*1 v. UNITED STATES DORSZYNSKI Argued June March 1974 Decided 73-5284. No. Friebert, Robert by appointment H. Court, argued U. S. and filed petitioner. cause a brief for *2 Gerald Norton argued P. the cause for the United States. With him on the brief Solicitor were General Bork, Assistant Attorney Petersen, General Deputy So Frey, Feit, licitor General Jerome M. Joseph Davies, Jr. * Burger opinion delivered the
Mr. Chief Justice the Court. granted
We
414
1091
certiorari,
U. S.
to resolve
(1973),
a conflict in the Circuits
concerning
sentenc-
whether,
ing
a
offender
applicable penal
under other
stat-
5010
utes, §
of the Federal
Youth Corrections
18 U.
seq.,
S. C.
5005 et
requires a federal district
court first
explicit
make an
finding, supported by
reasons
that
record,
the offender would
benefit
not
from treatment under subsection (b)
(c)
The Court of Appeals held that
such
finding
implied
from the
(CA7
484
2d 849
record,
F.
1973). Three Circuits have taken
position,1 and
three
required
Circuits have
explicit
accom-
panied by supporting reasons.2 We conclude that while
an express finding of no benefit must be made on the
Wald,
Rezneck,
Flug,
*Patricia M.
A.
Daniel
James F.
Robert
Plotkin,
and Alvin J. Bronstein filed briefs
Legal
National
Assn,
et al. as amici curiae
Aid and Defender
urging
reversal.
1
States,
Williams v.
United
Cox v.
(CA3
1973);
I the Federal special agent On October ar- made Drugs and Dangerous Bureau of Narcotics whose petitioner’s codefendant, case rangements Court, purchase approximately 1,000 not before diethylamide (LSD) the fol- lysergic tablets of acid day. appointed 20, 1971, At hour on October lowing approximately 1,000 agent the undercover was shown possession petitioner’s in the co- LSD tablets *3 who transferred the tablets to the defendant, agent. The in place exhibition and transfer took an automobile by petitioner. driven being After the trans- tablets were money ferred to agent the but before had changed hands, petitioner and his were codefendant arrested. The complaint upon which the arrest petitioner warrant for issued him charged and knowingly intentionally possessing approximately 1,000 tablets of in LSD, vio- lation of 18 U. S. C. and 21 §2 (a).3 U. S. C. 844 § Subsequent petitioner’s to release on his own recogni- counsel zance, his informed the District Court peti- tioner intended to plead guilty to the charge, and re- quested completion the of a presentence report prior to the as plea, by authorized Fed. Rule Crim. (c). Proc. 32 February
On
14,
proceedings were had in
1972,
the
District
upon
Court
the filing of an
ar-
information,
3Title 18 U.
petitioner
C.
punishable
S.
made
principal
as a
for
against
offense
the United
by
States committed
his codefendant.
Title 21
(a)
U. S. C. 844
punishable
makes
knowing
the
or inten
possession
tional
of a controlled substance such as LSD when not
pursuant
obtained
prescription
valid
order,
or as otherwise
by
authorized
law.
filed a
plea, and sentence. The Government
raignment,
petitioner
one-count
information
and his co-
charging
defendant with a misdemeanor offense under 18
S.U. C.
(a).
§2 and
U.
C.
Government
in-
§844
The
formed
petitioner
the court that
the maximum sentence
and his codefendant, who were
offenders under
first
(a),
year
§ 844
could receive
in prison,
was one
a fine of
$5,000, or
the
both;
pe-
court was also
that since
advised
might
titioner
have been under
of
in-
age
the
see n.
fra,
“may
he
subject
also be
to the Federal Youth
Corrections Act.”
“(a) If opinion youth the of court is the offender does commitment, may suspend need imposition it or execution place of youth sentence probation. offender on “(b) If youth person court shall find that a convicted is a offender, by imprisonment and the punishable ap- offense is plicable provisions subsection, law than may, other the court penalty imprisonment by lieu of the provided law, otherwise sentence custody Attorney offender to General pursuant supervision chapter to this until dis- charged by provided (c) the Division section 5017 of this chapter; or “(c) If the court shall find that offender not be able derive prior maximum benefit from treatment the Division expiration years may, of six from the date conviction it penalty imprisonment in lieu of provided law, otherwise *4 youth custody Attorney sentence the offender to the the General supervision pursuant chapter any for treatment for period may further be authorized law for the offense or discharged by offenses of which stands until he convicted or the provided chapter. Division as in section of this “ youth (d) If the court find that will shall the offender derive (b) (c), benefit from under treatment subsection or then the court may youth any applicable penalty sentence offender under other provision.
“(e) If the Court desires additional information as to whether a youth will offender derive benefit from under subsection proceeding at of the and had had no years old the time pleaded his guilty, as did code- prior record, criminal prescribed by After Rule Crim. inquiry fendant. Fed. in Proc. 11 to whether there was a basis fact determine and whether it was entered petitioner’s guilty plea, voluntarily its conse- understanding nature and accepted plea. the District Court quences,5 may custody (b) (c) it order he be committed to of the Attorney study appropriate clas- General for observation and at days agency. sixty sification center or Within from the date of the period may grant, order, or such additional as the court Divi- report findings.” sion shall to the court its youth The release of offenders under 5010 is committed governed by provides part: 18 U. S. C.
“(a)' may The Division at time after to the reasonable notice conditionally youth supervision Direétor release under a committed When, judgment youth Director, offender. in the of the a committed offender should be conditionally supervision released under he shall report so and recommend Division. “(b) may discharge youth Division a committed offender
unconditionally expiration year at the of one from the date of con- ditional release. “(c) A (b) offender committed under section 5010 of this chapter shall be conditionally supervision released under on or be- expiration years fore the of four from the date of his conviction discharged
shall be unconditionally years on or before six from the date of his conviction. “(d) A (c) offender committed under section 5010 of this chapter shall conditionally be supervision released under not later years than expiration two before imposed term discharged unconditionally court. He be expiration at the of not year
less than one from the date of his conditional release. He shall discharged unconditionally on expiration or before the maximum imposed, computed sentence uninterruptedly from the date of conviction.” 5Although petitioner’s complaint here is that he was not sentenced following his challenged validity conviction he plea part his ground on the that he was not that under informed
429
pro-
to be sentenced at this
petitioner
Since
desired
pre-
District
recessed to consider the
Court
ceeding,
already
counsel had
report,
petitioner’s
which
sentence
petitioner was
After
and
sentencing,
read.
recess
before
petitioner’s
and
counsel
his
given
right
allocution,
petitioner
...
on
requested
placed
the court
“be
App.
probation under
the Youth Corrections Act.”
