*1 COLORADORIVER WATER CONSERVATION DIS-
TRICT et al. v. UNITED STATES No. Argued 74-940. 14, January 1976 Decided March 1976* 74-949,
* Together Akin with No. et al. v. States, also on same certiorari to the court. *2 Burger, Court, in which J., opinion delivered the Brennan, JJ., Rehnquist, Powell, J., and Marshall, White,
C. and Black- J., dissenting opinion, which joined. Stewart, filed J., post, filed a Stevens, JJ., joined, p. 821. Stevens, mun and post, dissenting opinion, p. 826. petitioners cause for argued the Balcomb Kenneth J. D. MacFar- briefs were him on the both cases. With lane, Attorney General of Colorado, Jean E. Dubojsky, Deputy Attorney General, Edward G. Donovan, Solicitor General, David W. Robbins, First Assistant Attorney General, Charles Elliott, M. Special Assistant Attorney General, Scott Balcomb, Robert L. McCarty, George L. Zoellner, Kenneth L. Broadhurst, Glenn G. Saunders, Charles Beise, J. and D. Monte Pascoe.
Howard Shapiro E. argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With him on the brief were Solici tor General Bork, Acting Assistant Attorney General Kiechel, Deputy Solicitor General Randolph, Edmund B. Clark, Lawrence E. Shearer.†
Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court.
The McCarran Amendment, 66 Stat. 560, 43 U. S. C. § 666, provides that “consent is hereby given join to United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such † Abrief of amici curiae urging reversal both cases was filed for their respective by States Bruce Babbitt, Attorney General of Ari zona, Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of California, Wayne L. Kidwell, Attorney General Idaho, of Curt T. Schneider, Attorney General Kansas, of Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney 'General of Mon tana, Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, List, Robert Attorney General Nevada, of Anaya, Antonio Attorney General of Mexico, New Allen Olson, 1. Attorney General of Dakota, North Larry Derryberry, Attorney of General Oklahoma, R. Lee Johnson, Attorney General Oregon, of William Janklow, J. Attorney Gen eral of Dakota, South John L. Hill, Attorney Texas, General of Ver non B. Romney, Attorney General of Utah, Gorton, Slade Attorney General of Washington, and 7. Frank Mendicino, Attorney General of Wyoming. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases by were filed
Richard Baenen, A. Marvin Sonosky, J. and R. Anthony Rogers for Congress National Indians, American Inc., al.; et by and Robert Pelcyger S. for the Southern Ute Indian Tribe et al. is the appears it that States where the United
rights, by rights process acquiring owner of or is in the by exchange, law, by purchase, under appropriation State necessary party otherwise, and the United States is a or con- presented by this case questions such suit.” The to upon the of the McCarran Amendment cern the effect under 28 C. district courts U. jurisdiction of the federal rights of water 1345 over suits for determination certain for States as trustee brought by the United Gov- non-Indian owner of various Indian tribes as and ernment claims.1 (also McCarran Water known as the The McCarran Amendment codified, in full provides
Rights Act), §666, as Suit 43 U. S. C. text: de- as a
“(a) hereby join the United States given to Consent rights the use any (1) adjudication of to fendant suit source, (2) administra- for the system or other or water of a river States is appears that the United rights, where it tion such appropri- acquiring water process owner of or is in the otherwise, and by exchange, law, by or purchase, ation under State suit. The United necessary party to such is a the United States (1) suit, to have any be deemed States, shall party to such when inapplicable or laws are the State right plead that waived of its thereto reason amenable is not States orders, judgments, and subject (2) sovereignty, shall be may review obtain having jurisdiction, and decrees of the court *4 private same extent as a to the thereof, in manner and the same Provided, judgment no That circumstances: individual under like any such 6uit. States in against the United entered for costs shall be any shall be served such suit process “(b) other Summons or representative. designated his Attorney or upon the General authorizing the as be construed “(c) Nothing Act shall in this controversy in the Su- any suit or joinder States involving right States to the States preme Court of the United stream.” interstate the water of use of infra, at 807. See also provides: Title 28 U. S. C. § district Congress, the by ofAct provided “Except as otherwise actions, or suits civil jurisdiction of all original shall have
courts
I It probable that no problem of the Southwest sec- tion of the Nation is more critical than scarcity of water. As southwestern populations have grown, con- flicting claims to this scarce resource have increased. To meet these claims, several Southwestern States have established procedures elaborate for allocation of water adjudication of conflicting claims to that resource.2 In 1969, Colorado enacted its Water Rights Determina- tion and Administration Act3 in an effort to revamp its legal procedures for determining claims to water within the State.
