People v. d'Estree
2024 COA 106
Colo. Ct. App.2024Check TreatmentOpinion Summary
Facts
- The partition action involves two properties in Charlestown, Rhode Island, owned by Peter Karasuk, Lee Karasuk Ingley, and Sandra Karasuk Puchalski as joint tenants. [lines="53-55"].
- The siblings inherited the properties from their mother’s estate in 2017 and later attempted to sell them, which resulted in a partition action filed by plaintiffs on May 3, 2021. [lines="56-60"].
- After numerous continuances for various reasons, including the defendant's hearing impairment, a request for property tax payments from plaintiffs was granted, requiring each sibling to pay an equal share. [lines="90-96"].
- Defendant failed to appear at important hearings, and her appeals were subsequently dismissed by the trial court. [lines="98-104"].
- The Superior Court granted the motion for the sale of the properties and appointed a commissioner to oversee the sale on January 4, 2023. [lines="135-140"].
Issues
- Whether the trial court properly quashed the statement filed by the defendant in the Town of Charlestown Land Evidence Records. [lines="231-232"].
- Whether the trial court erred by granting the commissioner’s petition for instructions to engage a title examiner and appraiser. [lines="281-282"].
- Whether dismissals of defendant's appeals were properly executed given her claims of inadequate notice. [lines="358-359"].
Holdings
- The court affirmed the order quashing the defendant’s statement, as it did not dispute the title to the properties and was treated as a lis pendens. [lines="276-277"].
- The court found no error in granting the commissioner’s petition for instructions, as the defendant waived any lack of notice by being present when the matter was discussed. [lines="286-288"].
- The court upheld the dismissals of the defendant's appeals based on her failure to appear at crucial hearings and her acknowledgment of notice. [lines="376-378"].
OPINION
<div><div><div><div id="pdf-container" style="width: 782px"> <div id="pf1" data-page-no="1"> <div> <div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>SUMMARY </div> <div>October 3, 2024 </div> <div> </div> <div>2024COA106
<span> </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>No. 22CA0237, <span>People v. d<span>â</span><span>Estree</span></span><span> </span><span>â</span> Constitutional Law <span>â</span> </div>
<div>Fourth Amendment <span>â</span> Searches and Seizures <span>â</span> Exclusionary </div>
<div>Rule <span>â</span> Independent Source Exception <span>â</span> Inevitable Discovery </div>
<div>Exception<span> </span>
</div>
<div>A division of the court of appeals reverses the district court<span>â</span><span>s </span>
</div>
<div>decision declining to suppress evidence obtained from t<span></span>he second of </div>
<div>two warrants issued to search the contents of a defendant<span>â</span>s cell </div>
<div>phone. While the second warrant would have met the inde<span></span>pendent </div>
<div>source doctrineâs requirements, <span>here police used an illegally </span>
</div>
<div>obtained cell phone PIN code to execute the otherwise lawful second </div>
<div>warrant. Thus, the district court should have excluded evidence </div>
<div>obtained from the phone at trial. The division further holds that </div>
<div>when police seek to obtain a cell phone PIN code without a </div>
<div>defendant<span>âs consent, in this case via a digital âbrute force at<span></span>tack,â </span>
</div>
<div>this constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment and </div>
</div>
<div>
<div>The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions </div>
<div>constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by </div>
<div>the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be </div>
<div>cited or relied upon as they are not the <span>official language of the division. </span> </div>
<div>Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion </div>
<div>should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. </div>
</div>
</div>
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<div><div>
<div> </div>
<div>requires authorization via a warrant. Finally, the division holds </div>
<div>that the use of the PIN code here does not meet the requi<span></span>rements of </div>
<div>the inevitable discovery doctrine as police abandoned the lawful </div>
<div>search to find the PIN code pursuant to the second warrant and </div>
<div>expedited their access to the phone using the PIN code illegally </div>
<div>obtained pursuant to the first warrant<span>. </span>The defendant<span>â</span>s convictions </div>
<div>are reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court to hold </div>
<div>a new trial<span>. </span> </div>
<div> <span> </span>The special concurrence highlights t<span>wo</span> aspects of the </div>
<div>inevitable discovery jurisprudence that may warrant </div>
<div>reconsideration. </div>
</div></div>
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<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMq/p6V/MMqp6VuLCMHl7TCMfDWkGnolJvg0MLudk5YNy1msQMWA4%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPS6UWKBZO&Expires=1728536566&Signature=QPcEch2GMT7AujAlMyrmicXJhLo%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIFtfD2Ez3JMDb4MbnsKue0sSlWceRGAVSolTbgmrm9VJAiA3JPi4P6S9extweDDPns%2Bd5h%2FYlzrI5Hw5Lx32j2zGGCqyBQhtEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM4TgBc5ht0DC2AJY%2FKo8F7qSALm9PItWg%2BCzJYMsqcR%2BY63pXgo6JCCEGS1plO0dn3TawAeo5fsJJAP9e6YZerRshoIe27gzpWWY53NzdxGt6ZO3l%2FuM4TEYyP935rQdKgnR03XSk9vuaQ45OGVgNCUAyJ38AX8FNnhn0LJXaZjnSmleqm27mI%2BEs%2FKkfXA8KEjZmpUejdDqf7Ya108h6%2BwNsPDDBuNNM3Ht3sbOd11BYlx1lLWV4a8H7u94Bow68BMB8VIiC7mwbPxnS0fBg9w71z09vGd7JQElHJuBcKc9GwdOF0KPZ8Gs%2BpIL4glv7ikLuzynlkUR5VRT3DezH3dlyLz%2Bgh%2BN5S7KKQEF63TwbeLiggOzlQJPc0oQpVWgtY8pZ0u5o7XmTOJQ%2BNGIw1DvRh7NUKgBuBwfZQZDkVRJ1Wfm4PawOjOBGet1w82qp0b%2BLa2NuqCjLW7%2Fyl%2FadKPfdARcP8ltQXsk4LDt59oZBYulpcwcm3egPXLCJIrPtNyvXm0lUB8QsYqbSEXiG2NybT0l%2FD%2FUj9S0aCWGFbgAi0jVa4JUI36uRpKfl%2ByF%2F1c6Op19SBu3RtFJeiedbMYn85UYYm5cfOobB4gmL8Q33m%2FgClUBeY%2BXaK7prVtXr8nKceJz8Wsi%2B0vzEyGlTrKkGE3Ec%2F9I%2FCsvSRZCvhk7KZE7Q9iqdQ19gPXDwS3%2FM7RqKlEe0I9U3DJUdP3r7LmfExhdTzHQ7EwtScIoDy7PtWYWQhxT7OZcrOYuTUukm8AtlRBPL2McaEFfbk50WeNjYi%2FtMl8ukSvrZzaGtzmXEeOLWsRH6aWk8jcnutFMP%2BnM2l2Ff%2FOFPj4CnUxfi5dKriCupfngdNmm1jxhz6Ek5xZ0F3xY5TmHZ9%2BxFazCMnJ24BjqyAdBrXXeffGhNbbjae78%2BtzJVgxPmy8XeQL3C8jx3eNyZJ7cnKKMib%2BC3qodL9uDu%2F5F21Qgn8gwklrISpeRjnm3th7sIc6FGJGEQ%2BJuJr90anXl2WRB1z2p0QYa342p%2B6VBvG%2ByGf7FJ356zmyz8aLCNduYJCzja8a5QuZ6iarOCgSbX3YtbGUDvUjJR0bY8g2V%2B67gGtpTb%2BUjYAIquI1CllkC5nEi6LbN4PyAL326%2BSFE%3D"><div>
<div> </div>
<div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS <span>2024COA106</span> </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Court of Appeals No. 22CA0237 </div>
<div>Jefferson County District Court No. 19CR4149<span> </span>
</div>
<div>Honorable Jeffrey R. Pilkington, Judge </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>The People of the State of Colorado, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Plaintiff-Appellee, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>v. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Alec dâEstree,<span> </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Defendant-Appellant. </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE<span> </span>
</div>
<div>REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS<span> </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Division II </div>
<div>Opinion by JUDGE FOX </div>
<div>Sullivan, J., concurs </div>
<div>Grove, J., specially concurs </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Announced October 3, 2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, Senior Counsel, Denver, </div>
<div>Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Gregory Lansky, Alternate Defense Counsel, Aurora, Colorado, for Defendant-</div>
<div>Appellant</div>
</div>
</div>
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<div><div>
<div>1 </div>
<div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>Defendant, Alec d<span>â</span>Estree, appeals his convictions, challenging </span>
</div>
<div>the district court<span>â</span>s order declining to suppress evidence gathered </div>
<div>from his cell phone using a PIN code obtained via an infirm </div>
<div>warrant<span>. <span>We reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new </span></span>
</div>
<div>trial. </div>
<div>I.<span> <span>Background </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>On<span> October 15, 2019, Lakewood police officers responded to a </span></span>
</div>
<div>shooting outside an apartment complex around midnight<span>. </span>They </div>
<div>found the victim <span>â</span> who had been shot in the chest <span>â</span> in the </div>
<div>parking lot. First responders transported him to the hospital, </div>
<div>where he later died<span>. </span>A neighbor testified that, shortly before police </div>
<div>arrived, she heard arguing<span>, </span>a car horn<span>, </span>and then a gunshot, and </div>
<div>saw<span> three individuals rush to a waiting car before driving away.<span></span> At </span>
</div>
<div>trial, Autumn Lucero <span>â</span> who had been present when the shooting </div>
<div>occurred and accepted a plea deal from the prosecution before she </div>
<div>testified <span>â</span> detailed her version of the events leading up to the </div>
<div>killing<span>. <span> <span> <span> </span></span></span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 3<span> </span><span>Lucero testified that, on October 14, 2019, she was traveling </span>
</div>
<div>with her ex-boyfriend Manuel Garcia and her cousin Dominic </div>
</div></div>
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<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPS6UWKBZO&Expires=1728536566&Signature=IN1%2FJthdKqjDODiP4FUaHzin3eA%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIFtfD2Ez3JMDb4MbnsKue0sSlWceRGAVSolTbgmrm9VJAiA3JPi4P6S9extweDDPns%2Bd5h%2FYlzrI5Hw5Lx32j2zGGCqyBQhtEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM4TgBc5ht0DC2AJY%2FKo8F7qSALm9PItWg%2BCzJYMsqcR%2BY63pXgo6JCCEGS1plO0dn3TawAeo5fsJJAP9e6YZerRshoIe27gzpWWY53NzdxGt6ZO3l%2FuM4TEYyP935rQdKgnR03XSk9vuaQ45OGVgNCUAyJ38AX8FNnhn0LJXaZjnSmleqm27mI%2BEs%2FKkfXA8KEjZmpUejdDqf7Ya108h6%2BwNsPDDBuNNM3Ht3sbOd11BYlx1lLWV4a8H7u94Bow68BMB8VIiC7mwbPxnS0fBg9w71z09vGd7JQElHJuBcKc9GwdOF0KPZ8Gs%2BpIL4glv7ikLuzynlkUR5VRT3DezH3dlyLz%2Bgh%2BN5S7KKQEF63TwbeLiggOzlQJPc0oQpVWgtY8pZ0u5o7XmTOJQ%2BNGIw1DvRh7NUKgBuBwfZQZDkVRJ1Wfm4PawOjOBGet1w82qp0b%2BLa2NuqCjLW7%2Fyl%2FadKPfdARcP8ltQXsk4LDt59oZBYulpcwcm3egPXLCJIrPtNyvXm0lUB8QsYqbSEXiG2NybT0l%2FD%2FUj9S0aCWGFbgAi0jVa4JUI36uRpKfl%2ByF%2F1c6Op19SBu3RtFJeiedbMYn85UYYm5cfOobB4gmL8Q33m%2FgClUBeY%2BXaK7prVtXr8nKceJz8Wsi%2B0vzEyGlTrKkGE3Ec%2F9I%2FCsvSRZCvhk7KZE7Q9iqdQ19gPXDwS3%2FM7RqKlEe0I9U3DJUdP3r7LmfExhdTzHQ7EwtScIoDy7PtWYWQhxT7OZcrOYuTUukm8AtlRBPL2McaEFfbk50WeNjYi%2FtMl8ukSvrZzaGtzmXEeOLWsRH6aWk8jcnutFMP%2BnM2l2Ff%2FOFPj4CnUxfi5dKriCupfngdNmm1jxhz6Ek5xZ0F3xY5TmHZ9%2BxFazCMnJ24BjqyAdBrXXeffGhNbbjae78%2BtzJVgxPmy8XeQL3C8jx3eNyZJ7cnKKMib%2BC3qodL9uDu%2F5F21Qgn8gwklrISpeRjnm3th7sIc6FGJGEQ%2BJuJr90anXl2WRB1z2p0QYa342p%2B6VBvG%2ByGf7FJ356zmyz8aLCNduYJCzja8a5QuZ6iarOCgSbX3YtbGUDvUjJR0bY8g2V%2B67gGtpTb%2BUjYAIquI1CllkC5nEi6LbN4PyAL326%2BSFE%3D"><div>
<div>2 </div>
<div>Maestas.</div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> Garcia and Maestas <span>st</span>ole several items from a </div>
<div>convenience store and later robb<span>ed</span> some teenagers <span>in</span> <span>a </span>grocery </div>
<div>store parking lot. D<span>â</span>Estree was at Lucero<span>â</span><span>s </span><span>apartment</span><span>, </span>to which <span></span>the </div>
<div>group had returned after the robbery<span>. </span><span>DâEstree joined t</span><span>he</span> group<span>, </span>
</div>
<div>which then went to a friend<span>â</span>s house where Garcia re<span>tr</span>ieved a silver </div>
<div>handgun. </div>
<div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>The group next traveled to a private residence in Littleton </span>
</div>
<div>where, two weeks before, they had sold a stolen iPhone to an </div>
<div>individual. According to Lucero, Garcia<span>â</span>s sister <span>â</span>had gotten beat up </div>
<div>for the stolen iPhone,<span>â</span> so the group returned to the residence <span>â</span>to </div>
<div>retaliate.<span>â</span><span> Garcia fired the silver handgun at the house <span>â</span>[s]ix or </span>
</div>
<div>seven times<span>â</span> in a drive-<span>by</span> shooting, <span>but</span> no one was harm<span></span>ed.</div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 5<span> </span><span>Lucero testified that the group still wanted to <span>â</span>make some </span>
</div>
<div>money<span>â</span><span> by </span><span>â</span><span>robbing, stealing cars, et cetera.<span>â</span> While at <span>an<span></span><span> </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>apartment complex<span>, </span>Lucero saw d<span>â</span>Estree leave the car with the </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> Lucero, Garcia, and Maestas were originally set to be t<span></span>ried </div>
<div>together as codefendants with d<span>â</span>Estree, but the district court later </div>
<div>severed d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s trial.<span> </span><span> </span>
