*1 OF BOARD OF OF THE CURATORS UNIVERSITY HOROWITZ MISSOURI al. et 1, 1978 March Argued 76-695. November 197 7 Decided No. *2 Rehnquist, Burger, J., opinion Court, in delivered of the Stewart, Powell, Stevens, J., I, JJ., joined, C. and in and and Parts White, J., joined. Powell, concurring H-A, J., III and of which filed a opinion, post, p. White, J., part opinion concurring 92. an filed in and judgment, post, p. Marshall, concurring J., opinion 96. an filed post, Blackmun, concurring J., part dissenting part, p. opinion concurring part dissenting part, filed an in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 108. Wright
Marvin E. for argued petitioners. cause With Wright him on the were Jackson A. Fred Wilkins. brief Benson II for argued Arthur A. and filed brief cause a respondent.* Rehnquist the opinion delivered of the Court.
Me. Justice University Respondent, student at the Missouri-Kansas by petitioner City Medical dismissed officials School, study meet during year her final for failure to- Respondent petitioners under 42 academic standards. sued M. *Joel Gora filed a brief for American et al. Civil Liberties Union as amici curiae urging affirmance. for District Court in the United States §C.
U. S.
constitu-
among other
alleging,
Missouri
Western District
pro-
her
petitioners accorded
violations,
tional
Court,
dismissal.
District
process prior to her
cedural due
respondent had
trial,
full
concluded that
conducting
after
her
Four-
rights guaranteed
been afforded all
Constitution
Amendment
to the United States
teenth
Eighth
for the
Appeals
complaint.
The Court
dismissed
(1976),
petition
I Respondent standing with was admitted advanced years of final of During in the fall Medical School school, student student’s education at the a clinical studies units” academic and pursue in “rotational as obstetrics- pertaining disciplines various medical such Each student’s academic pediatrics, surgery. gynecology, periodic the School is evaluated on a basis performance at composed faculty of Evaluation, body the Council on a both students, including which can recommend various actions of probation and dismissal. The recommendations the Coun- body Coordinating Committee, cil are reviewed composed faculty must be solely members, ultimately approved by Students are not allowed to typically the Dean. Coordinating before the Council or the Commit- appear either tee on the occasion their review of academic student’s performance. respondent’s year first spring study, several expressed
faculty members dissatisfaction with her clinical performance during pediatrics The rotation. mem- faculty bers noted that respondent’s “performance was below that peers her patient-oriented all clinical settings,” that she was erratic in her attendance at sessions, clinical she lacked a critical concern for personal hygiene. Upon the recommendation of the Council on respondent Evaluation, was to her advanced second and year probationary final on a basis.
Faculty respondent’s dissatisfaction with perform- clinical ance continued during the following year. For example, respondent’s docent, or faculty rated her adviser, clinical skills as “unsatisfactory.” In the middle of the year, Council again reviewed progress and concluded respondent should not be considered graduation June of that year; furthermore, the Council recommended that, absent “radical respondent improvement,” dropped from the school.
Respondent permitted to take a set of oral practical examinations as an “appeal” of permit the decision not to graduate. Pursuant this “appeal,” spent a portion substantial of time with practicing physicians seven area who enjoyed good reputation among peers. their physicians were asked recommend whether should be graduate allowed to on schedule if and, not, whether *4 she dropped should be immediately or on allowed remain probation. Only two of the doctors recommended that re- spondent graduated be on schedule. Of the other five, two recommended she be that immediately dropped from the school. remaining The three that be recommended she not allowed to graduate in June and be continued probation on further pending reports on her clinical progress. Upon receipt of these recommendations, on the Council Evaluation reaf- prior firmed its position.
The Council again met mid-May to consider whether respondent should be to remain beyond allowed in school June recent respondent’s report on that year. Noting of that “low-satisfactory,” performance her rotation rated surgery receipt “barring recommended that unanimously Council radically, improved has Horowitz any Miss reports . . of Medi- . in the School re-enroll allowed be [she] its recommendation making delayed cine.” The Council rotations; when reports ón other receiving until official out also turned emergency rotation report recom- unanimously its reaffirmed negative, the Council be from the school. dropped mendation that recom- approved Dean Coordinating Committee and the decision appealed the respondent, who mendation and notified University’s for Health Sciences. Provost writing to reviewing the school’s after The Provost sustained the actions proceedings. earlier compiled during record II A the Four- protections of To be entitled to the such as this respondent must a case Amendment, teenth her deprived from that her dismissal the school demonstrate Respondent has “liberty” interest. “property” either a interest. deprived property of a alleged never that she was Perry v. law, creatures of state property Because interests are Sindermann, respondent would (1972), 408 U. S. 599-603 been to show at trial that her seat have interest Mis- “property” recognized Medical was a School respondent argued her dismissal souri state law. Instead, substantially her deprived “liberty” by impairing her of return her or to opportunities to continue medical education employment medically related field. Appeals agreed, citing opinion The Court of this Court’s Regents Roth, Board (1972). case, U. S. 564 1 Respondent any petitioners regu concedes have not “invoke[d] seeking employment out lations to bar” from in the medical *5 deprived we held that the not any State had a teacher of liberty or property dismissing interest the from a teacher nontenured but noted: position, is no suggestion State, declining
“[T]here re-employ imposed him respondent, stigma a disability other that foreclosed his freedom to take advan- tage employment opportunities. other for State, did example, to bar any regulations invoke respondent from public employment all other in state universities.” at 573. recently
We have upon an opportunity elaborate circumstances under which an employment might termination Wood, infringe protected Bishop liberty interest. v. U. S. 341 (1976), upheld we policeman without a hearing; rejected we theory that the mere fact dismissal, absent some publicizing of the reasons for the could action, liberty: stigma amount to a infringing one's Roth,