4,
split
13.
n.
Petitioner
then
a
supra.
See
received
him to the custody
sentence
remitted
Attorney
days’
for
year,
General
one
con-
serve
“in
jail-type'
finement
a
treatment”
institution,
only
judgment
“jail-type”
mentions
insti-
although
tution;
the execution of the remainder of the sentence
suspended
was
petitioner
placed
was
on probation
years upon
for
custody.
two
release from
18 U. S. C.
3651.6
no time
§
At
during
including
proceeding,
he
super-
the Act
could have received a sentence of incarceration and
up
period
years,
vision
(b)
to a
of six
S. C.
U.
§§
(c),
4, swpra,
see n.
in asserted
violation of Rule 11.
District Court
ground;
ruling
denied relief on this
has not been
challenged.
6There is no contention made that
the District Court could not
place petitioner
probation
on
opposed
under 18 U. S. C.
§
probation
(a).
C.
18 U. S.
See United States
§
Kurzyna,
(CA2 1973).
“(b) youth placed a probation Where offender has been on court, may thereafter, discretion, unconditionally the court in its discharge youth probation prior such expira- offender from to the tion period probation of the maximum fixed theretofore court, discharge which automatically conviction, shall set aside the and the shall court issue offender a to that certificate effect.”
Despite expiration petitioner’s sentence, then, he still receive the benefit of 18 U. S. C. 5021 he if is resentenced under § eligible To be Act. have his conviction set under aside Act, petitioner would (b) have to be committed under (c), or § placed probation or (a), early under and achieve the dis- charge required by (a) (b). might require While imposition longer originally sentence than received, peti- he through represents tioner counsel that voluntarily he would seek re- place probation. him would back on Tr. of Oral Arg. 8, 16-18. The District Court able, would then be as a discretion, provide requisite early matter of unconditional dis- charge. (b). U. S. C. §5021 require did not an affirm- hearing
conviction that the Act from petitioner would not benefit ative that him thereunder before the court could sentence con- applicable penalty provisions; under the court other year petitioner cluded committing one split impliedly sentence Court “the [held] [District] App. Youth applicable.” Corrections view that Appeals affirmed, rejecting Court of judges explicit finding trial must make an *7 offenders would not from under benefit Act. Appeals The Court of held that such a determina- may implied tion from the whole record as a and that imposition of split upon petitioner sentence after his possibility counsel had raised the of sentencing under that Act 5010 484 F. (d). 2d, satisfied at 851.
II The Federal Corrections Act Youth The sole in validity issue is the of this case the sentence imposed by the District Court. contends Petitioner that before adult (d) sentence be imposed § 5010 requires, first, that the sentencing judge find explicitly the convicted defendant would receive no benefit from treatment under and, second, the Act sentencing judge explain must the reasons for his find- ing. We begin general proposition that once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under it imposed, appel- is an late review is at end.7 Gore States, v. United 357 7There is no upon contention here that the District Court relied improper or inaccurate Tucker, information. United v. States 404 (1972). U. S. 443 Petitioner contends process he was denied due deprived because right he was of his claimed to be sentenced under explanation without a reasoned on the record for the as deprivation. serted We need contention, not address this for was it not raised Court, before the District the Court Appeals, or in the 432 Burke, Townsend v. 334 U. S. (1958); 386, 393
U. S. States, U. S. Blockburger v. United 284 (1948); 736, is determine (1932). task, therefore, 299, Our permitted imposed here was the sentence whether of the Act. accurately Act has been The Federal Youth Corrections federal statute comprehensive most described as the Coefield, sentencing. United States concerned with 1152, 1156 476 F. 2d App. 209, D. C. 205, U. part outgrowth Act of recom- The substantial made the Judicial Conference mendations principles years ago.8 more than 30 United States procedures Conference recommenda- contained developed largely tions were in turn based those since system Eng- offenders in young 1894 for a of treatment system. land, known the Borstal See Criminal Justice Act 6, 58, & Geo. c. and Criminal Justice 9 & 10 Eliz. c. 39. available at Statistics study prin- revealed the two the time of the Conference cipal motivating factors behind the enactment of the Act: first, period years age of life between was *8 questions presented petition Phillips v. in Co. for certiorari. Dist., 376, (1960); Irvine v. Cali Dumas School 361 U. 386 n. 128, fornia, (1964); 347 U. S. 129-130 Radio Union Officers’ NLRB, 17, 347 U. S. 37 n. 35 requested In 1941Mr. Chief Justice Stone the Judicial Conference study general subject punishment to of for The Chief Jus- crime. appointed appeals judges tice four federal courts of and three district judges study. A to the committee which undertook the subcommit- gave youth particular tee attention to the treatment of offenders. report 1942, The committee made a Judicial to the Conference in developed provide system and a draft of an act to a correctional for report and adopted adult offenders. The Con- presented Congress ference was first in 1943. The recommenda- regarding youth largely tions adopted by Congress offenders were in 1949 in bill which became the Federal Youth Corrections Act in special operated
found to the time when factors produce habitual then-existing criminals. meth- Secónd, treating criminally youths ods of inclined were found in- adequate avoiding in H. Rep. 2979, recidivism. R. No. Cong., Sess., (hereinafter Rep. 81st 2d 2-3 (1950) H. R. No. 2979). The Act designed provide was thus a bet- ter for in treating young method offenders convicted fed- eral age bracket, courts vulnerable to rehabilitate them and patterns. restore normal behavior Ibid. accomplish objective,
To judges federal district given were two new alternatives to add to the of array options previously sentencing them, available to see n. first, they were enabled to commit an of- eligible infra: custody Attorney fender to the of treat- General for ment under the Act. 18 (b) §§ U. S. C. (c). and Second, they if believed an offender did not need com- mitment, were they place proba- authorized to him on tion under (a). the Act. 18 U. S. C. 5010 If § the sen- tencing court first alternative, chose the of- fender would be committed to the program of treatment created the Act.
