*1 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. GILBERT et al. Argued January Reargued No. 74-1589. October 19-20s 1976— 1976 Decided December 1976* Co., 74-1590, et al. v. General Electric *Together Gilbert also with No. post, at 127 n. 1. the same court. See on certiorari to *2 for petitioner.! Kammholz cause reargued Theophil C. Strauss, John S. Stanley B. were him on the briefs With Jr., J. Brame III. Battle, Robert With Weyand reargued Ruth respondents.† for the cause DuBow. Seymour Newman on the briefs were Winn her Pottinger General the cause Attorney argued Assistant curiae amici urging reargument et al. on United States Solicitor him the brief were With on affirmance. Barnett, W. Abner Bork, W. Landsberg, Brian Walter K. Colvard Eddins, Sibal, Rosenberg, and Linda Beatrice Joseph T. ian.‡ Dor 127 n. 1. post, at †See by Gordon Dean urging reversal were filed amid curiae ‡Briefs Silver, Airlines, Inc., al.; Edward et
Booth, Jr., for Alaska Rehnquist opinion delivered the Justice Me. Court.
Petitioner, provides General Electric for all of its Co.,1 a employees disability plan pays weekly non- occupational sickness and accident Excluded from benefits. plan’s coverage, arising are disabilities however, on pregnancy. Respondents, behalf class of women brought seeking, this action inter alia2 declara- employees, Larry Lavinsky, Stephen Tisman, Portnoy, M. S. E. Manuel M. Sara Joseph al.; by King Gorman for Life et American Insurance Assn. T. Society by Thompson Administration; for the American Personnel Telephone Telegraph Co.; by Powers for the American & Thornton H. *3 by Corp.; Smetana, Kronenberg, Brooks for Oelanese Gerard Jerry C. Schreiber, Kraus, Julian D. Lawrence Richard Berman B. B. for the and States; by Grove, Chamber of Commerce United Kalvin M. Jeffrey Cohen, Goldman, Penney, M. S. Robert A. and Clem R. Lawrence Liberty Kyle Co.; by for Mutual Insurance D. Richard Godown for the of States; by Lloyd National Association Manufacturers of the United Inc., al.; by for Owens-Illinois, Wayman, Sutter et and John G. Scott F. Zimmerman, Corp. and Walter P. DeForest for Westinghouse Electric urging by Brown,
Briefs of amici curiae affirmance were filed William J. Attorney General, Manz, Attorney Earl M. and Assistant General, for the Ohio; by Woll, of Gold, Stephen State J. Albert Schlossberg, Laurence I. and John Fillion for the American Federation of Labor Congress and of by Organizations al.; Mary Industrial et and O’Melveny, K. Jonathan W. Lubell, Ostrin, H. Howard Charles V. Koons for and Communications America, Workers of AFL-CIO.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed Robert G. McClintock for the School City Ladue, of of District and Emerson, Thomas I. Ruth Bader Ginsberg, L. Project and Melvin for Law Women’s et al. Wulf 1 parties joined All the to the suit in petitioning of for writ certiorari. moving party General Electric before Appeals, the Court of judgment where the of the District Court was parties affirmed. The agreed have petitioner General Electric to be deemed the purposes briefing argument, of adopt oral a convention we for the writing opinion. of this 2Respondents represent employees also a class of women who have 14, been denied September 1971, such benefits since damages and seek arising from this denial. discrimination in constitutes sex this exclusion
tion
of
Rights
Act
Stat.
of Title VII of the Civil
violation
seq.
2000e et
The District
amended,
U. S.
C.
following a trial on
Virginia,
District
the Eastern
Court for
pregnancy-related
the exclusion
such
merits,
held
disability
employee
disability benefits
General Electric’s
Court of
Supp. 367. The
violated Title
F.
certiorari,
granted
2d
and we
F.
Appeals affirmed,
I Electric compensation total part As its package, to benefits nonoccupational sickness and accident provides In- Accident Weekly under its Sickness employees all an equal Plan in an (Plan) amount surance 60% These weekly earnings. straight-time normal employee’s totally dis- employees who become paid payments or accident. nonoccupational sickness as a result abled day of with the payments normally eighth Benefit start employee an disability (although total if employee’s pay- benefit hospital to a as a bed earlier confined patient, up continue to a maxi- will start ments immediately), period disability one any continuous mum of weeks due same related periods or successive causes.3 *4 respondents present or former individual named are production employees plant at General Electric’s
hourly paid employees was pregnant during Va. Each of these in Salem, Plan, Electric In respect effect, the General a self-insurer. is, With to obtained, employees California, Electric has for outside While General Co., policy Metropolitan policy the Life Insurance insurance only, payment premium subject adjust of the a tentative involves experience. Stipulation Facts, light Pretrial of ment of actual 11, effect, -therefore, Metropolitan App. 176-176. In Life Insurance ¶ processing claims, provide is used to the administrative Co. service practical remains, purposes, for all a while General Electric self-insurer. 1971 or 1972, employed while by General Electric and each presented a claim to the company for disability benefits under the Plan to period cover the while absent from work aas result of the pregnancy. These claims routinely were on denied ground provide the Plan did not dis- ability-benefit payments any for due pregnancy.4 absence Each respondents thereafter filed charges Equal with the Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that the refusal of General Electric to pay disability benefits under the for Plan time pregnancy lost due to childbirth against discriminated waiting her because Upon sex. requisite number of days, the action was commenced instant in the District Court.5 The a complaint asserted violation Damages Title VII. sought injunction were as well as an directing General pregnancy Electric to include disabilities within the Plan on the same other terms and conditions as nonoccupational disabilities.