</div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> A prosecution expert later testified that her analysis of<span></span> shell </div>
<div>casings and the bullets led her to conclude that the same gun <span></span>was </div>
<div>used in the drive-by shooting and the homicide<span>. <span>A </span></span>matching shell </div>
<div>was also found in Lucero<span>â</span>s apartment. <span> </span>
</div>
</div>
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<div>3 </div>
<div>silver handgun before hearing yelling, a car horn, and a gunsh<span></span>ot. </div>
<div>D<span>â</span><span>Estree returned to the car and the group left the victim <span></span>in the </span>
</div>
<div>parking lot.<span> </span>After arriving home, Lucero photographed Garcia, </div>
<div>Maestas, and d<span>â</span>Estree posing with the gun. According t<span></span>o Lucero, </div>
<div>the next day d<span>â</span>Estree used his phone to search the internet for </div>
<div>â<span>anything about what happened the night before.</span>â<span> <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>The defense pointed out on cross-examination that Lucero<span>â</span><span>s </span></span>
</div>
<div>trial testimony substantially differed from her earlier statements to </div>
<div>police. For example, in her first interview with police in Novembe<span></span>r </div>
<div>2019, Lucero only told them about the drive-by shooting and not </div>
<div>the homicide<span>. </span>During that interview Lucero claimed that only she, </div>
<div>Garcia, and Maestas were in the car for the drive-<span>by</span> shooting; <span></span>at </div>
<div>trial, she said that she had initially <span>â</span><span>forgotten<span>â</span></span> that d<span>â</span>Estree was </div>
<div>there. Lucero further first told police that Garcia forced her, at </div>
<div>gunpoint, to drive the car to the drive-by shooting location and that </div>
<div>d<span>â</span><span>Estree later forced her, at gunpoint, to remain in the bac<span></span>kseat of </span>
</div>
<div>the car during the robbery that resulted in the victim<span>â</span>s death<span>. </span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 7<span> </span><span>Sergeant Jonathan Holloway testified that the homicide </span>
</div>
<div>investigation initially produced no suspects, nor did anything </div>
<div>connect the drive-by shooting to the homicide, until the police </div>
</div></div>
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<div>4 </div>
<div>learned that Garcia wanted to speak to them<span>. </span>Once aware of </div>
<div>d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span><span>s potential involvement police arrested him, and lat<span></span>er </span></span>
</div>
<div>charged him on November 14, 2019. Police also seized his Apple </div>
<div>iPhone, and searched and downloaded all of its cont<span></span>ents after </div>
<div>acquiring a search warrant on November 20, 2019<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 8<span> </span><span>The district court, however, concluded the first search warrant </span>
</div>
<div>for the cell phone<span>â</span>s contents was invalid because it was overbroad<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>The prosecution later sought a second warrant to repeat the sea<span></span>rch<span>, </span>
</div>
<div>as <span>discussed in greater detail below. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 9<span> </span><span>Pursuant to the second warrant, the court allowed police to </span>
</div>
<div>search the contents of d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s cell phone from October 1, <span></span>2019, </div>
<div>to November 12, 2019, and the prosecution presented evidence </div>
<div>collected from the phone <span>at dâEstreeâs </span>homicide trial. The </div>
<div>prosecution admitted four pictures recovered from d<span>â<span>Estree</span><span>â</span></span>s phone </div>
<div>taken inside Lucero<span>â</span>s home approximately one hour after the </div>
<div>homicide<span>. <span> <span>One image showed Maestas and d<span>â</span>Estree standing, while </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>d<span>â</span><span>Estree pointed a silver handgun at the camera. One image </span>
</div>
<div>showed Garcia smiling for the camera, and another showed </div>
<div>Maestas with two handguns, one black and the other silver, t<span></span>ucked </div>
</div></div>
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<div>5 </div>
<div>into the strap of what appeared to be a bulletproof vest<span></span>. The last </div>
<div>image showed Garcia pointing both handguns at the camera. <span></span> <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>The phone also contained several text messages d<span>â</span>Estree sent </span>
</div>
<div>in the weeks following the homicide<span>. </span> Most notably, d<span>â</span>Estree sent </div>
<div>the following message on November 3, 2019: </div>
<div>Ayee fam <span>. . .</span> just gotta check in with all my </div>
<div>n[*****]s before I get locked up just wanted to </div>
<div>let you know I appreciate you fam . . . [.] </div>
<div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>The recipient of the message asked when d<span>â</span>Estree would go to </span>
</div>
<div>prison, and d<span>â</span>Estree responded: <span>â</span>Shit they ain<span>â</span>t kaught me y<span></span>et but </div>
<div>they looking for somebody they just won<span>â</span>t release the name and shit </div>
<div>link soon fam.<span>â</span><span> </span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 12<span> </span><span>Police also recovered d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s internet search history<span>. </span></span>
</div>
<div>Holloway testified that police found <span>â</span>[s]earch histories for looking </div>
<div>for man shot, articles of man shot in West Denver and Lak<span></span>ewood<span>â</span> </div>
<div>from October 15 and 16, 2019. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 13<span> </span><span>The jury found d<span>â</span>Estree guilty on all charges <span>â</span> first degree </span>
</div>
<div>felony murder, second degree murder, conspiracy to <span></span>commit </div>
<div>aggravated robbery, three charges of criminal attempt to commit </div>
</div></div>
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<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPS6UWKBZO&Expires=1728536566&Signature=IN1%2FJthdKqjDODiP4FUaHzin3eA%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIFtfD2Ez3JMDb4MbnsKue0sSlWceRGAVSolTbgmrm9VJAiA3JPi4P6S9extweDDPns%2Bd5h%2FYlzrI5Hw5Lx32j2zGGCqyBQhtEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM4TgBc5ht0DC2AJY%2FKo8F7qSALm9PItWg%2BCzJYMsqcR%2BY63pXgo6JCCEGS1plO0dn3TawAeo5fsJJAP9e6YZerRshoIe27gzpWWY53NzdxGt6ZO3l%2FuM4TEYyP935rQdKgnR03XSk9vuaQ45OGVgNCUAyJ38AX8FNnhn0LJXaZjnSmleqm27mI%2BEs%2FKkfXA8KEjZmpUejdDqf7Ya108h6%2BwNsPDDBuNNM3Ht3sbOd11BYlx1lLWV4a8H7u94Bow68BMB8VIiC7mwbPxnS0fBg9w71z09vGd7JQElHJuBcKc9GwdOF0KPZ8Gs%2BpIL4glv7ikLuzynlkUR5VRT3DezH3dlyLz%2Bgh%2BN5S7KKQEF63TwbeLiggOzlQJPc0oQpVWgtY8pZ0u5o7XmTOJQ%2BNGIw1DvRh7NUKgBuBwfZQZDkVRJ1Wfm4PawOjOBGet1w82qp0b%2BLa2NuqCjLW7%2Fyl%2FadKPfdARcP8ltQXsk4LDt59oZBYulpcwcm3egPXLCJIrPtNyvXm0lUB8QsYqbSEXiG2NybT0l%2FD%2FUj9S0aCWGFbgAi0jVa4JUI36uRpKfl%2ByF%2F1c6Op19SBu3RtFJeiedbMYn85UYYm5cfOobB4gmL8Q33m%2FgClUBeY%2BXaK7prVtXr8nKceJz8Wsi%2B0vzEyGlTrKkGE3Ec%2F9I%2FCsvSRZCvhk7KZE7Q9iqdQ19gPXDwS3%2FM7RqKlEe0I9U3DJUdP3r7LmfExhdTzHQ7EwtScIoDy7PtWYWQhxT7OZcrOYuTUukm8AtlRBPL2McaEFfbk50WeNjYi%2FtMl8ukSvrZzaGtzmXEeOLWsRH6aWk8jcnutFMP%2BnM2l2Ff%2FOFPj4CnUxfi5dKriCupfngdNmm1jxhz6Ek5xZ0F3xY5TmHZ9%2BxFazCMnJ24BjqyAdBrXXeffGhNbbjae78%2BtzJVgxPmy8XeQL3C8jx3eNyZJ7cnKKMib%2BC3qodL9uDu%2F5F21Qgn8gwklrISpeRjnm3th7sIc6FGJGEQ%2BJuJr90anXl2WRB1z2p0QYa342p%2B6VBvG%2ByGf7FJ356zmyz8aLCNduYJCzja8a5QuZ6iarOCgSbX3YtbGUDvUjJR0bY8g2V%2B67gGtpTb%2BUjYAIquI1CllkC5nEi6LbN4PyAL326%2BSFE%3D"><div>
<div>6 </div>
<div>aggravated robbery,</div>
</div>
<div><div>3</div></div>
<div>
<div> and two crime of violence sentence enhancers<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>The district court only sentenced d<span>â</span>Estree for his felony murde<span></span>r and </div>
<div>conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery convictions because hi<span></span>s </div>
<div>second degree murder and attempt to commit aggravated robbe<span></span>ry </div>
<div>convictions merged into his felony murder conviction. The district </div>
<div>court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole for his </div>
<div>felony murder conviction and sixteen years in the custody of the </div>
<div>Department of Corrections for the conspiracy to commit<span></span> aggravated </div>
<div>robbery conviction, served concurrently<span>. </span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 14<span> </span><span>This appeal followed<span>. D<span>â</span></span>Estree rais<span>es</span> four main issues<span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>arguing that (1) the district court erred by declining to suppress </div>
<div>evidence gathered from his phone after the second warrant was </div>
<div>issued; (2) Lucero was coerced into waiving her Fifth Amendm<span></span>ent </div>
<div>rights and testifying at trial, with the district court improperly </div>
<div>advising the jury not to consider Lucero<span>â</span>s punishment; (3) the </div>
<div>district court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>3</div></div>
<div>
<div> The prosecution charged d<span>â</span>Estree with three counts of att<span></span>empt to </div>
<div>commit aggravated robbery under three different theories, but the </div>
<div>district court did not require that the prosecution elect <span></span>a specific </div>
<div>theory; rather, it exercised its discretion to simply impose </div>
<div>concurrent sentences for each of the theories under which d<span>â</span>Estr<span></span>ee </div>
<div>was found guilty. <span> </span>
</div>
</div>
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<div>7 </div>
<div>criminal attempt; and (4) given his youth, his sentence to life </div>
<div>without the possibility of parole for felony murder is </div>
<div>unconstitutional. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 15<span> </span><span>We conclude that, in gathering evidence from d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s cell </span>
</div>
<div>phone, police violated the Fourth Amendment and that no </div>
<div>exceptions to the warrant requirement apply, and that the error in </div>
<div>allowing the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable <span></span>doubt<span>. </span> </div>
<div>We thus reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new </div>
<div>trial. We need not address d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s other contentions because </div>
<div>they may not arise on retrial<span>. </span> <span>See People v. Cook</span><span>,</span><span> </span>197 P.3d 269, </div>
<div>277 (Colo. App. 2008)<span>. </span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>II.<span> <span>Phone Search Conducted Pursuant to the Second Warrant </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 16<span> </span><span>As to the second warrant, d<span>â</span>Estree argues that (1) police<span>â</span>s use </span>
</div>
<div>of the PIN code</div>
</div>
<div><div>4</div></div>
<div>
<div> violated the independent source doctrine because </div>
<div>the PIN code was discovered during the first suppressed sea<span></span>rch and </div>
<div>was improperly used in preparing and executing the second </div>
<div>warrant; (2) collecti<span>ng</span> the PIN code through a brute force attack </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>4</div></div>
<div>
<div> Where possible, we refer to the specific combination requir<span></span>ed to </div>
<div>access d<span>â</span><span>Estree</span><span>âs phone as a â</span>PIN <span>code,â</span> though we also </div>
<div>occasionally refer to âpasswordsâ in a broader <span>sense, and case law </span>
</div>
<div>and the record occasionally refer to <span>âpasswordâ or âpass code.â </span> </div>
</div>
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<div><div>
<div>8 </div>
<div>constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (3) </div>
<div>the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 17<span> </span><span>These contentions were preserved. <span>See People v. Tallent</span><span>, <span></span>2021 </span></span>
</div>
<div>CO 68, ¶ 12<span>; </span><span>People v. McFee</span>, 2016 COA 97, ¶ 31. </div>
<div>A.<span> <span>Additional Background </span></span>
</div>
<div>1.<span> <span>The First Warrant </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 18<span> </span><span>The challenged cell phone evidence result<span>ed</span> from two separate </span>
</div>
<div>search warrants, the first of which the court declared invalid<span>. </span>In </div>
<div>the first warrant, police requested authorization to search d<span>â</span><span>Estre<span></span>e<span>â</span><span>s </span></span>
</div>
<div>cell phone <span>for</span> the following information: </div>
<div>1. <span>Specialized Location Records:<span> </span></span>All call, text </div>