“In Board Regents recog- v. 408 U. S. we nized college the nonretention of an untenured teacher might make him to other somewhat less attractive employers, but nevertheless it would concluded that field finishing or from her medical education at a different institution. Regents Respondent Brief for Roth, 21. Cf. Board S., 408 U. Indeed, Coordinating accepting Committee in the recommenda- tion of dismissed, the Council noted that with all “as students, improvement place, should sufficient take she be considered could for readmission to the School of Appeals, Medicine.” The how- Court of ever, testimony relied on City employed of a doctor the Kansas Veterans’ Administration to the effect dismissal would significant be “a black mark.” side, On the Medical School it was the doc- tor’s view that great “would difficulty have get into another school, medical if at all.” As employment, for people apply- if two were ing position with the Veterans’ Administration . with “otherwise . . equal qualifications, roughly, heavily I would lean person to the other who was not graduate dismissed from a 1317, 1320-1321, school.” 538 F. 2d n. 3 *6 a is person far 'to concept suggest too
stretch the in one is not rehired “liberty” simply deprived when he of Id., at before seek another.’ job but remains as free as aof discharge applies conclusion the 575. This same the will is position whose terminable public employee of the no disclosure public there employer of the when is for the discharge. reasons City Manager’s reasons for the
“In this case the asserted petitioner orally the were communicated decision inter- to- writing stated in in answer private and also were the litigation this commenced. Since rogatories after cannot public, was not made it former communication petitioner’s properly form the for a claim basis integrity’ name, reputation, honor, in his 'good interest omitted). thereby impaired.” (footnote only five Appeals, of decided opinion the Court Bishop, discuss opinion our does not weeks after issued we it university liberty a when infringes state interest whether a publicizing allegations harmful dismisses a student without reputation. of the Court judges student’s Three for Circuit from Appeals Eighth dissented the denial en ground banc that “the reasons rehearing public but were Horowitz’s dismissal were released to directly Citing communicated officials.” dis- Bishop, judges public concluded that such “[a]bsent F. deprivation there no interest.” closure, liberty of these urge adopt at 1335. Petitioners us to view 2d, deprived has not been of a judges and hold that interest. liberty
B however, dismis- decide, respondent’s need not whether We deprived liberty pursuing her of a medical interest sal Nor need we whether career. decide constitutionally infringed any against other interest protected process. Assuming due deprivation without liberty existence or property interest, respondent has been awarded at least as much due as the Fourteenth Amendment requires. fully The school informed faculty’s dissatisfaction with her clinical progress posed danger to timely graduation and continued *7 enrollment. The ultimate decision to dismiss was careful and deliberate. procedures These were sufficient under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We with agree the District Court that respondent “was afforded full procedural process by due the '[school]. In fact, the Court is of opinion, the and so the finds, that school beyond went [constitutionally required] procedural process due by affording [respondent] opportunity to be by examined independent seven physicians in to order be absolutely certain that their grading of the [respond- in her medical skills was App. ent] correct.” Lopez, Goss v. 419 U. S. (1975), held we that due requires, suspension connection with the of a student public from school disciplinary reasons, “that the student be given or oral written of the charges against and, notice him if he them, explanation denies an of the evidence the author- ities opportunity have and an present his story.” side of the Id., at 581. The Court of Appeals apparently read Goss as requiring some type of hearing formal at which could defend ability her academic performance.2 All Appeals The Court of held without elaboration that dismissal required been hearing “effected without the fourteenth amend 2d, ment.” 538 F. at express 1321. No given indication requirements what minimum hearing of such a would be. One can assume, however, hearing the contours be would much the same Bailey, as those set forth in Greenhill v. (CA8 519 F. 2d 1975), upon, also involved an academic which the Court of Appeals principally relied. Greenhill held that student must “accorded an opportunity appear personally allegations to contest of academic [the deficiency]. stop however, requiring short,, trial-type We proce full graduate professional dures in is, all, such A situations. after give-and-take” between that Goss required “informal was an body dismissing him that the student and administrative opportunity charac- give the student “the would, least, proper con- put conduct in what he deems the terize his it emphasized that frequently text.” we have 584. But any concept of very process negates nature of due “[t]he every imagina- procedures universally applicable inflexible McElroy, 367 U. S. Workers ble situation.” Cafeteria illustrated flexibility is well The need for to meet failure of a student between the significant difference valid by a student of the violation standards and academic stringent for far less This difference calls rules of conduct. dismissal.3 case of an academic requirements in the ability to performance and their judge of its students’ the best attorneys impo- presence or the curriculum. The master the *8 . hearing student . at for a . a rigid of cross-examination sition of rules notwithstanding the purpose, no useful would serve give-and-take’ ‘informal But question may permanent duration. an be of . body dismissing him . . the and the administrative between student give would, least, at process and unduly not burden the educational would put it in opportunity to his conduct ‘the characterize the student ’’ quot- omitted), Id., (footnote at 9 proper context.’ what he deems the go urges even S., Respondent us to Lopez, at 584. ing v. 419 U. Goss require safeguards “the Appeals and fundamental the further than Court counsel, confrontation, of wit- by and cross-examination representation Respondent Brief for nesses.” 36. 3 respondent was sub fully deprivation to recognize that the We more severe than graduate medical school—was jected from a —dismissal subjected in high were 10-day school students suspension to which the requisite determining the nature a And relevant factor Goss. by the official affected process private “the interest is [was] due (1976). 319, But Eldridge, 335 424 U. S. Mathews v. action.” that must be only factors deprivation is one several severity of the Ibid. conclude owed. We deciding the exact due weighed in nature of the factors, including the evaluative considering all relevant historically supported interest of the school significant inquiry and the evaluations, hearing a for academic framework preserving present its Fourteenth Amendment. Clause of the required by Process the Due
87 Since the issue years first arose 50 ago, state and lower federal recognized courts have there are distinct dif- ferences between decisions suspend or dismiss a student for disciplinary purposes and similar actions taken for academic reasons which may call for hearings in connection with former but not the latter. Thus, in Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 19, Mass. 102 N. E. Supreme (1913), Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected argument, an based on several earlier decisions requiring hearing disciplinary contexts, that school grant officials'must also hearing before excluding a student academic grounds. According to the court, disciplinary cases have
"no application.
