*1 PIERSON v. RAY et al. et al. Argued January 11, April

No. 79. 11, 1967. Decided 1967.* Ray *Together al., et al. with No. v. Pierson et also on certiorari to the same court. *2 argued

Carl cause petitioners Rachlin in No. him respondents and in No. 94. With on the briefs was Melvin L. Wulf. Grayson argued

Elizabeth Watkins Rulen the cause for respondents in No. 79 and for petitioners No. With her on the brief Thomas H. Watkins. delivered the

Mr. Chief Justice Warren opinion Court. present

These cases issues involving the lo liability of police cal officers and § under of the Rights Civil Act of 1871, 17 Stat. now 42 S. C. § Peti 1983.1

1 “Every person who, color any statute, ordinance, regu lation, custom, usage, any Territory, State or subjects, or n any causes subjected, to be citizen the United States t>r other person jurisdiction within' the thereof to the of' group of a 'of 15 tioners in were members No. clergymen attempted who Negro ..Episcopal white and termi segregated to use facilities at interstate bus Jackson, They Mississippi, nal in in 1961. were arrested Ray, respondents Griffith, Nichols, policemen violating City Jackson, 2087.5 charged a guilty of the which makes of misde Mississippi Code, a anyone congregates public meanor with others in place a the peace under circumstances such that breach of may be thereby, occasioned and refuses to move when by a police ordered to do so officer.2 Petitioners3 waived jury trial and were by respond convicted offense ent municipal justice. were each Spencer, They given the maximum four in jail sentence of months *3 rights, privileges, by or-immunities secured and the. Constitution laws, party injured law, shall be to the in liable an action suit equity, proper in proceeding or other for redress.” 42 S. C. 1983. § provoke peace,

2“1. Whoever intent a breach of the or peace under circumstances such that be occa a breach thereby: sioned

“(1) congregates hotel, motel, any in crowds or with others . . . store, shop, restaurant, counter, cafeteria, lunch sandwich ... or any place engaged selling serving other business in or members public, any any place or or in around free entrance to such any public building, building- by of business or -or to another owned individual, corporation, partnership association, or a or a or an and disperse on, disperse fails or refuses to move or or move on, by any so to law any when ordered do enforcement officer county, municipality, in committed, or which such act or acts are by any or Mississippi, law enforcement officer State of or person, guilty disorderly other authorized . . . shall con- duct, and, misdemeanor, upon thereof, which is made a conviction punished by shall be more a fine of not than two hundred dollars ($200.00), county imprisonment jail or in the for more than (4) by months, imprisonment four both such fine and . . . .” “peti in will designated ministers involved No. 79 -be as throughout opinion, although they- respondents tioners” this are the in No. accorded was Jones petitioner appeal On $200. fine of city after Court, County in the novo de

a trial motion his granted court evidence its produced petitioners the other against The cases verdict. a directed dropped. were then peti County Court, in the vindicated

Having been in the United damages action brought this tioners Missis District Southern for the Court District States had respondents alleging Division, sippi, Jackson liable were respondents and that supra, § violated A imprisonment. false arrest law for at common both counts. for-respondents verdicts jury returned Circuit for the Fifth. Appeals Court of appeal, On liability immune Spencer was respondent held that Mississippi the common law 1983 and § under both jurisdiction. his judicial within for acts committed court noted police officers, to the F. 2d 213. As Code held unconstitutional Mississippi § 2087.5 of the in Thomas v. Mississippi, to similar facts applied (1965).4 Although years Thomas was decided U. S. 524 after the in this the court held trial, arrest involved ¡an policemen would be liable a suit under 1983 for if they good unconstitutional arrest even faith acted making and with cause in an arrest yet state statute not held invalid. The court believed this stern was required Pape, result Monroe v. 4 In Thomas various “Freedom Riders” were arrested and con *4 substantially victed under circumstances similar to the facts of these police they cases. testified, that ordered the “Freedom Riders” they might leave because peace. feared that onlookers breach the opinion, citing Boynton argument We reversed without Virginia, (1960). Boynton 364 U. S. 454 held that racial discrimination a bus terminal integral part restaurant as utilized an of the trans portation passengers (d) interstate violates of the Interstate § Act. Commerce State enforcement of such discrimination is barred Supremacy the Clause. oh the the count Under (1961). based 365 U. S. the it held that however, Mississippi, law of common if had cause they liable would not be policemen violated, been because statute had the to believe predict officers to require police law does not Mississippi laws constitutional which state are peril their the common-law dismissing not. Apparently which are and remanded Court of reversed claim,5 Appeals the police claim officers against § new trial on counsel had been allowed cross-examine because defense mat prejudicial on various irrelevant and ministers including convergence particularly alleged ters, justice their views on racial the Communist those trial, At the new court Party. however,, the held proved not recover if were ministers could anticipating they went would Mississippi illegally arrested because such would constitute action non of volenti consent to arrest principle under injuria, he'who to a wrong injured. consents cannot be fit granted