4Additionally, payment coverage benefit under the Plan for all dis abilities, pregnancy, whether or related to “on the date terminates you disability pregnancy, except cease active work because of total or you Weekly disability existing if entitled to a Benefits for payments date benefit in accord on such of cessation” will be continued personal leave, layoff, provisions ance with the the Plan. In cases of however, strike, coverage nonoccupational sickness or future disability days, is continued for 31 ibid. accident Furch, respondent In Emma the case of who leave took hospitalized April 7, non-pregnancy-related and who was with a on 1972, April pulmonary embolism on claim was filed for solely period pul- the Plan due benefits under absence monary rejected claim “since benefits embolism. The such have provisions in accordance with of the General been discontinued Plan.” Electric Insurance employees; female the International Plaintiffs in the action were seven (IUE) Electrical, Workers, ; AFL-CIO-CLC Union Radio and Machine joint collective-bargaining affiliate, Local which is a and the latter’s hourly paid production representative, IUE, and mainte employees Salem, Va., plant. nance Electric’s *5 fact and findings of made the District Court Following trial, it deter- in which an order entered law, of conclusions disabili- pregnancy excluding by Electric, mined that General dis- in sex engaged Plan, had coverage ties from of Title (a)(1) of 703§ in violation crimination that nor- found (a)(1). District Court §C. 2000e-2 U. S. or an necessarily either a “disease” pregnancy, while mal weeks;6 eight of six disabling period for a “accident,” was are termi- pregnancies per cent approximately “[t]en ap- and that disabling”;7 which is by miscarriage, nated by diseases complicated pregnancies are proximately 10% District disability.8 The may to additional which lead good during trial, introduced the evidence Court noted cost to General the relative stipulated, concerning of it deal to male benefits under the Plan providing Electric preg- with that, of which indicated all employees,9 female of the Plan to cost disabilities nancy-related excluded, high as, at least as per employee female General Electric employee.10 male substantially per the cost higher than, if not “specific findings”: following made the The District Court voluntary, a substantial perhaps most often “1. While conception also occurs. negligent or accidental incidence of per se, Pregnancy, is not a disease. “2. normally disabling for a complications A pregnancy
“3. without weeks, period includes the from labor eight time period six to which recuperation.” before, through delivery, slightly several weeks Supp. 377. 375 F. 7 Ibid. by which diseases are pregnancies complicated are percent “Five may have been stimulated persons but nonpregnant
found complicated pregnancy- percent pregnancies pregnancy. Five may lead to complications are diseases which These related diseases. disability.” Ibid. following opinion charts from included its The District Court July 24,1973: stipulation dated by sex, claims under experience, respect During “143. GE’s
131 The District Court found that of pregnancy- the inclusion related within the of scope disabilities the Plan would “in- G. E.’s [disability plan] crease benefits amount costs an though is at this time 375 large, undeterminable.” which, Supp., F. 378.. The District to find Court declined present equal of coverage actuarial value was as between men women,11 but went on that even to decide weekly disability its coverage sickness and accident insurance was as follows:
Male Female (new) 19,045 of 15,509 No. claims Average days days duration of claim 48 52 of per employees No. new claims thousand 77 173 Average employees 246,492 of 89,705 No. covered paid Total $11,279,110 $7,405,790 benefits Average per employee cost insured paid
total benefits $45.76 $82.57 During 1971, “144. experience, by sex, respect GE's under to claims weekly coverage its sickness and accident insurance as follows:
Male Female 22,987 (new) 17,719 No. claims Average days days duration of claim 52 per employees of new claims No. thousand Average employees 231,026 81,469 No. covered paid $14,343,000 $9,191,195 Total benefits Average per employee cost insured paid $62.08 $112.91”
total benefits Ibid. trial, introduced, At Electric addition to the material 9, supra, testimony Jackson, actuary, cited in n. of Paul who presently calculated that the Plan more than “costs for females 170% Id., . . males . .” at 378. present plan objectionable coverage “The is in that excludes from unique disability sex, only which affects members of the female while suggestion no can affect made exclude disabilities which be said to only Additionally, suggestion gives weight males. no to the Court equalized provided coverage the actuarial now value finding such a would found economic
had it equivalence, pregnancy-related justified exclusion any case have nonoccupational comprehensive from an otherwise disabilities whether disability plan. Regardless of accident sickness the Plan make might such benefits including the cost District Court men, for women than for costly more *7 sexually equalize to Title VII intends determined that “[i]f exception must this one there be employment opportunity, Id., to defense.” at 383. the cost differential was that of the District Court The conclusion ultimate opera- in on the basis of the petitioner had sex discriminated id., in VII, violation of Title program tion of its enjoining petitioner An entered at order was 385-386. ,from pregnancy-related disabilities continuing to exclude for the future coverage Plan, providing of the and of the class monetary to individual members relief award Appeals for appealed to the Court of affected. Petitioner affirmed divided vote Circuit, the Fourth that court of the District Court. judgment judgment the date on which the District Court’s Between and the time this decided the Court case was was rendered Geduldig decided U. S. we Aiello, Appeals, dis- rejected very a claim that a similar where we (1974), under California law violated ability program established of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause repre- plan’s exclusion disabilities because majority The Court discrimination. sented sex Geduldig controlling was not felt because Appeals evidence, be Defenses must bottomed on between men women. lacking such, regard, in this here. may suggested by pre- inferences be statistical data “Whatever presume any precise
sented, simply to draw the Court cannot conclu- coverage provided value of the the actuarial under sions including pregnancy present plan, or the effect related disabilities on Id., at limited data.” 382-383. of that basis Equal arose under the Protection Clause Fourteenth and not under Title Amendment, 2d, F. 666- 667. dissenting opinion disagreed with majority as to impact 519 F. Geduldig, at 668-669. We 2d, granted certiorari important consider this issue construction of Title VII.12
II (a)(1) provides Section 703 part relevant it shall be an employment unlawful practice employer for an
“to against any discriminate respect individual with to his terms, privileges of compensation, conditions, employment, because of such individual's color, race, religion, sex, or origin,'' national C. 2000e-2 U. S. (a)(1).
While there is no necessary inference that Congress, choosing language, incorporate intended into Title VII the concepts of discrimination which evolved from have *8 court decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth the similarities between the Amendment, congressional language and some surely those decisions indicate that latter are useful in starting point inter- preting /Particularly the former. in the of defining case term “discrimination, which Congress has nowhere in Title VII defined, those cases afford an existing body of law ana- lyzing discussing that in a legal term not wholly context dissimilar which Congress concerns in manifested enacting Title VII. \We that our therefore, decision think, Geduldig v. Aiello, dealing with a supra, strikingly similar disability plan, quite relevant in determining whether or pregnancy not exclusion did discriminate on the basis Geduldig, In sex. the disability system insurance was noted, supra, joint petition. at 127 n. Respondents As this is presented questions, have several additional not all which merit treat they opinion. ment in this We have concluded that are all without merit. wages from the deducted from contributions entirely funded employee’s of the a rate of employees, participating 1% In relevant other $85. maximum salary up to an annual to General was similar program operation respects, at 487-489. see U. S., disability benefits plan, Electric’s challenge to this protection equal rejected appellee’s We statutory first noted: scheme. We of this the exclusion agree that
“We cannot under discrimination to invidious amounts coverage not dis- does Protection Clause. California Equal persons or respect groups to the criminate protection under disability insurance eligible for case re- challenged The classification program. set of underinclusiveness of the the asserted lates to Id., at 494. has selected to insure.” risks that State opinion in the when later point emphasized This again, we noted: Reed v. cry like far from cases case thus a
“[T]his Richardson, Frontiero v. (1971), Reed, U. S. upon based involving discrimination (1973), 411 U. S. does program insurance gender such. The California anyone from because eligibility benefit exclude physical condition— merely but removes one gender compensable the list of disabilities. pregnancy —from can only pregnant, women become While it is true every legislative it does not follow that classification like is a sex-based classification concerning pregnancy Reed, Frontiero, supra. supra, those considered objectively physical is an identifiable Normal *9 unique showing characteristics. Absent condition with involving pregnancy pretexts are mere that distinctions invidious against discrimination designed effect of one sex or the lawmakers are con- members other, or stitutionally free to include pregnancy exclude from legislation any such as this on coverage reason- just able respect as with any physical other basis, condition.