The objective options represented these a departure from traditional sentencing, primarily focused correction and All persons rehabilitation. under 22 years age at the time of conviction were made for eligible probation or under the latter de- Act,9 ordinarily applied persons Act is to convicted age eligible are provisions who under the Delinquency Act, the Federal Juvenile et U. S. C. seq. multiple And certain offenders the District of Columbia are, despite qualifying age, their barred from under the Act. (d) (1). By D. C. Ann. Code 22-3202 contrast, convicted persons ages “young between termed adult” offend ers, may be sentenced for treatment under the Act if “the court finds *9 groun[d) there is reasonable to believe that the defendant will benefit from” treatment under the Act. 18 C. U. S. Of § 4209. and train- guidance preventive “corrective fined by correcting public [their] the protect designed ing (g). (e) and C. §§ S. tendencies.” U. antisocial youth of- for of treatment program implement To Correction a Youth Act, under the committed fenders which, Parole under Board was created Division Proba- and the of Prisons Bureau conjunction features unique provide the Service, operates to tion S. C. 5005. program. Act’s 18 U. program An element of the was that once important for treatment under the person was committed crime person, to fit the not the execution sentence was. agencies he was convicted. Classification were for which to be established Director of the Bureau of Prisons study person to receive and committed and make rec- appropriate ommendations to Director as to treat- ment. 18 U. C. 5015. Further, range §§ S. provide treatment available was made broad to maximum flexibility. The Director was adapt authorized both to public numerous facilities, public and to contract with private agencies, provide in order to institutional treat- ment which the Director could vary according to the com- person’s progress mitted or lack of it. 18 U. S. C. §§ An integral part program was segregation of the committed prac- insofar as persons, ticable, place so as to them with similarly those commit- ted, to avoid the influence of association with the more hardened inmates serving traditional criminal sentences. 18 ü. C. §5011.
In addition to institutional treatment, the Division was empowered to order conditional release under supervision at any time of those committed under the Act, with fed- course, eligible adult offenders are sentencing only statutory provisions different from those available for juveniles, youth of- fenders, young adult offenders.
435 eral probation providing supervision.10 officers 5007, U. S. C. 5019. 5017, §§ Conditional release was mandatory period after of fixed the statutory time formula. 18 U. 4, supra. § S. C. 5017. See n. Division was further authorized to order the unconditional discharge of persons committed after a fixed period treatment, required unconditionally and was discharge to them period within a by statutory also fixed formula. A powerful U. C. § tool to the available Division was its discharge discretion to per- committed sons unconditionally required before it was so, to do upon such discharge the conviction upon which the sen- tence rested automatically would be set aside. U. (a). S. C. 5021 supra. § See n. if 5, Similarly, sentencing judge chose the second alternative created e., Act, youth i. placement of proba- offender on tion provisions, under its judge himself could exercise his discharge discretion to the offender from probation unconditionally. (b). 18 U. S. C. 5021 supra. § See n. too, in This, would result setting the automatic aside of the offender’s conviction. U. (b). S. C. 5021
The foregoing describes the new options of treatment probation and made to available the federal court under Act.11 Our the op- concern is with Congress In amended 5024 of the added and coverage youth order to extend the Act’s §§ offenders convicted the District of Columbia. 66 Stat. 45. 1967, Congress In sections, withdrawing further amended these from the Bureau of Prisons the Youth Correction Division youth during control District of Columbia offenders their commit ment during and after periods their release. Control these was in given stead to the Columbia, Commissioner of District of who delegate authority could in turn Department to the D. C. Corrections, continuity provide in order to of treatment. difficulty recognition ascertaining whether, In of the and if type of, so which treatment under the Act would benefit a of fender, permits the Act also court to commit the decision alternatives, but these eration preserved Act also for the employ them, court offenders sentence judges of trial power It is to the penalty provision.” applicable “any other youth offender sentence of when a question *11 we now turn. Act that outside the
Ill the Act Discretion Under Sentencing (A) of the sentencing role affecting the language The which tells in 5010 (d), under the Act is found us: will offender
“If find that the the court shall under subsection derive benefit from treatment not youth of- then the court sentence the (b) (c), applicable penalty provision.” other fender of a “no requirement concern is with the Our effect judge’s sentencing discretion. benefit” Act legislative history clearly The indicates that enlarge, sentencing op- restrict, was meant trial in permit tions federal courts order to them to sen- special tence offenders for rehabilitation of a sort.
“The proposed legislation designed is to make avail- able for discretionary judges use of the Federal system for the and [youth treatment of of- that will promote the rehabilitation of those fenders] opinion sentencing judge who show promise of becoming useful citizens H. R. . . .” . Rep. 2979, p. added.) No. (Emphasis agencies where, following offender to one of the above classification study, observation reports the Youth Correction Division its findings days. (e). court within 60 18 U. S. C. § purpose
“The proposed legislation pro- vide a new alternative and treatment pro- [youth cedure for Rep. No. S. offenders].” 81st Cong., (1949) (hereinafter 1st Sess., Rep. 1180). (Emphasis added.) No.
Thus, apart from the discretion vested administrative agencies for treatment of those committed under as described in II, Part the Act was intended to broaden scope judicial sentencing discretion to include the alternatives of probation treatment or thereunder. product Act was a of studies made commit- by a tee of judges federal under the auspices the Judicial Conference of the United States. The views of the sponsors as to the effect of the on the sentencing dis- cretion of the trial particular courts are thus of impor- tance, they uniformly support the view the Act *12 preserve was intended to the unfettered sentencing discre- tion of federal district judges. pertinent is Most statement made the Chairman of the Judicial Confer- special ence appointed study committee punishment for crime, supra, see n. Chief Judge John J. Parker, who testified before of Subcommittee the Senate Judiciary Committee, which conducted the only hearings held on (S. the bill 2609) as the enacted Federal Youth Correc- tions Judge Act. Parker stated: . act . power . does not interfere with the
