that the individual nothing more than state law means action under color of statute,” v. S. H. Adickes knowledge pursuant “with of and act Brothers Flagg S., 162, 23, clearly Co., n. then Kress & 398 U. Four of the itself, requirement not, satisfy the state-action that would that the under- Second, in this case although we hold teenth Amendment. already included not anything not add requirement does color-of-state-law Amendment, § 1983 Fourteenth requirement of the within the state-action statutory provisions provisions and applicable to other constitutional right is at federal such a requirement. Where that contain no state-action be a law would of state issue, statutory concept action under color finding of a viola by a implicitly the case not satisfied distinct element of particular right. tion of the federal Dodson, 454 County v. Polk today Nor is our decision inconsistent ac- defender’s public a County, In Polk we held U. S. in state tions, performing lawyer’s traditional functions counsel when we Although ana- § 1983 suit. proceeding, support would not criminal of action requirement light of the lyzed public conduct in defender’s necessary it was law,” specifically stated that “under of state we color to the was identical requirement whether that in that case to consider hHHH law constitutional the state- As a matter of substantive judicial recognition reflects fact action requirement by the Constitution are protected secured rights that “most Flagg Brothers, infringement by governments,” only against Metropol- Jackson said 156. As the Court (1974): Edison itan 345, Rights Cases, in the Civil U. S. “In set forth in dichotomy [the affirmed the essential Amendment between deprivation by Fourteenth] under its scrutiny provisions, State, subject pri- conduct, discriminatory ‘however or wrongful,’ vate Amendment no which Fourteenth offers against shield.” pre- to the “state action” requirement

Careful adherence freedom the reach of limiting serves an area of individual It also avoids impos- judicial power. federal law federal officials, State, responsibility on the its agencies ing *13 A be blamed. fairly major conduct for which cannot they the limits of is the courts to respect consequence require “Although Amendment: this requirement the Fourteenth “state action” identical, they if see questions were Court has sometimes treated United, (1966), Price, 787, 794, we need not and n. States n, Id., 322, this relationship in order to decide case.” consider their employee, in defender, although a state a public We there that concluded professional ethics client, canons of day-to-day defense acts under of his employ- Accordingly, although state in a role adversarial to the State. actor under our a state generally render the defendant ment is sufficient to any infra, to detect difficult” analysis, “peculiarly it was In Polk at 320. case. 454 U. the circumstances of that the State in agen- against governmental County, we also rejected respondent’s claims rights his any arguably violated allege policy that he “failed to cies because Id., Be- at 326. Amendments.” Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth under the for or decision of conduct challenge rule respondent failed to cause a claim support not allegations would responsible, his which the State Thus, Infra, at 937. analysis proposed below. action under of state County. in Polk outcome suggest a different today does our decision against governments as directed own power their or this is bad good policy, Whether it is a interests. order. of our political fact fundamental insisted the conduct accordingly have alleg- cases Our of a federal be right the deprivation fairly attrib- causing edly These cases reflect a two-part approach to the State. utable First, of “fair attribution.” the deprivation question the exercise of some or right be caused by privilege must rule of conduct byor a imposed by created the State for whom the State is In responsible. aby person State Fuentes, Grant, T. and North Sniadach, W. Georgia, statute or to provided right garnish a state example, as well as the attachment, procedure obtain prejudgment Second, be exercised. could rights party which must be a who with the deprivation person may charged actor. This because is a may be said to be a state be he fairly he has acted with or has ob- official, together because officials, from state or because his con- tained aid significant is to the Without a limit chargeable duct otherwise State. such as could face constitutional this, parties litiga- seek to state rule rely governing tion whenever on some they them. their interactions with community surrounding are not the same. related, these two Although principles into other the claim of a constitu They each when collapse official tional is directed whose deprivation against party to his deci character such as to lend the the State weight of sions. Monroe v. See Pape, S.

two di constitutional claim is principles diverge when the rected i. e., against authority, without such apparent in against the two The difference between party. *14 is well No. 107 quiries illustrated Moose by comparing Lodge v. Irvis, Brothers, 407 (1972), U. with S. Flagg supra.

