*1 HICKS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ORANGE
COUNTY, MIRANDA, et al. dba WALNUT PROPERTIES, et al. Argued No. 74-156. March 1975—Decided June *2 Sears, se, Smith, pro Oretta D. E. and Arlo Assistant Attorney California, argued General of ap- cause for pellants. With them on the were briefs Evelle J. Winkler, Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Chief As- O’Brien, sistant Attorney General, Edward P. Assistant *3 Attorney Knudson, Alvin Deputy J. General, Attorney Hicks, se, Cecil General, pro R. Capizzi, Michael Ronald H. Bevins.
Stanley Fleishman and Sam argued Rosenwein appellees. cause for With them on the brief was David M. Brown.
Mr. opinion delivered Justice White Court. poses Harris,
This case issues under Mackell, U. S. 37 (1971), Samuels v. 401 U. 66S. and related as well cases, preliminary as the question to jurisdiction as our of appeal this direct judg from a ment of a three-judge District Court.
I On November and 24, pursuant to four 1973, sepa- rate warrants issued seriatim, police seized four “Deep of the film Throat,” of each which had been Pussycat at the Theatre in shown Buena Park, Orange crim- eight-count November 26 an Cal.1 On County, Orange in' was filed charge inal misdemeanor employees against two County Municipal Court two subject matter of being film seized theater, each on November complaint. in the Also counts County appellees2 ordered Superior Orange Court of not be declared why “Deep Throat” should show cause being appel- available to obscene, hearing an immediate on state-law day, objected lees, appeared who pro- conduct such a jurisdiction the court’s grounds to questions, federal to “reserve” all ceeding, purported Thereupon, on November participate. further to refused film, hearing, Court held a viewed Superior 27 the the movie to be obscene evidence, and then declared took following viewing of the film 1 The issued first warrant was judge also Orange County Municipal judge. The same an viewing of warrants, three the third one after a issued other showing. film then The other two warrants were the version of the police officers who witnessed exhibition issued on affidavits had of the film. Each the warrant affidavits other than the first one respects the film to be seized in indicated that some different print from the seized. first response against In claims bad faith which were made later
them, police appellants four officer asserted that Octo- “Deep ber successive seizures of Throat” had been made County, under warrant Cal. The Riverside theater involved sought relief, denied, those seizures federal which was the seizures being despite challenge York, upheld under Heller v. New 413 U. S. *4 (1973). decision, It after this asserted, was it was that Buena sought “Deep Park authorities warrants for the seizure of Throat” city. showing that in against Miranda, Pussycat The order ran Vincent dba Theatre, Inc., Properties, and employees. Walnut theater Actually, Miranda, who the land on which located, owned the theater was did business Properties, Pussycat and Hollywood as Walnut Theatre was a Cali corporation president fornia which Miranda was and a stock Nothing parties has been holder. made of this confusion in identification. might of it that be found at all ordered seized
and appealed and were not judgment order the theater. This by appellees.3 pursuing appellate for not remedies is basis apparent colloquy in following of the this case in the course
illuminated Judge Ferguson appellees’ and counsel which occurred when between infra, 340, against appellees sought relief, described at subse Court, quent Superior Appellate Department. of the actions you up that to the “THE COURT: Have taken order California Appeals? Court of No, we
“MR. BROWN: have not. Why
“THE COURT: not? Because, your Honor, initially in “MR. BROWN: back Novem- day occurred, hearing ber when this first after the filed the we Complaint alleged of the in this action one bases for relief Complaint deprivation plaintiff’s was the Constitutional rights by proceedings alleged very virtue these we from the beginning law,- that those were violative of California clearly, rights and violative our Constitutional and we asked give this specific proceeding. Court to us relief from that That inception of this as a action, matter of fact. Once we jurisdiction had invoked the properly sought of this Court we relief press in this Court and we did not further in matter the California State Courts. Well, “THE you go COURT: halfway go how can and not all way? Honor, very