“[T]he the judge respect to sentencing [with offend- gives but him merely ers] alternative method treatment of those people. . . . He give still the youthful offender the punishment prescribed by existing there statutes, nothing is in the pre- bill that vents that. All that the bill does provide is to that if in judgment his and discretion, he thinks that the offender before court one is that can be treated him sentence bill, he can advantage under with existing of under law. bill instead under this possible objection I [to do not see . of these fellows are They say that there some Act]. notwith- punishment to be serious ought given that does being young it standing Act] their [the punishment. being given serious prevent their years pun- from prevents getting a man Nothing prevents his Nothing it. if he ishment deserves Hear- such sentence.” executed if he deserves being 2609 before a Subcommittee and S. ings on Judiciary, Cong., 81st on of the Committee Senate Hearings). (1949) (hereinafter 43-44 Sess., 1st Cir- the statement made To same effect is L. of the Con- Phillips, cuit Orie the Chairman Judge gave attention particular ference subcommittee 8, supra. n. to the treatment offenders. See Kilgore, In to the statement Senator response (in sponsor nothing” the bill terms of S. “takes “away court,” Judge Phillips from the re- sentencing) plied: correct; purely optional.” Hearings “That is it is Judge had bill: “That Phillips Earlier said and it is not he merely flexibility a command that boys up,” Kilgore send the to which replied: Senator Id., “I agree you . . .” 67. To . at the ex- testimony tent other and the debates addressed the ques- tion of discretion under the they in- *13 invariably reflected the same did the view,12 as House judges testify only The other to before the Senate Subcommittee Judge Hincks, were in accord. also District Carroll who served studying youth offenders, Conference subcommittee treatment of stated: judges say they opposed predecessor “I when the are think to the of you bill, you them, talk if could they
this would find that . . . Report, quoted above, Department and the Justice, which recommended enactment of that S. and noted the bill deprive “would not present the court of of its to sentencing.” functions as Rep. No. 10-11. 1180, pp. S. Report’s The Senate was language identical to that of the Department Id., legislative Justice.13 1. The at his- Very well, would not they themselves want to use it. do have not Hearings it.” to use 57. Judge Laws,
District Bolitha J. who served on the Conference special studying general punishment crime,, committee stated: already you “I purely have told optional that law is an situation. judge A present system respects who feels perfect that is in all except and who provisions, perhaps does not want to use the new rarely, may does not have to use them. He still do one of two things. may probation, He admit the man to or he send him exactly Id., institution as he does now.” 15. at Bennett, Director, Prisons,
Mr. James Y. Bureau testified similarly:
“I reemphasize Judge done, would like . . to . than more Laws has discretionary very that this bill is is .... difficult for me to con- [I]t anybody rightfully object ceive who could bill because they not, they Id., can use it or . see fit . . .” at 25. During bill, Kilgore the Senate debate over the made Senator position clear sentencing his of the matter of discretion under the bill: purpose
“Its grant is to to trial . . courts . some additional facili- try ties ... system certain correctional methods. Use of the provided mandatory.” Cong. this measure would Rec. not by anyone There was no discussion discretion other Kilgore than Senator in either the Senate or House debates. Report judge may Senate also noted sen youth applicable provisions tence offender under other than the if, receiving pre-sentence diagnosis after under 18 U. S. C. (e), 11, supra, see n. he “incorrigible is convinced the help program.” and would derive from Rep. p. no No. The remark was made in concerning the context of a discussion sentencing judges need have for additional information about they sentence, offenders merely must temporary indicated (e) commitment under deprive would *14 Congress did conclusion that Act the of the confirms tory the discre- or circumscribe to alter intend not any sub- judges requiring district tion of federal sen- imposition the of be met before standard stantive the unanimity opinion in is virtual There tence. intended to increase was history that the legislative than judges, trial rather of federal sentencing options the employ to discretion whether exercise of their limit the to newly options. the created a ben- requirement of “no (d)’s
To construe would that discretion to circumscribe efit” such congressional intent; a clear with incompatible at odds with traditional sen- would also be construction Congress was in accord tencing doctrine. intent authority in the United States long-established in trial exclusively function the vesting the court.14 prac-
“If
in
federal criminal
there is one rule
citing
Act,
outside the
sentence the
of the discretion to
judges
prototype
would
illustratively
whom
offender
likely
desire to sentence under
Act.
system
English
made
Borstal
To
extent reference was
to
treating young
drafting
did
in
that reference
offenders
English
make
not include
view of the trial court’s discretion to
system.
Judge (now
Judge) Kaufman of
use of that
Circuit
Chief
Appeals
has
the Court of
for the Second Circuit
stated:
only
present
in the
“At
the United States is
nation
free world
finally
judge
conclusively, decisively
where one
can determine
and
period
prison,
minimum
of time defendant must remain
with-
being subject
Symposium,
review of his determination.”
out
to
Sentences,
(1962).
32 F.
D.
Appellate Review
R.
260-261
States,
H.
also notes that in the
Professor Sanford
Kadish
United
[sentencing]
virtually
matters
“discretion
...
Legal
guidance,” Kadish,
free of substantive control
Norm
Sentencing Processes,
in the Police
75 Harv. L. Rev.
Discretion
unwilling
Congress
are
ascribe
We
to the
silentio, sentencing
import,
contrary
sub
intent
doctrine
sentencing judges.
powers
traditional
*15
tice
firmly
which is
it
appel-
is that the
established,
late court has no control
a
over
sentence which is
within the limits
by
allowed
a statute.” Gurera v.
States,
United
40 F. 2d (CA8 1930).
340-341
States,
See Gore v. United
(1958);
U. S. 386
Town-
Burke,
send v.
334 U.
(1948); Blockburger
S. 736
States,
United
The statutes referred line to of cases established permissible a range within which sentences could be im- posed; if judge imposed a a sentence within range, his exercise of discretion as where permis- to within the range sible sentence should be fixed subject was not challenge. authority The to sentence a offender under “any applicable provision” other penalty is ex- pressly reserved by to federal trial courts (d), § 5010 and thus permissible is within the range of sen- tences which may imposed be under the Act. The “no benefit” required the Act is not be read a substantive standard which must be satisfied to sup- port a sentence outside the for reading such a would subject the sentence to appellate though review even sentence was permitted by the Act's terms, thereby limit- ing the sentencing court's discretion. We will not assume Congress to have intended such a departure from well- established doctrine without expression a clear to disavow it. our As review shown, has exclusive power of judges district was Congress' acknowledged, affirm power intention to was clearly indicated. From our conclusion that a finding of “no-benefit” was not intended to constitute a substantive standard, fol- it lows that a sentence outside the Act need not accom- panied by a statement of reasons why court such chose a sentence. only purpose of such a requirement would be to facilitate appellate supervision of, and thus to short, In sentencing discretion.15 court’s trial limit, in a district discretion vested hold that we traditional dis- as the essentially same § 5010 impose example, court, in the vested cretion a sentence larger on offender sentence a first minimum partic- court to sentence If failure of a recidivist. harsh, the “too appears under the youth offender ular judi- Congress, by act remedy must be afforded Block- construction,” guise under the legislation cial “[wjhatever may be views burger, supra, at since . severity punishment . . regarding [t]hese entertained *16 Gore, legislative policy.” questions peculiarly are supra, at 393.