In Moose the Lodge, discriminatory Court held that the practices of the did not violate the Protection appellant Equal Clause because those did not constitute “state practices action.” The Court focused on the primarily question discriminatory policy admittedly could the whether inquiry, governmental The decision.19 way ato be ascribed adopted policies State that the those to therefore, looked as appellant. concluded follows: applied The Court to were exception hereafter with the hold, that therefore “We regulatory scheme operation the enforced the noted, by Liquor Pennsylvania not suf- Board does Control the discriminatory guest implicate ficiently in the the State Lodge policies . . . make the latter ‘state ac- to of Moose Equal the Protection Clause ambit of the tion’ within S., at 177. Amendment.” U. the Fourteenth as- to discriminate could not be the decision words, In other governmental any governmental decision; those de- to cribed Lodge were unconnected with affect Moose cisions that did discriminatory policies.20 its component

Flagg on of the Brothers focused the other pro- principle. case, In that the warehouseman state-action Code, 7-210, York Commercial under New Uniform ceeded constitutionality provi- challenged of that and the debtor grounds it violated the Due Process and on the sion Equal of the Fourteenth Amendment. Protection Clauses Undoubtedly responsible statute. for the The State response however, focused not on the terms of Court, on character of defendant to the 1983 the statute but inquiry opinion 19 Thereare elements of the other state-action relationship primarily distinguish well. in the effort to This is found Lodge and the restaurant Moose and the from that between State State Wilmington Parking Authority, considered in Burton at 175. See U. enjoined point. The exception” further illustrates this “one Lodge comply its requiring of a Moose own enforcement state rule racially bylaws they discriminatory constitution and insofar as contained rule, judicially or administra provisions. enforcement of this either State circumstances, would, governmental decision tively, amount adopt policy. racially discriminatory

939 statute, with- pursuant Action a suit: private not sufficient a char- more, justify something out as a “state actor.” The Court acterization of that party more” which would convert “something suggested with vary actor the circum- might into state the private party a recognition This was that the simply stances of the case. number of different factors or tests has articulated Terry g., e. test, function” see “public contexts: different Marsh v. Alabama, Adams, (1953); 461 326 S. v. U. test, see Adickes v. the “state (1946); compulsion” U. S. Co., H. Kress & 170; test, S. at the “nexus” see S., 398 U. Metropolitan Edison (1974); Jackson U. S. v. Parking Authority, Wilmington Burton 365 U. S. 715 attachments, and, “joint in the case (1961); prejudgment Flagg Brothers, at 157.21 Whether test,” different or actually operation different tests are these fact- necessarily characterizing different ways simply situation the Court in such a bound that confronts inquiry supra, Burton, 722 (“Only here. need not be resolved See non- can the facts and circumstances by sifting weighing conduct be attrib- obvious involvement of the State uted its true significance”).

IV is whether case, to this the first question Turning of a right the exercise claimed has resulted from deprivation second authority. its source in state having or privilege case, is whether, respond- under the facts of this question charac- ents, who are be parties, may appropriately terized as “state actors.” Powell’s dissent, of Justice we do Contrary suggestion legal procedures today

hold that “a of state party’s mere invocation satisfying ‘joint participation’ constitutes state officials ‘conspiracy’ Post, 951. The requirement § 1983 of action under color of law.” particu holding today, analysis clear, limited to the as the above makes prejudgment lar context of attachment. *16 Appeals the the Court of noted District Court and

Both the petitioner’s ambiguous scope “There has been contentions: of throughout litigation ques- the on the confusion considerable depri- Lugar’s claim of unconstitutional ultimate tion whether only Virginia itself or the statute vation was directed application 639 F. n. 1. 2d, him.” to at its erroneous ambiguity of this was not resolution that courts held Both necessary disposition init, of the case: both resolved their petitioner attacking that of the view case, in favor misapplica- constitutionality well as its statute as of the the is this issue essential to the of view, In our resolution tion. disposition proper of ease. the complaint. presented three his Count

Petitioner counts pendent on state tort law; claim based counts three was violations Due Process Clause. two one and claimed deprivation alleged property resulted that the Count two opressive respondents’ wanton, willful, “malicious, from By petitioner appar- [and] “unlawful,” [sic], acts.” unlawful say ently To this, law.” how- “unlawful state meant under petitioner say com- of which ever, that the conduct is any governmental plained decision; could not be ascribed contrary pol- respondents acting to the relevant were rather, they by icy the author- Nor did have articulated the State. put weight ity behind of the State of state officials to i. this case not fall within decision, e., does their recognized authority Monroe v. the abuse of doctrine respondents Pape, invoked That 365 U. S. 167 way grounds at- in no be to do so statute without the could two, Count to a rule or a state decision. tributed §1983 but of action under therefore, does not state a cause only challenges private action. That count describes one is matter.