“MR. BROWN: Your hearing at first in Novem- ber we filed Superior documents with the stating Court that reserving questions were we all pur- Federal Constitutional law England suant to the ease. may We knew we had in —we trap mind the litigant that can be set a in these circumstances. It was our intent the beginning allege from jurisdic- Federal tion seek and to relief under Rights the Civil Act for these events why very and that at the first time appeared we Orange County Superior Court we so indicated to the Court was the case. Yes, you “THE COURT: but told August me that you the 2nd appeared Superior before the Orange County and made some kind of a motion— *5 they suit in the filed this November
Instead, on officers police against appellants District Court —-four Attorney District and Assistant of Buena Park and County. complaint Orange Attorney District Superior in the and the recited seizures injunction was for an the action Court, stated the California stat- against the enforcement your Honor— again, But “MR. BROWN: me finish. “THE COURT: Let order with reference to seizures Judge McMillan’s “—to set aside request question your my you to these two films. He denied you halfway why you go shouldn’t be simple is a one. When way? required go to all beginning liti- purpose in the not to It was our BROWN:
“MR. court. gate claims the State these only fit and think that it is Well, you “THE COURT: don’t permitted to eradicate be the California courts should proper that may courts? occur the lower deficiencies that you up it before Why take don’t right. All “THE COURT: question you. my is That Supreme Court? the California Honor, done so Because, your we could have “MR. BROWN: jurisdiction. Federal right to invoke had the but we also you right. That is not I have “THE COURT: understand question My question, jurisdiction of this Court. my as to the Appellate you why you given the California Courts haven’t is any deficiencies of the California right to correct and the forum you say lower courts that exist? liti- Honor, this a situation which a BROWN: Your
“MR. question— gant If there is an unsettled has a choice. right. your you All So answer is do not “THE COURT: want your to. answer? Is That’s correct.
“MR. BROWN: -right. All “THE COURT: did not want do so because we did
“MR. BROWN: We question. question to be an of State law unsettled consider right.” All “THE COURT: *6 prayed judgment declaring obscenity
ute, and
for
unconstitutional,
injunction ordering
and for
statute
an
the return of all
of the
but
one of
film,
permitting
films to
duplicated
be
before its return.
temporary restraining
A
requested
order
and de-
was
Judge
proof
the District
nied,
finding
irreparable
of
injury to be
an
lacking
pre-
and
insufficient likelihood of
injunction.4
on
vailing
the merits
warrant an
He re-
quested
convening
three-judge
of a
court, however, to
constitutionality
consider
of the statute.
a
Such
designated
January
court
then
on
8,
was
1974.5
complaint
January
Service of the
completed
14,
was
on
1974, and answers and
dismiss,
motions to
as
as
well
a
summary
for
judgment,
motion
were filed
appellants.
Appellees moved
a preliminary injunction.6
for
None
Lydick,
Judge
Judge,
United States District
to whom the case
assigned following
disqualification
had
Judge
been
of
initial
Ferguson,
ruling.
made this
His
was
appellees
conclusion
had
totally
showing
irreparable damage,
"failed
to make that
lack
adequate legal remedy
of an
prevailing
and likelihood of
on the
justify
temporary restraining
merits needed to
a
issuance of
require
order
disobey
which would
[the
the orders of
defendants]
courts and
restrain
would
the lawful
[the state]
enforcement
State statute.”
5Judge Ferguson,
Judge Lydick,
designated
but not
to serve
on
three-judge panel.
The State of California insists that under
C.
providing
U. S.
judge
district
§
to whom
“[t]he
application
injunction or
presented
other relief is
con
shall
stitute one member”
three-judge court,
of the
Judge Lydick should
have
one
been
of the three members.
requirement
We do
deem the
jurisdictional, however;
though
and even
the order appointing the
three-judge
early
court
filing
called for
objections
to the
composition
court,
the issue
presented
was never
to the
District Court but is raised here for
time,
the first
and in our view
too late.
sought
injunction
The motion
against
an
the enforcement of
seq.
California Penal
(1970
Code
et
ed.
§311
and Supp. 1975), as
(1970
well as
1523-1542
ed.
Supp. 1975).
§§
Sections 1523-
hearings held,
and no
all
granted
of the motions was
affi
being ordered submitted on briefs and
the issues
Attorney
ap
also
General of California
davits.