<div>and data connection location information, </div>
<div>related to all specialized carrier records <span>. . . <span>. </span></span>
</div>
<div>Historical GPS/Mobile Locate Information </div>
<div>which shows GPS location (longitude and </div>
<div>latitude) and Cell-Site and sector of the device </div>
<div>in relationship to the network when connected </div>
<div>to the network. . . . </div>
<div>2. <span>Electronically Stored Records: </span>All records </div>
<div>associated with the identified cell phone<span>[]</span>, to </div>
<div>include all stored communication or files, </div>
<div>including voice mail, text messages, including </div>
<div>numbers text to and received from and all </div>
<div>related content, e-mail, digital images (e.g. </div>
<div>pictures), contact lists, video calling, web </div>
<div>activity (name of web site or application visited </div>
<div>or accessed), domain accessed, data </div>
<div>connections (to include Internet Service </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div>9 </div>
<div>Providers (ISPs), Internet protocol (IP) </div>
<div>addresses, (IP) Session data, (IP) Destination </div>
<div>Data, bookmarks, data sessions, name of web </div>
<div>sites and/or applications accessed), date and </div>
<div>time when all web sites, applications, and/or </div>
<div>third party applications were accessed and the </div>
<div>duration of each web site, application, and/or </div>
<div>third party application was accessed, and any </div>
<div>other files including all cell site and sector </div>
<div>information associated with each connection </div>
<div>and/or record associated with the cell. </div>
<div>A judicial officer approved the first warrant on November 20, 201<span></span>9<span>, </span>
</div>
<div>even though the warrant had no subject-matter or date limits<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 19<span> </span><span>Dawn Fink, who was admitted as a police expert in <span>â</span>digital </span>
</div>
<div>forensic analysis<span>â</span> during a pretrial hearing, testified that, in </div>
<div>analy<span>zing <span>a <span>cell phone, she typically extracts all electronic </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>information contained on the phone, unless the warrant has </div>
<div>co<span>nstraints. Fink then provides all of the extracted data in a </span>
</div>
<div>readable format to detectives, who search through the data within<span></span> </div>
<div>the scope of the warrant. The search tools available to her could </div>
<div>not first limit the extraction by date<span>. </span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 20<span> </span><span>A return and inventory dated December 18, 2019, d<span></span>etailed </span>
</div>
<div>that no downloads of d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s phone could yet be completed </div>
<div>pursuant to the first warrant because the phone was <span>â</span>password </div>
<div>protected.<span>â</span><span> <span>To gain access to the phone, police had earlier reache<span></span>d </span></span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div>10 </div>
<div>out to the United States Secret Service (USSS) in November 2019.</div>
</div>
<div><div>5</div></div>
<div>
<div> </div>
<div>Police took d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s phone to the <span>USSS</span>, which installed </div>
<div>â<span>Cellebrite,</span>â<span> its </span>â<span>advanced tool,</span>â<span> on the phone <span>to</span> initiate a </span>â<span>brute </span>
</div>
<div>force attack<span>.â</span><span> </span>A brute force attack<span> </span>uses a computer program <span>to</span> test </div>
<div>every possible combination of a PIN code (here, a six-digit numeric </div>
<div>code) until it finds the correct PIN code to access data in the device<span>. </span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 21<span> </span><span>After installing Cellebrite<span>, </span>the <span>USSS</span> returned the phone to </span>
</div>
<div>local police<span>. </span>Fink testified that police <span>â</span>waited three months or so till </div>
<div>[Cellebrite] cracked th<span>e </span><span>code.<span>â</span></span><span> </span>Fink testified that the timeframe for </div>
<div>a brute force attack to test every possible combination for a six-digit </div>
<div>PIN code was anywhere from <span>â</span>a week to eleven years.<span>â</span><span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 22<span> </span><span>Once the Cellebrite software discovered the PIN code, Fink </span>
</div>
<div>returned to the <span>USSS</span> to re-connect the phone to Cellebrite to </div>
<div>access the PIN code<span>â</span>s digits<span>. </span>With the PIN code in hand, Fink </div>
<div>testified that she then extracted all of the information from </div>
<div>d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span><span>s phone in February 2020, and she provided all t<span></span>he data to </span></span>
</div>
<div>detectives. <span> </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>5</div></div>
<div>
<div> Fink could not specify exactly when in November 2019 police too<span></span>k </div>
<div>the phone to the USSS. </div>
</div>
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<div>11 </div>
<div>¶ 23<span> </span><span>D<span>â</span><span>Estree moved to suppress <span>th</span><span>e </span>results of the first search in </span></span>
</div>
<div>March 2021. D<span>â</span>Estree argued that (1) the search occurred without </div>
<div>a warrant, as the first warrant did not authorize police to </div>
<div>indefinitely hold the phone; (2) the warrant violated Crim. P. </div>
<div>41(d)(5)(VI) and section 16-3-305(6), C.R.S. 2024<span>, </span>because it was </div>
<div>executed more than fourteen days after the warrant was issued; </div>
<div>and (3) the search was an unlawful general search. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 24<span> </span><span>The district court found, in May 2021, that while the warrant </span>
</div>
<div>was executed beyond the fourteen-day limit, thus violating Crim. P. </div>
<div>41(d)(5)(VI) and section 16-3-305(6), the timing alone did not merit </div>
<div>suppression. Relying on <span>People v. Coke</span>, 2020 CO 28, ¶¶ <span>33</span>-38, </div>
<div>however, the district court concluded that the warrant lacked </div>
<div>sufficient particularly and was a prohibited general warrant. <span></span> The </div>
<div>first warrant <span>â</span>permitted law enforcement to search and seize the </div>
<div>entire contents of the <span>[i]</span>Phone; there were no limitations. Notably,<span></span> </div>
<div>there were no subject matter or time limitations on t<span></span>he information </div>
<div>to be seized. Such a broad authorization violates the particularity </div>
<div>requirement demanded by the Fourth Amendment.<span>â</span><span> </span>Thus, the </div>
<div>court suppressed the evidence gathered from the full extra<span></span>ction of </div>
<div>d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span><span>s phone. <span> </span></span></span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div>12 </div>
<div>¶ 25<span> </span><span>The prosecution next requested that the district court </span>
</div>
<div>reconsider its ruling, arguing that <span>â</span> even though the warrant </div>
<div>lacked a search timeframe <span>â</span> when the warrant was read with t<span></span>he </div>
<div>accompanying affidavit, it was sufficiently particular and police </div>
<div>acted in good faith<span>. </span>Suppression of this <span>â</span><span>critical<span>â</span></span> evidence was </div>
<div>therefore unwarranted, the prosecution argued. The district court </div>
<div>rejected these arguments. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>2.<span> <span>The Second Warrant </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 26<span> </span><span>With the evidence from the first search suppressed, police </span>
</div>
<div>sought a second warrant to extract information from d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s cell </div>
<div>phone. This time, the warrant specified that it sought inf<span></span>ormation </div>
<div>from <span>â</span>October 1, 2019 - November 12, 2019<span>â</span> relating to the </div>
<div>homicide<span>. <span>The warrant requested the following information: </span></span>
</div>
<div>â¢<span> <span>Data which tends to show possession, </span></span>
</div>
<div>dominion and control over said equipment, </div>
<div>including device and system ownership </div>
<div>information (telephone number, ESN </div>
<div>number, serial number, IMEI, IMSI, CCID); </div>
<div>â¢<span> <span>Passwords, encryption keys, codes, and/or </span></span>
</div>
<div>other devices or information that may be </div>
<div>necessary to access the device and its </div>
<div>contents; </div>
<div>â¢<span> <span>Date/time, language, and other settings </span></span>
</div>
<div>preferences to include wireless local area </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div>13 </div>
<div>network setting(s), Bluetooth settings to </div>
<div>include device name(s), hotspot SSID </div>
<div>(name), and MAC address and connection </div>
<div>dates and times to the device; </div>
<div>â¢<span> <span>System and device usage files, logs, and </span></span>
</div>
<div>databases utilized to record device activities </div>
<div>such as lock/unlock activities, powering </div>
<div>on/off cycles, installation and deletions </div>
<div>records; </div>
<div>â¢<span> <span>Telephone contact lists, phone books and </span></span>
</div>
<div>telephone logs; </div>
<div>â¢<span> <span>Data contained in notes, reminders, </span></span>
</div>
<div>documents, calendars and/or other similar </div>
<div>applications that relates to the planning and </div>
<div>commission of the attempt[ed] Homicide/ </div>
<div>Homicide that occurred between October 1, </div>
<div>2019 - November 12, 2019; </div>
<div>â¢<span> <span>Communications made, stored, sent, </span></span>
</div>
<div>received or deleted that relate to the </div>
<div>planning and commission of the attempt[ed] </div>
<div>Homicide/Homicide that occurred between </div>
<div>October 1, 2019 <span>â</span> November 12, 2019; </div>
<div>â¢<span> <span>Photos and videos created, stored, sent, </span></span>
</div>
<div>received or deleted, or documents </div>
<div>containing such photographs or videos that </div>
<div>relate to the planning and commission of </div>
<div>the attempt[ed] Homicide/Homicide that </div>
<div>occurred between October 1, 2019 - </div>
<div>November 12, 2019; </div>
<div>â¢<span> <span>All electronic files, data, videos, and </span></span>
</div>
<div>communications, including related </div>
<div>metadata and location data, stored, sent, </div>
<div>received or deleted from social media and </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div>14 </div>
<div>third-party applications located on the </div>
<div>device that relate to the planning and </div>
<div>commission of the attempt[ed] Homicide/ </div>
<div>Homicide that occurred between October 1, </div>
<div>2019 - November 12, 2019; </div>
<div>â¢<span> <span>Communications through the </span></span>
</div>
<div>SIRI/(GOOGLE ASSISTANT system<span>[)]</span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>including all communications entered </div>
<div>and/or recorded into the system as well as </div>
<div>communicated from the system to the user </div>
<div>that relate to the attempt[ed] Homicide/ </div>
<div>Homicide that occurred between October 1, </div>
<div>2019 <span>â</span> November 12, 2019; </div>
<div>â¢<span> <span>Global position system (GPS) data and any </span></span>
</div>
<div>other geolocation data that relates to the </div>
<div>planning and commission of the attempt[ed] </div>
<div>Homicide/Homicide that occurred between </div>
<div>October 1, 2019 <span>â</span> November 12, 2019; </div>
<div>â¢<span> <span>Records of internet activity that relates to </span></span>
</div>
<div>the planning and commission of the </div>
<div>attempt[ed] Homicide/Homicide that </div>
<div>occurred between October 1, 2019- </div>
<div>November 12, 2019, including internet </div>
<div>protocol (IP) addresses and Port IDs, firewall </div>
<div>logs, transactions with internet hosting </div>
<div>providers, co-located computer systems, </div>
<div>cloud computing services, caches, browser </div>
<div>history and cookies, <span>â</span><span>bookmarked<span>â</span></span> <span>or </span>
</div>
<div>â<span>favorite</span>â<span> web pages, search terms that the </span>
</div>
<div>user entered into any internet search </div>
<div>engine, and records of user-typed we<span>b </span>
</div>
<div>addresses pertaining to violations of the law </div>
<div>or that show who used, owned, possessed, </div>
<div>or controlled the device(s). </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div>15 </div>
<div>The district court approved the second warrant on October 11, </div>
<div>2021. <span>After dâEstreeâs</span> arrest, the phone had remained in police </div>
<div>custody (except for the brief times the USSS handled <span></span>it).<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 27<span> </span><span>Fink conducted the second extraction seeking to collect all </span>
</div>