Count a different obtaining pre- by respondents procedures followed judgment state court the fact that the attachment as well as re- subsequently because dismissed the attachment ordered Pe- spondents state law. had not met their burden sequence states events summarily then titioner without due process. his Although property him deprived is to the referring state- petitioner whether not clear is it misuse of re- procedure or the procedure created the lower courts better we agree spondents, is that petitioner challenges the the complaint reading defective under the Fourteenth as procedurally statute Amendment.22 a state does not statute describe misuse

While private to the State, attributed procedural that can be conduct statute obviously product scheme created *17 This to constitutional restraints subject is and state action. if in a 1983 action, be addressed second may properly is met as well. requirement element of state-action in II, from discussion Part we have As is clear consist party’s joint held that ently participation is in the seizure of sufficient disputed state officials property characterize that as “state actor” for purposes party Amendment. The in these of the Fourteenth rule cases is H. Kress Adickes v. S. & as that in the same articulated supra, at. in the context of an equal protection deprivation:

“‘Private in with state officials persons, jointly engaged action, are color” of law prohibited acting “under for To color” of purposes the statute. act “under law does officer of require that the accused be an State. It is is that he willful in enough participant joint activity with the State or agents,’” quoting its United States v. Price, at 794. 22 Thisconfusion in petitioner’s in allegations nature of continued oral argument petitioner this Court. at various counsel times Although deny petitioner constitutionality seemed to challenged of the stat g., e.

ute, see, Tr. of Arg. Oral he also stated that claim taken, “[t]he is that the just action as even line line in if it were accordance with Virginia they right, law —whether or not the claim is did it Id., that it was in violation Lugar’s rights.” constitutional in this context in holding erred of Appeals The Court than more something invoking required participation” “joint advantage take state-created officials state the aid of to the con- holding contrary That procedures. attachment of due the applicability proc- as to reached have we clusions Whatever be true in may procedures. standards such ess has when the State created a sufficient contexts, this is other will attach on the ex property officials whereby system to a private dispute. one application parte of his was deprived property summary, petitioner In were, therefore, respondents acting action; through participating deprivation. law of state under color cause of 1983 in- a valid did present Petitioner constitutionality Virginia he challenged as sofar he misuse or abuse alleged only statute; he did not insofar of the statute.23 affirmed part part, is reversed judgment further consistent with is remanded for proceedings

the case opinion.

So ordered. *18 innocently private individuals who is concerned that Justice Powell if the law is responsible, use laws would be seemingly make valid state unconsitutional, consequences of their ac subsequently held to be for the with not view, however, problem should be dealt tions. In our by establishing an affirma changing character of the cause of action but for the partially responsible tive defense. A concern is at least similar defense, immunity, to state officials. availability good-faith qualified of a or pri question availability of such a defense to We need not reach the Adickes, U. at juncture. we said in vate individuals at this What 174, just today: 44, question applicable n. when confronted with this if a concerning might appropriate be “We intimate no views the relief that issues, remedial parties violation is shown. The not briefed these have in first instance they explored if a proved violation is are best developed Nor do light on remand. below of the new record that will be juncture are defenses we mean to determine at this whether there Pierson at hand. Cf. available to like the one defendants 1983 actions (1967)” (citations omitted). Ray, 386 U. S. 547 Burger, dissenting. Justice Chief dealing with suits under 1983 or we are suits Whether my brought pursuant Amendment, to the Fourteenth view infringement inquiry same: is the claimed of a fed is the fairly right attributable the State. Rendell-Baker v. eral Applying this it ante, standard, cannot be Kohn, at respondents fairly of the named are said that the actions Respondents did no more than attributable to State.* prejudgment presumptively valid state attachment invoke a Relying procedure to all. on a dubious “but for” available erroneously analysis, concludes that the subse attaching pu steps procedural quent the State a taken way respond property in some transforms tative debtor’s This case is no different actions of the State. ents’ acts into commences a law in which a situation from the temporary, injunctive if even which, relief and secures suit may Invoking injury significant a to the defendant. cause implicates judicial process, and its offi the State course, essentially private conduct into not transform cers but does Sparks, Dennis v. actions of the State. profession,