We certiorari No. 79 to consider whether local damages liable for 1983 for an unconstitutional conviction and whether the ministers recovery should be denied against police if officers they acted with anticipation would illegally arrested. granted We also police officers’ petition in No. 94 to determine if the Court of Appeals correctly held that they could not assert the defense 5 Respondents opinion read the court’s remanding for a new trial on this stated, claim. The however, court the officers liability “are immune from imprisonment for false at common law but liability not for violations of the Federal statutes on civil rights. It therefore follows that there should be a new trial of the rights against civil appellee claim officers so that there be a determination of the fact issue as to appellants whether the invited or consented to the arrest imprisonment.” 2d, 352 F. at 221. *5 an action under to cause and faith

good arrest.6 unconstitutional for petitioners showed that trial federal The evidence clergymen under- Episcopal white Negro and other and to 1961 from New Orleans in pilgrimage” “prayer took a visit was to pilgrimage purpose of Detroit. the North and places-in other' and institutions church integration, and, equality racial promote to South Let- convention Detroit. to church report to finally, to its members indicate group from the leader ters beginning go intended clergymen segregated to use facilities at attempt to Jackson and they fully expected and that there, the bus terminal doing group plans for so. The made based arrested if assumption would be arrested on attempted peacefully right to exercise their as interstate other, waiting travelers to use the rooms and facilities at the the letters terminal, arrange- bus discussed and other matters ments bail relevant to arrests. stayed night The ministers one in Jackson, and went to terminal the next morning depart bus They, Chattanooga, Tennessee. the waiting entered room, disobeying sign at the entrance that announced “White Waiting Only By Room Order of the Depart- Police — They ment.” then turned to enter the small terminal restaurant but stopped by were two Jackson police officers, respondents Griffith and Nichols, who had been awaiting their arrival and who ordered them to “move on.” The ministers replied that they wanted eat, 6 Respondents challenge did not petition their in No. 94 the holding Appeals of the Court of that a new necessary trial is because prejudicial cross-examination. Belatedly, they devoted -a section of their brief to the contention that the cross-examination proper. argument This is no more timelj-. meritorious than it is The views of the Party Communist equality racial were not an issue in these cases. then a Ray, Respondent' on. to move refused police, arrived deputy chief and now captain *6 placed were The ministers minutes later.

fewa jail. to the and taken arrest agreed that officers including police the

All witnesses and peacefully waiting the room ministers entered the conduct while objectionable or in engaged no boisterous conflicting testi- There Only” area. was the “White in their bystanders present and mony on the number was no crowd there testified Petitioners behavior. into the wait- them no one followed station, the at threatening words or no one uttered ing and that room, police testified that threatening gestures. made ministers into the persons some 25 to followed very in a dis- in the crowd were terminal, persons .that mumbling mood, they were ugly satisfied and and that threatening making unspecified gestures. police and any specific threatening did not describe and incidents, testified that took no in against persons action threatening the crowd who were because violence “had determined cause of the ministers violence if any might occur,” although ministers concededly orderly were polite police and the did beyond claim that it was their power control the allegedly disorderly crowd. The arrests convictions were by followed this lawsuit.