<div>information from the phone, without limitation, to ensure no </div>
<div>relevant information was missed<span>, </span>but this time she provided the </div>
<div>detectives only data within the dates specified <span>in</span> the warrant. Fink </div>
<div>also explained that a new tool available after the first warrant<span>, </span>
</div>
<div>â<span>GrayKey,</span>â<span> was used to conduct the extraction, which allowed p<span></span>olice </span>
</div>
<div>to conduct three types of extractions:<span> </span><span>a <span>â</span></span>partial BFU<span>â</span> (before first </div>
<div>unlock), an <span>â</span>instant AFU<span>â</span> (after first unlock), or a <span>â</span>full-file system<span>â</span> </div>
<div>AFU extraction. Fink testified that a partial BFU extracti<span></span>on </div>
<div>â<span>provides generally just system data,</span>â<span> and occasionally some </span>
</div>
<div>photos, and is used <span>â</span>to see if there<span>â</span>s any information to potentially </div>
<div>find [PIN] codes for the device<span>.â</span> This type of extraction is the only </div>
<div>extraction available without a PIN code. Having a PIN code enables </div>
<div>conducting an AFU extraction, with the <span>â</span>full-file system<span>â</span> AFU </div>
<div>providing all information on a device, but it could take years t<span></span>o </div>
<div>crack the PIN code<span>. </span><span> </span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPS6UWKBZO&Expires=1728536566&Signature=IN1%2FJthdKqjDODiP4FUaHzin3eA%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIFtfD2Ez3JMDb4MbnsKue0sSlWceRGAVSolTbgmrm9VJAiA3JPi4P6S9extweDDPns%2Bd5h%2FYlzrI5Hw5Lx32j2zGGCqyBQhtEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM4TgBc5ht0DC2AJY%2FKo8F7qSALm9PItWg%2BCzJYMsqcR%2BY63pXgo6JCCEGS1plO0dn3TawAeo5fsJJAP9e6YZerRshoIe27gzpWWY53NzdxGt6ZO3l%2FuM4TEYyP935rQdKgnR03XSk9vuaQ45OGVgNCUAyJ38AX8FNnhn0LJXaZjnSmleqm27mI%2BEs%2FKkfXA8KEjZmpUejdDqf7Ya108h6%2BwNsPDDBuNNM3Ht3sbOd11BYlx1lLWV4a8H7u94Bow68BMB8VIiC7mwbPxnS0fBg9w71z09vGd7JQElHJuBcKc9GwdOF0KPZ8Gs%2BpIL4glv7ikLuzynlkUR5VRT3DezH3dlyLz%2Bgh%2BN5S7KKQEF63TwbeLiggOzlQJPc0oQpVWgtY8pZ0u5o7XmTOJQ%2BNGIw1DvRh7NUKgBuBwfZQZDkVRJ1Wfm4PawOjOBGet1w82qp0b%2BLa2NuqCjLW7%2Fyl%2FadKPfdARcP8ltQXsk4LDt59oZBYulpcwcm3egPXLCJIrPtNyvXm0lUB8QsYqbSEXiG2NybT0l%2FD%2FUj9S0aCWGFbgAi0jVa4JUI36uRpKfl%2ByF%2F1c6Op19SBu3RtFJeiedbMYn85UYYm5cfOobB4gmL8Q33m%2FgClUBeY%2BXaK7prVtXr8nKceJz8Wsi%2B0vzEyGlTrKkGE3Ec%2F9I%2FCsvSRZCvhk7KZE7Q9iqdQ19gPXDwS3%2FM7RqKlEe0I9U3DJUdP3r7LmfExhdTzHQ7EwtScIoDy7PtWYWQhxT7OZcrOYuTUukm8AtlRBPL2McaEFfbk50WeNjYi%2FtMl8ukSvrZzaGtzmXEeOLWsRH6aWk8jcnutFMP%2BnM2l2Ff%2FOFPj4CnUxfi5dKriCupfngdNmm1jxhz6Ek5xZ0F3xY5TmHZ9%2BxFazCMnJ24BjqyAdBrXXeffGhNbbjae78%2BtzJVgxPmy8XeQL3C8jx3eNyZJ7cnKKMib%2BC3qodL9uDu%2F5F21Qgn8gwklrISpeRjnm3th7sIc6FGJGEQ%2BJuJr90anXl2WRB1z2p0QYa342p%2B6VBvG%2ByGf7FJ356zmyz8aLCNduYJCzja8a5QuZ6iarOCgSbX3YtbGUDvUjJR0bY8g2V%2B67gGtpTb%2BUjYAIquI1CllkC5nEi6LbN4PyAL326%2BSFE%3D"><div>
<div>16 </div>
<div>¶ 28<span> </span><span>Fink conducted a BFU extraction on October 12, 2021, and </span>
</div>
<div>then initiated a brute force attack. Fink allow<span>ed</span> the prog<span></span>ram to run </div>
<div>for seven days without success; then she abandoned the brute force </div>
<div>attack in favor of expediting the process by using a six-digit code </div>
<div>she found on the back of the phone <span>â</span> d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span><span>s </span>PIN code <span>â</span> to </div>
<div>unlock the phone and conduct the AFU.</div>
</div>
<div><div>6</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>It is unclear exactly how </span>
</div>
<div>the PIN code came to be adhered to the phone after the first <span></span>search </div>
<div>â<span> there is no evidence indicating that the PIN code was originally </span>
</div>
<div>there <span>â</span> and Fink conceded that the <span>USSS</span> <span>â</span>could have<span>â</span> placed the </div>
<div>code there. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 29<span> </span><span>Once the PIN code unlocked the phone on October 18, Fink </span>
</div>
<div>conducted a full-file system AFU extraction with GrayKey, </div>
<div>downloaded the phone<span>â</span>s contents, and then used Cellebrite t<span></span>o </div>
<div>â<span>decode</span>â<span> the raw data. Once decoded, Fink used Cellebrite to sel<span></span>ect </span>
</div>
<div>only data from October 1 <span>to</span> November 12, 2019 (the range specified </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>6</div></div>
<div>
<div> Fink testified that she tried birthdates and the PIN code on the </div>
<div>phone as these numbers were âsuggestedâ to her after the <span></span>first </div>
<div>seven days of the brute force attack proved unsuccessful.<span></span> There is </div>
<div>no evidence in the record that the PIN code changed between the </div>
<div>first and second search<span>es</span>, so we assume that the PIN code Fink </div>
<div>used is the same one that police used to first access the phone. </div>
</div>
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<div id="pf14" data-page-no="14">
<div><div>
<div>17 </div>
<div>in<span> the warrant), and provided this information to police in <span></span>a <span>â</span><span>user-</span></span>
</div>
<div>friendly<span>â</span><span> report.<span> </span><span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 30<span> </span><span>Holloway testified that, when drafting the second warrant </span>
</div>
<div>application and affidavit, he relied on information <span>â</span>[f]rom the first </div>
<div>warrant<span>â</span><span> but did not place any information learned from the </span>
</div>
<div>suppressed search into the second warrant application.<span> </span>Beyond </div>
<div>limiting the scope to specific dates<span>, </span>the <span>â</span>only thing that was added </div>
<div>[w<span>as<span>] . . . some explanations of cell phone capabilities.<span>â</span><span> </span><span> </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 31<span> </span><span>D<span>â</span><span>Estree challenged the second warrant, arguing that <span>it</span> (1) </span></span>
</div>
<div>was not independent of the first warrant<span>â</span>s illegality; (2) relied on </div>
<div>suppressed evidence, including the PIN code; and (3) did not cabin </div>
<div>the police<span>â</span>s search, which also exceeded the warrant<span>â</span>s legitimat<span></span>e </div>
<div>scope. Allowing this evidence would also be unfair, d<span>â</span>Estree arg<span></span>ued. </div>
<div>¶ 32<span> </span><span>The district court declined to suppress the cell phone evidence </span>
</div>
<div>gathered pursuant to the second warrant.<span> </span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 33<span> </span><span>The district court found that police sought the second warrant </span>
</div>
<div>for reasons independent of information learned from t<span></span>he first, thus </div>
<div>me<span>eting the <span>â</span>independent source doctrine<span>â</span> criteria. <span> </span>It noted that <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>[t]he Second Affidavit was essentially the same </div>
<div>as the First Affidavit with three exceptions: (1) </div>
<div>a reference to the court<span>â</span>s prior suppression </div>
</div></div>
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<div id="pf15" data-page-no="15">
<div><div>
<div>18 </div>
<div>orders; (2) an expanded explanation of </div>
<div>cellphone capabilities; and (3) inclusion of the </div>
<div>Second Date Range. Of significance here, </div>
<div>nothing in the Second Affidavit referenced the </div>
<div>information seized in the February Search. </div>
<div>It also found that Holloway<span>â</span>s testimony <span>â</span> that he did not rely on </div>
<div>information from the first suppressed search <span>â</span> was credible an<span></span>d </div>
<div>noted that there was no contrary evidence<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 34<span> </span><span>Regarding use of the PIN code (found on the back of the </span>
</div>
<div>phone), the district court said that suppression was unwarranted </div>
<div>for two reasons. First, the district court concluded that the </div>
<div>retrieval of the PIN code through a brute force attack during </div>
<div>execution of the first warrant did not constitute a Fourth </div>
<div>Amendment search. Recognizing that there were no Colorado ca<span></span>ses </div>
<div>on the issue, it analogized to how police officers execute se<span></span>arch </div>
<div>warrants against a locked house. Police may break into a home t<span></span>o </div>
<div>execute a search warrant and the actual breach of t<span></span>he home <span>â</span> via </div>
<div>a door or through a window <span>â</span> is not a search; rather, it is <span></span>a </div>
<div>âmeansâ to conduct a search. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 35<span> </span><span>The court also found that the discovery of the PIN code fell </span>
</div>
<div>within the <span>â</span>inevitable discovery<span>â</span> exception to the exclusionary <span></span>rule, </div>
<div>noting that, <span>â</span>[e]ven though it was listed on the back of the </div>
</div></div>
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<div id="pf16" data-page-no="16">
<div><div>
<div>19 </div>
<div>cellphone[,] <span>. . . </span>if it had not been available, law enforcement would </div>
<div>have obtained it through the [<span>USSS</span>] or its own software.<span>â</span><span> </span>It also </div>
<div>noted that case law <span>â</span>has not distinguished between evidence that </div>
<div>would have been discovered quickly and evidence that would <span></span>have </div>
<div>taken much longer to discover.<span>â</span><span> </span>Thus, because the PIN code would </div>
<div>have been revealed once all possible combinations were tested, </div>
<div>there was a <span>â</span>reasonable probability<span>â</span> <span>â</span> indeed, the court found, </div>
<div>because there was a finite number of possible combi<span></span>nations, there </div>
<div>was <span>a â100% probabilityâ â</span> that the PIN would have been </div>
<div>discovered eventually<span>. </span>The district court rejected the defense<span>â</span><span>s </span>
</div>
<div>fairness argument as unsupported by case law. </div>
<div>B.<span> <span>Standard of Review and Applicable Law </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 36<span> <span>âWhether evidence should be suppressed is a mixed question </span></span>
</div>
<div>of law and fact. As a result, we defer to the trial court<span>â</span>s factual </div>
<div>findings if they are supported by competent evidence, but we <span></span>review </div>
<div>the legal effect of those findings de novo.<span>â</span> <span>People v. Seymour</span>, 202<span></span>3 </div>
<div>CO 53, ¶ 19 (citation omitted). <span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 37<span> <span>â<span>The United States and Colorado Constitutions protect </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>individuals against <span>â</span>unreasonable searches and seizures.<span>ââ</span> <span>I<span></span>d. <span>at </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ <span>20</span> (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV<span>; </span>Colo. Const. art. II, § 7). <span></span><span>A </span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div>20 </div>
<div>â<span>search</span>â<span> within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment </span>â<span>occurs </span>
</div>
<div>when the government infringes on an individual<span>â</span>s reasonable </div>
<div>expectation of privacy.<span>â</span> <span>Id. </span>(citing <span>Katz v. United Stat<span></span>es<span>, 389 U.S. </span></span>
</div>
<div>347, 361 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring))<span>. </span>The <span>ââ<span>seizure</span><span>â</span></span> of property </div>
<div>occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an </div>
<div>individual<span>â</span><span>s possessory interests in that property.<span>â</span> <span>Id. </span>(quoting </span>
</div>
<div>United States v. Jacobsen<span>, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). <span>â</span>[T]o deter </span> </div> <div>police misconduct<span>â</span> and discourage illegal searches<span>, <span>â</span></span>the </div> <div>exclusionary rule requires courts to suppress evidence at <span></span>trial if the </div> <div>government acquired it in violation of constitutional <span></span>protections.<span>â</span> </div> </div> <div><div>7</div></div> <div> <div> </div> <div>Id. <span>at <span>¶ </span>62. </span> </div> <div>¶ 38<span> </span><span>A <span>warrant is generally required before cell phone data can be </span></span> </div> <div>searched. <span>See</span> <span>Riley v. California</span>,573 U.S. 373