Similarly, practices drives a trade one who is not license or builds house automobile, an fairly In both engaging the state. attributable to in acts pri remedy petitioner’s lies case Dennis and the instant prosecution. The damages such as malicious vate suits for any beyond opinion expands the statute the reach of Court’s consequence may thing by Congress. well be It intended trap casually falling because semantical into a of too figurative law.” of the term “color of use challenged demonstrate pleadings amply

*The in this case actions unlawful solely respondents’ acts. was directed conduct App. allegations,” “conclusory respondents made alleged were that id., attachment, and re- basis” for respondents lacked a “factual *19 support” attach- would facts which spondents “good cause to believe lacked Id., conspiracy with or of collusion allegation There is no ment. at 19. state actors. with whom Justice and Rehnquist Powell, Justice dissenting. join,

Justice O’Connor example expansive disquieting Today’s of how is a decision person every decisionmaking ensnare a who had judicial can acting in strict accordance law. he was to believe reason outgrowth nearly years ago began as the of a five The case Virginia Respond- simple a court. suit on debt brought Southside, dealer small wholesale oil ent—a Va.— Lugar, truckstop against petitioner who owner had suit pay collect The suit was to this indebted- a debt.1 failed to might dissipate petitioner his assets be- that ness. Fearful petition respondent also filed a collected, fore the debt Lugar’s seeking sequestration of certain of assets. state court Virginia statute, traceable at least to so under a He did prejudgment permits to seek attachment creditors ques- property possession debtors.2 No court had in the presump- validity statute, it remains tioned the duly tively of the state court issued writ valid. The Clerk County it. then executed and the Sheriff attachment, conspired respondent allegation with the is no There deny petitioner protection the fair of state state officials federal law. Co., alleged action, Edmondson Oil

1 The state filed the name previously deliv $41,983 products Lugar and merchandise owed defendants both Lugar has named as App. present ered. In the suit As the re Ronald Barbour. president, Oil Co. and its the Edmondson id,., Oil spondent is the stockholder of Edmondson Barbour sole id., 26,1 litigation, in this see appears to have directed all its actions respondent. throughout as if he were the sole refer Barbour (1977). § the attachment At the time of seq. Va. Code 8.01-533 et See (1973). seq. § et 8-519 case, applicable provisions were Va. Code essentially in their provisions remained Virginia attachment have Va. Code 1819. See despite since present form recodifications numerous seq. § et (1919); (1950); Va. Code seq. seq. et 8-519 et Va. Code 6378 (1849); Code, (1887); Code, ch. Va. ch. Va.

945 in his ultimately prevailed lawsuit. peti- Respondent a court to his A by ordered debt. pay was Lugar tioner that assets should not however, Lugar’s find, court did to a on the prior judgment underlying been attached have action. instituted action Lugar decision legal

Following Court for the Western District of Vir District States United statute, §1983, under federal U. S. C. Suing ginia. the respondent by filing petition alleged Lugar — of law” “under color and had caused court —had acted under Fourteenth constitutional rights the deprivation does Amendment not create rights Amendment —an such as have citizens, one would against private enforceable only against but the States. be, respondent assumed Kohn, ante, Bros., Inc. v. 837; Flagg Rendell-Baker Kraemer, Brooks, (1978); Shelley v. (1883).3 Cases, 109 U. 1, 13 (1948); Rights 3, 11 Civil S. U. S. of Appeals agreed Both the District Court the Court sensi They had no cause petitioner held for could not be found that bly respondent responsible suit did of constitutional that the any deprivation rights court. belong in federal This lower Court reverses of those today judgment who did It holds that citizen respondent, courts. traditionally no more than commence a action of a kind legal ac- in “state by engaged initiated private parties, thereby This decision is as as it is implausible. tion.” unprecedented no It is to the and the makes plainly unjust respondent, provided: question, Title U. at the S. C. time statute, ordinance, regulation, “Every person who, any under color of custom, subjects, to be sub- usage, Territory, or or or State causes jurisdic- jected, any person citizen of the or other within United States deprivation thereof immunities se- any rights, privileges, tion to the or injured in an laws, cured Constitution and shall be liable to law, equity, redress.” proper proceeding action at suit other repre- contrary. Respondent, argument who to the filing of a his had no notion that have counsel, could sented payment of the effort to secure petition court, in state *21 damages actor” liable private him a “state debt, made by action the Commonwealth allegedly unconstitutional analysis Virginia. with the consistent is the Court’s Nor of contrary, by inquiry prescribed our cases. On mode between the fundamental distinctions the Court undermines categories conduct and be- of state and common-sense concepts legal action” and action of “state tween the of law.” “under color