We difficulty find no in agreeing with the Court Appeals that Judge Spencer is from immune liability damages for for his role in these convictions. The record is barren of any proof or specific allegation that Judge Spencer played any role in these arrests and convictions other petitioners than.to adjudge guilty when their cases came before his court.8 Few doctrines were more solidly 7Transcript Record, at 347. (Testimony of Griffith.) Officer attempted Petitioners to suggest “conspiracy” Judge between Spencer and the officers questioning him about his reasons of judges common than law at

established within for acts committed liability damages recognized when as this Court jurisdiction, their Fisher, Bradley v. 13 Wall. doctrine, adopted it immunity applies This even when the (1872). “is acting maliciously corruptly, and it accused of corrupt protection or benefit of a malicious not for public, benefit whose interest judge, but liberty be at their is that shoúld to exercise independence functions with and without fear of conse- (Scott Stansfield, L. quences.” 220, v. R. 3 Ex. 223 (1868), Fisher, Bradley supra, 350.) quoted It note, duty ais judge’s jurisdiction decide'all cases within his brought that are before him, including controversial cases *7 that arouse the feelings litigants. most intense in the His errors be corrected on he appeal, but should not have fear litigants that unsatisfied may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such burden on would not principled contribute and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.

We believe do.not this principle settled of law was by (cid:127) (cid:127)§ abolished 1983, which makes “every person” liable who under color of law deprives another person his civil rights. legislative record gives no clear indi cation Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities. Accordingly, this Court held in Tenney Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), that immunity of legislators for acts within legislative role was not abolished. The immunity of judges for acts within role is equally well established, and finding petitioners guilty in these cases and showing that he had found other “Freedom guilty Riders” under similar circum- previous stances in proof eases. The conspiracy never went beyond suggestion this inferences could be drawn Judge. from Spencer’s judicial Transcript decisions. See of Record, at 352-371. so specifically have Congress would presume we the doctrine.9 to abolish it wished provided had police officers granted never law has The common in officers and the immunity, unqualified absolute and they are one. entitled not claim that this case do if liable they should not be is rather Their claim in cause good probable faith with acted a statute that believed making an arrest under country view in prevailing this to be valid. Under catise peace officer arrests someone simply is for false arrest because the innocence not liable Second, is Restatement, later suspect proved. Torts The Law of Torts (1965); Harper James, § & Fidelity Co. 3.18, (1956); Deposit at 277-278 Ward v. & (C. 1950). A Maryland, 2d 179 F. A. 8th Cir. policeman’s is not so he choose be unhappy lot that must being charged duty tween if he with dereliction does not when he has probable cause, being arrest mulcted if damages Although he does. the matter entirely free same doubt,10 the consideration would seem to require excusing him from liability acting reasonably a statute that he believed be valid but later held face or unconstitutional, its as applied. of Appeals Court held that the officers had such

á privilege limited under the Mississippi,11 common law of and indicated that recognized would have a similar *8 privilege § 1983 except that felt compelled to hold by otherwise our decision in Monroe Pape, v. 365 U. S. 9 Tenney Since our decision in Brandhove, supra, courts appeals have consistently held that is a defense to an action under 1983. See Heisel, Bauers v. (C. § 361 F. 2d 581 A. 3d 1966), Cir. and cases cited therein. 10 Caveat, See Restatement, Second, Torts §121, at 207-208 (1965); Stinnett, Miller v. (C. 257 2d 1958). F. 910 A. 10th Cir. Thompson,