, 386, 393-<span>98,</span> <span></span><span>401<span>-</span></span> </div> <div>403 (2014) (recognizing the ubiquity of cell phones, their immense </div> <div>storage capacity, and their potential to store deeply personal </div> <div>information)<span>. <span>Our state supreme court has also <span>â</span>acknowledged the </span></span> </div> <div>special protections applicable to cell phone searches.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>People v. </span> </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>7</div></div> <div> <div> <span>The exclusionary rule â</span>applies both to illegally obtained evidence </div> <div>and to derivative evidence <span>â</span> often called <span>â</span>fruit of the poisonou<span></span>s </div> <div>tree.<span>ââ <span>People v. Dominguez-Castor<span>,2020 COA 1
, ¶ 19 (quoting </span></span></span> </div> <div>People v. Schoondermark<span>,759 P.2d 715
, 718 (Colo. 1988)). </span>
</div>
</div>
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<div>21 </div>
<div>Davis<span>, 2019 CO 24, ¶ 19; <span>see also <span>Coke</span></span>, ¶ 38 (warrant to search a </span> </div> <div>cell phone that <span>â</span>permitted the officers to search all texts, videos, </div> <div>pictures, contact lists, phone records, and any data <span></span>that showed </div> <div>ownership or possession<span>â</span> violated the Fourth Amendment<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>particularity requirement). Indeed, <span>â</span>the general trend of caselaw </div> <div>provides cell phones with more protection, not less.<span>â</span> <span>Davis</span>, <span></span>¶ 17. </div> <div>¶ 39<span> </span><span>Preserved errors concerning the admission of evidence in </span> </div> <div>violation of the Fourth Amendment implicate <span>â</span>trial errors of </div> <div>constitutional dimension,<span>â</span> and thus we review any such error for </div> <div>âconstitutional harmless error.â <span>Hagos v. People<span>,2012 CO 63
, ¶ 11.</span> <span> </span></span> </div> <div>â<span>These errors require reversal unless the reviewing court <span></span>is <span>â</span>able to </span> </div> <div>declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reason<span></span>able </div> <div>doubt.<span>ââ</span><span> <span>Id.</span> (alteration in original) (quoting <span>Chapman v. Ca<span></span>lifornia<span>, </span></span></span> </div> <div>386 U.S. 18
, 24 (1967)). </div>
<div>C.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span>
</div>
<div>1.<span> <span>The Independent Source Doctrine </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 40<span> </span><span>The independent source doctrine is an exception to the </span>
</div>
<div>exclusionary rule <span>and allows â</span>unconstitutionally obtained evid<span></span>ence </div>
<div>[to] be admitted if the prosecution can establish that<span></span> it was also </div>
<div>discovered by means independent of the illegality.<span>â</span> <span>People v. </span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div>22 </div>
<div>Dominguez-Castor<span>, <span>2020 COA 1, ¶ 20 (quoting <span>People v. Arapu</span>, 2012 </span></span> </div> <div>CO 42, ¶ 29)<span>; </span><span>see also People v. Thompson</span>,2021 CO 15
, ¶ 21.<span> </span>The </div> <div>doctrine may apply to <span>â</span>evidence seized under a valid warrant<span></span> issued </div> <div>after the evidence was first discovered during execution of <span></span>an </div> <div>invalid warrant . . . if the prosecution shows that the second </div> <div>warrant was truly independent of information obtained fr<span></span>om the </div> <div>initial search.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Dominguez-Castor</span><span>, </span>¶ <span>22<span>. </span></span> The decision to seek an </div> <div>additional warrant because of a suppression order<span>âs consequenc<span></span>es<span> </span></span> </div> <div>does not, <span>on</span> its own, violate the independent source doctrine.<span></span> </div> <div>People v. George<span>,2017 COA 75
, ¶ <span>55</span><span>. </span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 41<span> </span><span>A second warrant meets the criteria of the independent source </span>
</div>
<div>doctrine if the prosecution proves, by a preponderance of the </div>
<div>evidence, that <span>â</span>(1) the decision to seek the warrant was not </div>
<div>prompted by what was observed during the initial unlawf<span></span>ul search, </div>
<div>and (2) no information obtained during the initial search wa<span></span>s relied </div>
<div>upon by the magistrate in issuing the warrant.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Dominguez-Cast<span></span>or<span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ <span>21</span><span>; </span><span>see also Thompson</span>, ¶ 22. It is a question of fact for the </div>
<div>district court <span>â</span>[w]hether the police would have pursued a second </div>
<div>search even absent what they discovered during an earlier unlawf<span></span>ul </div>
</div></div>
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<div>23 </div>
<div>search . . . . <span>We</span> will not disturb the court<span>â</span>s finding if it has rec<span></span>ord </div>
<div>support.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Dominguez-Castor</span><span>, ¶ 34. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 42<span> </span><span>The reasoning behind the independent source doctrine, </span>
</div>
<div>articulated in <span>Nix v. Williams</span>, is that </div>
<div>the interest of society in deterring unlawful </div>
<div>police conduct and the public interest in </div>
<div>having juries receive all probative evidence of a </div>
<div>crime are properly balanced by putting the </div>
<div>police <span>in the same, not a worse, position that </span>
</div>
<div>they would have been in if no police error or </div>
<div>misconduct had occurred<span>. <span>When the </span></span>
</div>
<div>challenged evidence has an independent </div>
<div>source, exclusion of such evidence would put </div>
<div>the police in a worse position than they would </div>
<div>have been in absent any error or violation. </div>
<div>467 U.S. 431, 4<span>43</span> (1984) (emphasis added) (citations and footnote </div> <div>omitted). Put another way, <span>â</span>while the government should not pr<span></span>ofit </div> <div>from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse </div> <div>position than it would otherwise have occupied.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Murray v. Unit<span></span>ed </span> </div> <div>States<span>,487 U.S. 533
, 542 (1988). </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 43<span> <span>The district court deemed Hollowayâs testimony â<span> averring </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>that the information from the first suppressed search did not <span></span>inform </div>
<div>the second warrant application or the decision to seek t<span></span>he second </div>
<div>warrant <span>â</span> credible. <span>See Dominguez-Castor</span>, ¶ 21. We may not </div>
<div>disturb this credibility determination. <span>See Seymo<span>ur</span></span>, ¶ 20. Nor does </div>
</div></div>
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<div>24 </div>
<div>the second warrant reference information learned during t<span></span>he first </div>
<div>search on which <span>a </span>judicial officer could have improperly relied. <span>See </span>
</div>
<div>Dominguez-Castor<span>, ¶ 21. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 44<span> </span><span>But <span>dâEstree </span>challenges the independence of the second </span>
</div>
<div>warrant because he argues it sought information that police had </div>
<div>discovered during the first search and knew existed<span>. T</span>herefore, he </div>
<div>contends the second warrant relied on information illegally o<span></span>btained </div>
<div>in the first search<span>. For example, dâEstree points to the second </span>
</div>
<div>warrantâs request for information on any âsearch terms that<span></span> the </div>
<div>user entered into any internet search engineâ as problematic. <span></span> </div>
<div>DâEstree argues <span>that the object of this request was to gather his </span>
</div>
<div>kn<span>own internet search history (which was introduced at <span></span>trial), and </span>
</div>
<div>improperly relied on information gathered in the first search. </div>
<div>¶ 45<span> </span><span>But the first warrant request, while not as specific, requested </span>
</div>
<div>such information when it sought âweb activity (name of web sit<span></span>e or </div>
<div>application visited or accessed), domain accessed, data connecti<span></span>ons </div>
<div>(to include Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Internet protoc<span></span>ol (IP) </div>
<div>addresses, [and] (IP) Session data.â The second warrantâs request </div>
<div>with additional specificity does not necessarily show that <span></span>the </div>
<div>second warrant relied on information improperly gained fr<span></span>om the </div>
</div></div>
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<div>25 </div>
<div>first search. <span>See id.</span> <span>at</span> ¶ 14 & n.2 <span>(second warrant contained âm<span></span>uch </span>
</div>
<div>more information than the firstâ in light of<span> </span>policeâs increased </div>
<div>training on search warrants for cell phones). </div>
<div>¶ 46<span> </span><span>As a result, the second warrant itself meets the criteria </span>
</div>
<div>detailed in <span>Dominguez-Castor </span>for the independent source doctrine </div>
<div>exception<span>. <span> Had police relied on the second warrant alone to retrieve </span></span>
</div>
<div>the contents of dâEstreeâs cell<span> phone, that would have been </span>
</div>
<div>permissible and the extracted evidence would have been prope<span></span>rly </div>
<div>admitted at trial. But police used illegally obtained information </div>
<div>from the first warrant <span>â</span> the PIN code <span>â</span> in <span>executing</span> the second </div>
<div>warrant. </div>
<div>2.<span> <span>The Use of the PIN Code </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 47<span> </span><span>The PIN code was discovered during the execution of the first, </span>
</div>
<div>unlawful general warrant. Police then used this illegally obtained </div>
<div>information to <span>expedite</span> the execution of the second warrant. By </div>
<div>using the illegally obtained PIN code, police extracted a crucial </div>
<div>benefit <span>â</span> guaranteed access to the phone<span>â</span>s contents ahead of the </div>
<div>forthcoming December 2021 trial. This conduct placed the </div>
<div>government in a better position than before the illegal search </div>
<div>occurred<span>. <span>See Murray<span>, 487 U.S. at 542; </span><span>Nix</span></span>, <span>467<span> U.S. at 443. So </span></span></span>
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<div>26 </div>
<div>while the second warrant was not infirm, the execution <span></span>of that </div>
<div>warrant most certainly was. </div>
<div>¶ 48<span> </span><span>A summary of the key dates relating to both warrants follows: </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Key Warrant Events </div>
<div>¶ 49<span> </span><span>Police and the prosecution had months to submit another </span>
</div>
<div>warrant application after the first warrant was invalidated, and </div>
<div>could have done so, but they did not request a second warrant until </div>
<div>about two months before trial. The first brute force attack took </div>
<div>three months, and Fink testified that a brute force attack could </div>
<div>have taken up to eleven years, so there was no guarantee that </div>
</div>
<div>
<div>Nov. 20, </div>
<div>2019: </div>
<div>First </div>
<div>warrant </div>
<div>signed</div>
<div>Dec. 18, </div>
<div>2019: No </div>
<div>download </div>
<div>possible </div>
<div>without PIN </div>
<div>code</div>
<div>Feb. 17, </div>
<div>2020: </div>
<div>Phone </div>
<div>unlocked </div>
<div>using </div>
<div>USSS-</div>
<div>provided </div>
<div>PIN code, </div>
<div>data </div>
<div>extracted</div>
<div>May 12, </div>
<div>2021: </div>
<div>Evidence </div>
<div>suppressed</div>
<div>Oct. 11, </div>
<div>2021: </div>
<div>Second </div>
<div>warrant </div>
<div>signed</div>
<div>Oct. 19, 2021: </div>
<div>Brute force </div>
<div>abandoned and </div>
<div>second </div>
<div>extraction using</div>
<div>PIN code</div>
<div>Nov. 23, </div>
<div>2021: </div>
<div>Court </div>
<div>permits </div>
<div>phone </div>
<div>evidence's </div>
<div>admission</div>
<div>Dec. 14 -</div>
<div>17, 2021: </div>
<div>Trial</div>
</div>
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<div>27 </div>
<div>police would have gained access to the phone in time for trial </div>
<div>without<span> relying on the illegally obtained shortcut (the PIN code).</span>
</div>
</div>
<div><div>8</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 50<span> </span><span>As the United States Supreme Court held in<span> Silverthorne </span></span>
</div>
<div>Lumber Co. v. United States<span>, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), which </span>
</div>
<div>originated <span>the independent source doctrine, â[t]</span>he essence of a </div>
<div>provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain <span></span>way is </div>
<div>that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used b<span></span>efore the </div>