I language plain 1988establishes that a of 42 U. S. C. requisites satisfy jurisdictional plaintiff to state an two must allege he the violation of a must First, actionable claim. right by and laws” of United “secured the Constitution rights by the Constitution “most secured Because States. by only infringement governments,” protected against are Flagg require- Brooks, Bros., this Inc. U. compels presence inquiry action. an into the ment alleged depriva- plaintiff that the Second, a 1983 must show by person acting of law. In tion was “under color” caused Flagg Bros., elements this Court affirmed that “these two separate inquiry.” Id., See denote two 155-156. areas Adickes v. S. H. Kress & separate why inquiries are re-

This case demonstrates Virginia quired. disputed Here it not that the Sheriff peti- sequestered Clerk of the state officials Court, who by Virginia property provided law, tioner’s in the manner alleging engaged petitioner, while state action. Yet the injury officials, did constitutional from this action agents. not sue the State or its In circumstances these inquiry Appeals correctly Court of stated that the relevant Flagg the re- was the second whether identified Bros.: spondent, private only invoke a whose citizen presumptively process, had acted valid state attachment peti- “causing” deprive under color of state law in the State to Consistently with rights.4 tioner of constitutional alleged the Court concluded Court, Appeals decisions of this past had occurred under conduct that respondent’s law. color of the Court Appeals, reasoning

Rejecting two mandated by inquiries conflates inexplicably opinion Flagg Bros. case involves two sets of Ignoring filed a suit and ac- who merely by respondent, actions —one the state offi- another petition; sequestration companying the lien —it wrongly and executed the writ who issued cials, not as whether the Court, pri- before frames the question law in filing under color of petition, acted respondent vate are who private parties, . . . respondents, as “whether but ” Ante, *22 as ‘state actors.’ characterized bemay appropriately on the that a may, theory that they It then concludes at 939. officials to take “the aid of state who invokes party is a “joint attachment procedures” state-created of advantage a “state actor.” the State and therefore with participant” asserts, is as follows: rule,” “The the Court with state officials jointly engaged “Private persons, law for ‘under color’ of action, are acting the prohibited does of law To act ‘under color’ of the statute. purposes the State. be an officer of not that the accused require in a joint that he is a willful enough participant It is Ante, 941, with the or its activity agents.” State supra, H. Adickes v. Kress & S. quoting Price, 383 U. S. States v. 787, 794 United turn quoting Appeals cor of Judge Phillips’ opinion excellent for the en banc Court by a institution rectly the mere question presented defined the as “whether without judicial proceedings, private litigant presumptively of valid state with litigant by that any prior subsequent collusion or concerted action administrative, or adjudicative, proceed the state officials who then under color proceedings, executive enforcement of the constitutes 1058, 1061-1062 F. 2d contemplation of 1983.” 639 state law within (footnote omitted). (CA4 1981) two fallacies in the Court’s conclusion. are at least There our cases have from the First, as is apparent quotation, with state offi- “joint participants” established that private become state actors. Where necessarily cials thémselves officials pursuit interact with state eitizens is ends, appropriate inquiry generally merely private have acted “under color law.” whether the private parties is whether an action occurred inquiry when the Second, even “joint par- our make clear law, cases under color when a citizen satisfied is not standard ticipation” valid judicial proc- invoke presumptively does no more than ends. only legitimate private ess pursuit

