*1 250 CALIFORNIA.
HARRINGTON 2, 1969. June April 23, 1969. Decided Argued No. Hanson, Court, by appointment Roger S. petitioner. filed briefs the cause 1075, argued U. S. Kline, Cali- Deputy Attorney General James H. on With him respondent. the cause argued fornia, C. Lynch, Attorney General, Thomas brief were James, Attorney General. E. Assistant William Briefs amici curiae urging affirmance were filed Scott, William J. Attorney General, and James R. *2 Thompson, James B. Haddad and Zagel, James B. Assist- Attorneys ant General, for the State of and Illinois, Lefkowitz, Louis J. Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, Amy Juviler Soloff, and Brenda Assistant Attorneys General, York, for the of joined State New and supported by John D. LaBelle for the of Connecticut, State Paul J. Abbate, Attorney General, of Territory Guam, and by the Attorneys respective General for their States Gary as follows: K. Nelson of Joe Arizona, Purcell Arkansas, of Duke W. Dunbar of David Colorado, P. Buckson Earl Delaware, of Faircloth Bert T. Florida, of Kobayashi Hawaii, of Theodore L. Sendak of Indiana, Richard C. Turner of Iowa, Kent Frizzell of Kansas, Quinn John B. Breckinridge of Robert Kentucky, H. of Massachusetts, Douglas M. Head of Minnesota, Joe T. Patterson of Mississippi, Robert L. Woodahl of Montana, Clarence A. Meyer Maloney H. of A. Nebraska, James Morgan of New Robert Mexico, Carolina, B. of North Helgi Johanneson of North Brown Dakota, Paul W. Daniel Ohio, R. McLeod of Gordon Carolina, South George Mydland Dakota, South F. McCanless of Ten- Romney B. nessee, Utah, Vernon Robert Y. Button and Slade Gorton of Virginia, Washington. Douglas opinion delivered the Justice Mr. Court. Chapman held in v. California, 386 U. S. a federal constitutional error can be
that “before held able to a belief harmless, the court must be declare that Id., beyond a harmless reasonable doubt.” it was at although that, “there are some constitutional We said fair trial basic to a their infraction can rights so (id., treated as harmless error” not all 23), never be automatically the Constitution violate which “trial errors Ibid. call reversal.” present alleged whether the
The question arose rule of under was “harmless” first-degree robbery and for attempted state trial together Harrington, tried men were murder. Four — Negroes— Rhone, Cooper, Bosby, Caucasian, and should that his trial an objection over confessed codefendants of his three Each be severed. the trial with introduced at were their confessions each was to consider jury instructions limiting took the confessor. Rhone only confession him. cross-examined counsel Harrington’s stand the stand.1 not take The other two did *3 States, 123, a con v. United 391 U. In Bruton S. the stand did not take codefendant who of a fession We prosecution. in a federal Bruton was used under the denied his had been that Bruton held Amendment. Since the Sixth Confrontation Clause well in state applicable Clause is as the Confrontation of the Four Process Clause of the by trials reason Due Texas, 400), (Pointer S. teenth Amendment Bruton applies here. the rule convic- the Appeal affirmed The California Court Rptr. 159, and App. 2d Cal. tions, 256 Cal. hearing. We petition a Supreme Court denied the whether certiorari to consider petition the granted Bruton facts harm- special on these was the violation Chapman. error under less of a which fell short Petitioner made statements him scene of the placed which confession but trigger man; Bosby that was the He admitted crime. participated attempted rob in were found to have an 1 All four employee was killed. Each was bery of which a store in the course imprisonment. felony to life guilty murder sentenced found and three; after mur- that he with the other and that fled der hair and shaved off his moustache. dyed he black of the placed petitioner at the scene eyewitnesses Several previously told the crime. But two of them had Rhone’s con- four committed the crime. Negroes that Harrington inside store fession, however, placed robbery and attempted at the murder. time refer Cooper’s confession did not fourth man “the white name. He referred to the as him by And he described boy” guy.” or “this white weight. age, height, and mention Harrington likewise did not
Bosby’s confession referred to him a blond-headed fellow name but as Patty.” or or “the guy” “the white in that Cooper said their confessions Both with a which is at guy” gun, did not see “the white testimony prosecution witnesses. variance with the he argues that it is irrelevant that Petitioner Bosby’s ref- Cooper’s confessions, named pointing made it clear guy” “the white as as erence to was the white shouting person referred to Negroes. make the with the man the dock three special on these But we conclude that assumption. same Cooper opportunity lack of to cross-examine facts harmless error under rule of Bosby constituted Chapman. Harrington’s cross-examined, whom counsel
Rhone, *4 gun with a at the time of the him in the store placed agreed himself he was there. murder. a an active gun partici- he had and was Others testified put did not a hands Cooper and pant. him They place did the scene of when he denied it.2 at abetting robbery persons aiding the commission of “All a degree acting guilty murder when one of them kills while are of first design.” People Washington, the common in furtherance 777, 782, 402 2d 62 Cal. 2d P. did Harrington himself, including others, But
the crime. con- through their evidence, supplied Their the same. them apart But from course cumulative. was of fessions, overwhelming that Harrington was so the case Bruton was harmless violation of this we conclude that minority adopt we a unless beyond doubt, reasonable departure 42-45) Chapman (386 S., at view in U. auto- procedures should result an from constitutional weight of the of the evidence. reversal, regardless matic imagine reverse if we can argued that we must It is up might have been made single juror whose mind who Bosby’s confessions and Cooper’s because of have remained in doubt and uncon- otherwise would jurors course do know the who sat. vinced. We of not reading must be based on our own of the judgment Our prob- record and on what seems to us to have been the of the two on the minds an impact able confessions Chapman, S., admonished in average jury. We emphasis “overwhelming much 23, against giving too errors evidence” of that constitutional guilt, stating party affecting aggrieved the substantial By could not be considered to be harmless. that test we impute cannot reversible to the two confessions. weight nor do we dilute depart Chapman; We do not from suggest that, reaffirm it. do not it inference. We crime bearing ingredients on all if evidence though evidence, is the use of cumulative tendered, is is harmless error. Our decision based tainted, against Harrington ease evidence in this record. The It so woven from circumstantial evidence. is say overwhelming that unless we that no violation of Bruton can constitute harmless we leave error, must this state conviction undisturbed.