<div>Court <span>but that it shall not be used at a<span></span>ll<span>.</span><span>â </span> <span>(Emphasis added.) </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 51<span> </span><span>The second warrant authorized police to acquire the PIN code </span>
</div>
<div>via brute force attack; evidence on the phone so acquired would </div>
<div>have presumably met the independent source doctrine<span>. <span>S<span>ee </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>Dominguez-Castor<span>, ¶ <span>21<span>. </span></span>However, police abandoned the brute force </span>
</div>
<div>attack and, instead, took a different (and shorter) route to the </div>
<div>encrypted information using illegally obtained information (the PI<span></span>N </div>
<div>code) to <span>execute</span> the second warrant. Law enforcement may not use </div>
<div>information obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment<span>. </span><span>See </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>8</div></div>
<div>
<div> If the prosecution had pursued the second warrant imme<span></span>diately </div>
<div>after the information obtained with the first warrant was </div>
<div>suppressed in May 2021, even if it took three months (as it<span></span> had </div>
<div>before) to unlock the phone, there may have been substantially less </div>
<div>incentive to use the PIN code <span>to expedite access to the phoneâs </span>
</div>
<div>contents before the December 14, 2021, trial start date<span>. </span> </div>
</div>
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<div>28 </div>
<div>Silverthorne<span>,</span><span> <span>251 U.S. at 392<span>. </span>With this framework in mind, we </span></span> </div> <div>proceed to address <span>the district courtâs other grounds for a<span></span>dmitting </span> </div> <div>the evidence. </div> <div>3.<span> <span>Whether a Brute Force Attack Constitutes a Search </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 52<span> </span><span>The district court also found that the use of a brute force </span> </div> <div>attack to discover a PIN <span>code and access dâEstreeâs cell phone data </span> </div> <div>did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment <span></span>because </div> <div>it was a âmeansâ to execute a warrant rather than a search. <span></span> <span>It </span> </div> <div>analogized the issue as akin to when police execute a warrant<span></span> to </div> <div>search a locked house <span>â</span> whether police choose to enter through </div> <div>the door or a window is irrelevant. </div> <div>¶ 53<span> </span><span>Case law supports this general concept <span>â</span> most notably, as </span> </div> <div>pointed out by the district court and the People on appeal, in <span>Dalia<span></span> </span> </div> <div>v. U<span>nited States<span>,441 U.S. 238
(1979). There, a defendant </span></span>
</div>
<div>challenged a wiretap order granting the government <span></span>the authority to </div>
<div>âi<span>ntercept all oral communications taking place in petitioner<span>â</span>s office<span>â </span></span>
</div>
<div>through electronic surveillance. <span>Id. </span>at 241-42. The defendant </div>
<div>argued that the order violated the Fourth Amendment beca<span></span>use it </div>
<div>did not specify the means used to execute the warrant<span></span> (i.e., by </div>
<div>covert entry into the office)<span>. </span><span>Id. </span>at 256-58. The Supreme Court hel<span></span>d </div>
</div></div>
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<div>29 </div>
<div>that â[n]<span>othing in the language of the Constitution or in this Court</span><span>â</span><span>s </span>
</div>
<div>decisions interpreting that language suggests that . . . <span></span>search </div>
<div>warrants also must include a specification of the precise mann<span></span>er in </div>
<div>which they are to be executed.â <span>Id. <span>at 257. Instead, the means of </span></span>
</div>
<div>executing a warrant are âgenerally l<span>eft to the discretion of t<span></span>he </span>
</div>
<div>executing officers . . . subject of course to the general Fourth </div>
<div>Amendment protection . . . [<span>, </span>and] the manner in which a warrant is </div>
<div>executed is subject to later judicial review as to its reas<span></span>onableness.â </div>
<div>Id. <span>at 257-58. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 54<span> </span><span>But the means versus search distinction does not neatly fit<span></span> </span>
</div>
<div>here. As the United States Supreme Court aptly recognized in <span>Riley </span>
</div>
<div>v. California<span>, analogizing the digital world and processes t<span></span>o the </span>
</div>
<div>physical world is difficult and unhelpful, and â[a]n analog<span></span>ue test </div>
<div>would <span>â</span>keep defendants and judges guessing for years t<span></span>o come.<span>â<span>â </span></span> </div>
<div>573 U.S. at 401 (citation omitted).<span> </span>The use of a brute force attack </div>
<div>to access a phone, <span>or any other means to obtain a phoneâs </span>PIN code </div>
<div>without a defendantâs cooperation or consent, is f<span>undamentally </span>
</div>
<div>different from entry into a home with a warrant because a search </div>
<div>for the PIN <span>code itself, just like a search of a cell phoneâs cont<span></span>ents, </span>
</div>
<div>is protected by the Fourth Amendment. <span>See Davis</span>, ¶ 19; <span>Coke</span><span>, </span>
</div>
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<div>30 </div>
<div>¶ <span>38</span><span>; </span><span>Riley</span><span>, <span>573</span></span> U.S. <span>at</span> 386, 393-98, 401-<span>03</span> (recognizing that cell </div>
<div>phones hold âthe privacies of lifeâ<span> (quoting <span>Boyd v. United Stat<span></span>es<span>, </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))<span>).</span><span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 55<span> </span><span>While the protections the Fourth Amendment affords to </span> </div> <div>passwords and PIN codes allowing access to cell phones are less </div> <div>clearly defined than those it affor<span>ds</span> t<span>o </span>physical spaces and the </div> <div>personal data cell phones contain,</div> </div> <div><div>9</div></div> <div> <div> existing Fourth Amendment </div> <div>principles, coupled with the recognition of the special <span></span>protections </div> <div>afforded cell phones, support concluding that obtaining <span></span>a cell phone </div> <div>PIN code without consent requires a warrant. <span>See United Stat<span></span>es v. </span> </div> <div>Booker<span>,<span> <span>561 F. Supp. 3d 924
, 9<span>29</span></span></span>-<span>32 <span>(S.D. Cal. 2021) (holding, in </span></span></span> </div> <div>part, that requiring defendant to involuntarily enter <span></span>his PIN code </div> <div>while law enforcement watched and recorded it, before police </div> <div>sought a warrant to search the phone using software that<span></span> required </div> <div>the PIN code, violated the Fourth Amendment).<span> </span> </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>9</div></div> <div> <div> The issues in this case are distinct from those in the Fifth </div> <div>Amendment context centering on whether a defendant can be </div> <div>compelled to provide a cell phone PIN code or unlock a device. <span></span> <span>See, </span> </div> <div>e.g.<span>, <span>Seo v. State</span>,148 N.E.3d 952
, 962 (Ind. 2020) (holding that </span>
</div>
<div>forcing a defendant to â<span>unlock her iPhone for law enforcement </span>
</div>
<div>would violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-</div>
<div>incrimination<span>â). The Fifth Amendment is not at issue in this case. <span> </span></span>
</div>
</div>
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<div>31 </div>
<div>¶ 56<span> <span>Courts use âa two<span>-prong test to determine if a claimed privacy </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>interest warrants constitutional protection: (1) whether the </div>
<div>individual âexhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacyâ </div>
<div>and (2) whether, objectively, âthe expectation [is] one that<span></span> so<span>ciety is </span>
</div>
<div>prepared to recognize as âreasonable.ââ <span>Seymour</span><span>, ¶ 22 (quoting </span>
</div>
<div>People v. Gutierrez<span>, 222 P.3d 925, 932 (Colo. 2009), in turn citing<span></span> </span> </div> <div>Katz<span>, 389 U.S. at 361). </span> </div> <div>¶ 57<span> </span><span>Turning to the subjective expectation of privacy prong, there is </span> </div> <div>no evidence that dâEstree exhibited anything other than an </div> <div>expectation that his PIN code would remain private. This is </div> <div>evidenced by the very fact that police had to use specialized </div> <div>software to break into the phone because dâEstree did not <span></span>provide </div> <div>the PIN code. On this point, <span>Davis</span>,2019 CO 24
, provides some </div>
<div>insight. There, the Colorado Supreme Court held that an individual </div>
<div>who voluntarily gave his phoneâs <span>PIN code to law enforcement </span><span>â</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>even for a limited purpose <span>â</span> <span>â</span>had no legitimate expectation of </div>
<div>privacy in the digits of his passcode<span>â and â</span>law enforcement<span>â</span><span>s </span>[later] </div>
<div>use of that passcode was not a search protected by the Fourth </div>
<div>Amendment.<span>â <span>Id. <span>at <span>¶¶</span> <span>30</span>-32. It stands to reason, therefore, t<span></span>hat </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>when an individual does <span>not </span>voluntarily share <span>a </span>PIN code with </div>
</div></div>
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<div>32 </div>
<div>police, he is exhibiting a subjective expectation that his PIN code </div>
<div>will remain private <span>â</span> particularly when a phone<span>âs</span> PIN code i<span></span>s the </div>
<div>key to unlocking a wealth of private information. </div>
<div>¶ 58<span> </span><span>As for the second, objective prong, it is clear that society </span>
</div>
<div>recognizes as reasonable the expectation <span>that oneâs </span>PIN code is </div>
<div>private. Indeed, keeping a PIN code private is an indisputably </div>
<div>important part of how passwords function. <span>See Booker</span><span>, </span>561 F. </div>
<div>Supp. 3d <span>at 931 (âT</span>here can be no question that a passcode ent<span></span>ered </div>
<div>into a cell phone, which is designed to keep the contents of t<span></span>he </div>
<div>phone hidden from others, is generally considered by <span></span>society to be </div>
<div>something private that should be free from warrantless intru<span></span>sion by </div>
<div>the government.<span>â); <span>see also </span></span>Jay E. Grenig, <span>Electronic Discovery a<span></span>nd </span>
</div>
<div>Records and Information Management Guide<span> § 3:7, Westlaw </span>
</div>
<div>(database updated Oct. 2023) <span>(â</span>It is essential to use passwor<span></span>ds and </div>
<div>to keep them safe. . . . No one else should be told a passwor<span></span>d.<span> </span>Any </div>
<div>compromised password should be changed immediately.<span>â);</span><span> Da<span></span>vis<span>, ¶ </span></span>
</div>
<div>30 (society would not deem a subjective expectation of pri<span></span>vacy to be </div>
<div>objectively reasonable <span>if</span> a defendant shared the PIN code with law </div>
<div>enforcement). </div>
</div></div>
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<div>33 </div>
<div>¶ 59<span> </span><span>The People <span>contend that dâEstreeâs </span>PIN <span>code â</span>had no </span>
</div>
<div>meaningful existence other than to protect the contents of his </div>
<div>cellphone <span>â</span> it was just a series of numbers that provided no </div>
<div>independent information about his thoughts or life<span>.â </span>This is true in </div>
<div>the most literal sense of what a PIN code is. But this </div>
<div>characterization of a PIN code ignores the importance of what <span></span>a </div>
<div>phoneâs <span>PIN code protects </span><span>â</span><span> namely, the wealth of private </span>
</div>
<div>information cell phones store.<span> <span>See Riley</span></span>, 573 U.S. at 393-94, 40<span></span>1-</div>
<div>03<span>.<span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 60<span> <span>Because dâEstree has a cognizable right to<span> the privacy of his </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>cell phone PIN code that warrants constitutional protection <span></span>under </div>
<div>the subjective and objective prongs of the <span>Katz </span>test, we conclude <span>a </span>
</div>
<div>brute force attack to discover dâEstreeâs <span>PIN code constitutes a </span>
</div>
<div>search under the Fourth Amendment. The second warrant allowed </div>
<div>police to obtain â[p]asswords, encryption keys, codes, and/or ot<span></span>her </div>
<div>devices or information that may be necessary to access the de<span></span>vice </div>
<div>and its contents.â <span>A brute force attack was therefore authorized. </span>
</div>
<div>But the use of the PIN code discovered while executing the first,<span></span> </div>