(B) cir- way to in intended Although the was pro- did sentencing it cumscribe the discretion of courts, sentencing designed prevent to a new alternative vide from their involvement in youthful continuing offenders expiration after of their sentence. criminal conduct the option available, the of the made novelty In treatment importance objective serve, and the was lies the it to requirement court purpose (d)’s that § imposing find “no benefit” than before a sentence other (b) (c). one under 5010 §
15Judge (SDNY) recently Marvin E. stated that Frankel has judges required explain rulings, see, g., while are e. Fed. other (a), requirement Civ. Rule Proc. 52 is no such in an “[t]here prison Frankel, nouncement of a sentence.” Lawlessness in Sentenc ing, 1, very 41 U. L. Rev. a Cin. It would have been simple Congress have matter included statement (d) sentencing court’s determination of no bene § supported reasons, required by fit must be proposal as was regarding offenders, Congress 1943, 895, adult before the S. Tit. II, 1, supra. Cong., 8, 78th 1st n. Congress’ Sess. See failure provide strengthens so in 5010 our view that it intended no appellate upon new encumbrance the sentencing process. bars review of Although well-established doctrine avail- limited review is sentencing discretion, exercise of discretion is not exercised at all. able when States, (1958) ; Yates v. United 366-367 U. Daniels, States v. (CA6 1971); United 446 F. 2d Williams, (CA4 United States v. F. 1969). 2d 7, supra. See also n. of the “no benefit” requirement finding was to insure designed exercised in choosing his discretion not to commit a offender to the Act. Such would make unmistakably sentencing judge clear that the only was not aware of the existence of the new but also knew that eligible offender before him was because of his age for the treatment it provided to accomplish important its purpose.
“Appellate statutorily-authorized modification of a sentence ... is an entirely different matter than scrutiny judicial process careful by which particular punishment was determined. Rather than unjustified incursion province into the the sentencing judge, this latter responsibility is, on the contrary, a necessary incident has always what been appropriate appellate review of criminal cases.” *17 United States v. Hartford, (CA5 2dF. 1974). (Emphasis in original.) Once it is made clear that the sentencing judge con- has sidered option the of treatment under the Act re- jected it, no however, appellate is review warranted. question whether the finding of “no benefit” must
be explicit or whether may it implicit be in the record of a particular case is by answered the manifest desire Con- gress to assure that treatment under the Act con- be sidered by the court as one option whenever the youth eligible offender is If it. the finding may implied be go must on to determine courts appellate record, from the im- showing requisite of the a sufficient what constitutes im- finding is a “no benefit” To hold that plication. Act is not chosen under the time a sentence plicit each to hold that some- (d) nugatory; would render inference that necessary support the thing more is ad hoc would create an found in the record must be subject not be to the bur- courts should Appellate rule. examination of the record make case-by-case den of sentencing judge considered the treatment sure that the by compliance the Act. Literal option made available by any expression makes with the Act can satisfied that judge considered the alternative sentencing clear the youth of- under the Act and decided that the benefit from treatment under fender would derive the Act. provides example problems arising
This case implication. when is required finding left to Coun- sel’s references to the Act followed the District Court’s support argument sentence indeed afford for the that, implication, options of the Act were considered and rejected. post-conviction However at hearing District Court found from the record of implication hearing applica- the Act was “not ble.” thus unclear It is whether this meant petitioner court believed to be legally ineligible for treatment under the Act—which would be error —or whether, he was realizing eligible, delib- nevertheless erately opted to sentence him as an adult. An explicit petitioner would not have benefited from would have removed all doubt concerning whether enlarged discretion Congress pro- vided to sentencing courts was indeed exercised.
Accordingly, judgment of the Court Appeals *18 and reversed, case the is remanded to the end that District Court conduct further proceedings consistent opinion. with this
It is so ordered. Mr. Marshall, Justice with whom Mr. Justice Douglas, Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Stewart join, concurring the judgment.
The upon Court called today provi- to construe sion of Federal Youth Corrections 18 U. S. C. seq., et § 5005 defining the circumstances under youth may offender be sentenced an adult. Youth provides Corrections Act (YCA) comprehensive sen- tencing scheme offenders between the of 18 ages and 22, affording judges trial four options for such The judge may suspend offenders. imposition or execu- tion of sentence place probation. offender on U. S. C. (a). §5010 sen- may Alternatively, tence the offender for treatment supervision at a special youth facility, discharged to be no more than years, 18 U. C. 5010 (b), cpmmit § S. or he may of- fender to a institution for a term whiéh exceed 6 years, up period maximum authorized by law for the offense. 18 U. C. 5010(c).1 Finally, § judge may sentence adult, pursuant the offender as an (d), U. S. which provides C. that:
“If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence offender under other applicable penalty provision.”
I agree with the Court's holding re- quires an explicit finding of “no benefit” as a condition precedent eligible offender as an adult,
1 The actual duration of period is determined the Youth Correction authorities. 18 S. C. U. §\5017. *19 inconsistent ante, patently holding I but find that at judge need sentencing a Court’s assertion that with the and choose of the Act only applicability be aware the clear satisfy in the admonition reject it order to Court, “no benefit” by the (d). As construed all. finding not a at finding is “provide I that was meant am convinced the Act 'preferred which must be used sentencing alternative a youthful unless, language offender in the sentencing court shall find offender (d), §of 5010 'the that ” will not derive from . under the . benefit States, (CA4 Act. Cox United 473 F. 2d 1973) (en banc) I (emphasis added). fundamen- And, tally merely by disagree holding with Court’s that statutory tracking language sentencing “no benefit” satisfy “finding” requirement (d). can of 5010 I require explicit would “no benefit” augmented by a statement of the reasons for imposing an adult sentence.
I I find no basis in either language or history of the support YCA to the Court’s observation that the Act “preserve was intended to unfettered” the discretion Ante, sentencing judge. at 437. The YCA product was the of more 10 years study than groups various and was modeled after the English system, Borstal which had achieved substantial success in rehabilitating young offenders.2 The initial legisla- tive proposal, .an American Law Institute model Act, re- power moved the eligible sentence offenders from the trial judges altogether reposed power in a cor- rectional authority.3 Not surprisingly, that proposal Rep. 2 H. R. No. Cong., Sess., 81st 2d 3-6 3 ALI, Model Youth Authority Correction (Offi §§ id., 1940); cial Draft comment, at 35-36. brought sharp judges swift and from the whose criticism power sharply proposal, was to be curtailed. next the Judicial Conference, involved shared powers judges between trial and correctional authorities.4 It met similar proposal, criticism. The 1949 finally power was enacted into retained law, today points trial judge. out, As Court *20 drafters of Act repeatedly emphasized legisla- the that the “ tion ‘does [sentencing] power not interfere with the Ante, the judge at 437.
