*1 MARKETS, v. RETAIL BOYS INC. CLERKS

UNION, LOCAL April 21-22, Argued 768. 1970 Decided June No.

Joseph M. McLaughlin argued the cause and filed briefs petitioner. M.

Kenneth Schwartz argued the cause for respondent. With him on brief were Laurence D. Steinsapir and Robert M. Dohrmann.

Briefs of amici curiae by were filed William H. Willcox Lawrence M. and Cohen for the Chamber of Commerce of the by George United R. Fear on States; for Associated Industries of York State, New John E. Branch Inc.; Swann, James Pulm and Jr., for General Electric Co.; by Carl M. Gould Stanley and E. Tobin for the Plumbing- & Heating Piping Employers Council of Southern Cali- fornia, Inc.; by Harold I. Elbert for Peabody Co.; Coal Woll, Gold, J. Albert Laurence and Thomas E. Harris for the American Federation of Labor of Industrial Organizations.

Mr. Justice Brennan opinion delivered the *3 Court.

In this case we re-examine the of Sinclair Re- holding fining Atkinson, Co. v. 370 U. S. 195 (1962), that anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act1 preclude a federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation under a collective- 1 “No jurisdiction court the United States shall have to issue any restraining temporary permanent injunction order or any or involving growing any case or dispute out of prohibit any labor person persons participating or dispute (as or interested such defined) doing, these terms are herein singly from whether or in concert, any following of the acts: “ (a) Ceasing refusing perform any or any work or to remain in employment; relation of

“(e) Giving publicity of, in, to the existence or the facts involved dispute, by advertising, labor whether speaking, patrolling, or by any involving other method not violence; fraud or “ (f) Assembling peaceably organize promotion to act or to act dispute; of their interests in a labor

“(i) Advising, urging, causing inducing or otherwise or without specified fraud or violence the acts heretofore 47 Stat. § . . . .” 70, 29 U. S. C. 104. § con- though agreement even agreement, bargaining Labor (a) of the § enforceable under provisions, tains for arbitration Act, 1947,2 binding Relations Management which the strike dispute concerning grievance of the Circuit, Ninth Appeals for the The Court of called. Sinclair, by grant reversed the itself bound considering District of Cali- for the Central the District Court prayer injunctive relief. petitioner’s fornia certiorari. 396 U. S. granted 2d 368 We F. Sinclair was erro- (1970). Having concluded that subsequent decided and that events have under- neously decision validity, mined its we overrule that continuing Appeals. judgment and reverse the I February the time of the at incidents petitioner respondent were produced litigation, pro- parties collective-bargaining agreement to a which alia, inter vided, concerning that all controversies its interpretation application or should be resolved adjustment procedures and arbitration set forth therein3 that, contract, the life of the there should during employer for violation of and a “Suits contracts between an organization representing employees industry affecting in an *4 any chapter, commerce as defined in this or between such labor organizations, may brought be district court of the United having jurisdiction parties, respect States of the without to the controversy regard amount in citizenship or without of to the the parties.” (a). 61 Stat. 29 U. S. C. § “ARTICLE XIV

“ADJUSTMENT AND ARBITRATION CONTROVERSY, “A. DISPUTE OR DISAGREEMENT. “Any and all controversy, dispute disagreement matters of or any kind or existing character parties arising between the and out any way involving of or in interpretation the application or Agreement terms this exceptions . . . certain not relevant [with work, lock-out, picketing or stoppage be “no cessation boycotts dispute petitioner’s or when . The arose supervisor frozen foods and certain members his crew to began who were not members of unit bargaining in the food of one of rearrange merchandise frozen cases in- petitioner’s representative A union supermarkets. sisted that the food be of merchandise stripped cases all personnel. petitioner and restocked be union When did accede to the union’s demand, not a strike was called began picket petitioner’s and the union to establishment. Thereupon petitioner demanded that union cease stoppage the work and picketing and sought invoke procedures and grievance specified arbitration in the contract.

The following day, since the strike had not been ter- petitioner minated, complaint filed a in California to the instant shall be procedures settled and resolved case] and in the manner hereinafter set forth.

“B. ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE.

“C. ARBITRATION. Any satisfactorily

“1. matter not or in Paragraph settled resolved B hereinabove shall be submitted to final arbitration for determina- upon party. tion written demand of . either . . or empowered

“4. arbitrator board shall arbitration be question hear and determine the matter determination binding upon parties, subject only shall be final and to their rights under law. . . POWERS, “D. LIMITATIONS AND RESERVATIONS. Stoppages. subject

“2. Work procedures Matters of this Article shall be provided settled resolved the manner herein. During the Agreement, term of this there shall no or be cessation stoppage of work, lock-out, picketing boycotts, except or this shall binding upon party limitation be not if either hereto the other party perform any obligation refuses to under Article or refuses by, or accept perform fails abide or a decision or award of an arbitrator or board.” *5 order, restraining temporary a seeking