“The lack of identity between the excluded gender as such under this insurance be- program upon comes clear most cursory analysis. The pro- gram potential divides recipients into two groups preg-— nant persons. women and nonpregnant first While the group is exclusively female, the second includes mem- Id., bers of both sexes.” n. 20. 496-497, quoted from language Geduldig leaves no doubt that our reason for rejecting appellee’s equal protection claim in that case was that exclusion from cover- age disability-benefits under plan California’s was not itself on discrimination based sex. recognized in Geduldig,
We the fact that course, there was no sex-based discrimination as such was not the end the analysis, should it be shown “that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against members sex or one other,” ibid. But we no noted that such semblance of showing had been made: is no
“There evidence the record that the selection of the risks insured program worked to discrimi- any nate against group definable or class terms aggregate risk protection derived group or class from the program. There is no from risk protected men are and women are not. there Likewise, is no risk which women are protected and men Id., are not.” at 496-497.
Since gender-based discrimination had been shown to exist either by the terms of the by its there effect, was no need to reach the question of what sort of standard govern would our had review there been such a showing. Frontiero v. Richardson, See U. S. 677 (1973); Reed Reed, (1971). S. 71 U. *10 in concluding Appeals wrong was therefore Court of
The Geduldig applicable an action reasoning was not that the of sex-based discrimi- finding it is a VII. under Title Since finding such as must in a case trigger, this, nation that (a)(1), 703§ under employment practice of an unlawful exclusion holding that an in its Geduldig precisely point in is general providing plan disability-benefits pregnancy from a at all. discrimination coverage gender-based not a than there this case in showing There is no more is a benefits Geduldig the exclusion in discrimination an invidious designed to effect “pretext mere t] Court The or the other.” sex of one against members Geduldig in view that the decision Appeals expressed the discrimi- or not a conceded actually on whether had turned doing it we think that so but nation was “invidious” As we opinion. from our quoted language misread is not on its face distinction noted a opinion, Protection Equal violate nonetheless might sex related forbid- accomplish a subterfuge to if in fact a Clause it were no of ex- question here have den But we discrimination. other re- disability comparable in all cluding a disease or yet confined and or disabilities spects covered diseases course, Pregnancy is, of one race or sex. to the members ways significantly is in other women, confined to but disability. The typical covered disease different from the all, “disease” at it is a District Court found that condition, voluntarily is often undertaken desired do not therefore infer that 375 F. 377. We Supp., peti- benefits the exclusion of pregnancy discriminating against pretext tioner’s simple by the adopted lower contrary arguments women. . The largely Brethren were dissenting courts and our expounded by Geduldig. rejected on Title than grounded VII rather instant suit was recognize our cases Equal Protection Clause, *11 prima
a facie violation of VII Title can be in established some upon proof circumstances that of an otherwise fa effect cially or neutral classification is to against discriminate members of one class or Washington Davis, another. See v. 426 (1976). U. S. 229, 246-248 For in example, the context of a under the challenge, provisions of (a) § 703 to (2),13 a facially employment neutral this Court held test, that a prima facie case of discrimination would be established if, even proof absent intent, consequences of the test “invidiously were to discriminate on the basis of racial or impermissible other Griggs Co., Duke classification,” Power v. 401 U. 431 (1971). Even assuming S. it 424, is not that necessary in prove this case to intent to prima establish a facie violation of Douglas § 703 but McDonnell cf. (a)(1), Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. respond 802-806 (1973), ents have not made the requisite showing gender-based effects.14 Geduldig,
As in respondents attempted have not to meet the burden of demonstrating gender-based a discrimi- natory effect resulting from the pregnancy- exclusion of disabilities from coverage.15 related Whatever the ultimate 13 provides employment This subsection that be shall an unlawful practice employer
“(2) limit, classify or segregate, employees any to his in way which deprive deprive any to employment would or tend oppor individual adversely or tunities otherwise affect his employee, status as an because race, color, religion, sex, of such individual’s origin.” national 42 (a) (2). U. S. C. §2000e-2 14Respondents, discrimination, who seek to establish have the tradi litigation tional civil establishing they burden of complain that the acts of constituted of Title VII. Albemarle discrimination violation Paper Moody, 422 Douglas Co. U. McDonnell (1975); v. S. Corp. Green, Griggs, S., at In placed 802. the burden U. on the employer any requirement showing given “of must have a manifest relationship employment question,” S., at did not U. discriminatory Albemarle, supra, shown, arise until effect had been at 425. showing gender-based discrimination, Absent a as that term is Dis- before the introduced evidence value
probative very- in the subject instant case, on this Court trict cov- of risks selection illustrate it tended to least to discriminate in fact, not did the Plan operate, vered indis- from the Geduldig, start we As women. against benefits and actuarial fiscal putable baseline “[t]he sexes,” of both members . . program . accrue findings need disturb 497 n. 20. We S., at U. finding, is there neither Court note that the District support finding, would evidence which any was there nor *12 to discrimi- of the “worked benefits Plan the financial that class in terms against any group definable nate or class from group that protection risk derived aggregate (and for all in effect id., at 496. The program,” Plan, package, than more an insurance nothing that is appears), id., at but excludes see risks, others, which covers some to relevant identifiable “package” going 496-497.16 The Electric’s concerned with —General groups presently we are employees exactly the same cate- male and female —covers facially nondiscriminatory in gories of is the sense risk, and protected no from which men are that is risk “[t]here risk from which women women are not. there is no Likewise, Id., men As there protected are not.” 496-497. proof no is in worth more to men package that fact impossible any gender-based is- to find than to women,pit discriminatory simply in this women effect scheme because not benefits; a result of do receive disabled as say, gender-based is to discrimination does not result that disability-benefits employer’s plan an simply because less Geduldig, showing effect, gender-based aor there can in be defined (a)(1). violation no §703 change does is, Electric self-insures not That fact just insurer, effect, acting as State California acting in Geduldig, 492. U. atS.,