Under the Colorado Act, the State is divided into seven Water Divisions, each Division encompassing one or more entire drainage basins for the larger rivers in Colorado.4 Adjudication of water claims within each Division occurs on a continuous basis.5 . Each month, Water Referees in each Division rule on applications for water rights filed within the preceding five months or refer those applications to the Water Judge of their Division.6 Every six months, Water Judge passes on applications referred and contested decisions by Referees.7 A Engineer State and engineers for each Division responsible are for the administration and dis- proceedings commenced the United States, by any or agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue Act of Congress.” 2 See, g., e. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 45-102 §§ to 45-106, 45-141 to 45-154, 45-180 to 45-193, 45-231 to (1956 45-245 and Supp. 1975); Cal. Water Code 174-192, §§ (1971 1000-5108 and Supp. 1976); Nev. Rev. Stat. seq. et §533.010 (1973); N. M. Stat. Ann. 75-1-1 §§ (1968 75-6-3 and Supp. 1975). 3 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. seq. 37-92-101 et § 4 37-92-201. § 5 See 37-92-302 to §§ 37-92-303. 6 § 37-92-303.
7 37-92-304.
805 tribution of the waters of the State to according determinations in each Division.8
Colorado applies the doctrine of prior appropriation
in establishing rights to the use of water.9 Under that
one
doctrine,
acquires a right
diverting it
from its natural source and
it
applying
to some beneficial
use. Continued beneficial use of the water is required
in order to maintain
right.
In periods of shortage,
priority among confirmed rights is determined according
to the date of initial diversion.10
The reserved rights of the United States extend
In-
dian reservations, Winters v. United States,
8 § 37-92-301. 9 Colo. Const. XVI, Art. 5, 6; §§ Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 37 — 92— §§ 102 to 37-92-306 (1974); v. Hand Ditch Co., Coffin Left 6 Colo. 443 (1882). City See Springs Colorado v. Bender, Colo. 366 P. 2d 552 (1961); City Springs Colorado Yust, 289; Colo. 249 P. 2d *6 Prior to institution of suit, this the Government had pursued adjudication of non-Indian reserved rights and other water claims based on state in law Water Divisions 4, 5, 6, and and the Government continues to participate fully in those Divisions.
Shortly after the federal suit was commenced, one of
the defendants in that suit filed an application in the
state court for
Division
seeking an order directing serv
ice of process on the United
States
order to make it a
party to proceedings in Division 7 for the purpose of
adjudicating all of the Government’s claims, both state
and federal. On January 3, 1973, the United States was
served pursuant
to authority of thé McCarran Amend
ment. Several defendants and intervenors in the federal
proceeding then filed a motion in the District Court to
dismiss on
ground
that under the Amendment,
court was without jurisdiction to determine federal water
rights. Without deciding
jurisdictional
question, the
District Court, on June
granted
21, 1973,
the motion in an
unreported
opinion
oral
stating that
doctrine
ab
stention required deference to the proceedings in Division
7. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir
cuit reversed, United States Akin,
U. S. 946 (1975). We reverse.
II We first consider question juris- district-court diction under 28 U. S. §C. 1345. That section provides the district courts shall have original
over all civil actions brought by the Federal Government “[ejxcept as provided otherwise by Act Congress.” It is thus necessary to examine whether the McCarran Amendment is such an Act of Congress excepting juris- diction under § 1345.
The McCarran Amendment does not its terms, at *7 least, indicate any repeal of jurisdiction under § 1345. Indeed, (d) subsection of the Amendment, which un- is codified, provides:
“(d) None of the funds appropriated by this title may be used in the preparation or prosecution of the suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Southern Division, by the United States of America against Fallbrook Utility Public District, public a service corporation of the State of California, and others.” Act July 10, 1952, Pub. L. 495, § 208 66 (d), Stat. 560. In prohibiting the use of funds for the maintenance the United States of specific a suit then in pending District Court, subsection (d) plainly implies that the Amendment did not repeal the of district courts under § 1345 to adjudicate suits brought the United States for adjudication of claimed federal water rights.11
Beyond its terms, the legislative history of the Amend- ment evidences no clear purpose to any terminate portion jurisdiction. 1345 i Indeed, three bills, at proposed approximately the same time as the Amendment, which expressly would have had the effect of precluding suits by the United States in district court for determina-
11Jurisdiction in the specific District Court suit was based on 28 U. S. C. 1345. See States v. Fallbrook Dist., Util. 101 F. Supp. (SD 1951). Cal. tion of water rights, passage.12 failed Further, report Senate on the Amendment purpose states: “The proposed of the legislation, as is to amended, permit the joinder of the United party any States as defendant adjudicátion suit water_” rights to the use of Nothing in this statement of in- purpose dicates an intent correlatively to diminish federal-district- jurisdiction. court Similarly, McCarran, Senator who in legislation troduced the Senate, stated in a letter part made a of the report Senate legislation that the was “not intended to be used for purpose other than to allow the United joined States to be in a suit it wherein necessary adjudicate all of of various owners given on a stream.”