Superior Court specific injunction, and permanent and preliminary a provision. arbitration contractual performance for- restraining order temporary a issued The state court also order to of the strike and an bidding continuation not be injunction should why preliminary a show cause removed the case Shortly thereafter, the union granted. made motion to there District Court and the Federal to restraining order. temporary court’s the state quash compelling for an order petitioner moved opposition, strike. the enjoining continuation and arbitration dispute subject arbitration that Concluding and collective-bargaining agreement that under the the District Court contract, in violation strike was dispute parties underlying to arbitrate the ordered the picketing all enjoined strike, and simultaneously attempts vicinity petitioner’s supermarket, any or to induce the to strike employees the union perform their services. refuse

II are outset, respondent’s At we met with contention not to ought that Sinclair be disturbed because deci- of statutory turned on construction which question sion Congress can alter at has time. Since not Sinclair, modified though our conclusions even it has respondent do so,5 been urged argues principles of stare decisis govern should the present case. agree

We do not that the doctrine of stare decisis bars a re-examination of Sinclair in the circumstances of this fully important recognize policy case. We consid- militate in of continuity erations favor predictability in the Mr. Nevertheless, law. as Justice Frankfurter g., Report See, Special e. Committee, Atkimon-Sinclair A. Proceedings B. Labor (1963) A. Relations Law Section — Report]. cited as A. B. Sinclair A. [hereinafter

241 principle decisis is of Court, wrote for the “[Sitare formula of adherence to the not a mechanical policy and questionable, however recent and when decision, latest prior involves collision with a doctrine such adherence intrinsically embracing scope, sounder, more its Hallock, by experience.” Helvering v. 309 verified U. S. Wickham, (1940). 119 & Co. v. 382 106, See U. S. Swift 111, (1965). precisely 116 It is because Sinclair stands departure as a from our significant otherwise consistent emphasis upon the congressional policy promote 6 peaceful of disputes settlement labor arbitration through and our efforts to accommodate and harmonize this policy underlying anti-injunction provi with those sions Norris-LaGuardia Act7 that we believe Sinclair should be Furthermore, reconsidered. light Sinclair, developments subsequent of in particular our Corp. Lodge in Avco v. Aero decision 390 U. S. 557 (1968), it has become clear that the Sinclair decision does not further but rather frustrates realization of an important of goal policy. our national

Nor can we agree that conclusive weight should be accorded to the failure of Congress respond to Sinclair theory on the that congressional in- silence should be terpreted acceptance as of the decision. The Court has cautioned that is at best treacherous to find in “[i]t congressional silence alone adoption of a controlling States, rule of Girouard v. law.” United 328 U. S. 69 6See, g., America v. American Mfg. e. United Co., Steelworkers of (1960); 363 U. S. 564 America v. Warrior & United Steelworkers of (1960); 363 U. S. 574 Co., Nav. United Steelworkers America Gulf Enterprise v. (1960); 363 U. S. 593 Corp., Wheel & Car Textile (1957). Union v. Lincoln Mills, Workers 448 U. S. See, g., Brotherhood Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago e. River & (1957); Co., 353 U. S. 30 Ind. R. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra; Graham v. Brotherhood Firemen, U. S. cf. (1949). (1941). See also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 any persuasive Therefore, in the absence congres- evidencing design a clear

circumstances Sinclair, acceptance be taken as inaction sional not reason for a sufficient mere silence of Hallock, Helvering v. the decision. to reconsider refusing supra, at 119-120.

Ill *7 Mills, Textile v. Lincoln From the time Workers Union (1957), frequently was we have decided, 353 U. S. 448 necessary consider found it various substantive and procedural aspects ques- of federal labor contract law and concerning application tions its both state and federal Lincoln Mills generally courts. held that “the substan- apply tive law to under (a) law, § suits 301 is federal which the courts must fashion from the policy of our laws,” national labor 353 S., specifi- U. at and more cally union specific that a can obtain performance of an employer’s promise to grievances. arbitrate rejected We the contention that the anti-injunction proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia prohibited Act type of relief, noting that a refusal to arbitrate was not “part parcel of the abuses against id., which the Act was aimed,” at 458, and that the Act itself manifests policy deter- mination that arbitration should be encouraged. See U. S. C. Subsequently § 108.8 in the Steelworkers provides: Section 108 restraining “No injunctive order or granted relief any shall be complainant who comply has failed any obligation imposed with by law which is involved in dispute the labor in question, or who has every failed to make reasonable effort to dispute settle such either by negotiation or with the aid of governmental available ma- chinery of voluntary mediation or arbitration.” generally See Brotherhood Railroad Trainmen Toledo, v. Peoria Co., & W. R. U. S. 50 Trilogy9 emphasized we importance arbitration as instrument of for resolving disputes an federal policy between labor and cautioned the management and lower against courts functions of the usurping arbitrator. questions remained, however, Serious concerning role that play state courts were to involving suits with collective-bargaining agreements. Confronted some problems of these Courtney, Dowd Box v. Charles Co. 368 U. 502 (1962), S. we held that in- Congress clearly tended not to pre-existing jurisdiction disturb the of the state courts over suits violations of collective-bar- gaining agreements. We noted that