than all-inclusive.17 For all that appears, pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk does destroy presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men and women alike, results from facially evenhanded inclusion of risks. To hold otherwise would endanger the commonsense notion that an employer who no disability has program benefits at all does not violate Title VII even though the “underinclusion” of risks as a result impacts, values, proof Absent of different against the cost to “insure” is, essence, nothing risks compensation more than extra to the em ployees, fringe the form benefits. the employer If were to remove fringe and, instead, wages insurance benefits increase an amount equal to the “insurance,” clearly gender- cost of the there would be no discrimination, based though even employee female who wished to purchase disability pay insurance that covered all risks would have to employee than purchased more would a male who identical insurance, due to the fact that her insurance had to cover the “extra” pregnancy. respondents disabilities acknowledge due While seem to any provide failure to benefit at all would not constitute 18, infra, sex-based discrimination in they violation Title see n. illogically suggest present also scheme does violate Title VII because: *13 money buy spend
“A female her personal disability policy must to own covering pregnancy disability fully against if she wants to be insured period income, of without whereas a male without extra expenditure fully against every period disability.” insured of GE Supplemental Reargumient Respondents Yet, Brief for on both 11. in cases—the case and the where disability coverage instant case there is no fully at all—the ultimate that a result is woman who to be insured wished pay would have to an incremental counterpart amount over her male due solely pregnancy-related possibility pro to the Title disabilities. VIFs scription not, case, require on employer discrimination does in either to pay wrong that incremental amount. The District Court assuming, was in did, Supp., employment as it F. at that Title 375 VII’s ban on dis necessarily “greater that crimination means economic benefit must be [s]” required paid or differing to be to one sex the other because of their roles in “the scheme of human existence.” heavily gen- one upon more disabilities, pregnancy-related gender- is no facial Just there upon
der the other.18 than is none here. too, there case, so, in that based discrimination Ill congres- of the analysis this however, that areWe told, with is inconsistent Title VII purpose underlying sional are entitled it is which, guidelines of asserted, EEOC, Griggs, Act, in construction to “great deference” Corp., Phillips v. Martin Marietta 433-434; S.,U. J., concurring). (1971) (Marshall, U. S. heavily pro- rely most guideline upon respondents pertinent part: in in mulgated and states by pregnancy, caused or contributed “Disabilities recovery therefrom miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, temporary disabilities job-related are, purposes, all any or health tem- should treated as such under be or leave available disability insurance sick porary , tacitly that this situation would not violate Respondents admit They acknowledge obligation had no to establish Title that “GE VII. Moreover, any fringe program,” Respondents Brief for 143. benefit engaged imper in difficulty Electric with their contention - vividly closing suggestion their portrayed missible sex discrimination paying sphere discriminates within classifi “[i]f Response Respondents by sex, pay,” so cation does failure Reply Reargument statement, Brief for on 7. As and its Petitioner converse, perceiving indicate, the issue terms of “sex discrimination” quickly places into a no-win situation. See also resolution this issue Supplemental Respondents Reargument (“[W]e believe that Brief for on equal unequal imposing employees on either are costs when benefits unequal equal right benefits costs violates the each individual when employee employee equally to be treated each individual opposite .”). interpretative problems sex . . Troublesome such as Congress, prohibiting reinforce our discrimina belief that sex-based meaning tion depart longstanding in Title did not intend to *14 “discrimination,” Hackney, 535, cf. 406 v. U. S. 548-549 Jefferson (1972).
141 with employment. in connection . . . shall [Benefits] be applied to to due or childbirth on the same terms and they applied conditions as to other temporary (b) disabilities.” 29 CFR 1604.10 § (1975).19
In evaluating contention it should be noted that first Congress, enacting Title did upon not confer EEOC authority to promulgate rules regulations pursu or ant to that Title. Paper Albemarle Co. 422 v. S. Moody, U. 431 405, (1975).20 This does not mean that EEOC guide lines are not entitled to consideration in determining legis lative see supra; Griggs v. Duke Power Albemarle, intent, Co., supra, at 433-434; Espinoza Co., v. Farah Mfg. 414 (1973). S. 94 U. But it does mean that courts properly may weight accord less to such guidelines than adminis to regulations trative Congress which has declared shall have the of law, Johnson, force see Oil Standard Co. v. 316 U. S. regulations (1942), enabling under the statute may supply imposition themselves the basis for of liability, see, g., (a), Exchange § e. Act of 1934, 15 Securities U. S. 78w§C. comprehensive most (a). The statement the role of inter pretative rulings such as EEOC guidelines is found Skidmore & 323 U. (1944), S. where Co., Swift Court said: interpretations
“We consider rulings, opinions the Administrator under this while Act, regulation respondents, (b) other cited 29 CFR 1604.9 § statutory proposition simply restates (1975), unlawful employment practice to discriminate men and regard “between women with fringe benefits.” given “authority The EEOC has been from time to time to . . issue . procedural regulations carry provisions suitable out the of this sub- chapter,” (a), (a). C. 2000e-12 contends, U. S. No one §713 above-quoted however, regulation procedural in nature or in effect. *15 authority, of their reason courts upon the
controlling judg- informed and experience body do constitute resort may properly litigants courts and to which ment par- in a judgment such a weight for guidance. evident thoroughness upon the depend will ticular case its reasoning, of its validity consideration, in its pronouncements, and later with earlier consistency if persuade, power give which factors all those to control.” lacking power well under does not fare question guideline
The EEOC interpretation contemporaneous not It is these standards. years after promulgated eight first it was of Title since More importantly, of that Title. the enactment position agency flatly contradicts guideline to the enactment date, closer at an earlier had enunciated opinion An letter the General governing statute. 17, 1966, dated October states: EEOC, Counsel of the the above requested opinion our whether “You have childbirth as a pregnancy exclusion would be continuation long-term salary under the of 1964. Rights VII of the Civil Act in violation Title opinion regarding pregnancy, letter we “In a recent policy in this does ‘The Commission area have stated, compare employer’s an treatment illness or seek maternity maternity since injury with his treatment disability unique to the female sex and temporary is a anticipated to be life during working more or less employees.’ opin- it is our of most women Therefore, to the facts stated according ion that a com- above, program insurance which covers hos- pany’s group expenses delivery of pital employees’ and medical for the from but excludes its long-term salary children, program those continuation disabilities which result and childbirth would not be in violation App. of Title 721-722. VII.” A few weeks later, opinion expressly pursu- letter issued ant 29 CFR 1601.30 position the EEOC’s was that (1975), plan may or other exclude simply “an insurance benefit maternity risk, as a covered exclusion would such an not in our discriminatory,” App. view be 735. *16 in to guidelines