In view of the McCarran Amendment’s language and legislative history, controlling principles statutory con- struction require the conclusion that the Amendment did exception not constitute “provided by an Act of Congress” repealed of district courts under *8 § 1345 to entertain federal water suits. “When there are clearly statutes defining jurisdiction of the courts the force and effect such provisions should not be disturbed a implication mere flowing from subsequent legislation.” States, Rosencrans v. United 165 U. 257, S. (1897). 262 Mancari, Morton See v. 417 U. 535, S. 549- 551 (1974); United Jackson, States v. 302 628, U. S. . (1938). “In the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, only permissible justifica- for repeal by tion implication is when the earlier and later statutes are Mancari, irreconcilable.” Morton v. supra, only at 550. Not do the legislative terms and 7691, H. Cong., (1952); R. 82d 2d 5735, Sess. Cong., H. R. 82d (1951); 5368, 1st Sess. Cong., (1951). H. R. 82d 1st Sess. 13 Rep. 755, Cong., Sess., No. 82d 1st 14Id., at 9. in
history not indicate an of the McCarran Amendment irreconcilability repeal tent to but there is no also operation in the The immediate effect both statutes. of the in the give jurisdiction Amendment is to consent to state courts concurrent in the federal jurisdiction with courts involving rights over controversies federal to the irreconcilability use is water. There no existence jurisdiction. concurrent and con state federal Such currency has, example, long for existed under federal diversity jurisdiction. we Accordingly, hold that the Mc- Carran Amendment in no way federal-district- diminished jurisdiction court under District § 1345 and Court jurisdiction had to hear this case.15
Ill We turn next to question whether this suit never- properly theless was in view of the concurrent dismissed proceedings in Division 7.
A First, we consider whether the McCarran Amendment provided rights consent to determine federal reserved held on ques- behalf of Indians in state court. This tion not previously squarely this addressed Court, given the claims for dis- rights Indian water in this case, clearly missal would inappropriate have been if the state court had no to decide those claims. We conclude that the state court had over Indian under the Amendment. Eagle States v. District Court County, 401 for U. S. 520 and United States District Court (1971), *9 jurisdiction The District Court also have had of this would suit general federal-question jurisdiction under the of 28 U. S. C. reasons, 1331. For the same the McCarran Amendment did not § affect under 1331 either.
Water Div.
401 U.
527 (1971),
held that
provi-
sions of the McCarran Amendment, whereby “consent
is
. given
join
. .
to
States
United
as a
defendant
any
(1)
suit
for
adjudication
(2)
...
or
for the ad-
ministration of
rights,
appears
where it
that the
[water]
by
States
the owner
appropriation
...
under
by
law,
purchase,
exchange, or otherwise
.
. .
subject federal reserved
rights
general adjudication in
state proceedings for the determination of water rights.
More
the Court held that
rights
reserved
specifically,
were included in those rights where the United States
was “otherwise” the owner. United States v. District
Eagle
Court
County, supra, at
Though Eagle
524.
for
County and Water Div. 5 did not
involve reserved
rights on Indian reservations, viewing the Government’s
trusteeship of Indian rights as
ownership,
logic
of those cases clearly extends to such rights.
In-
Eagle County spoke of
deed,
rights
non-Indian
Indian rights
without
suggestion that
there was a
distinction between them
purposes
for
of the Amend-
ment.