. . .
very
Misconduct
is a
different
matter from failure to
attain
standard of
excellence
A
studies.
determination as to the
investi-
fact involves
gation of a quite
A public hearing may
different kind.
regarded
helpful
the ascertainment of misconduct
and useless or harmful
in finding out
truth
as to
scholarship.”
22-23,
102 N. E.,
A similar
has
conclusion
been reached
other
state courts
to consider the issue.
g.,
e.
See,
Rose,
Mustell v.
282 Ala.
358, 367,
2d 489, 498,
So.
cert.
denied,
U. S. 936
cf.
(1968);
Foley
Benedict,
Tex.
4 “The
grant
district court’s
of relief is based on a confusion of the
power
disciplinary
court’s
to review
actions
educational
institutions on
hand,
the one
and academic decisions on the other hand. This Court has
vanguard
legal
been in the
development
process
protections
of due
for students ever since Dixon v.
Education,
Alabama State Board
5
1961,
150,
1961,
Cir.
294 F. 2d
cert. denied
However,
F. (CA10 2d 843 unanimously holding period years, of 60 over a courts, federal need be bodies decisionmaking hearings before formal rejected dismissals, cannot be case of academic held 118-119, 97, Massachusetts, 291 U. S. Snyder v. Cf. lightly. Alabama, 45, 69-71 S. 287 U. Powell v. 131-132 (1934); Co., (1922). 22, 260 U. S. v. Rosenbaum (1932); Jackman perception clearly supports furthermore, Reason, institution, not A an academic school is these decisions. Goss, In room. hearing courtroom or administrative reasons for disciplinary suspensions of students Court felt that judicial and ad- to traditional sufficient resemblance have a hearing developed in the requirements of notice the due disciplinary decisions. carefully limited to Dixon line of cases have been can- supported institution explained ‘the at the tax student When we ordinary, arbitrarily well disciplined without benefit not be know principles play’, to declare recognized ‘[w]e fair we went on subject are colleges and universities of no case holds that application of their in the uniform supervision or review of the courts Wright contrary.’ v. Dixon Indeed, infers standards. academic University, 2d 729. Misconduct Texas Southern 1968, 392 F. 5 Cir. equated. A scholarship cannot be attain a standard failure to misconduct, may charges of a hear- hearing to determine but be concerning may scholar- finding out the truth ing or harmful useless dichotomy process rights a student’s due There a clear between ship. 2d, 529 F. disciplinary and in academic dismissals.” dismissals 449-450. Bailey, supra, hearing Appeals held that a In Greenhill v. the Court of necessary only dismissed a student been where a medical school not Liaison Committee of the but also sent letter to the academic reasons Colleges suggesting that the student the American Medical Association of ability” insufficiently prepared course “intellectual or had his either lacked long specifically that “there has been a distinc noted work. court dismissals, hand, concerning disciplinary on the one between cases tion dismissals, emphasized that it did not on the other” and wish to 2d, opinion, pub F. at 8. court’s that distinction.” “blur ability deficiency alleged in the student’s intellectual removed licizing anof typical instance of academic called for the case from Bishop Wood, protections. Cf. 426 U. greater procedural S. *10 ministrative “hearing” for a factfinding call before relevant school authority. While recognizing authorities must be afforded necessary tools to maintain the Court discipline, concluded: would be a strange disciplinary system
“[I]t in an edu- cational if institution no was sought communication the disciplinarian with the in an effort to inform student him of his dereliction let him tell his side story in order to injustice make sure that an is not done. equiring notice hearing per- “{It] effective and informal mitting the student to give his version of events will provide meaningful hedge against erroneous At action. the disciplinarian least will be alerted to the existence disputes about facts and arguments about cause and effect.” 419 S., U. 583-584.
Even the context of a school disciplinary how- proceeding, ever, stopped Court short of requiring hearing a formal since “further formalizing the suspension process and esca- lating formality its adversary may nature only make costly it too a regular disciplinary destroy tool but also its effectiveness part as a process.” the teaching at 583.
Academic student, evaluations discipli- contrast nary determinations, bear little judicial resemblance to the factfinding administrative proceedings to which we have traditionally Goss, attached a full-hearing requirement. the school’s decision suspend the students rested factual conclusions that the individual participated students had demonstrations had disrupted classes, police attacked a officer, physical or caused damage school property. requirement hearing, of a where the present student could his issue, side the factual could under such circumstances “provide against a meaningful hedge Ibid. erroneous action.” The decision to dismiss respondent, rested on comparison, the academic judgment school officials that she did not have *11 90 aas perform adequately ability necessary
the clinical toward progress doctor insufficient making medical subjective nature more by its judgment Such a goal. presented questions typical than the factual and evaluative of an decision decision. Like the average disciplinary the in his for a student proper professor grade as to individual student to dismiss a the determination whether course, cumulative expert evaluation requires academic reasons an procedural tools adapted to the readily information and is not of-judicial decisionmaking. administrative or the historic ignore circumstances,
Under such we decline thereby the academic judgment .educators and formalize educational hearing. The process requiring a is not it centers around nature instead adversary; students, “one in faculty between relationship continuing many educator, adviser, occupy must teacher roles— Goss 419 parent-substitute.” Lopes, at friend, and, times, especially This is J., dissenting). S.,U. (Powell, of the through regimes true as one varying advances both more system, the instruction becomes educational Goss, Court con more this specialized. individualized and in disciplinary form of hearing cluded that of some value any resulting context harm to the academic environ outweighs clearly belief that Influencing ment. conclusion was decide in which the teacher disciplinary proceedings, must or punish disruptive whether to student for insubordinate adversary behavior, bring an may automatically flavor relationship. The conclusion normal student-teacher same does not follow the academic context. We decline presence com enlarge judicial further the academic munity many risk thereby deterioration beneficial relationship. of the aspects faculty-student recognize, We Supreme years Massachusetts Judicial Court over 60 did hearing may ago, finding that a be “useless harmful scholarship.” the truth as to Barnard v. Inhabitants out Shelburne, N. 23, 102 E., at 1097. Mass., interposition
“Judicial operation public system of the Nation problems raises requiring care and By restraint. ... large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control state and local authorities.” Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. We no see reason to intrude on that historic control in this case.6
Ill *12 In reversing District Court procedural process due grounds, the Court Appeals expressly of failed to “reach the process substantive due ground advanced Horowitz.” F. 2d, Respondent n. 5. urges that we remand the cause to Appeals the Court of for consideration of this addi tional In claim. this regard, a number of lower courts have implied in dictum that academic dismissals from state institu tions can be enjoined if clearly “shown to be arbitrary or capricious.” Mahavongsanan Hall, v. 529 F. 2d, See Gaspar Bruton, 513 F. 2d, at citations therein. Even assuming that the courts can review under such a standard an public academic decision of a educational