We have declined follow administrative past they pronouncements the where conflicted with earlier Forman, Housing Foundation, of the United v. agency. Inc. Espinoza 421 Far ah U. n. 25 (1975); S. 837, 858-859, Co., wholly Mfg. In not supra, short, at 92-96. while we do weight given discount the to be the 1972 it does guideline, high judged by receive marks when the standards enunciated Skidmore, supra. in more recent persuasive are also indications that the
There sharply indicia of the guideline EEOC conflicts other of proper interpretation provisions the sex-discrimination prohibi- of of legislative history Title VII. Title VII’s brevity. tion of sex discrimination is notable for its primarily however, Congress paid especial Even attention to the so, provisions Equal Pay 206(d),21 of the § 29 U. S. C. Act, (h) adding when it amended 703 of Title VII by § following sentence: practice
“It shall not be under employment an unlawful (d)(1) Equal Pay (d)(1), Act, Section 6 of the 29 U. S. C. §206 provides, pertinent in part: employer having employees subject any provisions
“No to of this sec- discriminate, tion any employees shall within establishment in which such employed, employees wages paying between on the basis of sex employees to in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which pays wages he employees opposite to for of sex such establishment equal jobs requires equal skill, effort, performance work on of which responsibility, performed working con- which are under similar ditions, (i) seniority except payment pursuant where such is made to a system; (ii) system; (iii) earnings system a merit measures by quantity quality production; (iv) any or or differential on based other factor other than sex... .” upon employer to differentiate subchapter any determining wages of sex amount
the basis employees to be to paid paid or compensation if differentiation authorized employer such such (d) of Title 29.” 42 U. S. C. provisions section (h). §2000^-2 proposed Amendment
This sentence Bennett bill, Cong. (1964), the Senate Rec. Senator floor stated that manager Humphrey, bill, “unmistakably purpose of the amendment was make benefit clear” that “differences of treatment industrial may plans, including options earlier retirement women, if it operation law,” continue in under this becomes bill, id., interpre- at 13663-13664. Because this amendment, Title Pay applicable (d) Equal tations Act are *17 by regulation promulgated interpretive and an well, VII Act Equal Pay Wage Hour Administrator under the and explicitly states: insur- plan providing
“If to a employer contributions equal both employees are for ance or similar benefits prohibited by the women, wage men no differential payments, will from such equal pay provisions result employees to the though even the benefits which accrue for question greater are for one sex than the other. employer may unequal The mere fact make employees opposite for sexes in such contributions however, a situation will be considered to indicate not, employer’s payments are in violation of section if benefits resulting equal such em- (d), (d) 29 CFR ployees.” (1975). 800.116 § depend if we were to for our Thus, even construction solely of Title YII language critical on the basis regulations interpretative “deference” appro- priate administrative we would find agencies, ourselves pointed diametrically opposite directions conflict- ing regulations on one EEOC, Wage and the hand, and Hour on the other. Petitioner’s exclu- Administrator, sion benefits for pregnancy would be declared an employment practice unlawful under §703 but (a)(1), be prac- would declared not to employment be unlawful (h). tice under
We are not reduced to such total in construing abdication the statute. The guideline EEOC conflicting as it does with pronouncements earlier of that agency, no containing suggestion some new of legis- source history lative had been discovered in intervening eight stands virtually years, Contrary alone. to it are the con- interpretation sistent of the Wage and Hour Administrator, quoted and the language of Senator Humphrey, the floor manager of Title VII in the They support Senate. what seems to us to “plain be the meaning” of the language used by Congress when it enacted (a)(1). §703 concept “discrimination,” course, was well known the time of the enactment of Title having been associated with the Fourteenth Amendment for nearly a century, carrying long history with it a of judicial con struction. Congress When makes unlawful an em ployer to “discriminate . . . because of . ,” . . sex . . . explanation without further of its should not meaning, we readily infer that it meant something different from what *18 the concept of traditionally discrimination has meant, cf. Morton Mancari, 417 Ozawa v. v. U. S. (1974); 549 535, States, United (1922). 260 178, surely U. S. 193 There is no any Walling, see Gemsco v. reason such inference here, 324 (1945). U. S. agree petitioner
We therefore with that its disability- not Title VII benefits does violate because of its failure judgment disabilities. pregnancy-related to cover The Appeals the Court
Reversed. concurring. Me. Justice Stewart, join I of the Court that General opinion holding disability during pregnancy Electric’s exclusion benefits for of Title per (a)(1) § is not a se violation of discriminatory respondents prove a that have failed I not under- Blackmun, effect. Brother do my Unlike Power Griggs Duke opinion question stand the either Co., 401 significance generally U. S. or the specifically, case. discriminatory a effect in Title VII proving part.
Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring opinion I join the concur its judgment Court and exclusion of (a) that Electric’s insofar as holds se, § a violation of per due to not, in this case there- (a)(1) VII; (b) plaintiffs of Title that the effect; discriminatory proving had least burden of fore I any not proof. join do (c) they failed opinion any such in the Court’s suggestion inference or —if may never be a effect inference or is there —that suggestion Griggs v. Duke case, VII factor in a Title controlling longer good is no law. Co., (1971), Power U. S. Justice Marshall Mr. Brennan, whom Mr. Justice concurs, dissenting. VII violating Title without today that Court holds seq., et 42 U. C. 2000e Act of S. Rights
of the Civil compen- disability plan that may adopt a employer private except af- one temporary disabilities all employees sates I respectfully dissent. pregnancy. exclusively women, fecting applicable adminis- only repudiates the holding Today’s Con- charged by agency guideline promulgated trative
147
gress
implementation
of the Act, but also rejects the
unanimous conclusion of all six Courts of Appeals that have
addressed this question. See Communications
v.
Workers
Tel.,
American Tel. &
I This case is unusual in that it presents question a resolution of which at first glance upon turns largely the con- ceptual framework chosen identify opera- describe the tional features of the challenged disability By di- program. their recting upon focus the risks excluded from the otherwise comprehensive upon justifications program, purported for such Equal exclusions, Employment Opportunity Commission, plaintiffs, women and the lower courts rea- son that the pregnancy prima exclusion constitutes a facie violation Title VII. This they violation triggered, because the omission pregnancy from the program has argue, the intent effect of providing “only women sub- [are jected] to a substantial risk of total loss of income because of temporary disability.” medical Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae 12. diametrically Court’s framework is It different. views representing Electric’s gender-free assign- of risks in with normal techniques.