People
to follow
peared
urged
District Court
(1973)
App.
Rptr.
3d
109 Cal.
Enskat,
33 Cal.
Miller v.
(hearing
24, 1973), which,
denied Oct.
after
I),
upheld
had
California,
(1973) (Miller
Meanwhile, 15, the criminal Municipal in the Court had been amended *7 naming appellees7 parties as additional defendant and conspiracy of adding counts, relating four one to each films. on Also, the seized motions of the defendants case, suppressed that two of the films were ordered on the “Deep two ground seizing that search warrants for issued, last one on November 23 and the other Throat” sufficiently films allege on November did that the to be seized under those warrants differed from each films two previously seized, other and from the the final Im- being multiple seizures said to be invalid seizures.8 mediately and order, appealed after this which was later prosecution stipulated the defense and the reversed, purposes trial, expected of the which was to be forth- Chapter 3 of the Penal Code entitled “Of Search constitute service, provide issuance, Warrants.” The sections for the return of search warrants. 7Actually, complaint the amended named as defendants Vincent supra. Properties, In re Miranda and Inc. See n. Walnut ferring appellees speak complaint, to the amended criminal complaint “appel “include” amendment of to the names of the Appellees lees.” Brief for 43. different, filed prosecution claimed that each film was effect, policy and asserted affidavits to this the official only copy one of a film unless different versions were seize The court limited its attention to warrant exhibited. the search expressly allege affidavits which it said did not last two copies seized different. were prints the four of the film would be considered
coming, only copy proved identical and one would have to be at trial.9 4, 1974, three-judge judg-
On June
court issued its
opinion declaring
ment and
stat-
the California
satisfy
ute to be unconstitutional
for failure to
the re-
IMiller
quirements
ordering appellants
to return
appellees
“Deep
all
Throat” which had been
making any
seized as well as to refrain from
additional
Harris,
Appellants’
seizures.
claim that
Mackell,
401 U.
and Samuels v.
401 U.
S.
S.
(1971), required
dismissal of the case was
rejected,
court holding
charges
that no criminal
were
against appellees
state court
and that
event
pattern
of search warrants and seizures demonstrated
bad faith
part
authorities,
and harassment on the
all
which
relieved the court from the strictures of
Harris,
Younger v.
supra, and its related cases.
Appellants
filed various
for rehearing,
motions
amend
judgment,
and for relief from judgment, also
calling
later
the court’s
developments
attention to two
they
important: First,
July
considered
the dismissal on
*8
25, 1974, “for want of a
question”
substantial
federal
of
appeal
California,
the
Miller v.
(Miller
On 30, three-judge appel- court denied motions, lants’ reaffirmed its June v. Harris ruling and, concluding by after it was not bound the dis- II, missal of Miller judgment adhered to its that California statute was invalid under the Federal Consti- showing “Deep Throat” had been resumed meanwhile by appellees. II Soon after and the sup reversal of the Miller pression order, Superior Orange County Court of reaffirmed its order of November and directed additional seizures of “Deep Throat.” Seizures under were also warrant made of the film “The Devil in Miss Jones.” At a proceeding show-cause Judge Ferguson sitting before single judge, as a judge declined appellants contempt hold failing to return the “Deep Throat” 4 judgment. covered the June ruling His oral was:
“THE argue COURT: You do not have to any about that at all Mr. more. Brown comes before the Court arguing that the con- tempt occurred because of the failure to turn over three of the films as a result of the November 1973 seizures. The defendants filed opinion a motion to An reconsider. circulating among now Judge the Three Court with reference to that motion so it would say be absurd for me to there was contempt a of court for failure to turn over those three films.
“THE COURT: . . .