6Respondent passing contends in that she not was dismissed because incompetence,” “clinical an inquiry, academic disciplinary but for rea sons similar to those in Thus, Goss, hearing Goss. as in involved a must regard, be conducted. respondent notes that the school warned her significant improvement only needed was in the area of performance clinical personal but also in hygiene keeping her to her clinical record, however, schedules. The leaves no doubt that purely was dismissed reasons, for a academic fact assumed discus without sion hygiene may lower courts. impor Personal be timeliness tant factors a school’s determination of whether a student will make good a ability history medical doctor as the student’s a to take case or Questions diagnose an personal hygiene timeliness, illness. course, may analogous factfinding seem more to traditional than other inquiries may academically evaluating make a student. évaLuating student, But in so weighs the school considers and variety factors, earlier, which, adaptable not all of as noted are factfinding hearing. faculty-student relationship may And the critical still injured required. hearing if a is showing no District Court that agree with institution, we in this case.7 has been made capriciousness of arbitrariness per- academic ill-equipped to evaluate particularly Courts are respect II with in Part The factors discussed formance. speak against and warn due here fortiori decisionmaking.8 any into academic judicial intrusion such Appeals Court of therefore judgment
Reversed. concurring. Mr. Justice Powell, upholding I I read it as opinion the Court’s because join for was dismissed view that District Court’s unsatisfactory personal deficiencies rather than stringent standards alleges applied more Respondent the school of her evaluating performance than that of other students because however, Court, sex, religion, physical appearance. The District any manner [respondent] found: “There was no evidence differently because from of her sex or evaluated other students because physical appearance, this religion. regard [respondent’s] *13 of her With differently any than to be in and of itself did cause evaluated [her] any App. 45. students.” other 8 petitioners their own Respondent that failed follow also contends this failure respecting of students and that rules evaluation medical Dulles, v. 354 U. S. under Service amounted to a constitutional violation legal respondent’s con disagree with both factual We clearly school followed facts, the that the As for the record shows tentions. designed in an rules, had to be except where new rules its established “appeal” protect respondent, practical with effort to further specifically respondent Court petitioners to take. District allowed [respondent] in the medical was progress of that “the status found the evaluation of and consistent with in a manner similar to evaluated exception [respondent’s] students, similarly with other situated [respondent] in an effort lengths to greater assist docent . . even . went to any his did other stu degree, than he for her M. D. for her obtain draws, respondent both legal App. 45. As conclusion dents.” (1954), Shaughnessy, upon which 347 U. S. Accardi Service and rather federal administrative law relied, principles of enunciate Service upon binding the States. than constitutional law conduct, and that in these she circumstances was accorded due process.
In the numerous meetings discussions with her teachers and advisers, opinion see of Me. Justice post, at 98-99, Marshall, culminating special clinical examination mte, administered seven physicians,1 81, respondent was warned of her clinical deficiencies and given every opportunity improvement to demonstrate or question the evaluations. The focus of primary these discussions and examinations on respondent’s was competence as physician.
Mr. Justice Marshall respond- nevertheless states ent’s dismissal was “largely” based on “her conduct”:
“It may ante, nevertheless be as the Court true, implies, n. 6, that the school respondent’s decided that inadequacies such personal areas as hygiene, .peer and patient relations, and impair ability timeliness would to be 'a good medical doctor.’ Whether these inade- quacies can be termed 'purely reasons,’ as the ibid., them, ultimately Court calls ques- an irrelevant tion, one an placing emphasis on words undue rather than functional considerations. The is that point relevant safeguard against 1 As a judgment, erroneous and at request, App. question the Medical School respond submitted the competency panel ent’s clinical experienced physicians.” to a of “seven requested Panel members were provide careful, thorough “to detailed, [respondent’s] assessment of abilities at this time.” Ibid. The Dean’s letter to quite of March specifically advised her 15, 1973, “general topic asking the curriculum about we are [s] [the your panel] performance to evaluate . . . .” Each member of Ibid. panel requested examining [respondent’s] to “evaluate the extent of mastery concepts, skills, competence knowledge, relevant to function *14 physician.” Id., as at 209. The pane] examinations members of the separately. conducted Two were of the doctors that recommended re graduated although spondent be qualify one added that would “she not hospital to intern at the he where worked.” 40. of the Each other negative recommendations, although they five doctors submitted as varied respondent dropped immediately. to whether should from Ibid. conduct, her largely because dismissed respondent was suspended in were because just Goss the students as footnotes Post, added; (emphasis their conduct.” omitted). Court’s contrary to the District explicitly
This is conclusion the term “conduct” sense, one fact. findings undisturbed as well poor performance academic to could be used embrace I understand But do not unsatisfactory personal conduct. as in term that undifferen- to use the Marshall Mr. Justice respondent opinion His likens the tiated sense.2 419 U. S. Lopez, Goss v. suspension to of the students in that There is evidence personal misbehavior. 565 (1975), viewed as may have been respondent’s personal conduct respond- suspensions quite unlike the eccentric, Goss— but — personal her behavior. was not based on ent’s dismissal conclusively show that District Court The of the findings for failure to meet respondent was dismissed reviewing after court, of Medical School. standards concluded: detail, some evidence totally in this case failed presented “The evidence apparent conclusion Indeed, in view of Mr. Marshall’s Justice objectively con of some determinable was dismissed because duct, special examination is to understand his conclusion that it difficult “may physicians practicing have been better administered the seven hearing.” Post, pur That not than a formal at 102. examination did ... whether, past, respondent engaged in conduct port determine Respondent apparently upon warrant dismissal. was called would argue things past. no not done certain There were she had did who point. facts found Nor the doctors administered time, apart conduct at the examination address themselves ability physicians perform the clinical tasks must master. from says that this evaluation the truth tested Justice Marshall Mr. Post, at 102- assertions that could not function a doctor. one, recognition n. This a tacit that the issue an academic respondent simply engaged improper rather than one limited to whether conduct.