“clear the entire implication of record the con- debates in both 1946 and gressional that the purpose conferring jurisdiction upon federal district courts not to displace, supple- but ment, the thoroughly jurisdiction considered courts of the various States over contracts made Id., organizations.” *8 at 511. Shortly Box, in after decision Dowd sustained, we Teamsters Local Co., in Lucas Flour v. 369 95 U. S. 174 (1962), an damages by award of a state court to an employer for breach union of a provi- no-strike sion in its contract.. While “in emphasizing that en- § 301 intended acting doctrines of federal labor uniformly prevail law over inconsistent local rules,” id., at did 104, we not consider the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to state court proceedings be- cause the employer’s prayer for relief sought only 9 America v. Mfg. Co., United Steelworkers supra; American of America v. United Steelworkers Co., supra; Warrior & Nav. Gulf America v. Enterprise United Steelworkers Corp., &Wheel Car supra. specific performance and not of a no-strike

damages obligation. Sinclair, in we held in Avco

Subsequent to the decision Lodge Corp. supra, (a) § v. Aero suits may initially brought state courts be removed to the forum under designated question federal the federal jurisdiction removal delineated in 28 § U. S. C. 1441. however, expressly open so the Court left holding, the questions whether state courts are bound the anti- injunction proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act courts, and whether federal after (a) § removal a 301 action, are required any injunctive dissolve relief previously granted by the state generally courts. See General Electric Co. v. Local Union 2dF. (C. 1969) (dissolution A. 5th Cir. injunction of state required). Three expressed Justices who concurred view Sinclair should be “upon reconsidered an ap- propriate future S., occasion.” U. 562 (Stew- at art, J., concurring).10 Avco,

The decision viewed the context of Lincoln Mills and progeny, produced its has an anomalous situ- ation in our which, view, makes urgent the reconsider- ation of principal practical Sinclair. The effect of Avco and Sinclair taken together is less nothing than to oust state jurisdiction (a) courts of in § 301 injunc- suits where

10Shortly decided, after Sinclair was an process began erosive weaken underpinnings. its suggested Various authorities methods mitigating rigor the absolute example, the Sinclair rule. For Appeals Court of the Fifth Circuit held that Sinclair prevent does not a federal court enforcing district from an arbi directing trator’s order a union to terminate stoppages work *9 violation of a no-strike Steamship clause. New Orleans Assn. v. Longshore Workers, General 389 2d denied, F. cert. 393 U. S. (1968); 828 see Maritime Longshore Assn. v. International Pacific N, men, (D. Supp, 304 F. 1969). 1316 C. gener D. Cal. See ally Keene, Supreme Court, The Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco Beyond, 15 Vill. L. 32 Rev.

245 sought obligation. tive relief is for breach of a no-strike can, course, defendants as a matter of obtain re- Union obviously court,11 moval to a federal and there is a com- in gain incentive for them to do so order to the pelling upon injunctive of the strictures relief which advantage imposes Sinclair on federal sanctioning courts. The however, wholly inconsistent with our practice, in Dowd purpose conclusion Box the congressional that (a) supplement, in not en- embodied was to § jurisdiction upon, pre-existing croach of the state provision It is ironic indeed that the that very courts.12 clearly provide intended to additional remedies for breach of has been collective-bargaining agreements employed displace previously existing state remedies. liberty depart clearly We are not at thus to from the expressed congressional policy contrary. to the widely to the extent hand, disparate

On other theoretically remedies remain available in state, op- as courts, posed federal, policy the federal of labor law (a) require diversity Section 301 suits neither the existence of citizenship jurisdictional controversy. nor a minimum amount (a) may pursuant All 301 suits be removed to 28 1441. TJ. S. C. § § jurisdiction The view that state court would be not disturbed (a) clearly perhaps Fergu most articulated Senator § son, spokesman provision, in a Senate debate 1946: President, nothing

“Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. there is whatever in now-being-considered away amendment which takes from the present rights adjudicate State courts all the of the State courts to rights parties agreements. between relation to merely says jurisdic- amendment that the Federal courts shall have away attempt jurisdiction tion. It does not to take courts, disagree State and the mere fact that and I Senator change does not effect the amendment. employers bring

“Mr. MURRAY. But it authorizes the suit courts, they if the Federal so desire.