“Now, returning with reference films, to the three find contempt cannot there was that, either, primarily because returning issue of the films had been taken under Judge submission the Three Court and there was no specific outstanding required order which immediate compliance. So the Order to Show Cause with contempt reference to will be vacated.” Judge Ferguson did, however, preliminary issue injunction a
against further seizures of the two films. Title 28 U. S. C. §§ (3) (5) single judge interlocutory forbid to issue an injunction *9 three-judge-court in a Judge Ferguson's case. The status of prelim- inary injunction is not at issue here. In response appellants’
tution. they claim that were power without comply with the June 4 injunction, films being in possession of the Municipal Court, court injunctive amended the portion of its order so as to read as follows:
“The defendants shall in good petition faith Municipal Court of the North Orange County Ju- dicial District to return to plaintiffs three of the four film prints seized from plaintiffs on No- vember 23 City of Buena Park.” Appeals were taken to this Court from both judg ment of June and the amended judgment September 30. postponed We further consideration jurisdic of our tion to the consideration of the merits of the case. 419 U. (1974) S. 1018 A11
II We deal first with questions about jurisdiction our over this direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. 1253.12 § At the judgment Because the amended response entered timely rehearing motions for and to judgment, amend the June appellees insist that judgment it is the amended before the Appellants appeal Court. filed notices of judgment, from the June 4 despite pending motions, their and some contend that the District jurisdiction Court had no September to enter the 30 order. Some appellants appealed September also from the judgment, however, and we think appellees have the better view of this issue. The judgment amended is before us. provides: Section 1253
“Except provided by law, any as otherwise party may appeal to Supreme granting Court from an order denying, or after notice hearing, interlocutory permanent an injunction or any civil action, proceeding required by any suit or Congress Act of to be heard and judges.” determined a district court of three requires three-judge Section 2281 courts under certain circumstances: interlocutory injunction “An permanent restraining or the en-
forcement, operation or execution of State statute restrain-
343 outset, concededly this case was a matter for a three- judge Appellees’ court. complaint asserted much, as they do not now contend otherwise.13 Furthermore, on June 4 the District Court declared the ob- California scenity statute unconstitutional and ordered the return of all film copies of the that had been seized. Appellees do not claim that this order, which would have aborted criminal prosecution, injunction was not an meaning within the §of appealable 1253 and was not here. jurisdictional issues arise from events that subsequent occurred to June 4.
A question The first emerges summary from our dis- missal in Miller II. Appellants claimed in the District Court, and II here, claim that Miller binding on the District Court and required that court to sustain the California statute and to dismiss the If case. appellants are correct in position, question this arises Miller II whether necessity removed the for a three- judge Patterson, court under the Bailey rule of v. (1962), U. S. 31 in which event our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. C.S. evaporate. § would also appellants
We with agree the District Court was in holding error it disregard could decision Miller II. That case was appeal by an from a decision a ing the action of officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such of an statute or order made an administrative acting statutes, board or commission under granted State shall not be by any judge ground upon district court or thereof of the un- constitutionality application of such statute unless the therefor judges heard a and determined district court of three under sec- 2284 of title.” tion this 13Although only defendants, they local were officers were enforc ing purposes statute and are statewide state officers for the Spielman Dodge, Motor Co. (1935). 1253. 295 U. S. 91-95 § against federal con a state statute upholding court
state prop A constitutional issue was federal attack. stitutional jurisdiction appellate within our erly it was presented, discretion we had no C. § under U. S. have as would on its merits case adjudication refuse *11 our here under brought been true had the case been grant to obligated were not jurisdiction. We certiorari but we not; did and we consideration, plenary case the by con did so merits. deal with its We required to were the because be dismissed appeal should that cluding was not statute to California challenge constitutional not free to court was three-judge The a substantial one. As Mr. pronouncement. Bren disregard this Justice “ summarily, and to affirm observed, otes nan once [v] it question, federal of a substantial for want dismiss merits of a on the hardly comment, are votes needs 247 Price, 246, 360 U. S. ex rel. Eaton v. Ohio case Supreme Court Gressman, & E. (1959); cf. R. Stern de however, 1969) (“The is, Court (4th 197 ed. Practice for want of it dismisses merits, when ciding a case on the of Federal Wright, Law .”); . . C. question substantial a ap an disposition of 1970) (“Summary (2d ed. Courts by dismissal by affirmance or either peal, however, disposition on question, is a federal of a substantial want followed have merits”). The District Court should Authority Bond in Port advice, first, Circuit’s Second Port New York Au Committee v. Protective holders (1967), that “unless and 259, F. 2d 263 n. thority, 387 in otherwise, should instruct Court Supreme until that if had best adhere to view federal courts ferior unsubstantial, as it re question Court has branded developments doctrinal indicate when except mains so Hodgson, Doe v. 478 F. 2d later, in otherwise”; and, Brennan, 414 nom. Doe v. sub U. S. denied cert. by lower courts are bound sum- (1973), '' mary by this decisions Court 'until such as time ” [they] informs are not.’ [them] Although the constitutional issues which pre- were II sented Miller and which were declared to be insub- stantial Court, this could be not considered substantial and decided otherwise the District Court, we cannot conclude II required that Miller the three-judge court be dissolved in the circumstances of this case.14 Appellees, plaintiffs as only the District Court, challenged the enforcement of the statute but enjoin also sought the enforcement the California statutes, search warrant Penal (1970 §§ Code 1523-1542 ed. Supp. 1975), they might insofar as applied, be contrary York, to Heller Newv. 413 U. S.