establish that plaintiff [respondent] expelled any was for quality reason other than the of her work.” 44.3 App. is well to bear in mind It attending was a medical school competence where in clinical is courses as much prerequisite to satisfactory as graduation grades in other courses. Respondent was dismissed because she was as defi- cient her clinical work as was proficient she the “book- portion learning” of the curriculum.4 her Evaluation of performance in the former is no area less an “academic” because judgment it involves observation her skills and techniques practice, actual conditions of assign- rather than ing grade her written essay question.5 answers an
3The District Court also found:
“Considering presented, all grad- evidence the Court finds ing system evaluating fairly applied of the medical school was plaintiff, plaintiff reasonably satisfy requirements but did not of the graduate medical school to App. from the medical school in June 1973.” 45. faculty Sirridge assigned Dr. William was the member ’ (faculty adviser). testimony as her “chief docent” portion A of his was summarized the District Court as follows: Sirridge] emphasized plaintiff’s “He [respondent’s] problem [Dr. thought that she she could learn to reading books, be a medical doctor equally and he advised important the clinical skills were [that] obtaining degree. D. the M. He plaintiff further testified that cannot many necessary perform basic skills of a practicing physician . . .”. at 35. 5 Mr. Justice Marshall judgment insists that calling an academic futility. is Post, 104^105, an exercise points out, n. As the Court however, deficiency the distinction between dismissal for academic may dismissal for misconduct decisive as due. Ante, at relating 89-90. A decision to the misconduct of a student re quires a factual determination place as whether the conduct took not. accuracy of that safeguarded by determination can be the sorts of procedural protections traditionally imposed under the Due Process Clause. An judgment also type objectively involves this determinable g., gave fact —e. whether student certain answers on an examination. requires But subjective, critical decision expert evaluation toas *16 by District findings of fact from the it clear is Because solely academic was dismissed that Court process due standards because the and grounds, join I occurred,6 dismissal met before abundantly were opinion. Court’s in part concurring White, concurring
Mr. Justice judgment. opinion Court’s II-A, III of I, I join Parts judgment. concur unnecessary that is my Brother Blackmun it agree with
I constitutionally protected a to decide whether pro- minimum liberty precisely or interest or what property is as- interest if it her of that required cedures were to divest pro- is, that minimum one. Whatever sumed she had minimum. or exceeded that cedures her satisfied accorded protected of a assumes the existence The Court nevertheless expulsion an repondent’s as interest, proceeds classify hearing any dismissal,” concludes that no “academic required is connection any respond or opportunity kind conclusion, I with this disagree with such an action. Because predetermined performance some standard of aca- that satisfies whether similarly expert standard, turn, a competence. demic That is set questions go beyond mere evaluations, which far judgment. These “conduct,” susceptible procedural safeguards same sorts of are not determining appropriate relating are to misconduct. Thus, that facts particular is academic—that it entails these the conclusion that likely controlling significance determining expert evaluations —is have sort of is due. how much and what 6University range making must have the widest of discretion in faculties judgments performance students and their entitle graduation. Contrary promotion suggestion or ment to of" Mr. post, 104-105, particular pro n. the fact Marshall, Justice is that it possible cedure or available does mean under the Lopez, (1975), simply Process Clause. Goss v. U. S. 565 does not Due point. speak to that
I feel constrained to so say and to concur only in the judgment.
As I it, assuming see protected interest, respondent was at the minimum entitled to be informed of the reasons for her dismissal and to an opportunity personally to state her side story. Of course, she had I all and more. this, suspect also expelled graduate college students nor- mally have the opportunity to talk expellers with their this sort of minimum requirement no impose will burden is not already being shouldered and discharged re- sponsible institutions. *17 Justice Marshall, in concurring part dissenting and
Mr. in part.
I agree with the Court that, “[a]ssuming the existence of a liberty or property interest, respondent has been awarded at least as much process due as the Fourteenth Amendment requires.” Ante, at I join 84-85. cannot opinion, the Court’s however, because it contains dictum respondent suggesting that was entitled to even less protection than she I received. also differ from the assumption Court its characterization of the reasons for a dismissal as “academic” or “disciplinary” relevant to resolution of question of what procedures are by the Due Process Clause. I Finally, disagree with the Court’s decision not remand to the Court of Appeals for of respondent’s consideration sub- stantive due process claim.
I We held in Lopez, Goss v. 419 U. S. (1975),
“due requires, connection with suspension 10 days less, that the student be oral or given written charges notice against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have an opportunity present story.” his side protec- these respondent received is no question There more.1 tions, District filed stipulation facts
According Dean, of the with the “discussion” Court, respondent year of her first mid-1972, at the close Medical School unsatisfactory of her she was notified school, during explained the he The Dean testified that performance.2 meeting, twice at respondent go problems of her nature from the them.3 A letter fully understand would so that she was respondent thereafter, in which shortly Dean followed of, because placed probation being that she was advised with “relationships in her alia, major deficiency” “a inter schedules” “kee[p] to established others,” her failure to The Dean appearance.”4 carefully personal and “atten[d] “to call attention in October 1972 with again met performance way to the fact that supportive direct in a strong.” not then between meeting still another January there was accompanied by respond- who was Dean, and the on Evaluation. chairman of the Council docent ent’s Council’s recommenda- there notified of the Respondent was from dropped she graduate and that tion that she *18 improvement” in her “radical “clinical unless there was patient relations, personal hygiene, and competence, peer and 6 again A letter from the Dean criticism.” ability accept to 1 underlying this conclusion in some necessary the facts to recount It opinion provide does not relevant facts with detail, Court’s because the given respondent. opportunity reply regard notice and formally these likely was less notified of App. It is id., earlier, March at 100-101 1972. See several months deficiencies docent). (testimony respondent’s 3Id., at 146.