Not the Amendment’s but language, also its un derlying policy, dictates a including construction Indian rights provisions. in its Eagle County rejected the con clusion that federal reserved rights general were not reached the Amendment for the reason that Amendment with an “[deals] all-inclusive statute con cerning adjudication ‘the of rights to the use water of ” system.’ a river Id., at 524. This ap consideration plies as well federal water rights reserved Indian And reservations. cogently, report Senate on the Amendment observed:
“In the administration of adjudication and the ol under State laws the State courts are vested with the necessary for the propel' *10 by and reason of disposition efficient and thereof, the adjudicated rights any stream interlocking on any right order affects affecting or action one system, all such rights. Accordingly all water users on a in stream, practically every are interested case, and necessary parties proceedings. court It is any apparent any that if claiming water user to hold right by such ownership reason of by thereof the United States departments per- or of its mitted to claim immunity from suit or of, orders in, a court, State such claims could materially inter- with fere the lawful equitable and of water for use beneficial use the other water users who are amenable to and bound the decrees and orders of the State courts.” Thus, in bearing mind ubiquitous nature of Indian rights water in the it is clear that a Southwest, construc- tion of the Amendment excluding rights those from its coverage would enervate the objective.17 Amendment’s
Finally, legislative history demonstrates that McCarran Amendment is to be construed as reaching federal water rights reserved on behalf of Indians. It was unmistakably the understanding of proponents and opponents of the legislation it comprehended water rights reserved for In Indians. the Senate hearings on the Amendment, participants for the Department of Justice Department of the Interior made clear that the proposal would include rights reserved on behalf of 16 Rep. supra, No. at 4-5. 17Indeed, if exclusion of conclusion, Indian were the con flicts between Indian and rights, practical non-Indian as well as matters of adjudication, might requiring have the effect of district- adjudication court along rights, thereby non-Indian with Indian effectively vitiating our Eagle construction Amendment County and Water Div. 6. In addition, Indians.18 the Amend- report Senate on ment took note of Department recommendation report of the Interior given that no to suit be *11 consent to rights as Indian rejected and the recommendation.19 fiduciary
The argues Government of its that because responsibility protect any to rights, Indian state-court jurisdiction property over Indian should be recog- not nized unless expressly by conferred It Congress. has been recognized, that an action for destruc- however, tion of personal property may be brought an against Indian tribe “[a]uthority implied.” where to sue is ... Turner v. United States, 248 (1919). S. 358 364, U. the Government's on in- Moreover, argument rests assumption correct that consent to state purpose of determining rights imperils water those rights or in way some special breaches the obligation the Federal Government to protect Indians. Mere sub- jection of Indian rights legal to in challenge state court, would no imperil more rights those however, than would suit brought the Government in district court for their suit declaration, which, absent the consent of the Amendment, eventually would be necessitated to resolve conflicting claims to a scarce resource. The Government has not abdicated any responsibility fully to defend Indian in rights court, Indian interests may satisfactorily protected be under regimes of state law. 1321, ; See 25 U. S. C. 1322 §§ 28 U. § S. C. 1360.20 Cf.
18 Hearings See on S. 18 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary, Cong., Sess., 6-7, Committee on the 82d (1951). 1st 67-68 19 supra, Rep. 755, 2, No. at 7-8. 20 sure, (b) To be 25 U. S. C. (b) and 28 U. S. C. § provide nothing in that sections “shall those confer upon adjudicate, probate proceedings in the State to or otherwise, ownership right possession [any personal or real or property, belonging any including rights, any Indian or Indian tribe... held trust provision This States].” Oregon Power Portland Cement Co. Beaver
California Co., U. S. 164 n. 2 Amendment in The way no In- abridges substantive on behalf of claim dians under rights. Moreover, the doctrine of reserved as Eagle County “questions [arising from the collision said, of private rights and reserved the United States], including the scope particular volume and reserved are rights, questions federal if which, preserved, [by can be reviewed the Supreme after final Court] judgment by the Colorado court.” 401 at 526. U. S.,
B we consider whether Next, the District Court’s dis- missal was appropriate under the doctrine of abstention. We hold that the dismissal supported cannot be under *12 that doctrine in of its forms.
Abstention from the
exercise of federal
the
not
rule.
exception,
the
“The doctrine of absten
tion, under which a District
may
Court
to
decline
exercise
or postpone the
of
exercise
its jurisdiction, is an extraor
dinary and narrow exception to
duty
of a District
Court
to adjudicate a
properly
controversy
before it.
Abdication of the
to
obligation
decide
justi
cases can be
fied under
only
this doctrine
exceptional
circum
stances where the
parties
order to the
to repair to the
State court would clearly serve
important
an
counter
vailing
County
interest.”
Allegheny v. Frank Ma
of
Co.,
shuda
185,
360 U. S.
(1959).
188-189
was
“[I]t
however, only qualifies
both sections,
import
general
of the
con-
jurisdiction given by
sent
to state
those sections.
It does not
purport
special
limit
given by
consent
contrary
McCarran Amendment. A
conclusion is foreclosed
principle of construction that
there is no clear
“[w]here
intention
otherwise,
specific
a
statute will not be
or nullified
controlled
general one,
a
regardless
priority
of the
Morton
enactment.”
Mancan,
U. S.
550-551
never a doctrine of equity that a federal court should
judicial
exercise its
discretion to dismiss
suit
a
merely
because State
court could entertain it.” Alabama Pub.
Serv. Comm’n v.