“Mr. FERGUSON. That is correct. That is all It it does. away jurisdiction Cong. no takes the State courts.” Rec. 5708. *10 Co., seriously in Lucas Flour is

uniformity elaborated hardly course, require, could policy, offended. This law matter, that be administered practical as a undoubtedly identically in for a certain diver- courts, all systems in sity the state and federal matters among exists procedural detail, Congress and remedial a fact that in evidently deciding took into account not to disturb jurisdiction injunction, of the States. The the traditional device, particularly remedial however, important is so a context, availability its or non- the arbitration only availability produce various courts will not ram- pant shopping maneuvering forum from one court but will also frustrate greatly another relative uniformity in agreements. the enforcement of arbitration scheme,

Furthermore, existing injunction with the remedy technically in the available state courts but rendered device, inefficacious removal assigns totally proceedings removal unintended function. underlying purposes While the Congress providing question jurisdiction federal removal remain some- obscure,13 what there has never been a serious contention intended that Congress removal mechanism be completely utilized to foreclose remedies otherwise avail- able the state Although question courts. federal re- jurisdiction may moval well have been pro- intended to vide forum for protection rights federal where protection such deemed necessary or to encourage development expertise by the federal courts in the legislative history question provision federal removal meager, suggested but purpose it has been that its was the same original question jurisdiction, as federal enacted at the same time in Judiciary 1875, 470, Act of namely, protect Stat. federal rights, Wechsler, see H. Hart & H. The Federal Courts and the System (1953), Federal 727-733 provide and to a forum that could accurately interpret law, more Mishkin, federal see The Federal “Question” in Courts, (1953). District 53 Col. L. Rev. 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1098 and n. 17 interpretation of federal there is no law, indication that intended the removal mechanism to effect a *11 judicial wholesale dislocation the allocation of busi- ness between the City state and federal courts. Cf. Peacock, Greenwood v. 384 808 (1966). U. S. undoubtedly It is true that each of the ob foregoing jections to Sinclair-Avco by could be remedied either overruling by Sinclair or extending decision to the States. While some commentators have suggested that the solution to present unsatisfactory situation does lie in the extension of the Sinclair prohibition to state court we proceedings,14 agree with Chief Traynor Justice Supreme the California that “whether or not deprive could state power courts of the give [injunctive] such remedies when enforcing collective bar gaining agreements, it attempted has not to do so either in the Norris-LaGuardia Act or section McCarroll 301.” Angeles v. Los County Dist. Council Carpenters, 49 2d 45, 63, Cal. 315 2d 322, P. 332 (1957), denied, cert. 932 (1958). g., U. S. e. See, American Dredging Co. v. Marine Local (C. F. 2d 837 A. 3d 1964), Cir. denied, cert. 380 U. S. 935 (1965); Shaw Electric Co. v. I. B. E. W., 418 Pa. 208 A. 2d (1965).

An additional reason for not resolving the existing by dilemma Sinclair extending to the States is the dev- implications astating for the enforceability of arbitration agreements and their accompanying no-strike obligations if equitable remedies were not available.15 As we have

14See, g., Bartosic, Injunctions e. and Section 301: The Patch Philadelphia work of Avco and Marine on the Fabric of National Policy, Labor (1969); Col. Dunau, L. Rev. 980 Three Problems Arbitration, Labor 55 Va. L. Rev. 427 15It is true that about one-half of the States have enacted so-called “little Norris-LaGuardia place Acts” that upon various restrictions injunctions granting state disputes. courts labor How ever, many because injunctive States do not bar relief for violations of collective-bargaining agreements, only jurisdictions about 14 or express obligation, no-strike

previously indicated, by quid quo undertaking for an pro is implied, to the disputes process submit employer grievance Mills, Union v. Lincoln arbitration. Textile Workers See enter employers to supra, at 455.16 incentive for Any dissipated if the necessarily into an arrangement such no- which the principal expeditious most method itWhile strike can enforced is eliminated. obligation be ave- as that other true, respondent contends, is of course would nues of for redress, damages, such as an action dam- employer, an award of open remain to an aggrieved no dispute after a been settled is substitute ages has Furthermore, illegal halt an strike. an immediate or after damages prosecuted during an action for *12 only aggravate to industrial strife dispute would tend early of the between delay an resolution difficulties employer and union.17 prohibition against significant Norris-LaGuardia-type

is there a equitable Bartosic, obligations. remedies for breach of no-strike See Keene, 79, supra, 1001-1006; supra, 80. n. at n. at and nn. Co., supra, Flour in Teamsters Local v. Lucas We held express that, an in the even in the absence of no-strike clause collective-bargaining contract, agreement disputes an that certain exclusively by compulsory be arbitration” “will covered terminal (369 106) gives promise by union S., implied U. rise to an at during response these not to the term of the contract strike Id., disputes. present case, In arbitrable at 104-106. there express union-management See an no-strike in the contract. clause supra. 4,n. 17As the neutral members of the A. B. A. committee on the