permit multiple seizures that occurred this case. application preliminary injunction for a made this *12 aim of the quite express. suit in three-judge The court its June 4 obscenity decision declared the uncon- statute stitutional and ordered four of the film returned. Its constitutional Septem- conclusion was reaffirmed on 30, despite II, ber injunction Miller and its was to some II, extent Miller modified. had nothing to do however, with validity the multiple wholly of seizures as an issue independent validity of the obscenity of the statutes.
14 course, Of Miller II only would have been decisive here the if in present issues Miller II and the sufficiently case were the same controlling precedent. II that Miller was a Thus, had the District by Court summary considered itself bound appeals dismissals of Court, this its initial task would have been to ascertain what issues properly presented had been II in Miller and declared this Court to be without Ascertaining substance. the reach and content of summary may present actions substance, itself issues of real in constitutionality circumstances where the aof state is at statute stake, undertaking may three-judge itself be one for a court. that is the here Whether case we need not decide. Heller, the chal- light of in validity,
That issue—the warrant statutes —re- of the search lenged application Indeed, II Miller dismissal. after the in the case mained injunctive order on its based although the District Court obscenity the in- unconstitutionality statutes, the the enforcement with junction also interfered necessarily on consti- statutes, search warrant California case, in question this With grounds.15 tutional it session, in as remained should have three-judge court with have dealt did, it also should and, as did, the consti- reaching merits of before Younger issue however, as we issue, That presented. issues tutional correctly decided. was not III, in Part show (1961), Court, 2d 47 Aday Superior Cal. 2d 362 P. In v. to of a search warrant Supreme sustained use the California a crimi books outcome of obscene effect a massive seizure prior-restraint claim, rejected a First Amendment court nal trial. noting that this referring to obscene books as “contraband” cases Court had allowed interim relief States judicial of obscene “prevent condemnation frustration of order Quantity A Books Court, g., Later of this e. matter.” decisions Aday Kansas, (1964), v. 378 17. S. 205 have undermined adversary hearing, State, prior it permits insofar as absent a York, Heller New exhibition,” block the “distribution or by seizing them in U. S. of films or books greater quantities necessary than is for use in a crim as evidence judicial However, reversing proceedings. or other inal case Municipal suppression order, 340-341, supra, Court’s see at we take Aday Superior reference to to mean November Court’s that the *13 by warrant case seizures effected search were valid under that adversary prompt hearing a under state statute once to de held, hearing termine which in its view would remove objection supra, York, Heller v. New under constitutional copy “Deep one of more than Throat.” The District retention injunction required return nevertheless of three of the Court’s not, course, pass upon seized films. do the merits of the We suppression expressed order or of the the views therein. reversal
B
Appellees
(1)
contend
that under Gonzalez v. Auto-
matic Employees Credit Union,
348
and seizable.16 The District 4 Court’s June we opinion, its think, express: made constitutional thesis gravamen “The justification is, defendants’ course, property is contraband, both the evidence and the fruit illegal activity. of an Such a justification, however, dissipates in the face of a by declaration this court that the statute is invalid.” accordingly We September injunc- conclude that tion, as as declaratory well judgment underlying it, properly before the Court.