ment accordance actuarial perspective From the lone exclusion of of Title violation VII insofar as all other disabilities for both sexes. This mutually reasoning covered relies primarily upon descriptive statement borrowed from *20 496-497 “There Geduldig Aiello, (1974): v. 417 U. S. and women are protected risk which men are no from is from which women are is no risk Likewise, not. there Ante, to the According not.” at 138. protected men are process precludes the assertedly sorting neutral Court, a violation of Title VII. constituting from pregnancy omission conceptual either it is not self-evident that Presumably, can appropriate than the framework is more other, the necessary is to select inquiry mean further only that out- analytical approach. At the more realistic accurate and underlying assumption that the soundness of the Court’s set, risk- product of a plan gender-neutral is untainted the the historical against can be assignment process examined practices Electric’s and the backdrop employment General policies governing of gender-free existence nonexistence resulting compensable Secondly, inclusion risks. Electric then be pattern risks insured can objectives promoted social evaluated terms broad inquiry compels Title I that first VII. believe assumption that General Electric conclusion that the Court’s process purely in a engaged gender-neutral risk-assignment that EEOC’s inter- fanciful. The second demonstrates pretation pregnancy disability a exclusion incompatible objectives insurance with the overall rejected. of Title YII been unjustifiably has II Geduldig Aiello, supra, purports point to be the starting analysis. state-operated Court’s There a system containing insurance was held pregnancy exclusion Equal Clause. Although violate Protection opinion from one quotes primarily footnote of that at some length, ante, 134-135, finally does not grapple at Court Geduldig own on its terms. favorably Geduldig
Considered most to the Court’s view, proposition established the that a classification standing alone cannot be said to fall into the category of classifications rest explicitly “gender on as such,” S., n. Beyond U. at 496 20. that, Geduldig offers little analysis helpful Surely decision of this case. it offends common sense ante, to suggest, a classification revolving around pregnancy is at the strongly not, minimum, “sex related.” e. See, g., Cleveland Board Education v. LaFleur, 414 S. 652 (1974) U. concurring). J., (Powell, Indeed, even in the insurance context where neutral actuarial principles were found provided to have legitimate *21 independent input into Geduldig’s the decisionmaking process, outcome qualified by was explicit the of reservation a case where could be demonstrated that a pregnancy-centered differentiation is used as a pretext “mere to designed . .. effect an invidious against discrimination the members of one sex. . . .” 417 U. n. S., at 20. 496-497,
Thus, Geduldig obliges itself the Court to determine whether the exclusion of disability a sex-linked from universe of the compensable product disabilities was the of actually neutral, persuasive actuarial considerations, rather stemmed policy a purposefully that downgraded in women’s role the labor force. In Geduldig, coupled inquiry that with the nor- presumption mal favoring legislative action satisfied the Court pregnancy the in prompted exclusion fact was by California’s legitimate fiscal and therefore that concerns, California did deny equal protection in effectuating re- “ ” forms step Id., ‘one at time.’ a at 495. But the record in this impossible case makes such deference here. Instead, in reaching pur- its conclusion that showing of poseful discrimination has not been at ante, made, the 136, history simply Court disregards practices General Electric that have employment opportunities served undercut the of women employed.1 who while pregnant become More- disability program developed General Electric’s was in an earlier era presumed play only openly temporary when women were a minor and conclu- studiously undisturbed over, ignores Court Electric’s “discrimina- District Court that General sion in factor motivating women was “a tory attitude” toward (ED Va. Supp. 1974), policy,” 367, its F. its “neutral on face” exclusion pregnancy [neither] Id., at 382.2
nor “in its intent.” appraisal of General Electric’s Plainly the Court’s then, gender- “not a process sorting risks and policy as a neutral easily be 136, at cannot ante, all,” based discrimination Court, in this case. The historical record squared with the originally Electric conceived General in the force. As role labor “ did not employees because ‘women to its female no benefit offered they hoping to life, probably were recognize responsibilities of ” App. excerpted from company.’ get married and leave soon Story Swope Electric and General E.: of Gerard Loth, Swope D. G. (1958). not until the 1930’s 1940’s It was American Business employees eligible participate company made female however, general practice, program. In common with business taking policy other factors pursue a Electric continued to wages at two-thirds level into account in order to scale women’s company policies common stereo- Id., reflect men’s. at 1002. More recent g., pregnant women, see, e. Cleveland types concerning potentialities LaFleur, (1974), and have Board Education v. U. S. *22 of disability maternity nonpayment pay- coupled the of forced leave with appears “In Thus, the Court found: certain instances ments. District required position employee to take of her pregnant that leave permitted weeks prior and to return until six three months to birth not short, of periods .... In after the birth. In other instances varied required only to employees pregnant been it is women who have all the only ability physical to and regardless of their desire and work cease work job arbitrary they required period to remain off their for an have been February 1973, Supp. 375 F. 385. In after the birth of their child.” suit, company coinciding of approximately with commencement this forced-maternity-leave policy directive. formal abandoned its finding, affirm of this Appeals of did not on basis The Court intent,” ‘consequences,’ since it concluded that “the statute looks here, ‘inextricably discrimination, sex- “[a]ny as that which is such consequences F. 2d and result is violative of the Act.” 519 linked’ in 664.
therefore, proceeds to a discussion of purported neutral cri- teria that suffice to explain the lone of pregnancy exclusion from the program. Court argues The pregnancy that is not “comparable” to other since “voluntary” disabilities it is a condition rather than Ibid. fallacy “disease.” argument this is that even if “non-voluntariness” and “dis- operational ease” are be as construed for criteria inclusion of appli- General Electric's program, cation these criteria is inconsistent with the Court's gender- interpretation neutral company's policy. “voluntary”
For pregnancy characterization of as example, persuasive is not a for factor, as the Court of Appeals 3 correctly “other than for childbirth noted, [General disability, had never eliminating construed its so- Electric] all 'voluntary' called disabilities,” sport including injuries, at tempted suicides, disease, venereal disabilities incurred in the commission a crime or during a cosmetic elective fight, surgery. 519 F. at 665. Similarly, the label “disease” 2d, “disability” rather than cannot be deemed since determinative General Electric's pregnancy disqualification also excludes pregnancies end debilitating miscarriages, 10% 375 F. Supp., at pregnancies cases where 10% complicated by are “diseases” the intuitive sense ibid., recovering and cases where women from child word, birth stricken severe diseases to pregnancy.4 unrelated course, proposition voluntary Of even the is a con overbroad, dition is the District Court found that “a substantial negligent conception incidence of accidental also occurs.” 375 F. assume, however, Supp., may purposes argument, 377. I voluntary pregnancies inability high incidence of and the voluntary involuntary conceptions, per except differentiate between obnoxious, means, justify haps through could intrusive the decision- voluntarily treating pregnancies as maker’s induced. *23 plaintiffs class is experience The of one of instructive On pregnancy April pregnancy she took a reach exclusion. days baby Upon nine later. leave, delivering some her return a stillborn for the principal argument even the Court’s Moreover, analysis. plan’s neutrality cannot withstand supposed, gender to demonstrate analytical upon The central framework relied principle the absence of discrimination described Geduldig: men protected is no risk from which are “There no from which women are not . . risk women . [and] quoted, at protected S., 496-497, and men are not.” U. are ante, impression is faced fostering at 138. In that gender-neutral of risks in a assignment a mere underinclusive irrespec- are insured fashion —that all other disabilities is, proves simplistic analysis to be gender tive of Court’s —the risks mutually contractible misleading. although For all supra, n. 4 but see irrespective gender, covered vasectomies, plan prostatectomies, risks such as also insures reproductive system specific to the and circumcisions that are counterparts for which there exist no female men and dis- only affords plan. Again, pregnancy covered from cov- or that is excluded sex-specific ability, otherwise, re- appropriately Court the District erage.5 Accordingly, her unrelated to home, lung, clot in a condition she blood suffered her claim rehospitalized. company declined pregnancy, and was eligi- her ground disability for on the severed payments id., separated from work bility plan. 372. Had she been See under plan example, during stoppage any work other reason —for —the the embolism. fully would have covered analysis is Indeed, of the Court’s “underinclusive” the shallowness ailments transparent. catalogue of all Electric assembled a Had General systematically exclude humanity, proceeded then that befall afflicts every disability female-specific predominantly coverage operates women, still reason as here the Court could pay equally: Women, men, entitled to draw like be would sex could and neither prostatectomies, ments for their circumcisions and excluded cancer, and the other pregnancies, breast payment claim disability that any lines, Along similar female-dominated disabilities. anemia, for group particular disproportionately occurs in a —sickle-cell troubling the plan without freely from the example excluded be —could analytical approach. Court’s
153 marked: concern defendants in “[T]he reference coupled pregnancy risks, apparent the lack of concern regarding balancing the other statistically dis- sex-linked buttresses the Court’s conclusion the abilities, discrimina- tory attitude in characterized elsewhere the findings Court’s in fact a factor its motivating policy.” in 375 Supp., F. at 383.