Co.,
Southern R.
(a) Abstention is appropriate “in cases presenting a
federal constitutional
issue which might be mooted or
presented in a different posture by a state court deter-
mination
pertinent
state law.” County
Allegheny
v. Frank
Co.,
Mashuda
supra, at 189.
e.
See,
Lake
g.,
Carriers Assn. v. MacMullan,
(b) Abstention is also appropriate where there have
presented
been
difficult questions of state law bearing
on policy problems of
public
substantial
import whose
importance transcends the result in the case then at bar.
Louisiana Power
Light
&
Co. v. City
Thibodaux, U. S. 25
(1959),
example, involved such
question.
In particular,
the concern there was with the scope of
the eminent domain power of municipalities under state
law. See also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch Co.,
391 U.
(1968); Hawks v. Hamill,
815 Court. District the by dismissed been have should wells not was case in that permit of the reasonableness The reasonableness of review but importance, of transcendent the where cases, future in that and courts federal the system review elaborate own its established had State oil and of complexities geological the with dealing for disruptive impermissibly had an have would gas fields, fields. those of management for the policy state on effect Co., R. Southern Comm’n v. Serv. Pub. Alabama also See supra.21 this sec- within not fall clearly does case present
The
are
claims
state
While
of abstention.
ond category
appears
applied
to be
law
the state
in the
involved
case,
are
policy
state
bearing on
questions
No
to be settled.
the state
of
will decision
Nor
for decision.
presented
as
policy
implement
impair efforts
claims
in-
are
claims that
federal
To
be sure,
Burford.
21
Serv.
Pub.
Co.,
Alabama
Sun
and
v.
Oil
note that
We
Burford
Light
&
Power
Louisiana
Co.,
from
differ
R.
Comm’n v. Southern
Frank
Allegheny v.
County
Thibodaux,
City
and
v.
Co.
two,
latter
cases,
unlike
Co.,
former two
in that
Mashuda
brought
therefore
were
and
claims
constitutional
raised colorable
ab
jurisdiction. While
diversity,
as
federal-question,
well
as
under
avoid
the effect
Serv. had
Pub.
and Alabama
stention
Burford
this
was
issue,
opinions indicate
ing
federal constitutional
See
cases.
in those
for abstention
ground
an additional
not
344;
S., at
Co.,
U.
R.
v.
Comm’n
Southern
Pub. Serv.
Alabama:
Wechsler,
334;
Hart & H.
H.
S., at
Co.,
Oil
U.
v. Sun
Burford
1973)
(2d ed.
System 1005
the Federal
The Federal Courts
characteristic:
least one common
share at
groups
(“The
of cases
two
constitu
necessity
federal
for
avoiding the
purpose of
the Pullman
course, that
held, of
relevant”).
haveWe
adjudication is not
tional
question does
a constitutional
decision
to avoid
opportunity
v.
Harman
See
federal court.
justify abstention
not alone
Bullitt,
U. S. 360
Baggett v.
(1965);
Forssenius,
U. S. 528
may
for
federal basis
of a
Indeed,
presence
v.
See
abstention.
needed
justification
Burford
the level
raise
S.,
61.
Hamill,
at
288 U.
5; Hawks
n.
Co., supra, at 318
Sun Oil
*14
volved in the
go
case
to the establishment of water rights
which may conflict with similar rights
on
based
law. But the mere potential
for conflict in the results
of adjudications, does not, without more, warrant staying
exercise
jurisdiction.
federal
See Meredith v. Winter
Haven,
bad faith,
or a
harassment,
patently invalid state statute,
federal
has been invoked for the purpose of
restraining state criminal proceedings, Younger Harris,
v.
declaratory judgment as the pending are proceedings under which criminal inal law in a state court.