Ill The District Court committed error in reaching the merits of this case despite appellants’ insistence that it be dismissed Harris, under v. U. S. 37 (1971), and Mackell, Samuels 66 (1971). U. S. they When filed their federal no complaint, state criminal proceedings pending against appellees were name; but employees two of the theater had been charged copies and four of “Deep Throat” belonging appellees had been seized, were being held, and had been declared to be obscene and seizable the Su- perior Court. Appellees had a substantial stake in the state much proceedings, they so so sought federal relief, demanding that the state statute be declared void and their films be returned them. Obviously, their interests and those of their employees were inter- prosecution The District Court noted that and defense coun following suppression sel, Municipal Court, order stipu lated that the four would be only deemed identical and one copy proved. However, prosecution need be any agree denied suppressed films, successfully ment return the appealed sup pression order, and asserted that the District Court's order inter prosecution fered with the of its case. said, As we judg have ment of the District Court also interfered with the enforcement of the California search warrant statutes. *15 the federal
twined; and, pointed out, as we have pending prose- to interfere with the state sought action whose cution. Absent a clear that showing appellees, could not seek lawyers represented also their employees, the return and property proceedings of their the state presented there, see to it that their federal claims were Younger be requirements of v. Harris could not on no ground prosecution avoided criminal was on com- pending against appellees the date the federal plaint Younger The rule in v. is designed filed. Harris “permit try state courts to state cases from inter- free ference federal 401 courts,” S., 43, particularly U. at the party may fully litigate where to the federal his case comity claim before the Plainly, state court. same “[t]he Medrano, apply,” 802, considerations Allee v. 416 U. S. (1974) C. inter- J., concurring), where the (Burger, ference is sought parties such as some, appellees, to the state case. more, day
What is on following completion of appellees service of the complaint, were charged along employees with their in Municipal Court. Neither Stef- Thompson, v. 415 U. 452 (1974), nor-any S. other case fel Younger this Court held has v. Harris apply, the state criminal proceedings must be day on the the federal case is filed. the issue Indeed, open;17 has been left and we now hold that where state criminal proceedings begun are against plain- the federal tiffs complaint after the federal is filed but before any of proceedings substance on the merits have place taken in the federal court, principles Younger Harris v. apply should in full force. Here, appellees were charged thought At least some Justices have so. Ledesma, Perez v. (1971) (Brennan, U. J., joined by S. n. 9 White and Mar JJ., concurring dissenting). shall, Also, Thompson, v. Stefiel supra, injunction, did not decide an whether as well declaratory as a judgment, prosecution can be issued when no pending. state January
on prior to answering the federal case and prior before whatsoever the three- judge court. we are Unless to trivialize the principles Harris, complaint the federal should have been dismissed on the appellants’ motion absent satisfac- tory proof of extraordinary those calling circumstances into play exceptions one of limited to the rule of Younger v. Harris and related cases.18
The District Court concluded extraordinary cir- cumstances had been shown in the form official harass- ment faith, and bad but this error. was also The rele- findings vant District vague Court were *16 conclusory.19 There were references to the “pattern of 18Appellees argue Younger also that dismissal under Harris was v. required People not Enskat, App. because 33 Cal. 3d Rptr. 109 Cal. had settled the constitutional issue in the respect state with courts to the statute. But easily v. Harris not so courts, avoided. State like courts, other change People sometimes Moreover, their minds. v. Enskat appellate was the decision of an intermediate court of the State, Supreme and the again Court of California could have been pass upon constitutionality asked to of the California statute. any event, way open In was appellees present for to their fed eral issues to this Court the event of adverse decision in the California courts. opinion The June 4 stated: “Finally, objective part facts set forth in the first of this