4 Idat 15-16. 5Id., at 147.
6Id., at 18. followed the meeting; letter summarized problem areas and noted they had been discussed with her “several times.”
These meetings and letters plainly gave respondent all that requires: Goss several notices and explanations, and at least opportunities three present “to story.” side [her] S.,U. I at 581. do opinion read the Court’s to disagree with this conclusion. I Hence do not why understand Court indicates that even the “informal give-and-take” man- Goss, id., dated at 584, need not provided have been here. ante, See 85-86, 89-91. This case simply provides no legiti- mate opportunity to consider whether “far less pro- stringent cedural requirements,” ante, at 86, than those in Goss are appropriate in other school I contexts. While disagree with the Court’s conclusion that “far less” is adequate, as infra, discussed it is equally disturbing that the Court decides presented an issue not by the case before us. As Mr. Justice “ Brandéis years warned over 40 ago, ‘great gravity and ” delicacy’ of our task constitutional cases should cause us “ ” “ ‘shrink’ from ‘anticipating] a question of constitu- ” tional law in necessity advance of deciding it,’ “ from ‘formulating] a rule of constitutional law broader than is required precise facts to which it is to be ” applied.’ A, Ashwander TVv. 297 U. (1936) S. 345-347 (concurring opinion).
II view the Court’s dictum to the effect that even the procedures required minimum in Goss need not have been I provided respondent, feel compelled to comment on the of procedural protection extent I mandated here. so do within a framework largely ignored by the Court, a frame derived from our approach work traditional problems. these to our According prior decisions, as summarized in Mathews v. *19 7 Id., at 182-183.
100 principal of factors are three (1976), Eldridge, 424 U. S. is due: what determining relevance by the be affected that will interest private “First, depriva- erroneous risk of an second, the action; official procedures used, and through the tion of such interest or substitute any, if of additional value, probable finally, the Government's safeguards; procedural and the fiscal involved the function including interest, sub- additional or burdens administrative Id., at entail." would requirement stitute 335. involved “private interest" recognizes,
As the Court which deprivation to one: “the weighty is a here school— medical subjected graduate from a —dismissal 10-day suspension high to which the than was more severe Ante, in Goss.” n. subjected students were is contained by respondent the loss suffered example of One offer from the Respondent job had a stipulation of facts: work university begin of another department psychiatry receiving her contingent on the offer was 1973; September Appeals noted: Court summary, as the D. degree.8 M. Horowitz here establishes that “The unrefuted evidence way in such a stigmatized been has education, continue her medical unable to that she will be employment in medi- returning chances of and her 2d severely 538 F. damaged." cally field are related 1976). 1321 (CA8 1317, when the context, written a related Friendly has Judge
As way of life to deprive person “to seeks State and on which years preparation [s]he has devoted ... [s]he provide a it first to rely,” should be come to ha[s] procedural protection." “high level 8 Id., at 16. (1975) L. 1296-1297 Hearing,” 123 Pa. Rev. Kind of U. “Some licenses).
(revocation professional
Neither other two mentioned in factors Mathews justifies moving from a high level lower level protection involved in Goss. There was at some risk least of error inherent the evidence on which the Dean relied in his meetings with and to respondent; faculty letters evalua- tions of patient such matters as personal hygiene and peer rapport are neither as “sharply “easily focused” nor as g., documented” e. was, disability determination Mathews, supra, involved Lopez, at See Goss 343. S., (when U. at 580 reports decisionmaker “act[s] advice of others . . trivial”).10 . risk of error is not at all [t]he
Nor can it be the university. any said greater in summary interest proceedings here did than the school Certainly disruptive Goss. the allegedly and disobedient students involved there, id., see 569-571, posed more of an immediate threat orderly school administration than did Goss, respondent. As we noted in moreover, “it . . disserves . of the if suspension interest State is fact '[the student’s] unwarranted.” at 579.11 Under these circumstances — with respondent having much more at than stake did the Goss, students having administration at best no more at stake, respondent and the meetings between Dean and the leaving some possibility erroneous dismissal —I believe that respondent was procedural protection entitled more than provided by give-and-take” “informal before the could dismiss her.
The contours additional protection to was entitled need not be defined in terms adversary system of the traditional so familiar to lawyers and inquiry separated The about risk of cannot error be from the first inquiry private about interest at stake. more serious the conse quences individual, the smaller the risk error will acceptable. 11The statements and letters of the Medical School Dean reflect a genuine wrongfully concern that not be App. dismissed. See 147-150, 180-183, 185-187. We have Eldridge, S., 424 U. Mathews v.