C of the abstention within none Although this case falls unrelated to considerations categories, principles there are for fed regard and proper adjudication of constitutional involving in situations govern which eral-state relations jurisdictions, of concurrent contemporaneous the exercise courts. federal or and either federal courts state on considerations principles “[w]ise These rest to conservation judicial regard administration, giving litiga disposition judicial comprehensive resources and Equipment Fire v. C-O-Two Mfg. tion.” Kerotest Co. Plaza Columbia Co., (1952). 342 183 See 180, U. S. C. Bank, App. D. 173 Corp. National U. S. Security v. Generally, as between (1975). 403, 525 2d 620 F. pendency “the rule is that courts, and federal con proceedings no bar to an action in the state court is having Federal court same matter cerning the Garland, supra, at v. jurisdiction . McClellan . .” . 408 City 377 U. S. Dallas, 282. Donovan v. See however, courts, district (1964). As between federal principle evolved, general has though precise no rule Mfg. Kerotest litigation. See duplicative is to avoid Co., Steelman Equipment supra; C-O-Two Fire Co. v. v. (1937); Landis All 301 U. 278 Corp., Continent S. v. This (1936). Co., U. 254 248, North American 299 con state-federal between general approach difference juris wholly federal concurrent current and obligation virtually unflagging from the diction stems given courts to exercise of the federal 411, Examiners, 375 U. S. Medical England v. them. States, Minerals, Inc. v. 352 U. S. Leiter jurisdiction. Cf. Carland, (1964); McClellan supra, v. 281; at Cokens Virginia, Wheat. 404 (1821) (dictum). Given this obligation, of weightier absence considera- tions of constitutional adjudication and state-federal re- lations, the permitting circumstances the dismissal of a federal suit due to presence of a concurrent state proceeding for judicial reasons of wise administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for abstention. The former circumstances, though exceptional, do nevertheless exist.
It has been held, for example, that the court first as jurisdiction suming over property may exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. Donovan City Dallas, v. supra, 412; at Princess v. Thomp Lida of son, 305 U. S. 466 456, (1939); United States v. Bank of New Co., York 296 U. S. 477 463, (1936). But Mark cf.
ham Allen,
v.
cise is will justifications of Only clearest at 254-255. supra, dismissal. warrant clearly of factors number case, a
Turning present to the The proceedings. federal against concurrent counsel it- Amendment is the McCarran of these important most legislation that policy evinced The clear federal self. of water adjudication piecemeal of avoidance is the underlying that to is akin system. policy This river in a court yielded to be requiring the rule that in such the concern for property, of acquiring control first additional generation avoiding the is with instances dispositions inconsistent permitting through litigation respect with heightened This concern property. highly are among relationships rights, water which actions recognized that Indeed, we have interdependent. essentially involve seeking allocation in unified conducted and are best property disposition Oregon Water Co. v. Live Stock See proceedings. Pacific given The consent Bd., at 449. supra, recog- policy bespeaks Amendment the McCarran systems availability comprehensive nizes *17 achieving for as the means rights adjudication water goals. these Water observed, the Colorado already been has
As established Act Administration Determination and Rights management and adjudication system for the such As the Govern- waters. use the State’s to the rights Eagle in recognized as this Court concedes24 and ment 5, Act established Water Div. County and adjudica- rights water proceeding for continuous single District Court. suit in which antedated tion S.,U. at County, 401 Eagle District Court States v. for 5, Div. Court Water District States 525; United 46-49. States Brief for United See S., U. at 529. That proceeding “reaches all claims, perhaps month month but inclusively in the totality.” Ibid. Additionally, the responsibility of managing the State’s waters, to the end they be allocated in accord- ance with adjudicated water rights, given is to the State Engineer.
Beyond congressional policy expressed by the Mc- Carran Amendment and with consistent furtherance of that policy, we also find significant (a) apparent ab sence proceedings in the District other Court, than the filing of the complaint, prior to the motion to dism iss,25 (b) the extensive involvement of state water rights occasioned by this suit naming 1,000 defendants, (c) the 300-mile distance between the District in Court Denver and the in court Division 7, (d) the existing partici pation by the Government in 4, Division 5, and 6 proceed ings. We emphasize, however, that we not do overlook the heavy obligation to jurisdiction. exercise We need not decide, for example, despite whether, the McCarran Amendment, dismissal would be warranted if more exten sive proceedings had occurred the District prior Court if the dismissal, involvement state were less extensive than it here, or if the proceed ing were in some respect inadequate to resolve the federal claims. But the opposing factors here, particularly the policy underlying the McCarran Amendment, justify the District Court’s dismissal in particular this case.26 25As we have observed, complaint was filed in District Court on 14, November 1972. The Federal Government was served in the state proceedings January on Shortly 1973. thereafter, on February 13, 1973, a motion dismiss was filed in District Court. Up to point, this it does appear not the District Court dealt any other manner with the suit pending before it. 26Whether similar considerations permit would dismissal of a *18 water suit brought by private party in federal district court is a question we need not now decide.
S21 judgment The of the Court of Appeals reversed and judgment of the District Court dismissing the com- plaint is affirmed for the reasons here stated.