But very even the proposal first Judicial Conference provision contained a specifically requiring the trial finding to make a that a bene- youth offender would not fit from treatment and should not be committed under before sentencing penalty him under other provisions.5 This from finding requirement adapted was provision similar Borstal which disallows sen- tencing court to “impose imprisonment on a per- son under twenty-one years age no unless ... other method of him dealing appropri- is [Borstal] ate . requirement ...” finding The of the Judicial Con- ference draft subject was not to same criticism as provisions actually than removed, limited, rather exercise trial judges’ sentencing and the discretion, finding requirement was ultimately enacted into law as 5010(d). requirement
The finding integral part is an of the YCA The premise scheme. stated of the Act is that young people between ages of 18 and 22, promising subjects are especially, for rehabilitation.7 purpose legislation The of the for those was, offenders, 2140, II, §3, Cong., 4 H. R. Tit. 78th 1st Sess. 5 Id., Ill, (c). Tit. §1 (2), Criminal Justice Act 12& c. Geo. 2979, supra, H. Rep. R. No. at 1-4. methods punishment for retributive “substitute prevent correct and designed training puni- mere from the departs It tendencies. antisocial primarily and looks criminals dealing with idea of tive Rep. No. H. R. idea of rehabilitation.” objective to the from .8 It clear that (1950) is Sess., 2d Cong., 81st was program corrections inception, very its con- could goals judges among intended to establish paramount— one offenders, sentencing eligible sider in this limited sense, of rehabilitation.9 And, necessarily cir- of trial judges discretion offenders. The re- regard cumscribed per- quirement policy by §of effectuates this deprived rehabilita- mitting eligible offenders to be provided only they tive treatment under the Act where would not benefit therefrom. Report accompanying explained Senate the bill
circumstances under which adult would be proper:
“If . .. the is youth incorrigible convinced the help would derive no from the he program, sentence him under applicable provision of law.” Rep. 1180, No. 81st 1st Cong., Sess., (1949). 5 aspects Other legislative of the history underscore Con- gress’ intention provide preferred that the Act sentenc- ing for eligible alternative offenders. Senator Kilgore, one of sponsors the of the legislation, observed given the requisite “only percent about 10 [eligible 8Although the rehabilitative model of recently corrections has been subject criticism, Congress the fact remains that established a clear preference objective for the of rehabilitation enacting the YCA. 9 See, g., e. United States Kaylor, 1133, (CA2 F. 2d 1974) (en banc); United Waters, States v. S. App. U. D. C. 293, 437 F. 726 (1970); 2d Carter v. States, United 113 U. S. App. 123, 125, D. C. F. 2d (1962). eventually have to offenders [be] sentence[d would] on before a Hearing or less.” S. 895 Subcom- adults], Judiciary, 78th Committee on Senate mittee Report concluded 1st The House Sess., Cong., which reha- the instances in YCA given that even per- would “more than 70 treatment fail bilitative eligible can be rehabilitated” youth cent offenders] [of The Rep. 2979, supra, the Act. H. R. No. at 10. options10 of treatment available under the panoply YCA in- program is but further evidence that was sufficiently all comprehensive tended to be to deal with youth. “incorrigible” but the congressional expression
This intent finds clear say words the statute. Section 5010 does op- merely court must consider the treatment provided by Act; uncompro- tion it in the most says court find mising youth terms that the must “will not impos- benefit” from YCA prerequisite treatment as a ing The an adult sentence. use of the words “shall find” mandatory emphasizes the nature of that finding. specific quality of the finding by § is underscored (e) provides for an eligible offender to be tem- committed for porarily study observation purpose report providing sentencing court with a particular question (d)— defined § 5010 youth whether offender would from benefit under the Act.11
10Emulating system, Congress comprehen the Borstal authorized a system, sive making range corrections op a wide of treatment tions available to maximum, offenders. It mandated that *22 medium, security and minimum utilized, be institutions 18 U. S. C. 5011, long- and short-term provided, compare § treatment be (b) 18 U. C. 5010 S. with 18 (e), U. S. C. § 5010 a that wide range of treatment services be 5011, available. U. S. C. §§ 11“If the court desires additional information as to whether a youth will derive treatment under subsection offender benefit from judge’s a trial remove does not Act while
Thus, determina- sentencing for discretion or responsibility eligible disposition preferred a provide does it tion, sen- required to judge A is offenders. can judge Act; under the offender youth a tence re- deny such discretion his “sound exercise still exceptional in the youths to those habilitative treatment special youth determines that the cases where the no value.” would be of Act by afforded 291, App. D. C. Waters, 289, S. United States v. U. relied history (1970). legislative The F. 2d merely emphasizes point the Court this —that alternative be another was intended to as to judge and that the decision available to the trial re- employed particular it be in a case whether should discretion. That a committed to his mains decision with what seems history however, inconsistent not, plain of the words of the statute— meaning to me circumscribed sentencing judge’s discretion is requirement (d).12 the affirmative § 5010 “provides The preferred sentencing YCA a alternative” in sentencing must used unless the facts requirement of the individual case meet the statutory —(cid:127) (b) (c) may custody it order that he be committed to the Attorney study appropriate General for observation and classi- at agency. sixty days fication center or Within from date of the order, period may grant, or such additional as the the Divi- court report sion findings.” (e) shall to the court its U. S. C. § (emphasis added). 12An unsuccessful effort to remove these bonds on the discretion of sentencing judges was made in when a bill was introduced to amend 18 provide U. S. C. 5010 that: “Nothing chapter in. shall preclude court, be construed any case, from sentencing offender under other applicable penalty provision.” Cong., 92d (1972); 2d Sess. see Cong. Rec. 6776-6788 proposed amendment was not enacted.
451
court finds that
unless,
language
§
of 5010
(d),
benefit from treatment
offender will not derive
States,
Act.13 Cox
v. United
337;
473 F.
at
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Waters,
United States v.
141
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at
App.
292-293,
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437
at
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has
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Brooks v.
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United
limited.
States, 497 F. 2d
Kay
United States v.
(CA6 1974);
1059
lor, 491
2d
United States
(CA2
(en
F.
1974)
banc);
1133
Schenker,
v.
United States v.
(CA5
486 F. 2d
1973);
Coefield,
App.