judges. See of due very nature times that emphasized many “[t]he universally appli procedures any concept of inflexible negates *21 Workers v. every imaginable to situation.” cable Cafeteria ante, 86; g., at (1961); see, e. McElroy, 367 U. S. 895 886, process is In what supra, words, 578. other Lopez, Goss v. at Hannah specific to factual contexts.” vary “according due will g., v. e. Mathews Larche, 420, (1960); 363 442 see, v. U. S. Brewer, 481 Eldridge, Morrissey 471, 40817. S. supra, 334; at Burson, See also- (1972); 535, 402 S. 540 Bell v. U. McGrath, 162-163 123, Anti-Fascist Comm. v. 341 17. S. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). (1951) to “appeal” provided In the factual context instant ante, purposes and 81, as, see at served the same respondent, may hearing. better a formal respects than, in some have been respondent was procedure establishing In under physicians who had separately by seven had little evaluated appears with it the Medical previous her, contact no on “a and neutral and placed emphasis obtaining fair School respondent, In order to assessment.”12 evaluate impartial spent a physicians approximately of half the seven each observing performed her as she various clinical duties day performance her to report the Dean.13 then submitted for imagine procedure determining difficult to a better It any allegations against school’s whether Eldridge, supra, to Cf. Mathews v. at substance them.14 12 id., (testimony Dean); 187, 208, (letters see at at 150 physicians). respondent and seven id., See at 190-207. 14Respondent appears argue religion her sex were under- hearing dying for her and that helped would have reasons dispute” “factual her and the resolve the between school on these issues. id., ante, 30; Respondent for see See Brief 51-52. also 92 n. express only grounds But the dismissal related deficien- personal hygiene, rapport, like, patient and, as a cies matter process, respondent procedural due more entitled no than 337-338, (use independent physician to examine dis- ability applicant report to decisionmaker). I therefore appeal procedure believe that utilized respondent, together with her earlier notices from and meetings with the Dean, provided respondent with as much protec- tion as the Due Process requires.15 Clause
Ill analysis I II Parts opinion illustrates resolution of this case under our traditional approach does not turn on whether the dismissal of respondent is char- acterized as one for “academic” or “disciplinary” reasons. my view, the effort to apply such labels does little to advance the due inquiry, is indicated examination *22 of facts this case. minutes of
The the meeting at which it was first decided respondent should not graduate contain following: the “This issue is not one achievement, academic but of performance, relationship to people ability and to com- App. (emphasis municate.” 218 added).
By customary the measures academic progress, moreover, deficiency apparent no was at the time that the authorities respondent prior decided could not to this graduate; time, according stipulation of facts, respondent had received underpinnings grounds. forum to contest factual of these appeal The procedure gave respondent here such a opportunity forum —an to demon charges mistaken,” strate that the school’s were “unfair or Lopez, Goss v. 565, 581 419 U. S. 15 procedure hearing, appeal Like a and the meetings “represent ... a valued human interaction in which the affected [ed] experience^] person participating at least satisfaction of in the decision vitally her rights interchange express .... [ed] [T]hese concern elementary person, idea that to be a thing, rather than a at is least to Tribe, be consulted about is done with what one.” L. American Constitu- 10-7, p. (1978) (emphasis original). tional Law § of her includ- grades” courses, all “satisfactory “credit” and clinical ing courses.16 ante, at true, implies, as the Court may
It nevertheless respondent’s inadequacies 91 n. that the school decided that 6, patient relations, personal hygiene, peer and in such areas as medical ability good to be “a impair timeliness would her “purely can be termed inadequacies doctor.” Whether these ibid., ultimately reasons,” them, as the Court calls placing emphasis an undue question, one an irrelevant The functional considerations. relevant rather than words of her was because point largely dismissed is that suspended because just as in Goss were the students conduct,17 of their conduct.18 emergency- her
16 App. Respondent received “no credit” for 12. later grade rotation, .only was less than satis course which room according factory. recorded, to the District grade Ibid. This was not not Court, had been made that could after the decision until Coordinating this deci graduate. 31. Committee made at When apparently any seen sion, moreover, it had not evaluation id., Coordinating (minutes emergency-room performance. at 229 See meeting). Committee deciding Only school for one of reasons voiced graduate any arguable aspects, that rea respondent had nonconduct plainly perceived son, competence,” related to deficiencies “clinical hygiene relationships colleagues with respondent’s personal id., id., patients. See 219. See also 182-183, futility trying draw a workable distinction between “aca *23 by my “disciplinary” further Brother dismissals is illustrated demic” concurring opinion. opinion The that the conclusion in the states Powell’s supra, explicitly contrary find “is the District Court’s text undisturbed indicating fact,” ante, 94, finding no ings it cites District Court of at but con respondent’s dismissal based on other than conduct-related that was finding exists. siderations. No such respondent was that dismissed because The District Court’s statement ” “ quoted ante, 95, quality work,’ at like statements to of her
of 'the ante, 96, is “solely grounds,” on at the dismissal was academic effect that process inquiry. provides It informa- ultimately the due no irrelevant to question disputed type of a whether “the facts are on the critical tion parties.” Infra, at 106. Nor does susceptible of determination third
105 The Court makes much of decisions from state and lower federal to support courts its point that “dismissals for . Ante, . not . cause do necessitate a hearing.” at The 87. decisions which the Court relies, however, plainly use the term “academic” in a much narrower sense than does the Court, distinguishing “academic” from dismissals ones based on “misconduct” and holding that, when a student is dismissed for failing grades, hearing would serve no purpose.19 These may cases be viewed as consistent with “ finding system the District Court’s that grading ‘the evaluating ” quoted the medical applied fairly,’ ante, school was 3, at 95 n. advance case, resolution of especially fact, supra, in view the noted respondent’s grades courses, clinical as all courses, other were satis- factory when the graduate. decision was made that she not could This indicates, contrary fact further intimation, Mr. Justice Powell’s ante, 95, at the school found the deficiencies in clinical performance to be different from the that lead deficiencies to unsatisfac- tory grades subjects. more traditional scholastic correct, course,
Mr. suggesting kind Justice Powell Lopez, of conduct here involved is different v. from involved in Goss supra. Ante, 94, question facing n. The the Medical School solely past, authorities was whether in the misbehaved past, present, likely rather her but whether future conduct indicated ante, good doctor,” that she not be “a would medical at 91 n. 6. appeal procedure of the school was well suited to aid in resolution of this question, techniques since it involved of her “observation skills ante, It practice,” actual conditions at 95. matters not at all whether judgment,” ibid,., the result of observation is labeled “an such ‘academic’ long recognized authorities, having as it is that the school so an efficient their procedure respond- available determine whether decision to dismiss mistaken,” Lopez, supra, 581, ent “unfair or Goss v. were consti- tutionally give procedure, a chance to invoke the they did, depriving liberty of a property before substantial interest. supra, at 100-102. See 19 Mahavongsanan Hall, (CA5 448, 1976); Gaspar 529 2d v. F. 450 See (CA10 Rose, Bruton, 843, 1975); 2d Mustell 513 F. 849-851 v. Ala. 367, 489, 497-498, denied, 358, (1968) ; 2d cert. U. 211 So. S. 936 Shelburne, 19-20, Barnard Mass. 22-23, v. Inhabitants E.N. 1095, 1096-1097 *24 106 “the Eldridge probable in Mathews v.