If case, decision of this upon turns acceptance therefore, of the Court’s view of plan General Electric’s as a assignment plaintiffs’ sex-neutral risks, perception of the plan as a sex-conscious process expressive the secondary in status women labor company’s history force, of General employment practices Electric’s and the absence of definable gender-neutral sorting criteria under rejection warrant Court’s view to the deference plaintiffs’. Indeed, the fact that the Court’s frame of refer- lends ence itself such sex-laden decisionmaking intentional, makes clear wisdom propriety contrary of the EEOC’s approach employment disability programs.
Ill course, purposeful Of demonstration of discrimination is not only ground recovery under Title VII. Not- unexplained and withstanding inexplicable implications to the contrary Washing- in the opinion,6 this see majority Court,
6
Douglas Corp.
Green,
cryptic
citation to McDonnell
cf.”
“but
v.
(1973), ante,
137,
perhaps
mystifying.
sets effects. First, all covers disabilities that mutually afflict sexes. But supra. both see n. Second, against insures all male-specific disabilities that are predominant impact have on males. all Finally, female- specific female-impacted covered, except disabilities the most prevalent, pregnancy. The Court focuses on first equal factor —the inclusion of mutual risks —and therefore understandably identify can no discriminatory arising effect plan. In contrast, plaintiffs rely the EEOC and upon unequal exclusion manifested in effects two and three *26 pinpoint impact an on adverse women. However one protected risks profile by defines the General the Electric, must question policies determinative be whether social the by aims to through be furthered Title VII and filtered phrase fairly “to discriminate” 703 (a)(1) § contained pattern coverage forbid ultimate insures all risks that except commonplace applicable one that to women but to men. not policy, paradigm example
As a matter of law and
is a
type
complex
economic
social
that
inquiry
wisely
pursuant
left
to resolution
the EEOC
Congress
92-238,
Rep.
its Title VII mandate.
No.
See
R.H.
(1972).
prior
8
Title VII decisions have
p.
And, accordingly,
EEOC
consistently acknowledged
unique persuasiveness
956,
(1975),
42, 46,
D.
F. 2d
960
rev’d
App.
C.
on constitutional
(1976).
grounds,
Indeed, following only” “effect outlined therein in test identi- pressly endorsed use of “forms and incidents discrimination” fying “increasingly complex” Rep. 92-238, glance.” H. R. No. “may at first See appear not obvious (1972). p. 8
interpretations prior in this These than decisions, area. rather guidelines “entitled to merely that Commission providing ante, the Court hold that allows, as at consideration,” “great deference.” interpretations EEOC’s should receive Griggs Duke Moody, 431; Paper supra, Albemarle Co. v. at v. Co., Martin Marietta supra, 433-434; Phillips Power at concurring). Corp., (1971) J., 400 U. S. (Marshall, in order today standard Nonetheless, the Court abandons this guideline repudiate provid- squarely to Commission by preg- contributed to ing that caused or “[disabilities disabili- nancy job-related temporary are, purposes, . . . for all temporary insurance any ties . . . health or [under] This (b) (1975). plan____” or sick leave 29 CFR 1604.10 8-year events: an rejection is attributed to two interrelated promulgation of delay Title enactment and between VII’s EEOC’s letters and. interim guideline, the Commission’s expressing Counsel the view disability. Neither necessarily compensable includable as a “great deference” to accord supports the Court’s refusal event interpretation. to the EEOC’s only ante, brief mention true, noted,
It is history early legislative in the appears of sex discrimination therefore, that be surprising, of Title VII. It should not candidly a fresh and uncharted charged EEOC, mandate, required study further before acknowledged that could proscribed by Congress of sex discrimination as contours pro- (1965). Reg. Although be defined. See Fed. *27 acknowl- the the outset ceeding Commission cautiously, preg- and relationship between sex discrimination edged the have to be devised “policies would nancy, announcing protection job employees reasonable which afforded female Report First Annual periods pregnancy.” EEOC during During p. (1967). Year Congress, 1965-1966, to Fiscal develop coher- to a succeeding years, seven the EEOC worked practices pregnancy-oriented employment policy ent toward through both pursuit of its normal adjudicatory functions8 comprehensive and by engaging studies with such organi- as the Advisory zations President’s Citizens’ Council on Status of See, Jacqueline Women. Address of g., e. G. Gut- willig, Chairwoman, Advisory Citizens’ cited in Council, App. 1159. investigations These on pregnancy the role of labor coupled market with the “re- Commission’s view . . its maternity . case decisions on preparatory to is- [of] id., suing guidelines,” formal in the 1161, culminated 1972 guideline, agency’s systematic first formalized, state- ment “employment policies to relating pregnancy on childbirth.” years
Therefore, eight prior while some elapsed had to the issuance of the 1972 guideline, opinion and earlier letters had refused to on impose liability employers period during deny no one can does deliberation, that the final EEOC determination thorough followed and well-informed consider- realistically ation. this extended evaluation Indeed, viewed, complex admittedly problem and an unwillingness to impose premature additional, potentially employers costs on during stages perceived to decisionmaking ought be as practice be commended. It is bitter irony preceded care that promulgation guideline of the 1972 today tardy condemned Court as its indecisiveness, unwillingness employers’ practices irresponsibly challenge period during formative labeled evidence of in- consistency, inconsistency and this indecisiveness and bootstrapped into reasons for denying the Commission’s in- terpretation its due deference. guideline represents particularly me,
For con- product scientious and reasonable EEOC and, deliberations “great I can find Certainly, merits our deference.” therefore, positions regarding synopses the Commission’s For adopted decisionmaking sex discrimination the course administrative activities, Reports Congress. litigation see the EEOC’s Annual *28 guideline step is out of concluding basis no Co., Espinoza Mfg. v. Farah intent. See congressional prior 1972, to On (1973). contrary, 86, 414 U. S. to rule just pregnancy-inclusive such a Congress enacted under the for “sickness” of benefits govern the distribution 351§ 45 U. S. C. Unemployment Insurance Railroad Act, following the announcement shortly (k) (2). Furthermore, and the President Congress approved rule, of the EEOC’s Depart- essentially promulgation identical signed an IX Title under and Welfare ment of Health, Education, (a) § C. 1972, U. S. the Education Amendments More- (c) (1976). V). 86.57 (1970 Supp. See 45 CFR ed., the Civil jurisdiction subject workers over, federal maternity preg- eligible now are Service Commission Federal program. leave See nancy coverage under their sick (FPM Supp. 13, S13-2 630, subch. Manual, ch. Personnel May 1975). 990-2, to the responses are reasonable formulations policy