problems report: raised Sinclair noted their may laws, existing employers “Under an dam- maintain action for ages resulting may discipline a from strike in breach contract employees many cases, however, involved. neither these Discharge strikers inex- alternatives will be feasible. of the is often qualified pedient replacements because of lack of or because of relationships plant. damage within on adverse effect remedy unsatisfactory may employer’s also be because the losses the unavail- management encouraged by Even if is not injunction remedy to resist arbitration ability agreements, the fact remains that the effectiveness injunctive be reduced if greatly such would agreements relief Indeed, very purpose were withheld. arbi- procedures provide tration for the is mechanism expeditious disputes settlement of industrial without re- sort or other strikes, lockouts, self-help measures. purpose This basic if obviously largely undercut there is no immediate, effective for those tactics remedy very that arbitration is designed Thus, because obviate. Sinclair, Avco, in the aftermath of casts doubt serious upon the effective enforcement of a vital element of stable labor-management agree- relations —arbitration ments with their attendant obligations no-strike —we conclude that Sinclair does not make a contribu- viable tion to federal policy.

IV We determined opinion have also the dissenting in Sinclair the correct principles states concerning the accommodation necessary between the seemingly abso- lute terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act policy and the underlying (a).18 considerations S., § 370 U. at 215. *13 employer may are often hard to and calculate because the hesi- by bringing damage tate to exacerbate relations with the union a Hence, injunctive only action. relief will often be the effective means remedy pledge which to the breach of the no-strike and thus policy.” labor Report effectuate federal A. B. A. Sinclair 242. 18Scholarly sharp, appears criticism Sinclair has been and it to universally recognized Sinclair, be particularly almost that after Avco, produced has an untenable situation. are commentators divided, however, respect proposed solutions, with favoring some Sinclair, suggesting reconsideration others extension of Sinclair States, recommending any to the and still others action Congress. generally be Aaron,, area left to See Strikes in Breach of 250 repeat said, all that was there

Although we need not emphasized a this time. points few should be at of 4 of Norris-LaGuardia Act § The literal terms pro- to the enacted subsequently must be accommodated (a) of the Relations Management § visions of 301 Labor Statutory interpre- purposes Act arbitration. upon tation more than concentration isolated requires words; rather, consideration must be to the total given corpus pertinent inspired policies law ostensibly provisions. inconsistent See Richards v. States, United 11 369 Mastro Plastics 1, (1962); U. S. NLRB, Corp. v. 350 U. 285 United States 270, (1956); S. Hutcheson, v. 312 (1941). U. 235 S.

The Norris-LaGuardia Act a responsive situa- totally tion different from that today. which exists the early part of this century, gener- the federal courts ally were regarded as allies of management attempt its prevent the organization and strengthening of labor unions; and in this injunction industrial struggle the potent became weapon that was wielded against activities of groups.19 labor The result was a large num- ber of sweeping decrees, often ex parte, issued drawn on an ad hoc basis without regard systematic elabora- tion of national policy. See Drivers’ Union Lake v. Co., Valley 311 U. 102 (1940). S. Agreements: Collective Some Questions, Unanswered 63 L. Col. (1963); Aaron, Rev. Injunction The Labor Reappraised, 10 L„ C, n, U. (1963); L. A. supra, Rev. Bartosic,, 14; Dunau, n, supra, 14; supra, Keene, 10; n. Kiernan, Availability Injunc- Against tions Agreements Breaches of No-Strike Contracts, Labor Albany L. (1968); Rev. 303 Wellington, The No-Strike Clause Injunction: and the Labor Time for Re-examination, 30 U. Pitt. (1968);

L. Wellington Rev. 293 Albert, Statutory & Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Atkinson, Sinclair v. (1963). YaleL. J. 1547 generally See F. Frankfurter & Greene, N. Injunction The Labor

251 In 1932 Congress attempted order bring some out developed industrial chaos that had and to correct the abuses that had interjection resulted from the 6f the federal judiciary disputes into on union-management the behalf of management. public See declaration of policy, Act, 2,§ Norris-LaGuardia 47 Stat. 70. Con- gress, therefore, determined initially severely to limit power of the federal injunctions courts to issue “in any case involving or growing out of labor dis- pute . . 474,§ . Stat. 70. Even as initially enacted, however, prohibition against injunctions federal by no means absolute. See 7, Norris-LaGuardia Act, §§ 8, 47 9, Stat. 72. Shortly thereafter Congress passed the Wagner Act,20 designed to curb man- various agement activities that tended discourage employee participation in collective action.

As labor organizations grew strength developed toward maturity, congressional emphasis from shifted protection of the nascent to the en- movement couragement of collective bargaining and to administra- tive techniques for peaceful resolution of industrial disputes. This in emphasis shift was accomplished, how- ever, without extensive many revision of of the older enactments, including anti-injunction section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus it became the task of the courts to accommodate, reconcile the older stat- utes with the more recent ones.