<div>invalid warrant was not authorized<span>. </span> T<span>he district courtâs âmeansâ </span>
</div>
<div>rationale therefore cannot save the execution of the second w<span></span>arrant </div>
</div></div>
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<div>34 </div>
<div>using the PIN code discovered while executing the first, unlawful </div>
<div>warrant.<span> <span>See Riley<span>, 573 U.S. <span>at</span> 400</span></span>; </span><span>Dominguez-Castor</span><span>, ¶<span> <span>19.</span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>4.<span> <span>The Inevitable Discovery Rule </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 61<span> <span>â<span>Under the inevitable discovery rule, evidence initially </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>discovered in an unconstitutional manner may be received if <span></span>that </div>
<div>same evidence inevitably would have been obtained lawfully.<span>â</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>People v. Schoondermark<span>, 759 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1988)<span>. <span>â</span></span>The </span> </div> <div>ability to obtain a lawful search warrant after an illegal <span></span>search has </div> <div>occurred does not satisfy the inevitable discovery excepti<span></span>on </div> <div>requirements.<span>â</span><span> <span>People v. Nelson<span>,2012 COA 37
, ¶ 52; </span>see also </span></span> </div> <div>People v. Diaz<span>,53 P.3d 1171
, 1176 (Colo. 2002)<span>. </span> </span> </div> <div>The Government cannot later initiate a lawful </div> <div>avenue of obtaining the evidence and then </div> <div>claim that it should be admitted because its </div> <div>discovery was inevitable. . . . Because a valid </div> <div>search warrant nearly always can be obtained </div> <div>after the search has occurred, a contrary </div> <div>holding would practically destroy the </div> <div>requirement that a warrant for the search <span>. . .</span> </div> <div>be obtained <span>before</span> the search takes place. </div> <div>People v. Burola<span>,848 P.2d 958
, 963-64 (Colo. 1993) (quoting </span>Unit<span></span>ed </div> <div>States v. Satterfield<span>,743 F.2d 827
, 846 (11th Cir. 1984))<span>. </span>As a </span>
</div>
<div>result, <span>â</span>[t]he prosecution must affirmatively show that the lawf<span></span>ul </div>
<div>means of discovering this evidence was already initiated when the </div>
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<div>35 </div>
<div>evidence was obtained illegally.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>People v. Dyer</span>, 2019 COA 161, </div> <div>¶ <span>38.</span> </div> </div> <div><div>10</div></div> <div> <div> </div> <div>¶ 62<span> </span><span>As<span> with the independent source doctrine, this requirement </span></span> </div> <div>effectuates the policy underlying the inevitable discovery doctrine <span>â</span> </div> <div>the exception should place the government in the <span>same</span> position (no </div> <div>better, no worse) than it would have occupied if no illegality had </div> <div>occurred. <span>See Nix</span>, 467 U.S. <span>at</span> 443-44 (the independent sou<span></span>rce </div> <div>doctrine<span>â</span><span>s </span><span>â</span><span>rationale is wholly consistent with and justifies our </span> </div> <div>adoption of the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception t<span></span>o the </div> <div>exclusionary rule<span>â</span>). Thus, if two searches <span>â</span> one lawful and one </div> <div>unlawful <span>â</span> began at the same time and would procure the sam<span>e </span> </div> <div>evidence, suppressing the resulting evidence would place the </div> <div>prosecution in a worse position because the police would have </div> <div>inevitably obtained that evidence even if no misconduct had taken </div> <div>place. <span>Id<span>.</span></span> </div> <div>¶ 63<span> </span><span>While it is true, as the district court noted, that the PIN code </span> </div> <div>would have eventually been discovered by police software <span>â</span> months </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>10</div></div> <div> <div> Some courts, including the Tenth Circuit, do not require t<span></span>he </div> <div>lawful means of discovering the evidence to have been initiated </div> <div>before the unlawful search or seizure. <span> See, e.g.</span><span>, </span><span>United States v. </span> </div> <div>Christy<span>,739 F.3d 534
, 540-41 (10th Cir. 2014). </span>
</div>
</div>
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<div>36 </div>
<div>or years later <span>â</span> focusing on the word <span>â</span><span>inevitable<span>â</span></span> in such a mann<span></span>er </div>
<div>ignores the requirements of the rule and undermines its purpos<span></span>e, </div>
<div>and the exclusionary rule more broadly.</div>
</div>
<div><div>11</div></div>
<div>
<div> While police here </div>
<div>initiated a <span>lawful</span> means to obtain the PIN code <span>â</span> via the brute </div>
<div>force attack that the second warrant authorized <span>â</span> that means was </div>
<div>abandoned in favor of a shortcut (using the illegally obtained PIN </div>
<div>code), thus violating a key requirement of the inevitable discov<span></span>ery </div>
<div>rule under Colorado precedent<span>. </span><span>See Dyer</span>, ¶ 38<span>; </span><span>Nelson</span>, ¶ 52.<span> </span>And </div>
<div>regardless, the soon-abandoned lawful means was initiated well </div>
<div>after the PIN code was first illegally obtained. <span>See Dyer</span>, ¶ 38<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>Simply because police software would have <span>eventually</span> discovered </div>
<div>the PIN code (perhaps years <span>after dâEstreeâs trial date) </span>does not </div>
<div>render it admissible.<span> </span> </div>
<div>¶ 64<span> </span><span>Even if we assume the second brute force attack would ha<span></span>ve </span>
</div>
<div>yielded a PIN code in three <span>or</span> so months (the time the first brute </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>11</div></div>
<div>
<div> Merriam-Webster<span>â</span>s Dictionary defines <span>â</span><span>inevitable<span>â</span></span> as <span>â</span>incapa<span></span>ble of </div>
<div>being avoided or evaded.<span>â</span><span> </span>Merriam-Webster Dictionary, </div>
<div>https://perma.cc/B3BN-X46N. Black<span>â</span>s Law Dictionary defines </div>
<div>â<span>inevitable</span>â<span> within the context of the inevitable discovery <span></span>rule. In </span>
</div>
<div>that definition, it notes that <span>â[t]</span>he inevitable discovery of evidence </div>
<div>by law enforcement is a discovery that would naturally and <span></span>lawfully </div>
<div>occur in the course of an investigation.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Black<span>â</span></span>s Law Dictionary </div>
<div>925 (12th ed. 2024)<span>. </span> </div>
</div>
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<div id="pf28" data-page-no="28">
<div><div>
<div>37 </div>
<div>force attack took using the first, unlawful warrant), the information </div>
<div>would likely have come <span>after </span>the scheduled December 14, 202<span></span>1, </div>
<div>trial. We are not prepared to speculate that the dist<span></span>rict court would </div>
<div>have granted a trial continuance whe<span>n </span>the prosecution waited so </div>
<div>close to the trial date to seek a second warrant. <span> See People v. Syrie</span><span>, </span>
</div>
<div>101 P.3d 219, 223 (Colo. 2004) (inevitable discovery<span></span> exception </div>
<div>cannot be met through <span>â</span>speculation about possible series of </div>
<div>eventsâ). <span> Recall that police asked the court for the second warrant<span></span> </span>
</div>
<div>in October 2021 <span>â</span> almost five months after the May 12, 202<span></span>1, </div>
<div>suppression ruling <span>â</span> <span>knowing that dâEstreeâs</span> trial was in Decem<span></span>ber </div>
<div>2021 and his speedy trial clock was ticking<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 65<span> </span><span>To admit evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine </span>
</div>
<div>â<span>requires an affirmative showing of a reasonable probability <span></span>that the </span>
</div>
<div>evidence <span>would inevitably be discovered through law<span></span>ful means </span>
</div>
<div>already initiated when the seizure was made<span>.<span>â</span><span> </span></span><span>I<span>d.</span></span><span> (emphasis </span>
</div>
<div>added)<span>; <span>see also Burola<span>, 848 P.2d <span>at</span> <span>963 (â</span></span></span></span>[I]<span>f <span>evidence is obtained </span></span>
</div>
<div>by illegal conduct, the illegality can be cured only if the poli<span></span>ce </div>
<div>possessed and were pursuing a lawful means of discovery <span></span>at the </div>
<div>time the illegality occurred.â)<span>. A lawful means was initiated </span><span>â</span><span> the </span>
</div>
<div>brute force attack authorized by the second warrant <span>â</span> but that </div>
</div></div>
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<div id="pf29" data-page-no="29">
<div><div>
<div>38 </div>
<div>means was abandoned in favor of using the proverbial f<span></span>ruit of the </div>
<div>first, poisoned warrant <span>â</span> the known PIN code. </div>
<div>¶ 66<span> </span><span>The primary rationale for the inevitable discovery rule as an </span>
</div>
<div>exception to the exclusionary rule would be undermined by allowing </div>
<div>admission of any evidence that would have been eventually </div>
<div>discovered, where <span>a </span>lawful means to obtain the evidence was </div>
<div>initiated but abandoned in favor of a tainted shortcut. <span>See <span>Ni</span><span>x</span></span>, 467 </div>
<div>U.S. <span>at</span> <span>442</span><span>-<span>43</span></span><span>; </span><span>see</span><span> </span><span>also</span> <span>Casillas v. People</span>, 2018 <span></span>CO 78M, ¶¶ <span>21</span>-22, </div>
<div>36<span>.</span><span> <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 67<span> </span><span>We recognize that the exclusionary rule<span>âs deterrence rationale </span></span>
</div>
<div>is not served when the challenged evidence would <span>â</span>ultimately or </div>
<div>inevitably<span>â</span><span> be discovered by lawful means. <span>Nix</span>, 467 U.S.<span></span> <span>at</span> <span>444</span> <span>(â</span>If </span>
</div>
<div>the prosecution can establish <span>. . .</span> that the information ultimately or </div>
<div>inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means . . . t<span></span>hen the </div>
<div>deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should b<span></span>e </div>
<div>received<span>.â)</span><span>. <span>As the <span>Nix </span>court reasoned, <span>â</span>when an officer is aware </span></span>
</div>
<div>that the evidence will inevitably be discovered, he will try t<span></span>o avoid </div>
<div>engaging in any questionable practice . . . [as] there will be little <span></span>to </div>
<div>gain from taking any dubious <span>â</span><span>shortcuts<span>â</span></span> to obtain the evidence.<span>â</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>Id.<span> at 445-<span>46</span><span>; </span><span>see also People v. Briggs</span>, 709 P.2d 911, 923 (Colo. </span>
</div>
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<div id="pf2a" data-page-no="2a">
<div><div>
<div>39 </div>
<div>1985)<span>. <span>But here, the opposite occurred </span></span><span>â</span><span> police took a shortcut, </span>
</div>
<div>presumably because they were not confident that the second <span></span>brute </div>
<div>force attack would crack the cell phone in time to put its </div>
<div>incriminating contents to use at the December 2021 t<span></span>rial. </div>
<div>¶ 68<span> </span><span>To rule that use of the PIN code was permissible in this </span>
</div>
<div>context would provide an incentive for police to engage in such </div>
<div>shortcuts in the future. <span>See Casillas</span>, ¶¶ 34-<span>36</span>. Although there is a </div>
<div>reasonable probability that police software would have <span>eventua<span></span>lly<span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>produced d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span><span>s </span>PIN code<span>, </span>by Fink<span>â</span><span>s </span>own estimates and prior </div>
<div>brute force attack<span>, </span>we can only speculate whether this would have </div>
<div>occurred before the December 2021 trial<span>. </span><span>See Syrie</span>, 101 P.3d at </div>
<div>223.<span> <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>D.<span> <span>Prejudice and Next Steps </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 69<span> </span><span>In their brief, the People <span>â</span>concede that if this Court wh<span></span>ere [sic] </span>
</div>
<div>to find that the trial court erred in denying all of <span>[dâE]streeâs</span> </div>
<div>preserved suppression claims, under the facts of this case, t<span></span>he </div>
<div>errors could not be harmless.<span>â</span><span> </span>We agree. </div>