opinion clearly bad demonstrate faith and harassment which would justify Any editorializing federal intervention. of those facts would purpose. pattern serve no is sufficient It to note that the of seiz- receipts plaintiffs’ ures of cash films demonstrate that the [s] police that, upon regardless were bent course of action of the na- any judicial effectively proceeding, ture of would exorcise the movie 'Deep Buena Throat’ out of Park.” opinion Also, supplemental September 30, 1974, in the the District brought light by petition Court stated: evidence to “[T]he rehearing only strengthen previous finding to serves of bad faith observing only harassment,” explanation that no had been instituting proceedings against appellees offered criminal for not seizure” brought light by pe- and to “the evidence tition for rehearing”; unexplicated and the conclusion “regardless any was then drawn that of the nature of judicial proceeding,” police banishing were bent on “Deep Throat” from in the step Buena Park. Yet each pattern of seizures condemned the District Court was by judicial authorized order; warrant or and the District did purport any to invalidate of the four war- rants, way question propriety pro- ceedings Superior in the Court,20 or even to mention the suppression reversal of the Appellate order De- partment of that court. Absent at least some effort the District Court impeach the entitlement of the prosecuting rely officials to on repeated judicial authoriza- tion for their conduct, agree we cannot that bad faith and harassment were made out. such conclu- Indeed, necessarily sion would not follow even if it were shown the state courts were in error on some one or more issues of or state federal law.21 complaint against until after the federal was filed them and that explanation such an it is reasonable for the court to con- “[w]ithout clude that the institution of the criminal in re- attempt by plaintiffs taliation for the to have their constitutional rights judicially determined in this court.” *17 20 appellees appeal Superior It has been noted that did not 27, 1973, declaring “Deep Court’s order of November Throat” ordering may obscene and all of it seized. It be under that Pursue, Ltd., v. 420 S. 592 U. the failure of Huffman appellees Superior 27, appeal to Court order of November 1973, court, would itself foreclose resort to federal absent extraor dinary bringing circumstances the case exception within some Younger Appellees assert, contrary seemingly now Harris. prior Judge Ferguson, supra, 3, their statement before see n. appealable. the November 27 order disposi In view of our case, pursue tion of the we need not the matter further. not, not, need and We do ourselves decide opin or intimate Superior ion as to were, whether the as claimed by appellees, under unauthorized California law. the District analysis, it seems to us that
In the last entirely on its conclusion rests almost judgment Court’s obscenity statute was unconstitu- the California assuming But even and unenforceable. tional conclusion, in the statute was correct its District Court and in November had not been so condemned bad faith not entitled to infer official District Court was disagreed with merely it—the District because Court — faith harass- Otherwise, v. Enskat. bad and People a state every case which present would be ment unconstitutional, and the rule is ruled statute exception. its up would be swallowed v. Harris complaint have dismissed the The District Court should judgment. accordingly it we reverse its before
So ordered. concurring. Burger, Mr. Justice Chief I I but add a word about join opinion of the Court Court and composition three-judge District Under under which it was convened. the circumstances to whom (1) judge the district § 28 U. S. C. who notifies presented, for relief is application court, three-judge to convene the chief of the need judge (cid:127) It is well of such court.” constitute one member “shall Rosa v. “must,” Merced “shall” means cf. settled that yet the Herrero, (CA1 1970), 423 F. 2d 593 n. here was not three-judge for the court judge who called appellants made panel. However, to the no named Ante, court. composition of the timely objection to the it Obviously rendering occasions can arise n. at 338 5. initiates the conven- judge district who for the impossible (1) court, to serve on the § court under of such a ing mandatory language of unqualified light but, obligation occurs there is an when that statute, *18 see to it reveal, very record at the a least, state- ment of the circumstances accounting for the substitution. Doug- with whom Mr. Justice
Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Marshall las, Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting. join, many
There are aspects of the opinion Court’s seem open to me to serious challenge. dissent, This is however, only directed III Part opinion, which holds that District Court committed “[t]he error in reaching the merits of this despite appellants’ case insistence that it be Younger dismissed under v. Harris ... and Samuels v. Mackell. . . .”
In
el v.
the time the federal complaint is filed, federal inter-
vention does not
duplicative
result in
legal proceed-
ings or disruption of the state
justice sys-
criminal
tem;
nor
can federal
intervention,
circumstance, be interpreted
reflecting negatively
as
upon the state
ability
court's
to enforce constitu-
tional principles.