These which show investigations testimony governmental uniform both disability programs built into exclusions break down workers and act burden women financially ex thereby relationship, employment continuity role in the labor transient comparatively women’s acerbating Income Commerce, Consumer g., Dept. e. force. U. S. See, U. S. 1974); Women’s July Bureau, No. (Series P-60, (rev. of Women Workers Dept. of Underutilization Labor, under coverage Title dictating pregnancy In 1971). ed. now ac merely upon a solution settled guideline the EEOC’s Dept, of country. every other industrial cepted by Western Security Programs Welfare, Social Education, and Health, Re (Research xix pp. World, 1971, ix, xviii, Throughout that such comprehend I 40). find it difficult port No. “sufficiently reasonable” anything be but a construction can Nat Train v. reviewing courts.” by the “accepted to be one Council, (1975). 421 U. S. Resources ural Def. *29 concept Court’s belief that the of discrimination cannot disability policies
reach effecting “an additional unique risk, ante, women to .. at plainly . out step the decision ago three Terms in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), interpreting provision another of the Civil Rights Act. There a unanimous Court recognized that discrimina- tion is a phenomenon social encased in a social context and, unavoidably takes its therefore, from the meaning desired products end of the relevant legislative enactment, end products that may demand due consideration to the unique- ness of “disadvantaged” A individuals.9 realistic understand- ing conditions found in today’s labor environment war- rants taking into pregnancy account fashioning in disability policies. hypothetical Unlike the conjectured situations ante, the at Court, 139-140, and n. contemporary disability 9Lau provide held that special the failure to language instruction Chinese-speaking students San Francisco schools the ban violated against origin racial or national discrimination contained in 601 of the Rights Civil Act of Act, 1964. The Court concluded that interpreted by regulations the administrative promulgated Depart Health, Education, ment of and Welfare addressed dis “effects] [to though purposeful design even present,” ultimately criminate] no sought goal to further insuring meaningful the broad “a opportunity participate program S., . educational . . .” 414 U. at [schools’] generalized objective, Faced with repudiated 568. such a the Court analysis Appeals upon Court which had relied San Francisco’s equal offerings every commitment of educational and resources to child as the concluding basis for that Chinese students have suffered no dis adjust remedy crimination due to failure to program the school unique language Instead, agreed their deficiencies. Court fairly require language anti-discrimination can be “to read affirmative linguistically give special deprived attention to remedial efforts to chil Id., J., concurring). Similarly, given at dren.” (Stewart, objectives infra, that underlie Title see at broad social unhesitancy unique apparent to take into General Electric’s account the physical defining of their male characteristics workers the breadth 152, ample coverage, supra, support appears uphold see ing accordingly. the EEOC's must be view treated or social cultural vacuum creatures of a programs pregnant concerning stereotypes signals devoid seriously no one contends employee. Indeed, woman actually conceptualized companies Electric or other dis- programs comprehensive insurance developed their fashion.10 strictly in a sex-neutral ability-by-disability that, policy but company has devised a Instead, those that for all even protection risks, offers pregnancy, *30 In heavily light dominated. men male “unique to” (cid:127) history of Electric's expérience, of this social of its design otherwise all-inclusive employment practices, contemporary the burdened role program, and sex discrimina- of working the EEOC's construction woman, (the ultimate fully 703 consonant (a)(1) tion under employment of equality “to objective of Title assure prac- discriminatory those opportunities eliminate [sexually] stratified fostered devices which have tices and Mc- of disadvantage to the job [women].” environments Green, 411 at 800. Douglas Corp. S., Donnell v. U. Appeals. of judgment I affirm the the Court would dissenting. Stevens, Justice Mr. appear not Equal does in the
The word “discriminate” plaintiffs' proving Since the burden Protection Clause.1 provision of that constitutional prima violation a facie proving prima heavier than the burden a significantly discrimina- statutory prohibition against facie violation a Geduldig Aiello, 417 holding constitutional v. tion,2 the 10 supra. g., e. See, 1, n. statutes, by does, however, appear number of but has a The word Compare interpretation in those statutes. given uniform
no means been (1948) (Robinson-Patman Co., Salt FTC Morton 334 U. S. 44-45 v. (1967) Trailers, v. Great Dane U. S. 32-35 Act) with NLRB Act). (National Labor Relations Washington Davis, (1976). 229, 238-248 S. U.
U. S. does not control question (1974), statutory- interpretation presented case. of course, when And, it enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of Con- gress could not possibly have relied on language which this Court was to use Geduldig a decade later in the opinion.3 We are, presented with a fresh, and rather therefore, simple, question of statutory construction: Does a contract between a company its employees which treats the risk absentee- ism caused pregnancy differently any other kind of absence against discriminate certain individuals because of their sex?
An question affirmative answer to that would not neces- lead sarily to a conclusion of illegality, statutory because a might disparate affirmative justify defense treatment pregnant women in certain situations. case, In this however, the company has not any justification. established such On the other hand, negative to the question answer threshold necessarily plaintiffs’ would facially defeat claim because neutral may illegal they criteria be if have a discrimina- tory analysis effect.4 An company’s of the effect of a *31 rules relating to appropriate absenteeism would be if those rules referred only criteria, neutral such as whether absence particularly costly. was or voluntary perhaps or involuntary, This case, does not involve rules of that kind. however, places
Rather, the rule the risk caused at issue absence of. By definition, a class itself.5 such Court’s clearly adopt Congress could not intended to have Quite years statute analysis of sex discrimination it after the because was seven discrim passed concept of sex the Court first intimated equal analysis. See might protection ination have some relevance Reed, Reed (1971). 404 U. 71S. Griggs (1971). Co., v. Duke Power 401 U. 429-432 S. “ ‘potential re program dividing It is accurate to describe ” persons.’ cipients nonpregnant groups pregnant into women and two — Ante, employment programs, policies, con company at 135. Insurance tracts all deal The elassifica- risks with future rather than facts. historic capacity is the on account sex; rule discriminates fe- differentiates the primarily pregnant which to become whether analysis is the same male. male acceptability of hiring, rule relates to promotion, disability in- an exclusion from an excuse absence, reaching questions without plan. Accordingly, surance which Mb. policy, expertise, administrative of motive, ques- or the persuasively exposes, so Brennan Justice which Mr. tion effect Stewart Mr. Justice language I conclude refer, Blackmun Justice which the Courts the result requires plainly the statute unanimously. reached Appeals have pregnancy and those who face a risk of persons who is between tion do not. “ risk from no that under the state ‘[t]here is it accurate to Nor ” If the word are not.’ Ibid. protected and women men against the risks associated narrowly, protected men are “risk” used *32 is used If the word women are not. operation whereas prostate with a uncompensated unemployment caused broadly the risk of to describe more (subject protection disability, total men receive by physical 60% only women receive limitations) against that risk whereas and 26-week protection. partial