11See Golden v. 194 Miss. (1943). 11So. 2d question no Pape presented Monroe v. (1961). The com- none was decided. however, and immunity, Chicago officers alleged police case that “13 plaint in that early morning, routed into home in the broke petitioners’ living bed, made them stand naked in them évery room, emptying drawers room, and ransacked Mr. allege[d] further ripping mattress covers. It police then taken to the station detained Monroe was he charges hours, interrogated on for 10 while was ‘open’ two-day-old he was not taken before murder, about he was not though accessible, one was magistrate, family attorney, call his or that he was permitted to charges being pre- released without criminal subsequently against S., ferred him.” at 169. The go officers did not choose to trial and defend the case hope they jury they could convince a good believed in faith that it was duty their to assault family in Monroe and this manner. Instead, his. sought dismissal complaint, contending principally their activities were so plainly illegal under state law that did not act any “under color of statute, ordinance, or regulation, custom, usage, State Territory” required by § 1983. In this rejecting argu- ment we- in way no intimated that the defense of good faith cause was foreclosed the statute. We also held that complaint should not be'dismissed for failure to state that the officers “a had specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right,” but this holding, which related to requirements of pleading, no carried implications as to which defenses would be available to the police officers. As we went on say in the same paragraph, “should be against read the back- ground of liability tort that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” 365 U. S., at 187. Part of the background of tort liability, in the *9 arrest, is the defense making officers of police case cause. probable faith and good of good of faith and the defense hold that We available to the Appeals of found the Court cause, which action for arrest in common-law false officers to. them in the action also available imprisonment, holding not, however, This mean does under thereon be dismissed. The the count based should that ordered dismissal the common-law Appeals Court theory police officers were not re- count in Thomas predict Mississippi, to our decision quired agree police We that a officer is not S. 524. charged predicting future course of constitu- petitioners simply tional law. But the in this case did argue they were arrested statute later held They unconstitutional. attempted prove claimed and that the officers solely arrested them for attempting Only” waiting use room, “White that no crowd was and that no one present, threatened violence seemed about cause disturbance. The officers did not defend theory they on the in good believed faith that it was constitutional to arrest the solely using ministers waiting room. Rather, attempted claimed and prove did not arrest the ministers for the purpose preserving the custom of segregation in Missis- solely but sippi, for the purpose preventing violence. They testified, contradiction to the ministers, that a gathered crowd and that imminent violence was likely. If the jury believed testimony the officers and disbelieved if ministers, and the jury found reasonably officers in good believed faith that the arrest was constitutional, then a verdict for the officers would follow even though the arrest was in fact unconstitutional. jury did resolve the factual issues favor but, officers for reasons previously stated, prejudicial irrelevant influenced

its verdict *10 must be remanded to the case Accordingly, evidence. a new trial. court for trial necessary importance should be to decide what It is substantially undisputed new trial to the at the given expecting went to Jackson to petitioners that fact agree We Court arrested. do illegally not they somehow to arrest consented Appeals they illegally anticipation because their would assuming even went to the Jackson arrested, purpose testing rights bus terminal for the sole their public to unsegregated accommodations. The case con- proof tains allegation any way no or tricked goaded or arresting the officers peti- into them. The tioners had right waiting use the room of the Jackson bus terminal, and their deliberate exercise of right in a peaceful, orderly, and inoffensive manner does not disqualify them from seeking damages under § 1983.12

The judgment of the Court is Appeals affirmed' in part and reversed in part, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered. Douglas, Mr. Justice dissenting. I not do think that judges, all under all circumstances, '

no outrageous matter hqw their conduct are immune petition The for certiorari presented in No. 79 question also whether the Appeals Court of correctly dismissed the count based on the common Mississippi. law of ordinarily doWe not review the holding appeals court of on a law, matter state and we no departing reason for find from that tradition in this case. The state common-law claim in this case is cumulative, merely' petitioners’ right to recover for an invasion of their rights, civil subject good defense of faith and cause, is adequately by secured 1983. § §C. 13, 42 U. S. 17 Stat. suit under for a by the admitted need not ruling justified is

Court’s not commanded independent judiciary, vigorous immunity, and doctrine of the common-law by decisions. inexorably prior from our not follow does 1 of the the.books as came on statute, which April 1871,17 13, provides Stat. Klan Act of Ku Klux or color law cus- who under of state “every person” any citizen . . . or causes to be “subjects, subjected, tom or immunities rights, privileges, shall be liable laws, secured the Constitution party injured in an law, equity, action suit proceeding “every proper most, other for redress.” To every except person, person” every person would mean *11 Despite plain import judges. words, of those Tenney Brandhove, in Court decided- U. S. legislators that state are immune from as as the long suit of rights person which caused a civil legislators occurred acting while the “were in field Id., legislators where traditionally power have to act.” 379; at I dissented of the creation judicial that I exception do from the creation present one. The congressional purpose seems to A me to be clear. condition of lawlessness in existed States, certain of the under which people were being rights. their civil denied Congress provide intended to a remedy for wrongs being perpetrated. And its members were not unaware that certain of the judiciary members were in implicated the state of affairs which the statute was intended to rec- tify. It was often noted “[ijmmunity that is given to crime, of and the records the public tribunals are searched in vain for evidence of effective redress.” Cong. Globe, Cong., 42d 1st Sess., 374. Rainey Mr. of South Carolina noted that courts are many “[T]he instances under the control of those who are wholly inimical to the impartial administration of law and equity.” Id., at 394. duty that it was the of Ohio claimed

Congressman Beatty “by rea- appeals of Congress to listen to the those preju- or organizations or secret popular sentiment son rights obtain the judges, juries diced bribed [cannot] Id., American. citizen . . . .” andi.privileges due an measure supporting proposed members break- complete had been a apprehensive were there justice in certain States down the administration being were nondiscriminatory their face and that laws won manner, newly discriminatory in a applied being Negro ignored, were rights civil against It back- being defied. was this Constitution was against this passed, that the section was and it ground background interpreted. should that, enactment, said at the timé of the statute’s

It is well the doctrine settled Congress presumed cannot be intended to to have abrogate clearly doctrine since it did evince such beset many This view is difficulties. It purpose. a' specify in ad- Congress could should assumes circumstances which a remedial possible all the vance which might and state are within apply cases statute of a scope statute. view is an

“Underlying conception atomistic [this] coupled with what intention, called a theory meaning. pointer This view conceives the *12 to be mind directed toward things, individual rather general than ideas, toward toward distinct situations of fact rather than toward significance some in hu- man affairs that these situations If share. this were view taken then seriously, have, we would to re- gard the intention of the draftsman of a statute di- against ‘dangerous weapons’ rected being as directed toward endless series of individual objects: re-

561 knives, daggers, Bowie pistols, volvers, automatic its weapon the If statute applies a court etc. be thought then it would of, not had draftsman even ob- more ‘interpreting,’ not ‘legislating,’ if the viously apply it were to statute it would be the weapon yet not invented statute to a when Law 84 Fuller, Morality (1964). of passed.” existing of acts in Congress course the context of rules, construing common-law statute a court making law the considers “common before the Hey don’s Case, Rep. Eng. Act.” 3 Co. a, Rep. (Ex. 1584). remedy Congress But enacts a statute to the inadequacies law, pre-existing including common law.1 presumed It cannot be the common perfection law reason, is the statutory superior law (Sedgwick, (1st Construction of Statutes 270 ed. 1857); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, Harv. L. Rev. 404-406 (1908)), legislature and that always changes law should worse. Nor the canon derogation construction “statutes of the common law are to be strictly construed” applied so as to weaken a remedial statute purpose remedy whose is to pre-existing defects law. position Congress change did intend to the common-law immunity ignores rule of every of Congress fact that member who spoke to the issue words of assumed the statute what meant said and that Many would be liable. mem- Congress bers objected to the im- statute because it liberally are generally, “Remedial statutes construed.” See Llewellyn, Theory Appellate Remarks on the Decision Rules or About Construed, Canons How Statutes Are Be To 3 Vand. (1950); Llewellyn, L. Tradition, Rev. 395 The Common Law Appendix (1960). C *13 Mr. Arthur of the judiciary. members liability on

posed measure because: Kentucky opposed held judge or has been no court “Hitherto ... acts . . . . civilly criminally, or liable, every judge provisions 1] Under [section upon pursue . will enter the State court . . with the duty sword Damocles call official Cong. Globe, Cong., suspended him . 42d over . '. .” Sess., 1st 365-366.