In addition,
while a
state
*20
prosecution provides
plaintiff
the federal
with a
concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional
rights, a
part
refusal on the
of the federal courts to
intervene when
proceeding
may
no state
is
place
hapless plaintiff
Scylla
between the
of
intentionally flouting
Charybdis
state law and the
of forgoing
he
constitutionally
what
believes to be
protected activity in order to
becoming
avoid
en-
meshed
a criminal proceeding.”
S.,
415 U.
at 462.
“
Consequently, we concluded that
fed-
equiring the
[r]
totally
eral courts
step
aside when no state criminal
prosecution
pending against
is
plaintiff
the federal
would
turn
Id.,
federalism on its head.”
In
at 472.
such cir-
cumstances,
opportunity
“the
adjudication
for
of consti-
tutional
rights
a federal forum,
as authorized
Declaratory Judgment Act,
paramount.”
becomes
Ellis
v. Dyson, 421
S.U.
432.
v.
426,
See also Huffman
Pursue, Ltd.,
The of the federal adjudicate courts to and vin- dicate federal rights constitutional is, course, shared with state but courts, there can be no doubt federal courts primary are “the powerful reliances every vindicating right given the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.” Frank- F. & furter J. Landis, Supreme Business of the Court: A Study in System the Federal Judicial (1927). 65 The statute under which this action was brought, 42 S. C. § U. established in our law “the role of basic federal guarantor as a of the Federal Government Foster, v. power.” Mitchum 407 U. state S. rights against very purpose 1983 was to Indeed, § 239. “[t]he and the interpose federal courts between States Koota, Id., Zwickler v. people.” at 242. also See Education, 248; McNeese v. Board 241, 245, U. S. 668; v. 167. Pape, U. S. Monroe U. S. And this cen- tral guarantor interest a federal court as of constitu- fully implicated rights tional from the moment its jurisdiction is invoked. How, subsequent does the then, of a state criminal filing charge the situation from change one in which the federal court’s dismissal of the action Younger principles under “would turn federalism on its head” one in which dismiss would “trivialize” failure principles? those same
A State has a vital interest the enforcement of its criminal law, and this Court has said time and again that it will sanction little federal interference with that im- portant g., Helfant, state function. E. Kugler *21 S. 117. But there is nothing U. in our decision Steffel requires that a stay State to its hand during pendency the of the federal litigation. If, interest of efficiency, the State wishes to refrain from actively prosecuting criminal charge pending the of outcome the federal de- claratory judgment may, it of suit, so. do But course, no decision this Court requires it to make that choice.
The today, however, goes much further than simply recognizing right proceed State to with orderly administration of its criminal law; it ousts the federal from courts their historic role as the “primary reliances” for vindicating constitutional freedoms. This is no less offensive “Our Federalism” than the federal injunction restraining pending state criminal Younger condemned in v. Harris. The concept of fed- requires eralism “sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both and National 401 U. S., State Governments.” Younger v. Harris and its 44- (emphasis added). at cases companion principles reflect federal judiciary refrain interfering legiti- must from with the surely functioning mate courts. But the con- state verse principle is a no less valid. new rule a reality Court's creates which few state
prosecutors can expected ignore. open be is an It invitation to state officials to institute state proceedings in order to defeat jurisdiction.2 federal need not One impugn the motives of officials to suppose they state prosecute would rather a criminal suit in court than state defend a case in forum. Today's opinion civil a federal virtually instructs state officials to answer federal com- plaints state with Today, indictments. the State must file a criminal charge dismissal to secure federal an litigation; perhaps tomorrow action a “akin to crimi- nal will proceeding” serve the purpose, see Huffman Ltd., Pursue, supra; day may and the not be far off civil will when state action do.
The doctrine of v. Harris reflects an accom- modation of interests. competing The rule announced today beyond distorts balance recognition. filing The District Court found that of the state criminal complaint, appeared oppose six weeks after the State had appellees’ application temporary restraining for a only order but day complaint after service of effected, *22 “would seem to supply justification” finding added for its harassment. The court concluded “that institution criminal inwas attempt by plaintiffs retaliation to have their constitutional rights judicially determined in this court.”