It is so ordered. Justice Stewart, with whom Mr. Justice Black- Mr. mun and Mr. concur, dissenting. Justice Stevens
The says Court that States United District Court for the District of Colorado clearly jurisdiction had over I this lawsuit. agree.1 The Court further says that the McCarran “in Amendment no way diminished” the Dis- jurisdiction. trict Court’s I agree.2 The says Court also federal that courts have a “virtually unflagging obliga- tion ... jurisdiction exercise the given I agree.3 them.” And says the Court finally, in the nothing absten- tion doctrine “in any of justified its forms” the District Court’s dismissal of the Government’s I complaint. agree.4 These views would seem to lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the District Court was wrong in dis- missing the complaint. Yet the Court holds that order was “appropriate.” dismissal With that con- I clusion must respectfully disagree. 1 “Except provided as otherwise Congress, Act of the district original courts shall have actions, of all civil suits or
proceedings
commenced
the United States . . . .” 28 U. S. C.
1345.
2 Nothing in the McCarran Amendment or in
legislative
its
his
tory can
limiting
be read as
of the federal courts.
operates
law
pro
That
tanto
as no more than a
sovereign
waiver of
immunity. Eagle
States v.
County,
Court
District
for
520;
United States v. District
U. S.
Court
Water Div.
U. S. 527.
England
Examiners,
Medical
See
411, 415-416;
375 U. S.
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.
228.
ante,
See
at 813-817.
*19
In holding that the United States shall not be allowed
proceed
to
with its
lawsuit,
Court relies principally
on cases reflecting the rule that where “control of
the property which is the subject of the suit
neces-
[is
sary] in order to proceed with the cause and to grant
the relief
sought,
jurisdiction of one court must
of
yield
necessity
that
the other.” Penn General
Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U. S.
189, 195. See also Donovan
City
Dallas, 377 U. S.
408; Princess Lida v. Thompson,
The rule invoked the Court thus does not support the conclusion that it reaches. In the Princess Lida case, for example, the reason for the surrender of federal juris- diction over the administration of a trust was the fact that a state court had already assumed over the trust estate. But the Court in that case recognized this rationale no “ha[d] application to a case in a federal court... wherein plaintiff seeks merely an ad- judication of his right or his interest as a basis of a claim against a fund in possession of a state court . . . .” S.,U. at 466. The Court stressed that ques- “[n]o tion is presented in the federal court as to the right of any person to participate in the res or as to the quantum of his interest in it.” Id., at 467. Similarly, in the
Bank New case, supra, York the Court stressed that “object property of the suits is from the take the depositaries and from the control court, to vest the property the United . States . . *20 U. at 478. suits not to merely “The are establish a S., debt or right to in share and thus to obtain property, adjudication an which might disturbing be had without the control of the state court.” Ibid.5 Mark- See also Allen, Klein, ham v. 490; 326 U. S. United States v. 276. generally U. S. See 1A Federal Practice J. Moore, (1974); 0.222 14 Wright, Miller, Cooper, ¶ C. A. & E. Federal & pp. Practice Procedure 19-22 §3631, precedents
The cited by only the Court thus not fail support to the Court’s in decision this but case, expressly point in the opposite present direction. The in suit, is not short, to analogous the of administration a trust, but rather to a claim of to “right participate,” since the United in States this litigation does not ask the court to control the administration of the but river, only to its specific determine in flow of the in the This is river. an almost exact analogue a suit seeking a of determination rights in the of flow income from a trust.
The principal Court’s reason for deciding to the close doors of the federal courthouse the United States in this case seems to stem from the view that its decision will piecemeal avoid adjudication rights.6 of water To City Dallas, Donovan 377 U. has only relevance opinion insofar as the there summary Court’s contained a brief the Princess Lida case. in discussion 6 The Court policy lists four other reasons for the “appropriate ness” of the District Court’s dismissal of this lawsuit. All of those First, reasons are insubstantial. significant fact that no pro ceedings yet place had taken in the federal court at the time of no dismissal means more than that the federal court prompt was granting in the defendants’ motion to dismiss. time, At that the extent that this view is based on special con- siderations rem governing it proceedings, is without precedential basis, as the decisions discussed above dem- To onstrate. the extent the Court’s view is based on this, practicalities realistic case, it is simply wrong, because the relegation of the Government to the state courts will piecemeal not avoid litigation.