155 U.
D. C.
476 F.
(1973)
2d
States,
supra;
Cox v. United
(en
Williams v.
banc);
States,
United
see United
(CA3
In a sense, the today Court recognizes also the inherent limitation on the judge's imposed (d) discretion by § explicit an requiring “no benefit” finding prereq- as a sentencing. uisite to adult As conceived Court, however, required finding “no benefit” no finding is at all, but merely a ritualistic invocation statutory In language. why explaining the “no benefit” finding requirement positive finding of a sup of “no benefit” to port merely adult sentence under 5010 is the obverse of the requirement of 18 U. S. C. prerequisite 4209 that as a young sentencing adult offender “court finds there is grounds reasonable to believe that the defendant will from benefit .” . . . See United States Kaylor, 2d, [such] 491 F. at 14Subsequently in Walker, United States v. F. 2d 1377 (1972), Appeals the Court of agreed the First Circuit that the Act precluded adult where the offender would derive benefit from treatment under the but found it clear from the nature of the offenses involved that the defendant had no antisocial tenden corrected, cies to hence be no benefit to be derived from YCA treat Id., ment. at 1381 n. 4. “ a 'no o hold notes that Court explicit, [t]
must each time sentence implicit benefit' *24 nugatory.” (d) would render not chosen Act is today Ante, the Court Despite protestations, these at 444. nullity. (d) §of finding requirement renders the “the un- preserve intended Act was By the holding that judges,” federal district of sentencing discretion fettered only have need ante, sentencing judges and that at 437, Act and re- the option the of treatment “considered ante, reads the effectively 443, the Court jected at it,” finding out of the “no benefit” unambiguous mandate of a hardly statutory language A parroting mere of the Act. opinion seems finding. The Court’s an affirmative what judge need not mean sentencing that indicate Al- pronounces litany. when he the “no benefit” says he the charade requires go through Court him to though the benefit from treat- saying that the offender would not apparently require ment under the it does not that judge actually only find no benefit but he be that aware I reject Act and it. think it remarkable approve emptv that this Court should such an and duplicitous ritual. II
If the were to hold Court that the Act limited a judge’s trial actually discretion requiring that he find a offender would not benefit from YCA treat- ment before him I as an adult, would think that more than a mere recitation of the conclusory finding of “no benefit” should required. say To simply that in- voking the words of the statute satisfies the mandate of § 5010 affords far little too credence Congress’ both to deep concern for the potential rehabilitative of young of- fenders and its obvious intention eligible offenders be sentenced under they the Act if would benefit from its rehabilitative programs. give To effect to these con- I cerns, would require that the trial judge include, he makes clear that considered record, a statement which provisions option the treatment Act, weighed his available, light familiarity decided offender he would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act.15 mere litany recitation of benefit” can the “no
hardly weight compliance. bear the of demonstrating such By taking step specific finding the unusual requiring in this limited but highly important sentencing, area of Congress mandated a reasoned determination that offender would benefit from the rehabilitative treat- ment available under the Act. Accordingly, my view, a statement factors which informed shaped decision accompany conclusory must *25 of “no benefit” if finding purpose to congressional is be served. provided
The Borstal which system, for model general corrections scheme and the requirement (d) of 5010 in particular, § envisions a judge stating trial sentencing eligible his reasons for offender as an Similarly, adult.16 most of the Appeals Courts of 15 States, 1059, (CA6 See Brooks v. United 497 2dF. 1062-1063 1974); Kaylor, 1139; United States v. 2d, 491 F. at v. United States Coefield, 205, App. 210-211, 1152, 155 U. D. F. C. 476 2d 1157- (1973) (en banc). 1158 16Criminal Justice of 1948, (3), 6, Act 17 11 12& Geo. c. § asserts, ante, 14, Court at 440 English n. that the reference to the system drafting Borstal made in “did English Act not include the view of the trial system.” court’s discretion to make use of that To support claim, general Court relies on descriptions two of sentencing procedures American amade decade after enactment legislation. Those comments were not directed to the the YCA, administration of validity their as hence indicia of con- gessional intent in questionable this limited context is at best. hand, On the other there is considerable evidence that the Borstal system did, fact, provide a question model on the of the trial sentencing court’s discretion, not the least of which is the marked of reasons statement required a the issue have have faced finding. (d) § a of necessary concomitant Appeals A banc decision of the Court unanimous en en banc near-unanimous Circuit and a for the Second the District of Colum- Appeals of the Court of for decision support- a statement of reasons bia Circuit17 have found “ ‘essential to a knowl- ing the “no benefit” States edgeable administration of the Act..." United Coefield, Kaylor, United States v. 1139; 491 F. at 2d, at 1157. App. C., 210, 2d, D. at F. U. S. Appeals has, The Court of for the Sixth Circuit accom- more held that a reasons statement recently, “necessary insure that the panying adult . deliberately court . . has considered whether pro- a offender benefit from the treatment . . .” Brooks v. United for in States, vided Act . F. 2d, at 1063. Similarly, Appeals the Court of for the recently Fourth Circuit remanded a case consideration of whether treatment under the Act would be beneficial to specifically offender and ordered the trial States, state the reasons for his conclusion. Cox v. United In 2d, F. at 337. fact, the court below only is the Court Appeals to specifically disavow requirement (d) reasons for a 5010 § sentence.18 similarity between 18 U. S. C. 5010 and the Criminal Justice (2), require 12& Geo. c. both no- of which *26 finding prerequisite benefit as a sentencing. to adult 17Only Judge MacKinnon, participating judges of the 10 on the Appeals Court of for the Circuit, District of Columbia dissented from that court’s Coefield, supra. en banc in decision 18The First in Circuit United States v. MacDonald, 455 F. 2d 1259, 1265 (1972), remanded a case to the District Court “to make the findings required by the Act,” Federal Youth leaving Corrections un clear findings whether encompassed those a statement of reasons. The Third specifically Circuit reserved the issue in Williams v. States, United (1973). 2d F. The Fifth Circuit, in its only issue, case on the remanded for appropriate findings under re- appellate to the Court’s assertion that
Contrary only a statement purpose view is the served of other requirement serves number reasons, important it contribute to policies. First, well might process and decreasing rationalizing disparities in Articulating sentences. reasons should as- in judge sist a trial himself developing for a consistent principles set of on which to his base decisions. Requiring a procedure judge would encourage “[s]uch clarify justify, grounds in his own mind, the sentence he As a result, sentencing chooses. deci- tend, sions would on the carefully to be more whole, Velasquez, States United thought out.” v. 482 F. 2d Brown, 1973); accord, United States v. (CA2 1973). 1170, 1172 (CA2 F. 2d may The reasons also be of use to correctional au- thorities in their handling prisoner after sentence. kind of correctional and rehabilitative an offender receives should take into account the reasons for his sentence.
