dissenting.

We granted certiorari in this case to decide one very narrow question: “May a court, without articulating its rationale, summarily deny an application for attorneys’ fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988?” Petitioner concedes that “not... all cases require opinions,” Brief for Petitioner 6, n. 6, but argues that with respect to an application for fees under §1988 “[t]he combination of discretion and a standard for the exercise of that discretion necessitates a statement of reasons to determine whether the decision is proper.” Id, at 12. In my view, such an application is not sufficiently distinguishable *330from numerous other motions and applications that a court may concedely decide without opinion. Whether this is a good or bad method of exercising discretion in a particular case, or even in general, is not at issue in this case. Because I do not believe that there is any per se rule that a court may never summarily deny an application for fees, I would affirm the decision below.

Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s disposition of this case.

The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.