Affirmed. *5 255 Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
The today Court overrules v. California, 386 S. 18 (1967), very U. purports it apply. to Far more fundamentally, severely it undermines many of the most significant Court’s decisions in the area of criminal procedure.
In Chapman, recognized we that “harmless-error rules can work very unfair and mischievous results” unless narrowly are Id., circumscribed. at 22. We em- phasized that error in admitting plainly “[a]n relevant evidence which possibly jury influenced the adversely to a litigant ... cannot be conceived of as harmless.” Id., at 23-24. Thus, placing the proof burden of beneficiary of error, we held that “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it beyond was harmless a reasonable doubt.” Id., we And, left no doubt for an to be “harmless” it must have no made contribution ato criminal Id., conviction. at 26.
Chapman, then,
no compromise
meant
propo-
sition that a conviction cannot constitutionally be based
any
to
extent on constitutional error. The
today
Court
by shifting
inquiry
from whether the constitutional
error contributed to the conviction to whether the un-
tainted
provided
evidence
“overwhelming” support
the conviction puts
firm
aside the
resolve of Chapman
and makes
compromise.
As a result, the deterrent
effect of such cases as
Ohio,
v.
Mapp
The Court is if there harmless be held may offense of a criminal the con- support to evidence “overwhelming” untainted expressly rejected was however, approach, This viction. For, reason. good supra, Chapman, in accumulation of extent the concerns inquiry the where of tainted impact the than rather evidence untainted of resulting decision, convictions jury’s evidence attack. from insulated may be constitutional from evidence substantiality of issue of By nature, its the review. appellate kind of limited only the most admits of effectively leave the often rule will the Thus, Court’s hands solely in the constitutional of vindication courts of appellate the task If, instead, judges. of trial jury’s on a evidence of tainted impact the appraise is to courts will be better these required, decision, as constitutional deprivations of protect able to appellate The focus defendants. rights of criminal the quality of the character and be on inquiry should evidence to. untainted as it relates the tainted evidence of untainted evidence. on the amount just appli- the in illustrates well difference The instant case today adopted the Court approach the cation between is Chapman. in At issue set down approach and the in the Harrington’s participation to going the evidence going not the evidence attempted robbery, crime of the ad- the scene of crime. Without presence at the against Harrington mittedly unconstitutional evidence of codefendants provided by the confessions proof Harrington’s partici- prosecutor’s the Cooper, testimony two pation in the crime consisted attempted robbery victims of codefendant the testimony Rhone. was weakened The victims the fact that earlier told the had robbery participants attempted all the in the were was Negroes. testimony against Harrington Rhone’s self-serving aspects. in certain At time of his arrest, Rhone was found possession gun. of a On the stand, he explained that he given gun by Harrington after the attempted robbery, and that Harrington had during carried the commission of robbery. Thus, although there was more than evidence ample to establish Harrington’s participation in attempted robbery, jury might still have concluded proved beyond was not a reasonable doubt. The con- fessions the other two codefendants implicating Har- rington the crime were less self-serving and might *7 well have tipped the jurors’ balance in the minds favor Certainly, conviction. the State has not carried its burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that these two confessions did not contribute to Harrington’s conviction.
There should be no need to remind this Court appellate role applying standards of or sufficiency substantiality of evidence is extremely To apply limited. such standards as threshold requirements to the raising of constitutional challenges to criminal convictions is to shield from attack errors of a most fundamental nature deprive thus to many defendants of basic constitu- tional I rights. respectfully dissent.