A leading example of this process accommodation Brotherhood Railroad Trainmen Chicago v. River & Co., Ind. R. U. S. 30 There we were con fronted peaceful with a strike which violated the statu tory duty to imposed arbitrate by the Railway Labor Act. The Court concluded strike in violation of statutory duty arbitration was not the type of situa- Act, National Labor Relations Stat. amended, as seq. U. S. C. et § *15 responsive, Act was the Norris-LaGuardia to which

tion in the was involved policy federal important an that statutorily the through disputes of peaceful settlement pol- important this procedure, that mandated arbitration not avail- were remedies if imperiled equitable icy Norris-LaGuardia’s hence that it, and implement able to should federal courts by the of nonintervention policy imple- successful interest the overriding the yield to process. mentation of the arbitration equally River are Chicago elaborated principles The Chicago sure, To be present to case. applicable the stat- by established procedures River arbitration involved noted, such frequently we have However, ute. Trilogy, and Mills, Lincoln the Steelworkers cases as has at- Flour, that importance Lucas the of labor voluntary the settlement generally tached to particu- self-help and more disputes without resort to Indeed, it as a means to this end. larly arbitration Mills, exposition Lincoln in its has been that stated making arbitration (a), long way § 301 “went a towards the central in the administration collective institution bargaining contracts.” seriously however, Sinclair undermined decision, technique of the arbitration as a method the effectiveness disputes without resort peacefully to resolve industrial strikes, Clearly and similar devices. em- lockouts, to arbitrate ployers wary assuming obligations will be no specifically against similarly enforceable them when remedy efficacious is available to enforce the concomitant to refrain from On undertaking striking. of the union purpose the other the central of the Norris-LaGuar- hand, growth viability organi- dia Act to foster the hardly anything, goal zations is retarded —if this merely a remedial device that enforces advanced — freely that the union undertook obligation under supra, Wellington Albert, & n. at 1557. disputes to submit enforceable specifically agreement unavail- that therefore, We conclude, arbitration.22 pre- arbitration context ability relief in the equitable policy impediment congressional sents a serious of a mechanism voluntary establishment favoring the the core peaceful disputes, resolution of labor Act is not purpose of Norris-LaGuardia sacrificed to further equitable use of remedies limited consequently Norris- important policy, *16 injunctive the granting Act does not bar of LaGuardia relief in of the instant the circumstances case.

V in case is holding present Our the a narrow one. We do not the vitality undermine Norris-LaGuardia only in Act. We deal with the which a collec- situation a tive-bargaining grievance contract contains mandatory adjustment procedure. or arbitration Nor it follow does injunctive appro- from have said is what we relief As well stated the neutral members of A. Sinclair A. B. the committee:

“Any proposal subject injunctive which would unions to relief opposition of must take account the and Norris-LaGuardia Act the expressed injunctions disputes. of issuing in that Act to the in labor Nevertheless, the reasons behind the Act seem Norris-LaGuardia scarcely applicable to the situation ... which a in viola- strike [in collective-bargaining agreement enjoined]. tion of a is The Act passed primarily widespread because of with dissatisfaction tendency judges enjoin concerted activities in accordance with ‘doctrines of tort law which depend made the lawfulness of strike a judicial upon policy.’ views of social economic [Citation injunction against an Where is used a breach omitted.] strike contract, subjected judicially- union is not this fashion to compelled created limitations on simply its freedom of action but is comply previously limitations agreed. with to which it has More- over, underlying dispute where arbitrable, the union is not deprived practicable pressing only means claim but is its required dispute impartial to submit the to the tribunal that it has agreed purpose.” to establish Report A. B. A. Sinclair 242.

priate every of a as a matter of course case strike dissenting opinion over an arbitrable grievance. in Sinclair principles for the suggested following guidance of the district courts in whether to determining grant injunctive principles adopt: that we now relief —

“A District Court an action under entertaining § 301 not may grant injunctive against relief con- certed activity unless until it decides that injunction case is one which an be appro- would priate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When sought enjoined strike is to be because it is over a grievance parties contractually which both are bound to arbitrate, the District Court may injunc- issue no tive order until it first holds that does contract effect; employer have that and the should be ordered arbitrate, as condition of obtaining his an in- junction Beyond against this, strike. the District must, course, consider whether issuance of injunction an would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity occurring breaches are —whether *17 and will continue, or have been threatened and will be committed; they whether have caused or will irreparable injury cause to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the injunction denial of an than will the union from its S., issuance.” U. at (Emphasis 228. in original.)

In the present case there dispute is no the griev- ance in question subject adjustment was and arbitra- tion under the collective-bargaining agreement and that the petitioner ready was proceed with arbitration at injunction time an against the strike was sought and obtained. District Court also concluded that, by respondent’s reason of violations its no-strike obliga- tion, petitioner irreparable “has suffered injury and will continue to suffer irreparable injury.” Since we now Sinclair, Appeals overrule of the Court of holding in reliance on Sinclair be must reversed. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment Appeals Court and remand the case with enter judgment directions to affirming the order of District Court.

It is so ordered. in part took no the decision Mr. Justice Marshall of this case.

Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring. Refining Atkinson, 195,

When Sinclair v. Co. U. S. was decided in I 1962, opinion subscribed to the passed Court. Before six I years had had reached the conclusion that the Sinclair holding should be reconsid ered, Corp. 735, so in Avco Lodge said v. Aero U. S. 562 (concurring opinion). join I Today concluding “that Sinclair erroneously de cided and that subsequent events have undermined its continuing validity.”

In these circumstances temptation strong upon embark a lengthy personal apologia. But since my present has so stated Mr. Justice Brennan clearly opinion views his today, join the Court I simply opinion An judgment. apho- Court’s rism Justice me provides Mr. Frankfurter refuge: “Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not reject it merely because it comes late.” Henslee v. Bank, Union Planters U. S. 600 (dissenting opinion). Black,

Mr. Justice dissenting. *18 in Congress 1932 enacted the Act, Norris-LaGuardia of which, C. exceptions § § U. S. with not relevant, specifically prohibited here federal in courts comprehensive and most the broadest language from against permanent, or temporary injunctions, issuing any in Subsequently, dispute. in a labor participation in federal courts to the jurisdiction “[s]uits Congress gave and a employer between an of contracts for violation (a) subsection, § this Although organization.” labor explicitly (a), Taft-Hartley Act, § 29 U. S. C. amount-in-controversy require diversity and waives the says at all about jurisdiction, nothing it for federal ments con years this Court ago injunctions. Eight granting full brief of these two statutes: after the relation sidered history of on the and relying language ing argument, did not wish the Court decided that Acts, impair any way in Norris-LaGuardia’s this later statute disputes. injunctions in labor explicit prohibition against Atkinson, Refining Sinclair Co. v. 370 U. S. 195 our Although Congress urged has been to overrule to do holding Sinclair, steadfastly it has refused so. in the or of the two Acts has Nothing language history fact, except at all has changed. Nothing changed, the membership personal of the and the views of one I opinion Justice. remain of the that Sinclair was correctly decided, prohibition and, moreover, the Norris-LaGuardia Act is close to the heart of the entire federal system regulation. view my Sinclair should control the disposition of this case.

Even if the majority were correct, however, saying Sinclair misinterpreted Taft-Hartley and Norris- LaGuardia I Acts, compelled should be I dissent. believe that both the making and the changing of laws which affect the substantial rights people are primarily Congress, not espe- Most Court. cially is this so when the laws involved are the focus of strongly powerful held views of but antagonistic polit- ical and economic interests. Court’s function application interpretation of such laws must be limited carefully to avoid on encroaching power *19 carry make laws and policies to determine Congress them out. stare called the doctrine implies that the Court

When policy considera- “important solely on decisis rests in predictability continuity in favor tions ... con- story. Such the whole does not tell law,” the it as labor field as delicate in a present and, are siderations said, Brandéis Justice extremely important. relations, Co., 285 Oil & Gas Coronado in Burnet v. dissenting (1932): U. S. policy, because usually decisis is the wise

“Stare appli- the important more matters it is most it be settled than that rule of law be settled cable right.” and the certainty considerations ordinary case, pro- will litigants situated

equal similarly treatment precedent. to adhere to strong vide a incentive however, an interpreting statute, When this Court is It is must be in the balance. weighed additional factor re primary to the deference that this Court owes of laws. Of legislature making of the sponsibility then interprets statute, when Court first course, what this Court has it is. See the statute becomes said Moser, F. R. Co. v. 275 U. S. Gulf, C. & S. interpretation proper, is (1927). an initial Such in which courts have the unavoidable, any system in a multitude of situa applying general task of statutes The Process Cardozo, Nature Judicial tions. B. undertakes the task of in 112-115 spe however, not because Court has terpretation, intent of but rather ability Congress, cial to fathom the unavoidable in the interpretation is decision because When law has been settled an the case before it. any subsequent “reinterpretation” then earlier case and neither more nor gratuitous less than statute judicial an it is no effect from a amendment: different in placed alteration of itself language statute. *20 important is a

Altering provisions the a statute And legislative function. the states sim- Constitution ply and “All unequivocally: Powers herein legislative granted shall vested in be United States . . . .” U. S. I. It is the Const. Art. Con- gress, not Court, responds pressures this that to the political groups, pressures entirely proper in a free society. It is not the Congress, Court, that has capacity investigate divergent the considerations in management complex involved the of a national labor policy. Congress, And it is Court, not this that is elected people. the This should, therefore, interject possible itself as little as into the law-making and law- process. changing Having given our view on the mean- ing of a our statute, concluded, task is absent extraordi- nary circumstances. When the Court changes its mind years later, simply judges because the have in changed, my judgment, upon it takes itself function of the legislature.