our statement factor is a procedural safeguards” . . value ... additional . S., quoted 424 U. at process inquiry. 335, to the due relevant they provide But 424 U. at 343-347. supra, S., see 100; where present one, like the resolving little assistance in cases on grades but conduct- failing dismissal is based not on related considerations.20 should not be talismanic reliance labels such cases a procedures consideration of the substitute for sensitive disputed are of by process.21 When the facts
required due by as the susceptible parties, of determination third type ante, 91 see allegations respondent plainly were, about deny protection all procedural n. there is no more reason to in Goss v. who serious loss there was to one will suffer a than good provide even Lopez, may there reason indeed supra. in Part A court’s II, more as discussed protection, Bonnell, Supp. 379, (ED 1973) Pa. : See Brookins v. 362 F. disciplinary case is situation a student “This not the traditional where by actively engaging prohibited regulation the law a school violates or comply failed to act school allegedly activities. Plaintiff has with passively ignoring these regulations for admission and class attendance alleged regulations. failures do not constitute misconduct in These plaintiff subject disciplinary They procedures. con- sense that do plaintiff something. sense do stitute misconduct in the requirements. comply he did Plaintiff contends that with Like the case, disciplinary plaintiff traditional the determination of whether did question comply regulations did not with the school is a fact. Most determining importantly, question, factual reference is not made a standard of in an achievement esoteric academic field. Scholastic stand- involved, disputed not concerning ards are but rather facts whether plaintiff comply regulations. did or did not with certain These readily adapt impartial issues themselves a fair and determination process’ hearing.” 'due labels, moreover, may give The Court’s reliance on those school who are administrators reluctant to accord due to their students doing generally Kirp, an excuse so. See Proceduralism Bureaucracy: Due Process Setting, School Rev. 841 Stan. L. *25 of
characterization the reasons for a student’s dismissal adds nothing to procedures the effort to find that are fair to the student and the school, promote goal that the elusive of determining the truth in a manner consistent with both dignity individual society’s limited resources.
IV I agree While with the Court received adequate procedural I due cannot process, join the Court’s judgment it because is based on of resolution issue an never by the Appeals. reached Court of That court, taking prop- erly limited of view its role cases, in constitutional refused to respondent’s offer dictum on process substantive due claim when it decided the case on process due grounds. quoted ante, See 538 F. 1321 n. 2d, at 91. Petitioners presented only therefore us questions relating pro- cedural issue. Pet. for Cert. Our normal course in such a questions case on the reverse decided and presented below petition, in the and then of Appeals to remand the Court for remaining consideration of any issues.
Rather course, than this taking the Court here decides on its own support record will not a substantive due Ante, claim, thereby “agreeing]” with the District Court. I Appeals at 92. would allow the Court of provide the first appellate question. on this only level review Not would a give remand us the benefit lower it thoughts,22 court’s useful, example, It would be for to have more careful assessments dismissing respondent of whether the school followed own rules in its consequences legal of what if it should be did not. Court states "disagree legal it with both factual contentions.” [s] Ante, clearly It at 92 n. 8. then asserts that “the record shows” com pliance rules, ibid., provides it with but neither elaboration of this specific ways nor discussion of the conclusion contends followed, Respondent 42-46, the rules were not Brief conten by accompanied tions citations to same record that the Court finds so quoted Court, ante, The statement of the District Court “clear.” consistency with our own us to maintain also allow would ‘‘[ojnly set questions Rule 23 which states that (l)(c), con will petition fairly comprised therein forth in the appeals By bypassing the courts court.” sidered to those courts we do no service nature, questions issues range a wide in dictum on speculate that refuse prudential, preferred course follow more and instead *26 particularly constitutional decision-—until avoiding decision— “ ” Ashwander of ‘absolutely resolution a case. necessary’ to A, v. TV 297 U. concurring). at 347 S., (Brandeis, J., Appeals I the Court of judgment the of would reverse proceedings. for further remand with whom Brennan Justice Justice Mr. Blackmun,
Mr. in concurring part dissenting part. joins, opinion, Court’s and that of Mr. Justice Marshall, conclusively assuming together demonstrate the existence that, liberty or all the property of received interest, process her under the Fourteenth procedural that was due 8, respondent’s the at 92 is its claim that n. not inconsistent on face with followed, the anything rules not nor there about the context of were is App. claim, see to indicate that it was statement addressed issues, clarify the of factual Appeals Court would these Review rarely expenditure If the of this time. Court’s view warrant the Court’s why correct, however, the of record is I do not understand the then consequences legal goes on of a of facts Court to comment on the state just aspects the Court has said does exist. Like other supra, opinion, the are legal Court’s discussed comments this issue ante, nothing true, notes, Court confusing more than dictum. It is as the by respondent at 92 decision cited was not n. from this Co.urt expressly grounded Dulles, Service Due Process Clause. 354 U. S. only analysis fact, legal But which amounts hardly respondent’s point offered the Court on this answers question, compliance particularly previously that some with established rules rules— providing procedural safeguards constitutionally required before the —is agencies may deprive liberty State one of or or its a citizen of a valuable property interest. disposes
Amendment. for That, me, case, compels of this reversal judgment Appeals. the Court of I find it unnecessary, indulge therefore, arguments counterarguments opinions contained the two as to type extent protection that the Four- teenth Amendment requires graduate-school-dismissal I situation. unnecessary also find Similarly, it choose arguments between the as to whether respondent’s dismissal academic or disciplinary reasons indeed, whether (or, I relevant). such a agree distinction do with Mr. Justice we should however, leave District Marshall, Appeals Court and the Court of in the first instance the resolution of substantive due claim and claim any presented to, other but not decided by, those courts.
Accordingly, of the Court I, too, judgment would reverse the Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings.