*1 TOWNSEND v. SAIN, SHERIFF, et al. Argued No. 8. February 19, 1962. Restored to the calendar for reargument April 2, Reargued 8-9, October 1962. 1962. Decided March 1963. *3 George N. Leighton reargued the and filed a cause brief for petitioner.

Edward J. reargued Hladis for respondents. cause him With on the brief was Daniel P. Ward. opinion delivered the of

Mr. Chief Justice Warren the Court.

This case, present posture its raising questions as to to a right plenary hearing corpus, federal habeas again comes to us once after a tangle prior of proceedings. In 1955 the petitioner, Townsend, Charles was tried before a jury for murder in the Criminal of County, Court Cook Illinois. At his petitioner, through trial his court- appointed public counsel, defender, to the objected was it ground on the his confession introduction outside held hearing was A of coercion. product the motion denied trial jury, presence into evi- confession admitted He later suppress. issue volun- to the relating evidence Further dence. charge per- The jury. before introduced was tariness they found confession disregard the them to mitted admissibility law the Illinois involuntary. Under it was judge, trial solely by the is determined the confession on the it bears voluntariness, because question but See, jury. to the presented may also be credibility, issue of 121 N. E. 2d Schwarts, 520, 523, 3 Ill. 2d g., People v. e. E. 2d 873. Roach, 95, 15 N. 369 Ill. People v. 760; 758, pen- the death and affixed guilty jury found The affirmed of Illinois Supreme Court The alty to its verdict. Town- v. dissenting. People conviction, justices two This denied 729. Court N. E. 2d send, 11 Ill. 2d S. 850. U. writ of certiorari. relief collateral post-conviction sought next Petitioner County Criminal The Cook courts. Illinois State in the holding eviden- without petition his dismissed Court by order of Illinois Court Supreme tiary hearing. judi- res of coercion the issue was holding that affirmed, S. certiorari. 358 U. again denied cata, and this Court stages of at all pressed The issue coercion 887. proceedings. these remedies, Town- state thoroughly his

Having exhausted *4 in the States corpus United for habeas petitioned send of Illinois. That District for the Northern District Court of filed in the course only pleadings considering court, Supreme of the Illinois opinion and the proceeding writ. The denied the on direct appeal, rendered Court Circuit dismissed an for Seventh Appeals Court a granted However, F. 2d Court 660. appeal. 265 and re- certiorari, judgment vacated the petition whether, light as to a decision manded for record, plenary hearing required. state-court was S. 64. U. remand,

On the the District Court no held dismissed petition, finding only that “Justice would by ordering not be a full hearing by served awarding any or all sought by relief Petitioner.” The judge [the] stated that he was satisfied from the state-court records before him that the decision of the state holding courts the challenged confession to freely have been and volun- tarily given by petitioner was correct, and that there had been no denial of federal process due appeal law. On the Court of Appeals concluded that corpus, habeas “[o]n inquiry district court’s is limited to a study of the undisputed portions of the record” and that the undis- puted portions of this record showed deprivation no constitutional rights. 276 F. 2d 324, 329. granted We certiorari to determine whether the courts below had cor- rectly determined and applied the standards governing hearings in federal corpus. 365 U. S. 866. The case was first argued during the October Term 1961. Two of the Justices were unable to participate in a decision, and we subsequently reargued. ordered it 369 U. S. 834. We now have it before us for decision. undisputed evidence adduced at the trial-court

hearing on the motion to suppress showed following. Petitioner was arrested Chicago police shortly before or after 2 a. m. on New Day Year’s 1954. They had received information from one Campbell, then in their custody for robbery, that petitioner was connected with robbery and murder of Jack Boone, a Chicago steel- worker and the victim in this case. Townsend was 19 years old at the time, confirmed heroin addict and a user age narcotics since 15. He was under the influence of a dose of heroin administered approximately one and one- half hours before his arrest. It practice his to take injections three to apart. five hours At about 2:30 a. m. *5 station police district the second to was taken petitioner period a questioned arrival, was his after shortly and, During this two hours. to one-half fixed from variously Thereafter any crimes. committing denied he period, station district the 19th to taken m. he was 5 a. about about until being questioned, without remained, he where returned was time he evening. At that m. that p. 8:15 with line-up ain placed and station district the second by one be viewed could that he men so other several Anag- robbery. When of another the victim Anagnost, as petitioner, rather than man, another identified nost were of which the details ensued, a assailant, scuffle his Following this police. and the by petitioner disputed questioning. again subjected was petitioner incident from about 8:45 regularly or more less interrogated He was an Assistant time At that officers. by police 9:30 until shortly before time Attorney arrived. Some State’s of State’s the arrival before o’clock, but nine after that he Cagney to Officer complained Attorney, petitioner suffering from was other he stomach, that in his pains had that doctor, a wanted that he symptoms, withdrawal clutched Petitioner of narcotics. of a dose in need he was Cagney, times. number of at his stomach convulsively telephoned addict, a narcotic was petitioner aware dispute between was some There physician. for a police witnesses, prosecution Attorney, both him the State’s until the doctor continued questioning toas whether and the State’s it did testified Cagney arrived. any event, after with- contrary. In to the Attorney petitioner appears it commenced symptoms drawal appeared doctor questioning. unresponsive gave Town- Cagney he presence In the Officer at 9:45. pheno- dosage by injection %-grain combined send a Hyoscine hyoscine. 1/230-grain barbital and is scopolamine claimed as same “truth serum.” properties to have proceeding *6 petitioner %-grain The doctor also left four or tablets five phenobarbital. Townsend was told to take two of that evening following day. these and the remainder the The doctor testified that given these were to medications petitioner for purpose alleviating the withdrawal symptoms; the police officers and Attorney the State’s testified they did not know what the had given doctor petitioner. The departed doctor and between 10 10:30. The medication alleviated the discomfort of the with- drawal symptoms, petitioner and promptly responded to questioning.

As to succeeding point events time on January 1, testimony prosecution peti- witnesses and of the tioner irreconcilably conflicts. However, for the purposes of this proceeding both sides agree following occurred. After the doctor left, Fitzgerald Officer the Assistant State’s Attorney joined Cagney Officer in the room with the petitioner, questioned where he was about 25 They minutes. all then went to ; another room reporter court there took down petitioner’s statements. The State’s Attorney turned the questioning to the Boone case about 11:15. In less than nine minutes a full con- fession was transcribed. At about 11:45 the questioning was terminated, petitioner was returned to his cell.

The following day, Saturday, 2, at about 1 January p. m. petitioner was taken to the office of prosecutor where the Assistant Attorney read, State’s petitioner signed, transcriptions of the statements which he had made the night before. Townsend again When experienced discom- fort on Sunday evening, the doctor was summoned. He gave petitioner %-grain more tablets of phenobarbital. Monday, January On 4, Townsend was taken to a coroner’s inquest where he was called to the witness stand the State and, being after advised of his right not testify, again At the confessed. time inquest peti- tioner was without counsel. The public defender was not on arraignment him his represent until appointed 12. January fol- suppress at the motion to

Petitioner testified initially ques- He was lowing version of his detention. period for a police station tioned at the second district from the 19th his return Upon in excess of two hours. who had robbery victim Anagnost, district and after person another as the had identified line-up, viewed the Anagnost into Cagney accompanied Officer assailant, wrong person. hall and him that he had identified told hit the room, officer then entered the Another *7 knew that he petitioner and in the stomach stated floor and fell to the Anagnost. had robbed Petitioner Cagney spoke water and a little blood. Officer vomited him later, or minutes Townsend told to Townsend 5 drugs, Cagney and offered sick from the use of that he was “cooperate” would and tell petitioner to call a doctor minutes later about the Boone murder. Five the truth told that he changed tack; petitioner had his he the officer doctor, him innocent and that he would call the thought him The give doctor would a narcotic. implying that the arm and an five gave petitioner injection doctor Al- immediately. of these Townsend took three pills. and and his dis- dizzy sleepy felt he felt though better, he brought impaired. Anagnost was then tance vision was by was asked someone to room, petitioner into the then had robbed him. Petitioner Anagnost tell that he was thing and the next he knew robbery, admitted the was sitting asleep at a desk. He fell but he signed believing his name pen; handed a he awakened and on bond. Townsend was going to be released that he was taken back to the room in cell but was later taken to his lights He could see “a lot of had been before. which he him to hold up. told his head and someone flickering,” so, petitioner was then on for minute This went morning peti- next to his cell. The taken back again although he could clearer, much head was tioner’s following the injection occurred what had really remember petitioner then told An officer evening. previous on the room taken into a Townsend was had confessed. that he “I and murders. of robberies and asked about a number very not hear He could yes I all of them.” believe said he had taken afternoon, after sleepy. well and felt That he was taken pills, phenobarbital the remainder signed he asleep Half Attorney. the office of the State's The of its contents. although not aware paper another on of a color pills him or seven different gave doctor six immediately. of these evening. He took some Sunday Monday following The night. him awake all They kept day he pills. Later that he took more these morning at the He testified inquest. to a coroner’s was taken told him to do so. officers had because the inquest all witnesses contradicted prosecution Essentially had been petitioner They testified of the above. had that he initially only hour, one-half questioned and not Anagnost, man identified scuffled with the he had not vomited. officers officer, and that Attorney also testified that the Assistant State’s throughout awake and coherent appeared had to be times January and at all relevant evening of the 1st *8 pills given not taken the and that he had thereafter, They stated evening on the of the 1st. him the doctor to follow the statement appeared had that the him at which was read to the State’s signed which he and any threats Finally they denied Attorney’s office. made or that Townsend any of sort had been promises As inquest. coroner’s testify at the had told to been him at this provided for counsel was not stated above inquest. at the motion to testimony was considerable

There and hyoscine effects of concerning probable suppress for prescribed who had Mansfield, Dr. phenobarbital. confessed, evening when he had first petitioner on the He stated that a full thera- prosecution. testified for the gave hyoscine grain; of of a that he peutic dose was 1/100 . . . grain; “phenobarbital of a Townsend 1/230 . . [hyoscine you with . very reacts well combined when] will a the combination quiet” person; want mind”; on the but that “pacify” because “it has effect sleep dosage put person would not a administered eyesight impairment amnesia or of and would not cause had that he or mental condition. The doctor denied of However, “truth serum.” he did any administered or that hyoscine scopolamine disclose that is same as Peti- familiarly latter known as “truth serum.” physiology, pharmacology was a doctor of expert tioner's formerly toxicological senior toxicology. He was of trial County of and at the time chemist Cook toxicology chemotherapy professor pharmacology, testi- Loyola University School Medicine. He at the injection upon hypothetical fied to the effect obviously petitioner. expert stated that subject, hyoscine dosage upon prescribed the effect of the a narcotic “w’ould be addict, to be subject, assumed range a nature that it could between absolute of such extreme, drowsiness, . .. and as one and the other ex- sleep incorporate complete treme . . . would disorientation and assuming that took And, subject excitation by injection 14-grain orally ^4-grain phenobarbital time, expert depressive the same stated that the effect The expert would be accentuated. testified that the sub- or total for ject partial eight would suffer amnesia five to and loss of near vision four to six hours. hours summarily sup- denied the motion to The trial reporter’s admitted the court transcription and later press findings into evidence. He made no of the confession stating opinion grounds no fact and wrote his deci- *9 testing credi- purpose sion.1 Thereafter, relating to coercion the evidence bility confession, At that time additional note- jury. was before the placed identity hyoscine worthy testimony was elicited. (but no mention of the scopolamine was established made). a was An ex- drug’s properties “truth serum” as testified that Town- by prosecution witness called pert a mental intelligence send had such low that he was near “just little above moron.” Townsend defective him slapped testified that the officers had on several occa- and had threatened to shoot him. Officer Finally, sions p. Friday evening Corcoran that about 9 m., testified arrival, before the doctor’s Townsend had confessed robbery response Boone assault and to a question pro- pounded Cagney Officer Fitz- presence Officers Martin and gerald, although himself. But Corcoran, Cag- ney and Martin extensively had testified at the motion to none had suppress, any mentioned such confession. Fur- both Townsend and thermore, Fitzgerald Officer at mo- suppress flatly tion to had said that no statement had been made before the doctor arrived. Although the other three trial, officers testified >atthe not one of them was asked to phase corroborate Corcoran’s testimony. 1The final defense witness who testified suppress at the motion to following transpired: excused. The then attorney]: defense have, That’s all we if the "MR. BraNION [a please. Court

“The hearing? Court: The defense rests on this “Mr. BranioN: Defense rests. Anything

“The Court: further from the State? purpose McGoverN: The State rests hearing, for the of this “Mr. Judge. “The Gentlemen, deny sup- Court will the motion to Court: press proceed and admit the statement into evidence and we will with presentation jury].” of the evidence [to *10 304 occurred at about that the homicide

It was established Essentially only evi- 18, m. on December 1953. p. 6 other crime, with the petitioner dence which connected then testimony Campbell, of confession, than his was the per- who probation robbery, pathologist on for that Campbell on Boone. testified autopsy formed the m. p. at about 8:30 he about the “middle” of December vicinity walking had seen Townsend down a street of murder with a brick in his hand. He was unable fix not know of Boone murder date, the exact did had testimony revealed, at so far as his and, the time anything no that had done suspect reason to Townsend meeting. unlawful previous their by a pathologist The testified that death was caused top “severe blow to of his head . . . .” [Boone’s] Contrary opinion to the statement in the of the Illinois testimony Supreme appeal Court on direct there was no that the wounds were “located such a manner as to have been a a by inflicted blow with house brick . . . .” any 11 Ill. 141 E. at In that 2d, 45, 2d, event, at N. 737. court meagre characterized the evidence as and noted brought that “it was Camp- out cross-examination that bell had informed on to obtain own the defendant his custody.” release from 11 Ill. at 141 2d, 44, 45, 2d, N. E. at petitioner’s Campbell 737. Prior to trial on placed probation robbery. Justice Schaefer, joined by Chief Klingbiel in dissent, Campbell’s testimony Justice found “inherently 2d, incredible.” 2d, Ill. N. E. at 739. theory application of petitioner’s corpus for habeas upon allegations physical

did not rest Rather, coercion. upon undisputed it relied the hitherto testimony and alleged: (1) vomited water and blood at station when he became ill from police the withdrawal (2) scopolamine is a narcotics; “truth serum” and brought that this fact was at the motion to sup- out alone “either (3) scopolamine press trial; or at the medi- proper not the Phenobarbital, or combined with . effect . . for a narcotic addict [t]he cation [and that] phenobar- hyoscine injection intravenous psychological physiological produce bital ... is to and will . . . affecting the mind adversely condition thus subject removes the effect which psychic [and] person so reality; so that scope from the injected *11 he environment, his from contact with is removed treated proper use he loses properly, and feel is not able to see of perception and his sense hearing his eye-sight, of his (4) that interrogation”; ability his to withstand and information and willfully suppressed doctor this police scopolamine, hyoscine of identity information of the to and of his intention knowledge things, of these of his in Town- producing of hyoscine purpose for the inject the suscep- state . . . psychological physiological “a send .”; . . resulting in . . . confessions interrogation tible to confess; to caused Townsend injection (5) that immediately after evening January 1, on the (6) that confessed to three petitioner scopolamine, injection of Boone other than the murder robbery and one murders there was Anagnost. Although some robbery and the only the confes- trial, confessions of other mention to. specifically was testified Anagnost robbery sion to the “Re- respondents stated: answer, in their Initially, petition of the allegations the factual admit spondents custody is held in deny that Petitioner but pleaded, well the constitution or laws Respondents violation by in the course of However, . . . .” States of the United appeared it the District Court argument before the first nothing alleged petition admitted respondents that face, on its petition, that the merely position took the but to a entitle Townsend either insufficient to was argument, of the second In the course to his release. respondents admitted Court, by remand after the as true, are taken allegations petition “if of the that ,” he . . . entitled to the relief seeks then crimes had confessed to at least five Townsend hyoscine. respondents But denied injection after the adversely influenced its “petitioner [the to the extent that his confes- hyoscine’s] administration “Hyoscine is the involuntarily”; was obtained sion or the serum”; police surgeon prosecution that “the truth material and relevant or that pertinent, facts”; concealed under the circum- hyoscine improper was an medication that a Despite respondents’ dispute stances. concession denied Town- existed, as to these facts the district send call opportunity produce witnesses or other support allegations evidence in of his and dismissed the petition. granted

Before we the most for petition recent certio- requested respondents rari we an additional submit response directed to certain of allegations peti- tion for corpus. Respondents habeas submitted an “addi- tional petition corpus” they answer to again admitted that Townsend had made confessions *12 immediately injection drugs. after the Specifically they admitted that confessed to the robberies of Anagnost Joseph and one Martin and to the murders of Boone, Thomas Johnson, Johnny Stinson, and Willis Thompson. The additional answer revealed the follow- ing additional information respecting Townsend’s confes- Anagnost sions to these crimes. had identified another person, petitioner, rather than as his assailant. Thomas Johnson, before his had death, stated that injury his had been an accident. The Assistant State’s Attorney did bother to even transcribe Townsend’s statement with Thompson’s respect murder “because the defendant could not recall the details of the assault which led to the Thompson death . . . .” At the coroner’s inquest, when deputy coroner that Townsend unable noted was then crime, remember even that he had committed the Cagney complained: “Why given Officer shouldn’t we be Clean-ups.” Despite credit for these these circumstances which made for the Anagnost robbery conviction and the Johnson Thompson murders, possi- at a remote best, bility, petitioner was indicted for all of the crimes to which he had confessed. after a However, jury trial, he acquitted of Johnny the murder of and on the Stinson, very day that he was sentenced to death for the Boone murder, on the motion of prosecutor, the indictments for the murders of Johnson and Thompson and for the Anagnost robberies of and Martin were dismissed. Although the petition for corpus allega- contains tions which would a constitute claim that police doc- tor, trial, had perjured himself, the heart of Town- send’s claim is that his confession was simply inadmissible because it was caused by injection of hyoscine. We must first determine petitioner’s whether if allegations, proved, would right establish the to his release.

I. Numerous decisions of this Court have established the standards governing the admissibility of confessions into evidence. If an individual’s “will was overborne” or his confession was product not “the of a rational intellect a will,” free his confession is inadmissible because coerced. These standards applicable are whether con- fession is product of physical intimidation psycho- logical pressure and, of course, equally are applicable to a drug-induced statement. It is difficult imagine situation which a confession would be product less the of a free intellect, voluntary, less than when brought

2 Pate, 433, Beck v. 367 U. S. 440. 3 Alabama, Blackburn v. 361 U. S. 208.

308 4 It a “truth serum.” having effect of drug by

about adminis- been drug may have significant that is not with unfamiliar by persons asked questions and the tered proper- these serum,” a “truth as hyoscine’s properties which officers by police Any questioning exist. ties of a product not the which is a confession produces fact inadmissible.5 that confession intellect renders free 4 many in this case relevant circumstances course, there are Of determining required consider in district would be to which a injection scopolamine Townsend to confess. caused whether the addiction, drug time, his Among of counsel at the these are his lack youth defective,” and his he “near mental the fact that was a inexperience. of the sec Respondents dispute In fact at the time do not this. respondents argument stated: before the District Court ond very shortly, bluntly put very we will it as “If it was a fact —to to the upon a truth serum was administered and elaborate it —if gave an by truth serum and influenced and he was obtained, then involuntary confession, upon his conviction was is it.” suffi- generally recognized the administration of It is at least Thus, it is scopolamine down the will. will break cient doses of 1955) (25th 1223: ed. Dispensatory of the States stated in The United scopolamine excessively susceptible and toxic “Many persons are very alarming. symptoms symptoms may occur; are often such complete intellection, ranging from There marked disturbances of are early literature on the delirium . ...” The disorientation to an active thought It was subject designated scopolamine as a “truth serum.” Why suspects. g., House, E. produce criminal true confessions Medico-Legal Legal, Journal 138 Truth Should be Made Serum Wigmore suggested recently (1925). And as 1940 Dean as Wigmore interrogation. scopolamine might in criminal be useful 1940) However, some more recent (3d 998, at 642. ed. on Evidence § likely produce scopolamine’s use is not suggest that commentators contrary it said: true confessions. On the drugs very sug- persons are “Unfortunately, under the influence they may not committed. gestible to crimes which have confess may given, especially questions misleading be when answers False or police phrased. example, if the officer asserted improperly For are money, you?’, didn’t did steal the tone ‘You in a confident

309 g., e. usually so stated the test. Stroble v. See, Court has 190: “If the which California, 181, 343 U. S. confession made . . . was in fact involuntary, convic- y. Alabama, in tion cannot stand . . . .” And Blackburn 199, 361 S. we held the absence of U. irrelevant evidence improper purpose part questioning on the of the offi- interrogating cers. There the evidence indicated that the thought officers the defendant when he confessed, sane judged but we the confession inadmissible because the probability was that the defendant was fact insane the time.

Thus we petition conclude that corpus alleged a deprivation of rights. constitutional The re- maining question us then is whether the District before Court was required to hold to ascertain the facts necessary which are a predicate to a decision ultimate constitutional question. problem power and duty of federal judges,

on habeas corpus, evidentiary hold hearings is, —that try issues fact6 recurring anew —is a one. The Court last at length dealt with it in Allen, Brown v. 344 443, opinions U. S. by Justices Reed and Frankfurter, both speaking for a majority of the Court. then, Since suggestible suspect might easily give a false affirmative answer.” MacDonald, Serum, Truth 259, (1955). 46 J. Crim. L. 259-260 findings We make no as to properties scopolamine either the medical likely dosage or the effect of the administered to Townsend. How- ever, scopolamine produces whether true confessions or false con- fessions, if it in fact caused statements, Townsend to make those statements constitutionally were inadmissible. 6By “issues of fact” we mean to refer to basic, what are termed primary, or historical facts: facts “in the sense of a recital of external credibility events and of their Allen, narrators . . . .” Brown v. 443, (opinion 344 U. S. Frankfurter). of Mr. Justice So-called questions mixed law, require of fact and application of a legal standard historical-fact determinations, are not facts in this sense. upon granted but touched it.7 We certiorari

we have ultimately to consider the but question, the 1959 Term ground. of the case on more immediate disposed Richmond, Rogers It v. U. S. 540. has become Allen, in Brown apparent opinions supra, v. do for all provide aspects hearing prob- answers *15 courts, lem for the lower federal which have reached in widely divergent, fact often irreconcilable, results.8 no express opinion We mean on the par- correctness of ticular decisions. But we think that it is appropriate this time to elaborate the ought considerations which properly govern grant evidentiary denial of hear- ings in federal habeas corpus proceedings.

II. bearing The broad considerations upon proper interpretation power of the of the federal courts on habeas corpus length are reviewed at in opinion Fay the Court’s in 7 Arizona, 390; Rogers See Thomas v. Richmond, 356 U. S. v. 357 (denial U. S. 220 accompanying statement); certiorari with United Jennings Ragen, (per States ex rel. Town curiam); v. 358 U. S. 276 Sain, (per send curiam) v. 359 (vacating judgment U. S. 64 on Jennings Ragen, supra). authority v. 8See, g., Tillery United ex rel. e. Cavell, States v. 294 F. 2d 12 (C. Schlette Cir.); People, A. 3d (C. v. Cir.); 284 F. 2d 827 A. 9th Bolling Smyth, (C. v. 281 2d Dickson, Chavez v. Cir.); F. 192 A. 4th Gay (C. 280 Graham, Cir.); F. 2d 727 (C. A. 9th v. 269 F. 2d 482 A. Rogers Cir.); United States ex rel. 10th Richmond, v. 252 F. 2d 807 (C. Cir.), A. 2d cert. denied accompanying with statement, 357 U. S. States ex 220; Murphy, United rel. Alvarez v. (C. 2d 246 F. 871 A. Tyler Pepersack, Cir.); 2d (C. v. Cir.); 235 F. 2d 29 Cranor v. A. 4th Gonzales, (C. Cir.); 226 F. 2d 83 United States ex rel. De A. 9th McCorkle, Vita v. (C. Cir.). 216 F. 2d Note, A. 3d See also Corpus: Developments Habeas Survey Since Brown A v. Allen: Analysis, 765; 53 Nw. L. Comment, Corpus U. Rev. Federal Habeas Review of Interplay State Convictions: An Appellate Ambiguity Discretion, and District Court 68 Yale L. 98. J. here. We repeated Noia, 391, need not be p. post,

v. writ, of the conception that the historic out there pointed in our Constitu- law and ancient common in the anchored deten- remedy for imperative tion as an efficacious constant remained has illegality, fundamental tions of Act of too, that the day. pointed out, present to the We 1, 385-386, 28, § c. Stat. February 5, described the prisoners the federal writ to state extending testimony and deter- to take of the federal courts power restated what largest terms, de novo in the mine the facts understanding. Fay v. common-law apparently was the Noia, hearing provisions n. post, p. 416, 27. unchanged present substantially remain 1867 Act construing the man- 2243. In § codification. 28 U. S. C. trial-type to afford a plainly designed so Congress, date of aggrieved prisoners for state proceeding federal court detentions, has consist- by unconstitutional this Court power of federal courts on habeas ently upheld the *16 of such deten- to take evidence relevant to claims corpus Mangum, 331, this 309, tion. “Since Frank v. 237 U. S. in recognized corpus that habeas the federal Court has is a by proper courts one convicted of a criminal offense all within procedure safeguard liberty persons 'to of against infringement of jurisdiction the United States through any though violation of the even Constitution/ alleged infringe appear which were did not events upon the face of the record of his conviction.” Hawk v. Olson, 271, S. 274. Brown v: Allen and numerous U. recognized other cases have this.

The history rule could be otherwise. The whole of unique development the writ —its a construction —refutes corpus powers of the federal courts’ habeas that would assimilate their task to that of of appellate courts review. on by way The function is different. It is to test of habeas original civil proceeding, independent of the normal gravest very of criminal judgments, channels of review to relief on fed- prisoners are entitled allegations. State that their detention corpus only upon proving eral habeas person, of safe- the fundamental liberties violates guarded against action the Federal Constitution. state Simply intolerable, detention so obtained is because oppor- opportunity redress, presupposes argue and must tunity heard, present evidence, to be totally Mangum, 237 never be foreclosed. See Frank v. Mr. 309, (dissenting opinion U. S. 345-350 Justice in Holmes). rare, It is the not the case which typical, upon constitutional claims turn the resolution of con- tested factual issues. Thus narrow view the power in totally Congress’ specific would subvert aim passing February 1867, affording the Act of state prisoners a forum the federal trial courts for the deter- mination of claims of detention violation of the Con- stitution. language Congress, history of the writ, the of this all Court, decisions make clear that power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus plenary. Therefore, an applicant where for a corpus writ alleges which, proved, facts would him relief, entitle the federal court to which application is made has the power to try receive evidence and the facts anew.

III. We turn now to the considerations which in certain may cases make exercise of power mandatory. The appropriate standard —which must be considered to supersede, to any the extent of inconsistencies, the opin- ions Brown v. Allen —is this: Where the facts are in *17 dispute, the federal corpus court habeas must hold an evidentiary hearing the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing a state court, either of the time the trial or in a collateral proceeding. In other words federal evidentiary hearing required is hearing a full after fact has of trier the state-court unless facts.9 the relevant found reliably test. this overly particularize to be unwise It would intimately familiar more are judges district The federal fact, than the trial and with justice, criminal with state very be left must discretion their sound and to we, are corpus. habeas of federal administration large part standard-—-the general a too that proves But experience flaw” tests and “vital circumstances” “exceptional adequately serve not Allen —does in Brown v. opinions guidance for controlling criteria explain particularization Some courts. corpus habeas federal court a federal that hold useful. We be may therefore applicant habeas to a evidentiary hearing grant must (1) If the merits following circumstances: under hearing; in the state not resolved dispute were the factual fairly supported not is (2) state factual determination fact-finding procedure whole; (3) record as by the afford adequate to was not court by the state employed allega- a substantial (4) there hearing; fair is a full and facts evidence; the material (5) newly discovered tion hearing ; at the state-court developed adequately were not of fact the state trier appears reason it any (6) fair fact a full and applicant afford the habeas did not hearing. of a full and semblance be the

(1) cannot even There actually reached court hearing unless the state fair imply the state announcing we do not test mean In this satisfy findings hearings and required hold make courts are hearings large to a extent governed are standard, because such by state law. (an- requirement remedies of state of the exhaustion

The existence now in 28 parte Royall, S. codified U. nounced in Ex 2254) that a federal support to the view lends U. S. C. § adjudication the State’s always required. presupposes It sitting in the federal court be of aid to issue can of the constitutional corpus. *18 decided by the issues of fact tendered the defendant. Thus, if express findings no fact have been made court, state the District initially Court must deter- mine whether the state court has impliedly found mate- rial facts. No findings relevant have been made unless the state court decided the constitutional claim tendered by the defendant on the If merits. relief has denied been in prior proceedings state collateral after a hearing but without opinion, it is likely often the decision is based upon procedural issue—that the claim is not collaterally cognizable not on the On the merits. —and other hand, prior hearing state occurred in the course of the original trial —for on a example, motion to suppress allegedly unlawful evidence, as in the instant case—it will usually proper be to assume that the claim rejected on the merits.

If the state court has decided the merits of the claim but has made no express findings, it may still possible be for the District Court to findings reconstruct state trier of fact, either because his view of the facts plain from opinion his or because of other In indicia. some cases this will be impossible, and the Federal Dis- trict Court will compelled be to hold a hearing. possible

Reconstruction is not if it is unclear whether the state finder applied correct constitutional standards in disposing of the claim. Under such circumstances the District Court cannot ascertain whether the state court found law or the facts adversely to the petitioner’s contentions. Since the decision of the state trier of fact may upon rest an error of law rather than an adverse determination of the facts, is.compelled to as- certain the facts. Of course, possibility legal error may be eliminated in many situations if the fact finder has articulated the constitutional standards which he has applied. Furthermore, coequal responsibilities of state and federal judges the administration of federal constitutional law are such that we think the district may, ordinary case which there been has no articulation, properly assume that state trier *19 fact applied correct standards of federal law facts, to the in the absence of evidence, present such as was in Rogers Richmond, v. there is suspect reason to an in- correct standard applied.10 fact if third- Thus, degree of obtaining methods a confession alleged are the state court refused exclude the confession from evidence, the district judge may assume that the state trier found against the facts the petitioner, being, the law of course, that third-degree necessarily produce methods a coerced confession. any

In event, even if it is clear that the state trier of utilized proper fact standard, hearing is sometimes if required decision presents his a situation in which the “so-called facts and significance their constitutional ... so blended that they cannot be severed in con- [are] Rogers Richmond, sideration.” supra, v. at 546. See Mangum, Frank v. supra, at 347 (Holmes, J., dissenting). judge Unless the district can be reasonably certain that the state trier granted would have relief if he had believed petitioner’s he cannot be allegations, sure that the state denying trier in allegations. relief disbelieved these If any combination of alleged the facts would prove a viola- tion of rights constitutional and the issue law on those presents facts a difficult problem decision, any or novel hypothesis as to the relevant factual determinations of purest the state trier involves speculation. fed- 10 Rogers Richmond, course, required Of under v. a new trial is finding jury, facts, guided by trial or the has been However, an erroneous standard of law. will there be situations in which statements of the trier will of fact do no more than create whether applied. doubt as to the correct standard has been In such hearing situations a District Court to determine the constitutional necessary. issue will be cannot the trial possibility

eral court exclude of con- deprivation which showed a judge believed facts rights yet (erroneously) concluded that stitutional it is relief should be denied. these circumstances Under facts, impossible for the federal court to reconstruct must be held. that state factual (2) consistently This Court has held cannot fairly supported by determinations not the record Kansas, 274 rights. be conclusive of federal Fiske v. U. S. Alabama, 380, 385; Blackburn 208-209. v. U. S. Where the fundamental are person liberties infringed, carefully claimed to have been we scrutinize Alabama, See, g., the state-court record. Blackburn e. v. Michigan, Moore supra; duty v. S. 155. The U. exacting. the Federal District Court on is no less *20 (3) However, obligation the District the Federal Court to findings goes scrutinize the state-court of fact farther if than this. Even all the relevant facts were presented in the state-court may it be the hearing, fact-finding procedure employed adequate there was not reaching for reasonably correct If results. the state trial judge has procedural (respecting made serious errors claim pressed habeas) in federal things such as the burden of proof, a federal required. is Even procedure where the employed does not violate the Con- stitution, appears it seriously to be for the inadequate ascertainment of the it is truth, judge’s duty the federal to disregard findings state and take evidence anew. Of procedural there grave are errors so course, require as to appropriate directing an order applicant’s habeas grants release unless the State a new trial forthwith. present is with Our concern errors which, although less serious, grave enough are deprive nevertheless to the state hearing of evidentiary its as a adequacy means of finally determining upon facts which rights constitutional depend. in a alleged is evidence discovered newly Where

(4) reasonably not could which evidence application, habeas federal facts, trier of the state presented been have course, such hearing. Of evidentiary must grant court appli- constitutionality of upon bear must evidence newly discovered merely of the existence detention; cant’s is not prisoner of a state guilt relevant evidence the dis- Also, corpus. federal on for relief ground hearing upon grant obligation under no judge trict newly discovered allegation or incredible a frivolous evidence. newly kind of notion conventional The

(5) reopening of permit will evidence discovered limited to too respects in some however, is, a judgment district to the federal guidance complete provide to the not attributable any reason If, for habeas. on Noia, post, Fay v. see petitioner, neglect inexcusable con- adequate crucial to (Part V), evidence p. 438 developed claim the constitutional sideration compelled. hearing is a federal hearing, at the state Noia Fay v. set down default inexcusable standard interest state legitimate protects adequately need- not sanction it does procedure, orderly criminal in the claims of constitutional presentation piecemeal less Com- procedures. of state by-passing of deliberate form primary 291: “The Johnston, S. Price U. pare v. certain is to make proceeding corpus of a habeas purpose ifAnd *21 for some imprisoned. unjustly a man is to assert his previously unable reason he justifiable facts, of relevant significance the unaware or was rights him deny all to nor reasonable necessary it is neither relief.” obtaining judicial opportunity intentionally open-ended is category final (6) Our all situations anticipate the here cannot we because province It is the demanded. hearing is wherein in ac- necessities such to determine first judges district general cordance with the duty try rules. The the facts anew in every case in which the state court has not exists hearing reliably after a full found the facts. relevant

IV. It is to add few appropriate concerning observations the proper application of the test we have outlined. purpose

First. The test is to indicate the situa- in tions which the holding of evidentiary hearing is mandatory. In all other cases where the material facts in are dispute, holding such a is in the dis- cretion of the district If judge. he concludes that habeas applicant was afforded a full and hearing by fair resulting state court findings, reliable may, he should, ordinarily accept the facts as found in hearing. But he not. In need case he every con- power, has strained only by his sound discretion, to receive evidence bearing upon applicant's constitutional claim. There every reason to be confident that federal district judges, mindful of their delicate role of proper maintenance relations, federal-state will not abuse that discretion. We no have fear that the hearing power will be used sub- vert integrity of state justice criminal or to waste the time of the federal courts the trial of frivolous claims.

Second. Although the judge may, district where the state court has reliably found the relevant facts, defer to the state court’s findings of fact, may he not defer to findings its of law. It is the judge’s district duty to apply the applicable federal law the state court fact findings independently. The state conclusions of may law not be given binding weight on habeas. That was settled in Brown Allen, v. supra, at (opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter). *22 corpus sitting in habeas Court A District

Third. com- production compel to power clearly has the a record— Ordinarily such record. state-court plete (or unavailable testimony of transcript including record), as a narrative such substitute, adequate some docu- pertinent other opinions, court pleadings, whether determining to indispensable ments —is fair state-court a full received applicant findings. See resulting reliable evidentiary Ragan, 358 U. 276; S. Jennings rel. ex v. States United no if because course, Sain, Of S. 64. Townsend v. 359 U. way has no judge the district can be obtained record hearing which re- fair a full and determining whether vouchsafed, he must was fact findings relevant sulted it is more may be cases which there also, hold So one. evidentiary hold an to district for the convenient production compel than rather hearing forthwith to do so. power he clear that has It is record. judges federal district with the largely It rests Fourth. today. announced principles to the form give practical grant of eviden- promiscuous too aware that the We are dockets swamp both habeas could tiary hearings on unnecessary fric- acute and cause the District Courts while the too justice, of criminal organs state tion with grave many allow hearings would use of such limited go uncorrected. forever errors constitutional made must be factors competing of these accommodation who are conscious judges the district line, by on the front in this area. responsibility paramount of their V. particular principles to foregoing Application received Townsend difficult. litigation before us where his con- trial, original his evidentiary hearing at his exhausted voluntary. Having held be fession *23 state remedies without receiving any further such hear- ing, he turned to the Federal District Court. now, Twice corpus relief has been denied without an eviden- tiary hearing. appeal On from the second denial, the Court of Appeals held that habeas corpus, the district “[o]n inquiry court’s is study limited to a of the undisputed por- tions of the record.” That formulation was error. And we that believe on this record it was also error to refuse Townsend an evidentiary hearing in the District Court. The state trial judge rendered neither con- opinion, law, clusions of findings nor of fact. He made no charge to the jury setting forth the constitutional gov- standards erning the admissibility of confessions. In are short, there no indicia which would indicate whether the judge trial applied the proper standard of federal ruling law in upon admissibility of the confession. The Supreme Illinois Court opinion rendered at the time of appeal direct contains statements might indicate that the court thought the confession was admissible if satisfied it “coherency” standard. Under that test the confession would be admissible long as the “[s]o accused . . . [was] capable making past narrative of events of stating his own participation in the crime . . . .” 11 2d, Ill. E. 2d, N. at 736. As we have indicated in Part I of this opinion, this test is not proper Possibly one. the state trial judge believed that admissibility allegedly drug-induced confessions was to judged by be the “coherency” standard.11 However, if possi- even bility could be eliminated, and it could be ascertained charge jury The only dealt credibility with the issues of so far as the confession was accepting concerned. Even the relevance of. instructions, nothing charge jury there in the to the to show judge, that the Supreme trial like the Court, did not think that volun- conclusively tariness by showing established that the defendant was coherent. applied,

that correct standards of law were it is still judge the state trial would have ex- unclear whether had involuntary as he cluded Townsend's confession presented at the believed the evidence which Townsend which the trial suppress. problem judge motion to difficulty. We no means without faced was novel conclude Federal District Court could not believe the confession because the state trial admitted it was which would show that he disbelieved the evidence findings of fact of involuntary. We believe We successfully be reconstructed. trier state could *24 was evidentiary hearing reason, for this that, hold compelled.12 not disclosed at the a crucial fact was

Furthermore, into substance hearing: injected that the state-court may which properties Townsend before he confessed has This legal involuntary.13 in a trigger statements sense product confession was the fact was vital to whether his there sure, will and therefore admissible. To be of a free of general properties testimony was medical as to the con- might have been inferred the hyoscine, from which say why hearing required was not for to The dissent fails hearing “accepting standards” as the And the Court’s . . . reason. hearing seriously argued was not does, be that a dissent it cannot jury judge it compelled. instructed the that True the state trial credibility grounds if it believed disregard on of could the confession hardly petitioner’s expert. indicates whether the trial But this expert or judge, suppress, himself disbelieved the at the to motion expert’s notwithstanding thought that, the truth of the whether he voluntary. testimony, the confession was suppression it was not disclosed appears at the It that along phenobarbital, hyoscine (the injected, with into that substance Townsend) scopolamine, and neither was it disclosed identical to was familiarly scopolamine is known as “truth serum.” Later on in that hyoscine scopolamine, testimony to trial, is identical there was hyoscine) scopolamine (or is “truth serum.” but been had of resistance power Townsend’s elusion characteriza- crucially informative But debilitated. have would the characterization drug, of the tion to intelligently laymen, mere jury, and enabled was inquiry, under the substance of nature grasp testimony. experts’ from the medical omitted inexplicably identity disclosure circumstances, Under fair, ato indispensable serum” a “truth hyoscine as And the facts. material development rounded, realistically testify fully cannot to failure experts’ medical Fay See default. inexcusable as Townsend’s regarded be V). Noia, (Part p. 438 post, v. be sufficient course, not, would it

theOn remand new evidence merely to hear District Court factual an unresolved Where record. re'ad the state-court significant factor is a evidence exists, demeanor dispute credibility, And credibility. questions adjudging testimony. conflicts resolution of basic to course, are evidence,14 competent record the state-court sure, beTo solely upon evi- rely may choose party either and the petitioner, but the record, in that contained dence present' other opportunity given be must State, to the relevant evidence documentary testimonial done here. was not This disputed issues. *25 not mean we do do, as we deciding case

In petition allegations the the truth prejudge on this record the only that We decide corpus. hearing. hold a obliged to was judge district federal remanded. Reversed and Goldberg, concurring. Mr. Justice the Court judgment opinion in the I join dissenting on comment by way of words a few add my Brother Stewart. opinion 2245, 2247. C. Cf. 28 S.U. §§ with agree I cannot Mr. Justice Stewart judge the trial on the given jury to the instructions of a credibility application proper indicate the issue of to measure the voluntariness —and constitutional test admissibility petitioner’s disputed hence the the—of my murder. In view, very confession of the Boone portions excerpted by my of the instructions Brother if support, anything, contrary conclusion Stewart that an improper constitutionally impermissible standard utilized by judge the trial himself in the suppression hearing. suggested

If, by my as Brother these instruc- Stewart, tions are taken to exclusionary evidence the standard by the trial in applied ruling on the petitioner’s suppress, they motion to reflect error of constitutional dimension, as the standard of admissibility does contained affirming opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court. appellate court, pointed While the opinion as out of The Chief see pp. 319-321, appears ante. Justice, adopted a test of “coherency” have to measure the admis- sibility of the confession, the trial court seemingly con- cluded that inducement amnesia was a prerequisite to disregard of the confession. Both standards, whether or incorporate intended to similar fail elements, to con- form requisite to the test.

The third paragraph of the quoted instructions by my 2, Brother Stewart post, p. footnote advises jury might that it discount the if confession it found that administration of the drug caused the petitioner to “lose memory,” his to suffer “a state of amnesia” during the period of questioning, and to be unable “to control his answers to assert will by denying charged.” his the crime By use of conjunctive incorporate requirement of loss of control, this instruction indicates the trial court’s apparent drug view that had the effect of overbear ing the petitioner’s will but did not also cause loss of *26 accept remain nonetheless would confession

memory, the by is buttressed conclusion This guilt. able evidence concluding paragraph the in quoted instruction the in dissenting opinion, my 2 in Brother note Stewart's might confession that the indicates court the trial which had the drug if simply the by jury the not disregarded be in to expert response petitioner’s the by effect asserted addition, so drug only if, but question, hypothetical “he did that consciousness petitioner’s affected have been may doing.” petitioner The was he know what may confessing doing he was of what fully aware that is not the issue. memory, but no loss of have suffered evidentiary measure of and the question, crucial drug— whether the Constitution, is propriety under affixed to it—so overbore or was not was whatever label confess unable to was resist will he petitioner’s was he conscious what or not he was ing. Whether been drug, of the have could, petitioner because doing, admitting guilt.* from stop himself wholly to unable I think we must indications, contrary In the absence of the constitutional misconception recognize well have may instructions by these standard evidenced hearing. suppression at the ruling judge’s trial infected the by the remainder negatived is not of error The inference con- of the permit disregard instructions, of the duress, or physical mental, by force, fession induced context of the instructions In reward. promise of not meet do “voluntariness” these references to whole, as a drug of the administration raised problems the crucial inference and do not vitiate admitting guilt, his sudden petitioner’s initial *The resistance succeeding flood of confessions change attitude, and the veritable drug him, ante, pp. see immediately upon administration possibility so overborne. that his will 306-307, the real all indicate seriously reliability of these of a number confessions Moreover, the impaired. ibid. See *27 upon the dependent exclusion as trial viewed

the drug-induced sterilization facts in addition to a presence of of will. petitioner’s opinion Court, contained in the of the

For the reasons I fair wholly of what to be the and on the basis believe proper misconceived the inference that the trial court admissibility of petitioner’s measure of constitutional lack indication trial court any of that the confession, appellate correct and the state court’s test, did utilize the application similarly standard, of a erroneous apparent I agree that must be held below.

Finally, opinion my the Court’s does not warrant propriety Brother Stewart’s criticism as to the or wisdom articulating govern grant of standards to of eviden- setting in tiary hearings corpus proceedings. habeas The of disposition certain standards is essential to of this case and a definition of their scope application appro- anis of priate adjudicatory obligations. exercise this Court’s Particularly when, here, as directing the Court is judiciary federal as to its role in applying the historic in a remedy involving large difficult area sensitive federalism, discharge issues of the careful of our function that, “in order to preclude counsels individualized enforce- ment of the in parts Constitution different Nation, lay . . . down specifically as as the nature of the [we] problem permits the standards or directions that should govern the Judges disposition District applica- corpus by tions for habeas prisoners under sentence of Brown Allen, State courts.” 443, v. U. S. 501-502 (separate opinion of Mr. Frankfurter). Justice whom Mr. Justice Clark, Mr.

Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice White join, dissenting. Harlan, Justice my disagreement basis with per- the Court can haps explained best be if I define at the outset the several I entirely areas in which am accord with the Court’s of constitu- issue underlying First, as to opinion. induced a confession agree completely I law, tional inad- constitutionally drugs is administration by agree I Secondly, trial. in a criminal missible standard an erroneous case stated Appeals Court court’s corpus, the district it said “[o]n when undisputed portions study limited to inquiry agree I Thirdly, 329. 276 F. 2d . . .” the record. *28 corpus a writ of habeas for applicant that where relief, him to would entitle proved, which, alleges facts is made has application to which federal court anew.1 try the facts and evidence to receive power in case two of this disposition the Court’s I differ with wisdom doubt the strongly I First, respects. important cata- a vehicle any other —as using this case—or inflexibly which are a of standards in advance set loguing evidentiary hearings grant judges district compel I that think Secondly, corpus proceedings. in habeas present required in the evidentiary hearing de novo which the Court’s very standards under case, even opinion elaborates.

I. with the Court’s statement quarrel I no have determine which should governing principle the basic corpus in a federal habeas is to be had hearing whether a original 2243 directed Indeed, version of 28 U. S. C. § summary way of the “proceed to determine the in a court to facts thereupon testimony to dis by hearing arguments, and and ease, Johnston, justice require.” Walker v. pose party law and See as (Emphasis added.) was later The statute 312 U. S. 283-284. summarily hear provides “The court shall it now revised so that justice and facts, dispose of the matter as law and determine change was one of require.” that the Revisers’ notes indicate “phraseology” not substance. any reliably relevant to found facts state court has Where the course, give hearing should,

issue, the in such district findings. ante, p. See 318. appropriate to such deference in dispute, the facts are the federal proceeding: “Where in corpus evidentiary court must hold an hear- ing if the habeas did not receive a full and applicant evidentiary hearing fair in a either at court, state proceeding.” Ante, time of the trial in a collateral or p. rightly says 312. But the Court would “[i]t I overly particularize test,” be unwise to think attempting hearing to erect detailed standards myriad presented by for the situations federal habeas disregards corpus applications, the Court its own wise admonition. today

The Court has done little more than to supply new phrases imprecise scope and uncertain mean- — ing the habeas corpus vocabulary of District Court —for And because judges. they purport to establish manda- tory requirements guidelines, rather than the tests opinion elaborated in the run the Court’s serious risk of becoming talismanic phrases, the mechanistic invocation of which will alone determine whether not a is to be had.

More the fundamentally, enunciation of an elaborate governing set of corpus hearings standards is in required, no sense in invited, even order to decide the us, case before many pages the opinion Court’s which set these standards forth cannot, justi- be therefore, fied even in terms the normal function of dictum. The reasons for the rule against advisory opinions pur- which port questions to decide not actually in issue are too well repeating established to need g., this late date. e. See, Co., Marine Cooks v. Panama S. S. 365, 368, U. S. Board, n. Machinists Local v. Labor 5; S. 411, 415, U. I regard n. 5. these peculiarly reasons as persuasive in present context. try should not to hedge We in with essentially inflexible rules what is an extraordinary writ, designed to in justice do extraordinary and unpre- often dictable situations.

II. hearing standards detailed the Court’s accepting Even one of them any agree that toto, I cannot however, in evidentiary hear- hold a new District Court requires rigid these putting And I think, case. ing present in the govern- principles side, accepted to one formulations justice of criminal administration prompt ing the fair against counsel affirmatively system our federal within case. hearing in this court de novo federal it feels which specific defects refers to two The Court the absence District Court: hearing compel a trial whether would indicate “indicia which ruling upon of federal law standard proper applied fact that it and the admissibility of the confession” substance hearing that “the in the state was not disclosed prop- has he confessed Townsend before injected into legal in a sense invol- may trigger statements erties testimony from the lengthy extracts untary.” Since me do not seem to opinion in the Court’s and pleadings sketch the necessary it issues, these becomes to bear on Iwhy indicate think the in this case to prior proceedings that a new concluding is mistaken Court required. January 1, 1954, early morning

During the hours He Chicago police. was arrested the petitioner having given injection himself an heroin 90 admitted of his arrest, his arrest. hour minutes before Within crimes, for 30 minutes about various questioned he was having he denied committed. He was not all of which again evening. until that questioned evening questioning Shortly began, peti- after stomach complained pains requested tioner *30 surgeon A was police summoned, doctor. he admin- consisting of 2 a injection cc.’s of saline solution istered grain hyoscine hydrobromide in which 1/230 % grain of phenobarbital were Slightly dissolved. more than an hour later, petitioner the confessed to the murder of Boone. following day, 15 hours after police the surgeon had administered the hyoscine, petitioner the initialed copy previous a of his night’s in statement offices of Attorney the State’s General. At the coroner’s January on petitioner again confessed to killing. Boone Applied A. The Standard Federal Law Ruling Upon State Trial Court in Admissibility of the Confession.