HH t—i in Monroe Pape, As Court recognized this §of 1983 was to purpose prevent the historic (1961), their under state authority the cloak of using officials from infringement against violate rights protected law to is cor accordingly Amendment.5 The Court the Fourteenth in a 1983 suit against pri inquiry rect that an important an “con wrongful there is allegation whether vate ” Ante, at 941. This to the State. duct that can be attributed Bros. But there Flagg referred to is the first question Bros, whether remains the second Flagg question: still whose respondent, can be to the fairly attributed state action *23 5 if in abuse their capacities, even acting in their official State officials g., of law. E. color” authority, generally act “under lawful are held to 339, Virginia, 100 U. S. Pape, parte Ex S., 171-172; Monroe v. 365 U. at (1880). author with the are “clothed 346-347 This is because such officials very wrongs ity” law, perpetrate gives power which them Classic, 313 United States v. Congress prevent. intended 1983 to Polk Virginia, supra, at 299, 346-347. Cf. parte Ex (1941); U. S. (a defender, an Dodson, (1981) representing County v. public 454 U. S. which the indigent performs a function proceeding, client in a criminal under needed, not act authority therefore does of his is not state office traditionally pri attorney’s color of state engaged law when defense roles). vate invoke a valid was to attachment presumptively action only unasked by Court, This reveals the statute. question, be held account- may its conclusion respondent fallacy because he was a attachment “state property able for the occurrence of state action by From the taken actor.”6 it property, does not petitioner’s who sequestered Sheriff became a “state be- actor” respondent simply follow that Court, This until was. has never today, cause the Sheriff this non sequitur. endorsed action is true that respondent’s private

It of course fol- lowed action, and that the state ac- by “[tjhat But the State responds tions were not unconnected. action of its does not [taking actions [private] by own] actions.” Blum v. for those [private] render it responsible Bros., S., Flagg 1005. See at 164- Yaretsky, post, at Co., Edison 165; Jackson v. Metropolitan 345, U. S. (1974). is not for a And where the State responsible in a certain way, gener- decision to behave “state action” within the meaning cannot be considered ally Blum e. at 1004-1005; g., Yaretsky, post, our cases. v. See, Irvis, Moose No. 107 v. Lodge 163, 407 U. S. 172-173 Edison supra, “[re- Jackson Metropolitan As in v. where exercise of the choice allowed state law spondent’s by Price, ante, 787, 928, United States Court, quotes 1983, (1966), ‘under color’ establishing n. 7 cases under “[i]n consistently thing of law has same as the ‘state action’ been treated as the Price, however, required under the Fourteenth Amendment.” In same action” and the conduct the same actors constituted both “state (if action “under color” of law. n. 7 an indictment See 383 U. alleges part ‘private’ “conduct on the of the which constitutes defendants .”). action,’ ‘state . The situa alleges] [it also action ‘under color of law. tion in this “state action” quite present case different. The case involves Price. But Sheriff —action that also was “under color of law” private respondent question the real here is whether the conduct constituted either The Price quo state action or action under color of law. Price, plainly tation cited in does not resolve And the cases question. relies, similarly inapposite. on which the Court also are *24 from State, and not does not from it the initiative comes purposes doing for so ‘state action’ its make action (footnote S., at 357 Amendment.” the Fourteenth omitted). private parties are has held that ame- course

This Court of “jointly engaged” with state 1983when nable to suit under rights. Adickes of constitutional See in the violation officials (1970).7 Yet the Court, v. S. H. Kress & theory, advancing “joint participation” does not cite a its presump- single invoke decision to in which case legal process tively has been to constitute held valid state princi- quotation on the Court which Even state action. applicable ante, pally “rule,” at for its statement relies explic- Rather, it states not refer to action. 941, does jointly engaged “[pjrivate persons, with state offi- itly that acting prohibited color’ of law action, are ‘under cials in the purposes the statute.” for recognized quotation, have our cases illustrated

As private action under “state action” and between a distinction principle. It also This is sound of law.” distinction “color supportive of the distinction between is consistent with subject government “private” that is conduct and procedural Clause of the of the Due Process limitations notes: “Careful As the Court itself Fourteenth Amendment. requirement preserves an area to the ‘state action’ adherence by limiting law and federal freedom reach of individual imposing judicial power. State, on the It also avoids federal responsibility for which agencies conduct for officials, its they fairly Ante, cannot be blamed.” inquiry acknowledges individ-

A “color law” joint officials, engaged with state in unlawful behavior uals, they wrongs may personally responsible cause be with the actors But it does not confuse occur. spe have been used “jointly engaged” appears In Adickes the term See U. “conspiracy.” engagement cifically to connote 152-153. *25 the analysis of fallacy adopted today by

State —the involving private case action of In this the re- Court. the state courts of Virginia, petitioning ap- spondent is to not respondent’s liability whether inquiry propriate he but whether acted color of actor, state law. he was a I therefore that turn. this question It is to