And Senator Thurman noted that: already

“There been have two three instances bill rights judges being the civil of State taken court, into United States district sometimes (cid:127) upon indictment for the honestly offense ... conscientiously deciding the law to be as under- stood it to be. . . .

“Is intended to perpetuate Is it [section 1] that? enlarge intended to Is it it? intended to it so extend no longer judge sitting on the bench to decide causes can decide them free from any fear except that of impeachment, which never lies in the absence of corrupt motive? Is that extended, so that every judge of a State be liable to be dragged before some Federal to vindicate his opinion in damages mulcted if that Federal judge shall think opinion was erroneous? That is the language of this Cong. bill.” Globe, 42d Cong., 1st n Sess., Appendix 217. Mr. Lewis of Kentucky expressed the fear that:

“By the first section, in certain cases, the judge a State court, though acting under oath office, is made liable to a suit in the Federal court and subject to damages for his decision against a suitor. ...” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 385. *14 opponents, of its repeated the fears despite Yet subject would recognition the section explicit the was proposed: the section as it suit, to remained exception was no “any person.”2 it to There applied con- light sharply of of judiciary. members In issue, of it would judicial immunity tested nature of the have be to the judiciary reasonable assume would exempted sweep of the expressly been the wide Congress section, if had intended such a result. for the provide

The was to purpose section’s redress recognized civil certain rights. of It was judiciary oppression of members instruments were partially responsible wrongs be rem- and were to of parade coming edied. The to this Court shows cases that a similar of condition now obtains some the States. Some suppression state have of courts been instruments of rights. civil The methods may changed; have means wrong have become more to subtle; but be remedied still exists.

Today’s decision is prior not dictated by our decisions. In Ex Virginia, parte 100 339, the Court S. held that a judge Negroes from juries excluded could be held liable under the 1, (18 Act of March Stat. 335), Rights one the Civil The Acts. assumed Court judge merely that the performing a func- ministerial tion. But on to went state judge.would liable under the statute even if his judicial.3 actions were It is one thing say to the common-law doctrine As altered prepared the reviser who the Revised Statutes of 1878, printed and as in 42 1983, U. S. C. the- statute refers to “every person” “any rather than person.” to opinion parte in Ex Virginia, supra, Bradley did not mention Fisher, Wall. which held that a could not be held liable for causing the attorney name of an to be struck from the court Bradley, rolls. But in brought action was not Rights Acts, the Civil cause a common-law immunity is a defense the common- say another quite it is

action. But Congress liability which is a immunity rulé defense law Ex as in person,” or other “any officer imposed upon has as in these cases. “every person” Virginia, upon parte judi- today grants which Court independent preserve ciary necessary not back-, in the action lies If the threat of civil judiciary. will argument goes, judges ground litigation, so judgment the discretion reluctant to exercise opera- effective and vital to the position in their inherent protect course, judiciary. should, tion of the We using guilty “who is fact judiciary a member of the *15 , or for upon others, spleen his powers his to vent public not connected with- the personal other motive' Biddle, 581. To v, 579, F. 2d Gregoire 177 good.” ruling of a by a the recovery person injured to deny gain personal of motives acting personal out judge argued is But, Ibid. it would be “monstrous.” chilling necessary prevent to the immunity absolute is inquiry, inquiry, or the threat of such judicial effects of a a has been unfaithful to his whether, fact, into necessary protect guilty Thus, of office. is oath it well as the innocent.4 powers of separation is, course, The doctrine of of only to the relations of coordinate branches of applicable government, the- same not to relations between 4 justifications Other for the doctrine of absolute have (1) preventing influencing been advanced: of suit from threat decision; (2) protecting judges liability mistakes; honest (3) relieving judges expense defending suits; of the time and of (4) removing impediment responsible entering judi men ciary; (5) necessity finality; (6) appellate satisfactory of review is (7) duty public remedy; judge’s is and not to the indi vidual; (8) self-protection; (9) separation powers. of See generally Jpnnings, Liability Officers, Tort of Administrative (1937). 263, Minn. L. Rev. 274-272 those of the Government and Federal branches Carr, 186, Any argu S. Baker v. U. States. See on state impose liability Congress could ment have rights of civil would thus judges for the violate the doing claim that so wpuld to be based-upon powers of between the Federal theory division claim has been foreclosed State Governments. This Congress power cases “that has the to enforce recognizing provisions against Amendment those the Fourteenth a carry badge authority of a State ... Monroe Pape, power S. 171-172. In terms of the I Congress, can see no between lia imposing difference bility' on a (Monroe officer supra) state v. Pape, judge. a state question presented is not n solely dimension; constitutional question statutory interpretation. argument public actions of officials must subjected