At the trial, petitioner’s lawyer objected to intro- duction of the ground confession on the that it was invol- untary. In with accordance Illinois practice, the motion to suppress argued before the the absence of the jury. During this proceeding, testified the injection produced had temporary state amnesia, that he could not making remember any confes- sion, and that physical various other effects were pro- duced. The police present officers the petitioner’s questioning stated no change in the petitioner’s de- meanor suggesting any loss of his mental faculties had taken place as a result of the injection. On the question possible effects of injection administered to the petitioner, Dr. Mansfield, the police surgeon and a licensed physician, testified for the State that he had treated thousands of narcotics suffering addicts from with- drawal symptoms, about of such he cases had 50% used the same treatment administered to the petitioner, and that he could no recall case in his experience where his use of hyoscine had produced loss memory. A doc- tor of pharmacology (who was not a licensed physician) testified on behalf of the petitioner, and in answer to a hypothetical question stated that person peti- tioner’s condition at the time of interrogation could have *31 as of consciousness partial and loss amnesia suffering

been been administered which had the treatment result of the cross- symptoms. On withdrawal the narcotic to relieve that he had never witness revealed this examination, and ad- a human hyoscine on the effects actually seen treating drug in with its use he was unfamiliar mitted that rea- fact could with that a finder of It is evident addicts. offered credibility to the evidence accorded more have son defense. by to that offered the than by prosecution overruling today says, that as the Court true, It is did confession, judge the trial suppress the motion he was exclusionary standards spell out the explicitly jury to the at the end The instructions applying. of credi- although question directed to the case, however, Illi- under jury was the issue before the bility —since voluntariness, couched procedure nois terms —were was aware clearly judge that the trial they established applied.2 to be constitutional standards of the correct given following: Among were the instructions alleged evidence a written confession “There has been admitted into voluntarily by freely the defendant. been made to have freely confession made further instructed that a “You are by may voluntarily by person charged with crime be considered a a any force, physically you find the evidence that you, but if from having upon by mentally, been the defendant those has exerted confession, charge after his arrest in order obtain defendant persons any promises him if he made to reward or that those you may disregard confession, totally such would then make such confession. you further instructed that find from the evidence

“You are drugs drugs given said caused him the defendant was and that memory his and create a state of amnesia in defendant to lose police during questioning or State’s defendant Attorney his the defendant was not able to control answers and that you may by denying charged, his will the crime then or to assert disregard totally such confession. you any find from the

“You are instructed that if evidence that upon to duress used on the defendant amounted influence was standard Nothing in record indicates that incorrect hearing. these suppression Given applied impermissible for us completely I think it circumstances, apply proper did not “the to assume that the trial admissibility ruling upon law in standard federal *32 totally is Where, here, as record of the confession.” employed trial any judge indication that state devoid standard, presumption the an erroneous constitutional the law and cor- surely judge should be that the knew Certainly improper presume it to rectly applied it. is did not know the law which the judge that the trial Con- precisely him to follow. Yet that is stitution commands presumption which the Court makes in this case. the body you confession, his mind or him make the then which caused may totally disregard the confession. you the evidence further instructed that if believe from

“You are physically mentally, was influence either in this case that duress or upon him to make the written exerted the defendant which caused may you evidence, into then which has been introduced confession in existence this influence still further consider whether was inquest alleged appeared at the coroner’s time the defendant made a confession there. to have testimony of a wit- been into evidence the

“There has introduced Witness,’ ‘Expert who category known as an ness, who is drugs upon a certain had influence or effect testified as to what person. hypothetical may testimony you take this into further instructed that

“You are drugs alleged been determining to have whether consideration by have the Dr. Mansfield would to the defendant administered drug opinion in the upon the that the effect defendant same you if believe upon hypothetical person, and ‘Expert had Witness’ upon drugs the effect that the had the evidence in this case from all impaired be to the extent his consciousness to defendant to cause being ques- doing was while he was did not know what he that he you Attorney, by police Assistant State’s then officers or the tioned alleged any he is may totally disregard or confession that statement upon influence, any, exerted during such was the time to have made him.” op “Properties” op the Medicine

B. Disclosure Petitioner. to the Administered presented had been of the evidence Much by jury before the brought subsequently alone was weight diminish the attempt in an counsel defense Additional evidence the confession. given to to be testimony by including prosecution, adduced also hyoscine clear that who made physician, another licensed case was submitted The scopolamine. with was identical and the instructions,3 unexceptionable jury to the under to death. convicted sentenced petitioner was reviewing in detail the after evi- Supreme Court, Illinois confession, bearing on voluntariness dence 11 Ill. 141 N. E. 2d 729. the conviction. 2d affirmed rehearing certiorari, 850; denied 355 U. S. This Court denied, 355 S. 886. U. *33 proceed- post-conviction

The then instituted petitioner in proceed- in state trial court. His claim these ings the procured the confession had been as a result ings was that that scopolamine, of the administration of the witnesses identity scopolamine were aware of the of the State hyoscine deliberately and had withheld the of and fact and identity trial, petitioner the had conse- an quently opportunity not been afforded to make clear the basis for his claim that his confession had been coerced. The trial court dismissed the petition, Supreme the of In unpublished Court Illinois affirmed. opinion, that court concluded as follows:

“A study opinion of our on original appeal] [the discloses that all of the evidence with respect of injection hyoscine the and phenobarbital was carefully by considered us resolving the issue of validity petitioner’s of (People confession. vs. supra. See footnote Townsend, 2d, Ill. 30, 35, 44). it is clear Thus, the issue of of drug the effect on the con- fession was us ... . only before matter which presented was not then was the fact hyoscine and scopolamine are identical. In an attempt escape from the judicata, doctrine res the present petition for a writ of error contends that this fact could not have been presented to us because it was unknown to and his counsel at the time. Assuming for the moment the truth this state- ment, we are opinion that the mere fact that the drug which was to petitioner administered is known two different presents names no consti- tutional issue. At the original trial there was exten- sive medical testimony as to the properties and hyoscine. effects of If hyoscine scopolamine are, in fact, identical, testimony medical as to properties these and effects would be same, re- gardless of the name of drug. In determining drug effect on the validity petitioner’s confession, the vital issue was its nature and its effect, rather than its name. This was thoroughly issue presented, trial both court this Court. Furthermore, by petitioner the claim now that 'suppressed’ State this identity hyoscine and sco- polamine at the trial destroyed by reference to the bill of exceptions from original trial. A State medical witness, on cross-examination by petitioner’s 'Scopolamine counsel or hyoscine stated: are the ” *34 same.’ Even under detailed hearing the requirements an- today by nounced the Court, therefore, I think it clear is that the district had no choice but to on conclude, the basis of his examination full record of the state proceedings, hearing that a new on corpus would proceedings of the state For the record

not be proper. fair full and a received petitioner that clearly shows for his constitutional factual foundation to the as had e., drug which claim—i. properties toas sur- circumstances him and the to administered been experts medical of 3 total A rounding his confession. testimony was Their testified. lay witnesses and 17 conflicting upon trial court determined The conflict. petitioner’s basis no there was factual evidence There involuntary. had been his confession claim that an inference support to in the record nothing whatever a com- apply scrupulously did not the trial court determining that standard constitutional correct pletely deter- trial court’s was admissible.4 confession Supreme Court by the reviewed fully mination was post-con- in state again and on reviewed appeal, Illinois trial at the no witness sure, To be proceedings. viction has phrase which “truth serum” —a phrase no. used but I cannot meaning. Yet or scientific precise medical mere Illinois that Supreme Court with the agree than one name by more known drug may a be fact issue. constitutional hardly presents has the of Illinois the State Constitution our Under justice. own criminal its duty to administer power must each must, Illinois as duty, out that carrying In of the Four- Process Clause Due to the State, conform clearly accorded Illinois has I think Amendment. teenth To a fed- require this case. process due of factual claims trial hold new court now eral the courts fairly determined in ago fully long were prompt fair frustrate the think, I is, of Illinois the fun- disrespect criminal justice, administration debase system, and to of our federal damental structure Corpus. of Habeas Great Writ I would affirm. supra. 330-331, pp. See