HH I—I our cases not Court, of do es- Contrary position mere that a invocation state private legal tablish party’s “joint participation” constitutes “conspiracy” procedures with state officials ac- satisfying requirement In Dennis v. Sparks, tion under color law. S. held under color (1980), parties we acted awith state a joint law when corruptly conspiring judge however, to defraud. In so we holding, scheme explicitly on to the courts and “merely resorting being stated side of a lawsuit does not make a winning co-conspir- party Id., This ator or a actor with the at 28. con- joint judge.” Polk is our more decision clusion reinforced recent Dodson, As we held to County be defendant, of a criminal invo- respect true to the defense of state is function legal “essentially cation process . . . for which office and are needed.” authority Id., at 319. These recent decisions make clear inde- litigation made the context of private decisions pendent, The Court said to color law.8 cannot be occur under for its grounds holding nevertheless two principal advances to the contrary. context of holding particular “is limited The Court avers that its Ante, welcome, 939, n. 21. However this

prejudgment attachment.” why en principled limitation lacks a It unclear basis. property, seeking filing papers an attachment gages state action when (e. g., injunction), or when summoning an seeking but not when relief other police investigate a crime. suspected

A § 1983 is petitioner’s action under argues that The Court proc applied has due supported in which cases prejudgment garnishment attach standards to ess specificallyon Sniadach relies procedures. The Court ment *26 (1969); Corp., Fuentes v. 337 Family Finance (1972); T. 416 v. W. Grant Mitchell Shevin, 407 U. S. Finishing, Georgia Di- (1974); Inc. v. North and U. S. (1975). According Court, to the Chem, Inc., 419 S.U. private acts “under color” a establish these cases property an un seeking of under the attachment when of law reading In dem fact, a careful state statute.9 constitutional authority proposition. provide they for this no onstrates that Sniadach, Mitchell, and Court, the cited the cases Of validity of state attach- on the attacks all involved Di-Chem alleged garnishment None the cases statutes. ment or joint private State, with the was a actor that the creditor damages against the creditor. claim for involved a and none under not a federal action suit, a state Each case involved any unnecessary these cases It was 1983. therefore by virtue of creditor, the for this Court to consider whether instituting garnishment, a state became the attachment or There not one acted under color state law. actor or word in of these cases that so characterizes consider Shevin, In Fuentes v. the Court did creditor.10 stage litigation respondent At one in the that his lawsuit averred question validity raised of the constitutional statutes.” “[n]o the State Opposition Dismiss 3. The Dis Plaintiff’s Memorandum to Motion to complaint only trict Court nevertheless concluded that “the can be read as App. challenging constitutionality Virginia’s statute.” attachment 2d, Appeals to Pet. agreed. for Cert. 38. The Court of 639 F. n. and support contrary only reading

10 TheCourt finds for its these view implicitly embracing fallacy today. cases as In same as the does Court Sniadach, Mitchell, and question Di-Chem —as in this was no case —there There, here, that state action had occurred. as some official of State— undisputed property an state actor —had undertaken to attach or either creditor as well the State against be- however, only Again, question General.11

Attorney of a state statute. No claim the validity fore this Court was actor with the was a State joint was that the creditor made were from damages law. No sought had under acted color for this there no occasion creditor. Again, §1983 of and private party, consider the status this. As in the discusses a word opinion there is not Di-Chem, Mitchell, Sniadach, Fuentes thus fails to mere invocation of state at- party’s that a establish action under represents procedures or garnishment tachment in which those are procedures case color of law —even to be unconstitutional. held subsequently

B on the constitutional- In cases relying involving addition statutes, the Court of state attachment ity garnishment *27 Adickes v. on theory a based “joint advances participation” Co., 398 U. In Adickes the H. Kress & S. 144 S. 1983, § a alleging sued a restaurant under plaintiff conspiracy the restaurant local to police deprive between in accom- of place public her of the to treatment right equal Id., below, the decision at Reversing modation. that the pri- this the cause of action. It found upheld offi- to obtain defendant, vate in with local police “conspiring” of racial segregation, cial enforcement of a state custom in or its agents’” the State engaged “‘joint activity with by these garnish wages. Court, For the occurrence of state the must ipso also private plaintiffs state officials the establishes that facto presence have of state action been viewed as state actors. the Given officials, however, pri- there whether the inquire state was no need to opinions that the parties plain vate also were actors. It is from Nor, court, arising do Court did not so. was there cases of need consider under color to whether defendants had acted meaning law within the of 1983. 11 v. Epps Fuentes was consolidated with facts, involving similar a case Cortese, (ED 1971). Supp. 326 F. Pa. the meaning of law within under color and therefore acted Price, Id., United States §1983. of at (quoting 794). S., U. however, Court, Justice of the suggestion