The Colorado courts currently are engaged in two types of proceedings under the State’s water-rights law. First, they are processing new claims to water based on recent appropriations. Second, they are integrating these new awards water rights with all past decisions awarding such rights into one all-inclusive tabulation for each water source. The claims of the United States that are involved in this case have not adjudicated been past. they Yet do not involve recent appropria- *21 tions of water. fact, In these claims wholly are dissim- ilar to normal state water claims, they because are not course, no proceedings involving the Government’s claims had taken place in the state Second, court either. geographic the distance of the question federal court from the rivers hardly is significant factor age in this rapid easy transportation. Since the basic issues here involve the determination of the amount of water the Government intended to reserve rather than the actually amount it appropriated on given date, there little likelihood that live testimony by water district residents would necessary. be In event, the Federal District Court in Colorado is authorized to sit at Durango, headquarters the of Water Division 7. 28 U. S. C. Third, 85. the Government’s willingness participate to in some of the certainly state proceedings does not mean right that it had no bring action, this unless the today Court has unearthed a new kind Finally, of waiver. the fact many that there were defendants in the federal hardly suit is relevant. It only indicates that federal court had necessary all the parties before it in order to issue a finally decree settling the Government’s Indeed, claims. presence of all parties interested in the federal court made the lawsuit the kind of unified proceeding envisioned Live Pacific Stock Oregon Co. v. Bd., Water 241 U. S. 447-449.
based on actual use beneficial of water but rather on an intention formed at the time the federal land use was established to reserve a certain amount water to sup- port the federal reservations. The court will, there- fore, have conduct separate proceedings to determine these claims. only And after the state adjudicates court the claims will they be incorporated into the water source tabulations. If this suit were to proceed allowed federal court the same procedures would be followed, and the federal court decree would be incorporated into the state tabulation, as other federal court decrees have been incorporated in past. Thus, process same will occur regardless of which forum considers these claims. Whether the virtually identical separate proceedings take place in a federal court or a state court, adjudication of the claims will be neither more nor “piecemeal.” less Essentially the process same will be followed in each instance.7
As the Court it says, is the virtual “unflagging obliga- tion” of a court federal to exercise that been has upon conferred it. Obedience to obligation is particularly “appropriate” in this case, for at least two reasons.
First, the issues involved are issues of A federal law. federal court is more likely than a state court to be fa- miliar with federal water law and to have experience had in interpreting the relevant federal statutes, regulations, 7It is true, as *22 notes, the Court that the relationship among water rights is interdependent. When water levels in a low, river are junior appropriators may not be able take water from the The river. Court is mistaken, however, in suggesting that determination of a priority is related to the determination of other priorities. priority When a is established, the right holder’s to take a certain amount of water and seniority (date) of his priority is established. That determination does not affect and is not by affected the establishment of other priorities.
and Indian treaties. Moreover, if tried in a federal court, these issues of federal law will be reviewable federal appellate court, whereas federal judicial review of the state courts’ resolution of issues of federal law will possible be only on by review this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. certiorari
Second, some of the federal claims in this lawsuit re-
late to water reserved for Indian reservations.
It is not
necessary to determine that there is no
juris-
state-court
diction of these claims to support the proposition that a
federal court is a more appropriate forum than a state
court for determination of questions of life-and-death
importance to Indians. This Court has long recognized
“
policy of
'[t]he
leaving Indians free from state
jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation’s
”
history.’ McClanahan v. Arizona State
Comm’n,
Tax
The says Court that “[o]nly the justifica- clearest of tions will warrant dismissal” of a lawsuit within ju- risdiction of a federal court. In opinion my there was no justification at all for the District Court’s order of dis- missal in this case.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Mr. Justice Stevens, dissenting. I join
While Mr. Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion, I add three brief comments: I
First, find the holding that the United States may not litigate a federal claim in a federal court having jurisdiction thereof particularly I anomalous. could not join such a disposition unless commanded to do so an unambiguous statutory mandate or some other clearly identifiable applicable rule of law. The McCarran Amendment to the Department of Justice Appropriation
Act of 1953, 66 Stat. 560, 43 U. C. announces no such rule.
Second, the Federal Government surely has no lesser right of access to the federal forum than does a private litigant, such as an Indian asserting his own claim. If this be so, today’s holding will necessarily restrict access to federal court private plaintiffs asserting water rights claims in Colorado. This is a rather surprising byproduct of the MeCarran Amendment; for there is no basis for concluding that Congress intended that Amendment to impair private citizen’s right to assert a federal claim in a federal court.
Third, even on the Court’s assumption that this case should be decided by balancing the factors weighing for and against the exercise of federal I jurisdiction, believe we should defer to the judgment of the Court of Appeals rather than evaluate those factors in the first instance ourselves. In this case the District Court erroneously dismissed the complaint on abstention grounds and the Court of Appeals found no reason why the litigation should not go forward in a federal court. Facts such as the number of parties, the distance between the court- house and the water in dispute, and the character of the Colorado proceedings are matters which the Court of Appeals sitting in Denver is just as able to evaluate as are we.
Although I agree with Parts I, II, III-A, and III-B of the opinion of the I Court, respectfully dissent from the decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap- peals for the Tenth Circuit.