The legislative effect of the Court’s espe- reversal cially clear Sinclair here. the Court invited Congress if displeased act it should be judicial with inter- pretation of the statute. We said, S., 370 U. at 214-215: are

“Strong arguments made to us that it is highly desirable that Norris-LaGuardia Act changed be in public If interest. is so, Congress itself fit to might see change that law and repeal anti-injunction provisions of the Act insofar as suits violation collective agreements are concerned, as the House bill under consideration originally pro- might, on vided. It the other hand, decide if injunctions are necessary, the whole idea of enforce- agreements ment of these private suits should enforcement through be discarded favor of machinery of the Board, administrative Labor as provided Taft Senator his Senate Or it bill. might decide that neither of these is en- methods tirely satisfactory and turn completely instead to a approach. new The question of what if change, any, should be made one of existing legisla- law is policy properly tive within the exclusive domain of Congress question is a for lawmakers, not —it interpreters.” law

Commentators on our holding found this invitation to legislative action clear, judicial self-restraint proper. Dunau, See Three Problems Labor Arbitra- tion, 55 Va. L. Rev. 427, (1969); 464-465 Wellington & *21 Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Proc- Aess: Comment on Sinclair Atkinson, v. Yale L. J. (1963). 1547, 1565-1566 Bills were introduced Con- gress to effect a seeking legislative change. 2132, S. 89th 1st Cong., Sess. H. (1965); 9059, R. 89th 1st Cong., (1965). Congress, however, Sess. did not act, thus indicating at least a willingness leave law as Sinclair had construed it. It seems to me highly inappropriate for this Court now, eight years later, effect to enact the amendment that Congress adopt. has refused to Toolson Yankees, Inc., v. New York 346 U. 356 (1953); S. see also United States v. International Boxing Club of York, Inc., New 236, (1955). U. S. 242-244 I do not principle believe that stare decisis forecloses all reconsiderations of earlier decisions. area constitutional law, for example, where the only alternative action this Court is the laborious process of constitutional amendment and where the ulti- responsibility mate rests with this I Court, believe re- always proper. consideration is James See v. United States, 366 213, U. S. 233-234 (1961) (separate opin- questions on J.).* statutory

ion of Even Black, appearance in circumstances changes new facts or past excep decisions might warrant re-examination exceptional under In the tional cases circumstances. Con there are no circumstances. present situation such inconsistent our decision has taken no action with gress States, Girouard v. United in Sinclair. 328 U. S. introduced, have been (1946). And, although bills cf. Hallock, Helvering v. (1940), U. S. 119-120 Congress has declined invitation to act.

The only “subsequent event” to which the Court Lodge Corp. is our in Avco v. Aero point can decision 735, 390 U. S. 557 The recog Court must way nize of Avco is holding no inconsistent Avco, we supra, with Sinclair. As said in at 561: “The nature of the relief available jurisdiction after of course, attaches different from the is, question whether jurisdiction adjudicate controversy.” there is contends, however, the result of the two taken together cases is the “anomalous situation” that no-strike clauses become unenforceable in state courts, and this is inconsistent with important “an goal our policy.” national

*Other members of the Court have drawn the distinction between statutory matters, constitutional and indicated that the cor rection statutory of this Court’s errors in interpretation left best Douglas Congress. example, For Mr. Justice noted in dissent *22 Wickham, & Co. v. 111, (1965): 382 U. S. 133-134 Swift interpreting “An error in may easily federal statute be remedied. perceive If this has failed to the Congress, intention of or has interpreted a statute in such a manner as legislative the thwart purpose, Congress may change it. The experience lessons of are by judges not learned alone.” Improvement See also United Gas Co. Co., v. Continental Oil (1965) 381 U. (Douglas, S. J., dissenting). Apparently, however, some members of willing give Court are greater weight to stare decisis statutory constitutional than in matters. g., e. See, Texas, Orozco v. 394 U. (1969) S. 327-328 (Harlan, J., concurring). no-strike to enforce a Avco does make effort but court, to a federal in a state court removable clause clause is unenforce- does follow that the no-strike it not be may be the union Damages may awarded; able. employer may engage And forced to arbitrate. these tech- self-help. The Court would have it is injunction. That are less effective than an niques and effectiveness doubtless true. But the harshness in- opposition “government relief-—and injunctive congres- for the precise reasons junction” —were The Act. prohibition sional in the Norris-LaGuardia is, indeed, highlight Avco effect of the decision if the of federal courts. But powers limited remedial powers as this Court unhappy with these Congress this Court Congress may act; defined then the them, majority simply The members of the have should not. “realization are more sensitive to the they decided that policy” labor than important of an of our national goal predecessors or their on this Court. Taft-Hartley Act, The of the interpretation correct are policy,” and even the of “our national goals important proper of functions be- less than division Federal tween the branches our Government. of John Court would do well to remember the words in the in the Con- Adams, Rights written Declaration of Massachusetts: stitution Commonwealth judicial [department] “The shall never exercise the or of them: legislative powers, and executive either to the end be of laws and not may government it of men.”

I dissent. MR. Justice White dissents for the reasons stated Atkinson, Refining opinion in Sinclair Co. v. majority 370 U. S.