Contrary in Adickes did to define purport opinion Harlan’s Court closely to facts Attending law.” color of term “under “[wjhatever else may observed the Court presented, that a has acted under color to show person also be necessary 1983,... we think it essential purposes [a] of statute’for of pursuant to that stat knowledge he act with added). 162, n. 23 As indi (emphasis S.,U. ute.” the Court seems to language, clearly choice cated A citizen sum limiting principle. some contemplated have law would not be ordinarily to enforce the the police moning Nor, in a presum have engaged “conspiracy.” considered be characterized as acting citizen would such ably, to suit con thereby amenability risking color law and might Surely occur. subsequently violations stitutional in Adickes indicate that the Court would nothing there is in cases of this kind. action under color law have found Adickes from these distinguishable hypotheti- Although in Adickes oc- case is not. The conduct cals, current Education, after Brown v. Board years curred (1954), litiga- S. 483 and after the decade publicized In of the intense na- that followed in its wake. view tion discrimination, it is virtually focus issues of racial tional on have acted that a citizen then could inconceivable involved belief that the state and customs the innocent law *28 Justice Harlan Adickes still were valid. As presumptively stitched into firmly more wrote, of law are principles “[f]ew a that State constitutional fabric than the proposition our or of his race because not discriminate a against person must or act to way compel or in any the race of his companions, 150-152. Construed S., at U. encourage segregation.” that establishes basis, on this as resting Adickes when he of law conspires acts under color party of a state law so un- plainly to secure the application officials In validity. as no enjoy presumption to constitutional characterized could be as context, the private such in “joint of law and as authority engaging behind hiding in the of constitu- deprivation with the State participation” has however, petitioner alleged no Here, tional rights.12 even was alleged respondent Nor has he conspiracy. should law he known be con- the aid have invoking there is no Finally, allegation invalid.13 stitutionally inwas legal process to invoke way decision respondent’s unconstitutionality of racial discrimination patent Arguing that Adickes, charges count in that this “conspiracy” to the Court irrelevant conspiracy and the substantive causes action. confuses the discussion Ante, 932, is In n. 15. The Court’s view difficult to understand. at conspired Adickes allegedly police with the to “de defendant place in a right enjoy equal her treatment and service prive plaintiff of accommodation,” 150, 5, S., n. to cause public apparently 398 U. her discriminatory vagrancy statute. Be legally baseless arrest under a face, vagrancy challenged invalid on its cause the statute was not as “joint “conspiracy” concludes that count “did not in action” Court Ante, law, ‘plainly volve a state or not.” whether unconstitutional’ simply wrong. place, alleged This In n. 15. conclusion is the first “conspiracy” agreement requiring included enforce an a state law racial plainly Fur segregation restaurants. This law was unconstitutional. ther, certainly the vagrancy even statute would have been unconstitutional these applied segregation. Presumably to enforce it was for rea racial “conspir[ed]’’ sons that the agreed that the had defendant police. entirely a Adickes with the local at 152. different case from the one at bar. 13At least one has scholarly commentator stated a cautious conclusion Virginia provisions satisfy attachment the standards es would Brabham, process tablished this Court’s recent due decisions. See Through Analysis Virginia’s Sniadach Di-Chem and Backwards: An At Statutes, tachment and Detinue 195-199 U. Rich. L. Rev. pres The correctness of not of issue in the this conclusion is an course posture case, ent directly proper nor case’s is it relevant to the resolution. *29 in which he lived. of the State custom law or

compelled is inapposite. simply Adickes In this context it is unprecedented ás therefore Today’s decision unjust.14 good-faith may to claim suggests respondent be entitled The Court Ante, is a 942, n. 23. This

immunity damages. from this suit civil for immunity will miti holding of positive suggestion agree. I A with which however, not, convert litigation. It gate the of this would ultimate cost litigation already has been holding This case just the Court’s into a one. proceedings. further nearly for years. five will now be remanded It by a rights authorized assert solely Respondent, he undertook because expense, subjected to the statute, have been presumptively will valid state litigation. distractions, protracted hazards of