A disclosure of reasons also aid the defendant’s counsel to insure that the sentence is not premised on misinformation or inaccuracies in the upon material relies. “A which the sentencing judge Sphinx-like si- lence on part precludes the court’s anyone (including the parties, .) . . from learning [and] whether he Tucker, acted error.” Id., 1173; United States v. at cf. 443 (1972). U. S. explanation without as to whether finding an ultimate no benefit was Schenker, alone sufficient. United States v. 486 F. 2d specifically A require- case .dealing with the reasons Hoyt ment, States, United 73-2435, presently No. pending before the Fifth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit express called for an no-benefit question but has not faced the of whether reasons required are support thereof. United Jarratt, States v. 471 F. 2d 226 (1972). *27 actually con- may of reasons an articulation Moreover, avoiding any by rehabilitation offender’s tribute to the arbitrary.19 As his sentence was feeling Justice Mr. observed: Judge) Stewart (then but to a many ways, in measured “Justice fair- in the measure lies criminal its surest convicted an anom- ... It is he ness of sentence receives. developed so which has judicial system that a aly of a criminal protection for the a concern scrupulous stage pro- of the throughout every other defendant have so neglected him should ceedings against, justice.” dimension of fundamental important States, Shepard v. United (CA6 2d 257 F. 1958). sentencing decision,
If were for the reasons articulated apt perceive being offender would be less his fate as arbitrarily determined.20 Reasoned decisions even legitimacy sentencing process enhance the of the per- general public for, ceived Report as noted the American Bar Project Association on Standards for Criminal Justice:
“It is hardly commanding public respect for our system on the one hand to increase the alternatives sentencing judge so that he can shape his sentence to fit each case, and on the other hand to 19 leading A federal district has observed that ab “[t]he any explanation sence purported justification for the sentence is among the more familiar and understandable sources of bitterness among people prison.” Frankel, in Sentences, M. Criminal Law Without Order 42-43 may, course, There circumstances which it would not be advisable underlying to state the imposition reasons particular of a presence sentence defendant, in which case those reasons writing could instead be committed to part and made of the record. *28 explain he need position why take not he 21 . . particular a sentence . selects Although sentencing deci- apply these considerations to I generally,22 suggest sions do mean to reasons Contrary are required sentencing other context. majority’s accusations, view the does not my of require wholesale abandonment of “traditional Ante, doctrine.” here with at We are concerned only limited, important, a albeit area of for Congress special Congress’ has rules. established urgent potential young concern the rehabilitative specific-finding requirement offenders and the of 5010 particularly compelling make the need for reasons a Requiring context. statement of reasons would encourage judges to trial their attention to the direct questions crucial of benefit and take treatment, hard look at the relevant factors, and to focus on value judgments in their sentencing inherent decision. See United States v. Phillips, App. 156 S. 217, U. D. C. 479
21 Project American on Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Appellate 1968). Review of 2-3 (Approved Sentences Draft 22 general For a discussion the value of a statement of rea underlying imposition sentence, sons United States v. see Phillips, App. (1973); 217, 156 U. C. F. D. 479 1200 United 2d Velazquez, 139, (CA2 1973); States v. 2d 482 142 States F. United Brown, 1170, v. (CA2 2d 1973); 479 F. American Bar Asso Project ciation Justice, Sentencing Standards for Criminal Alterna (ii) tives and commentary Procedures 5.6 (b), pp. 270-271 (Approved 1968); id., Appellate Draft (c) Review of Sentences 2.3§ commentary (e), pp. (Approved 1968); Frankel, 45-47 Draft M. Sentences, (1972); Law Criminal Without Order 39-49 R. Goldfarb & Singer, L. (1973); Wyzanski, After Conviction 191-195 A Trial Judge’s Responsibility, Freedom and 1281, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1292- (1952); Youngdahl, Opening Remarks Sentencing Institute Program, (1964); F. D. Pearce, R. cf. North Carolina (1969); U. S. Kent v. States, United 383 U. S. (1966). clearly with the Act consonant It is F. 2d 1200 I agree must consideration. reasoned require such Judge Fahy observations of Senior perceptive requiring state- of Columbia Circuit that District is essential to assure: ment of reasons only manifest not Judge the District “firstly, that case, applicable Act is to the an awareness that scope understanding accurate but also an secondly, that the Dis- Act; his discretion under the *29 facts pertinent been informed of the Judge trict has him, before relating to the individual defendant his attention in the by coming either evidence or a recommenda- by presentence report, by a trial, report (e); made under section 5010 and tion and Judge, the District his statement thirdly, given where has consideration and required, reasons appli- individual case to the related facts Coefield, cable law.” United States App. v. 155 U. 2d, (footnote at 1157-1158 C., 210-211, at F. D. omitted). a mechanism for (e) provides
Section 5010 expert assistance of correc- judge trial to secure the eligible tional of- determining authorities whether I agree fender benefit from with the would treatment. issue Appeals passed two Courts of have on the that: judge availed himself of the assist- has
“[W]hen ance where he (e), say, afforded that is to § committed ... for has ordered the offender study observation and . . . and the Division has report court, made its and after considering report has followed findings its recommenda- tion in imposing sentence, additional reasons are required stated, to be although, course, the stating from his own rea- judge prevented is not Kaylor, sons.” United States v. 2d, 491 F. at 1139. Coefield, United States D. App. C., 155 U. S. Accord, clearly at 476 F. at 1157. But the Act intended 2d, ultimate decision remain with the pass by judge. trial That decision should not abdication prepare to the correctional (e) authorities who the 5010 study. Thus, (e) where trial secures a report, only adopt should its reasons his own he after adequacy report pro- himself of assuring priety of its recommendation.23
I see no here of appellate reason to reach re- issue view of the imposition District Court’s of an adult sen- I tence. believe that the Youth pro- Corrections Act vides a preferred-sentencing alternative which can only be abandoned on the of a finding eligible that an basis offender will not benefit from treatment under the Act. The District imposed Court sentence on the assumption that the preferred YCA was not a disposition no find- ing required. was The Court today finds the District Court’s sentence only invalid failure make the *30 “no required finding. benefit” Under either the Court’s my view or own, appellate-review question is clearly yet presented by this case.24 I judgment concur in Accordingly, in- the Court sofar as it reverses and remands because District Court failed to the requisite make “no finding. benefit” I disagree, however, opinion with the of the Court inso-
23See, g., Norcome, e. United States v. Supp. (DC 375 F. Tillman, 1974); United States (DC Supp. 1974). 374 F. 24Respondent agrees that should this Court determine provides YCA preferred-sentencing eligible offenders, alternative for then the Court need appellate not reach in this case issue of review since the District Court never considered itself bound such standard. Brief for United States 40-41. statement of suggests merely conclusory
far as it that a statutory requirement “no benefit” satisfies the and inso- purports far as it in dicta, question albeit on the pass, appellate review of a sentence, adult issue not before this Court.