not be judicial scrutiny because to do so inhibiting would have an effect on work, their but sophisticated more of saying manner King “The can do no wrong.” Chief Justice long ago disposed Cockburn argument liability judges: would deter “I cannot believe .. would fail to . dis- charge their duty faithfully and fearlessly according to their oaths and consciences *16 . any . . from fear of exposing themselves to actions law. I am per- suaded that the number of such actions would be infinitely small and easily- disposed would be of. 5Historically judicial corollary theory. was a to that King Since the could wrong, do no judges, the delegates his for dispensing justice, “ought to be drawn question into any for supposed corruption this to justice [for tends] slander of the Floyd King.” Barker, & Rep. 12 23, 25, Eng. Co. Rep. 1305, (Star 1607). Chamber judges Because the were the personal delegates King they should be answerable to him Brigham, .alone. Randall v. 523, 7 Wall. cases conceive easily I can hand,

While, on the other so might perverted be opportunity judicial which that, injustice purpose abused for and ought to wrong authors of such principles, sound Dawkins wronged.” parties responsible be to Cockburn, (C. J. Paulet, Q. R. B. Lord L. dissenting). honest makes an a who say judge

This not to is is nec- liability. It subjected civil should be to mistake for conse- liability from essary exempt to function judicial of their honest mistakes. quences It is judgment. often an informed exercise involves fact, differing versions necessary to between choose closely to decide and opposing interests, to reconcile be made in Decisions must often issues. contested mind independent and is needed vigorous A heat trial. to. would be unfair delicate tasks. It perform to such independent judgment his require judge a exercise in a manner having for exercised it punish him then liability Imposing retrospect, was erroneous. which, acts, curb though judicial honest would mistaken, spirit perform needed to judi- independent mind who a Thus, judge a sustains conviction cial functions. considers forthrightly adequate evidence on what he liability appellate subjected when should n<*t adequate. was not Nor the evidence decides court who allows a conviction under judge what should statute. held an unconstitutional later saying far a judge But that is different shall consequences from the of his immune that he shall actions, knowing liable not.be person’s of a rights. and intentional civil the judge conspires about who What with local law officers “railroad” a enforcement What dissenter? knowingly about turns a trial into “kangaroo” court? Or one who intentionally flouts the. *17 a Congress, obtain conviction? in order to Constitution allowing intentional, I concluded that evils think, rights far go of civil knowing deprivations unredressed speculative inhibiting might effects which outweighed the into a of civil inquiry judicial attend rights.6

The is plight oppressed indeed serious. Under City Peacock, Greenwood v. S. defend- ant remove prevent cannot to a federal court to a state court from depriving him of his rights. And under civil the rule today, person cannot announced recover damages deprivation. for the judge A injury is liable for act; caused a ministerial to have judge performing judicial must be See, a function. g., parte e.. Virginia, S. 339; Ex Harper James, 100 U. & Law (1956). Tort's presence 1642-1643 of malice and the inten deprive tion person rights a wholly incompatible of his civil function. intentionally When acts and know ingly deprive person rights his constitutional he exercises

no judgment; discretion individual longer judge, he acts no as a but as a prejudices. “minister” his own