<div>¶ 70<span> </span><span>The admission of the evidence gathered from d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s cell </span>
</div>
<div>phone undoubtedly prejudiced him at trial. Photos of d<span>â</span>Estree </div>
<div>holding a handgun that matched the description of the homicide </div>
</div></div>
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<div><div>
<div>40 </div>
<div>weapon, text messages admitting that he expected to go to prison<span>, </span>
</div>
<div>and the incriminating internet search history were impactful pieces </div>
<div>of evidence against d<span>â</span>Estree. Further, the prosecut<span>or</span> referred t<span></span>o </div>
<div>this evidence several times in closing argument, pointing <span>to</span> <span>it</span> to </div>
<div>help convince the jurors that, regardless of what they thought of </div>
<div>Lucero<span>â</span><span>s <span>credibility, they could rely on the evidence taken f<span></span>rom </span></span>
</div>
<div>dâEstreeâs <span>cell phone <span>to</span> corroborate her testimony<span>. </span>And the </span>
</div>
<div>prosecution noted in its motion for reconsideration after the first </div>
<div>warrant<span>â</span><span>s suppression that it considered the <span>â</span>evidence collected </span>
</div>
<div>from the cell phone belonging to the defendant [to be] <span>of</span> critical </div>
<div>importance to the prosecution of this case.<span>â</span><span> </span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 71<span> </span><span>We cannot find that the improper admission of this critical </span>
</div>
<div>evidence against d<span>â</span>Estree was harmless beyond a reasonable do<span></span>ubt<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>Furthermore, these errors likely impacted every one of his </div>
<div>convictions<span>. <span> The </span></span><span>prosecutionâs</span><span> trial evidence supporting each of </span>
</div>
<div>d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span><span>s convictions, especially Lucero</span><span>â</span><span>s testimony, benefite<span></span>d from </span></span>
</div>
<div>this improperly admitted digital evidence for corroborati<span>on</span>. Th<span></span>us, </div>
</div></div>
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<div>41 </div>
<div>these errors require reversal of each of his convictions.</div>
</div>
<div><div>12</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>See </span>
</div>
<div>Hagos<span>, ¶ 11;<span> see also People v. Folsom</span>, 2017 COA 146M, ¶¶ <span>17</span>-23 </span> </div> <div>(admission of videos extracted from iPod was not harmless an<span></span>d </div> <div>required reversal). </div> <div>¶ 72<span> </span><span>In the light most favorable to the prosecution, however, </span> </div> <div>considering both the properly admitted evidence through witness </div> <div>testimony and the policeâs <span>investigation, in addition to the </span> </div> <div>improperly admitted cell phone evidence, we cannot say w<span></span>ith </div> <div>certainty that there was insufficient evidence to convict <span></span>dâEstree of </div> <div>some or all of the charged crimes. And because this reversal is </div> <div>predicated on the receipt of improperly admitted evidence, <span></span>the </div> <div>prosecution is entitled to a retrial of all of dâEstreeâs charge<span></span>s on </div> <div>remand. <span>See People v. Marciano</span>,2014 COA 92M
-2, ¶¶ 42-<span>49</span><span>; <span>see </span></span> </div> <div>also People v. Sisneros<span>,606 P.2d 1317
, 1319 (Colo. App. <span></span>1980)<span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>(â[W]<span>here reversal is predicated upon trial error consisting of t<span></span>he </span>
</div>
<div>reception of inadmissible evidence, remand for a new trial <span></span>is proper, </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>12</div></div>
<div>
<div> The People do not address whether any of d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s convictions </div>
<div>may have been <span>un</span>affected by the admission of the digital evidence </div>
<div>were we to find the execution of the second warrant was infirm, </div>
<div>while d<span>â</span>Estree contends that every one of his convictions mu<span></span>st be </div>
<div>reversed<span>. <span> </span></span>
</div>
</div>
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<div>42 </div>
<div>and an appellate court should not review the remain<span></span>ing evidence in </div>
<div>order to determine whether it is sufficient to sustain <span></span>the </div>
<div>conviction<span>.â) (citations omitted). <span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>III.<span> <span>Disposition </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 73<span> </span><span>We reverse d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s convictions and remand the case to the </span>
</div>
<div>district court for a new trial. </div>
<div>JUDGE SULLIVAN concurs<span>. </span> </div>
<div>JUDGE GROVE specially concurs. </div>
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<div>43 </div>
<div>JUDGE GROVE, specially concurring<span>. </span> </div>
<div>¶ 74<span> <span>I agree with the majorityâs reasoning and its conclusion that </span></span>
</div>
<div>dâEstreeâs convictions must be reversed. I write separately<span></span> to urge </div>
<div>the Colorado Supreme Court to revisit two aspects of<span></span> its inevitable </div>
<div>discovery jurisprudence that I believe have drifted away from the </div>
<div>United States Supreme Courtâs articulation of the rule.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 75<span> </span><span>First, since the doctrine was first applied in this state, </span>
</div>
<div>Coloradoâs version of the inevitable discovery rule has requi<span></span>red the </div>
<div>prosecution to show that (1) âthe police were pursuing<span></span> an </div>
<div>independent investigation at the time the illegality occurred,â and </div>
<div>(2<span>) there was â<span>a reasonable probability<span> that the evidence would have </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>been discovered in the absence of police misconduct.<span>â </span> <span>People v. </span>
</div>
<div>Breidenbach<span>, 875 P.2d 879, 889 (Colo. 1994) (emphasis a<span></span>dded). My </span> </div> <div>concern in this case is with the second element of this test, which </div> <div>not only makes little semantic sense but also materially diverge<span></span>s </div> <div>from the standard set forth in <span>Nix v. Williams</span>, 467 U.S. <span></span>431 (1984). </div> <div>¶ 76<span> <span>Breidenbach<span>âs âreasonable probabilityâ approach tracked t<span></span>he </span></span></span> </div> <div>Fifth Circuit Court of Appealsâ holding in <span>United Stat<span></span>es v. Cherry<span>, </span></span> </div> <div>759 F.2d 1196
(5th Cir. 1985), which applied pre-existing circuit </div>
<div>precedent to define the scope of the inevitable discovery rule base<span></span>d </div>
</div></div>
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<div>44 </div>
<div>on its conclusion that the <span>Nix <span>court had made âno attempt</span></span> . . .<span></span> to </div>
<div>define the contours of that exception.â <span>Id. <span>at 1204. But howeve<span></span>r </span></span>
</div>
<div>thin the analysis in <span>Nix </span>may have been, it still clearly held that<span></span> the </div>
<div>inevitable discovery rule only applies if the prosecution </div>
<div>âestablish[es] <span>by a preponderance of the evidence<span> that the </span></span>
</div>
<div>information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovere<span></span>d by </div>
<div>lawful means.â <span>Nix</span><span>, 467 U.S.<span> </span>at 444 (emphasis added).</span>
</div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>The </span>
</div>
<div>preponderance standard is different from âreasonable pro<span></span>bability,â </div>
<div>and, importantly for this case, it also places a heavier burd<span></span>en on </div>
<div>the prosecution. <span>See United States v. Zava<span></span>la<span>, 541 F.3d 562, 579 n.7 </span></span> </div> <div>(5th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that the Fifth Circuitâs applicati<span></span>on of </div> <div>the âreasonable probabilityâ test rather than a preponderance </div> <div>standard in the context of the inevitable discovery rule âis mo<span></span>re </div> <div>favorable to the Government than <span>the test in other circuitsâ); <span>cf. Mi<span></span>le </span></span> </div> <div>High Cab, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Commân<span>,2013 CO 26
, ¶ 15 </span> </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>1</div></div> <div> <div> I recognize the linguistic difficulties in measuring inevitability in </div> <div>terms of probability. <span>See, e.g.</span><span>,</span><span> United States v. Cabassa</span>, 62 F.3d </div> <div>470, 474 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing the âsemantic puzzleâ c<span></span>reated </div> <div>by <span>âusing the preponderance of the evidence standard</span> to prove </div> <div>inevitabilityâ). But that standard is dictated by the holding in <span>Nix v. </span> </div> <div>Williams<span>,467 U.S. 431
(1984), and has generally pro<span></span>ved workable </span>
</div>
<div>in the context of suppression rulings. </div>
</div>
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<div>45 </div>
<div>(observing that âreasonable probabilityâ is used âto refer to a </div>
<div>likelihood of occurrence which, although not insignificant<span></span>, </div>
<div>nevertheless need not rise to the level of a preponderance of <span></span>the </div>
<div>evidenceâ); <span>Krutsinger v. People<span>, 219 P.3d 1054, 1060 <span></span>(Colo. 2009) </span></span> </div> <div>(â[T]he Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that<span></span> it does not </div> <div>intend its use of the term âreasonable probabilityâ to req<span></span>uire a </div> <div>showing that the defendant would more likely than not have </div> <div>received a different result <span>. . . </span><span>.â). As a result, Coloradoâs ve</span>rsion of </div> <div>the inevitable discovery rule appears to be out of step wit<span></span>h Supreme </div> <div>Court precedent.</div> </div> <div><div>2</div></div> <div> <div> </div> <div>¶ 77<span> </span><span>To be sure, in practice it will often make no difference whet<span></span>her </span> </div> <div>the âreasonable probabilityâ or preponderance standard ap<span></span>plies. </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>2</div></div> <div> <div> Notably, <span>the Colorado Supreme Courtâs application of<span></span> the </span> </div> <div>âreasonable probabilityâ test in inevitable discovery cases also </div> <div>diverges from its application of a preponderance standa<span></span>rd in the </div> <div>closely related context of the independent source doctrine. <span>See </span> </div> <div>Peo<span>ple v. Thompson<span>,2021 CO 15
, ¶ <span>22 (âWhen, as here, the People </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>assert the applicability of the independent source doctrine, they </div>
<div>bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the <span></span>evidence the </div>
<div>doctrine<span>âs applicability.â).<span> <span>Because the two exceptions share the </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>same doctrinal underpinnings, <span>see Murray v. United States</span>, 487 </div>
<div>U.S. 533, 539 (1988) (observing that <span>â</span>[t]he inevitable discovery </div>
<div>doctrine <span>. . . </span>is in reality an extrapolation from the independent </div>
<div>source doctrine<span>â), </span>I see no reason why the same standard sh<span></span>ould </div>
<div>not apply to both. </div>
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<div>46 </div>
<div>But in close cases, the test that the trial court applies may well <span></span>be </div>
<div>dispositive. This case provides a perfect example. Given that<span></span> the </div>
<div>United States Secret Service took three months to complete a <span></span>brute </div>
<div>force attack on the phoneâs PIN code, I believe tha<span>t it was </span>
</div>
<div>reasonably probable that a second brute force attack woul<span></span>d also be </div>
<div>successful within a similar amount of time. But I am far less </div>
<div>certain that the prosecution <span>proved</span> <span>by a preponderance o<span></span>f the </span>
</div>
<div>evidence<span> that cracking the PIN code would be inevitable in any sort </span>
</div>
<div>of reasonable timeframe. <span>See United States v. Jones</span>, 72 F.3d 1324, </div>
<div>1334 (7th Cir. 1995) (âInevitable discovery is not an excepti<span></span>on to be </div>
<div>invoked casually, and if it is to be prevented from swallowing <span></span>the </div>
<div>Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule, courts must tak<span></span>e </div>
<div>care to hold the government to its burden <span>of proof.â). To t<span></span>he </span>
</div>
<div>contrary, the only evidence on this point was Agent Finkâs </div>
<div>testimony that, if she had not decided to use the illegally <span></span>obtained </div>
<div>PIN code after only a week of searching, the brute force attack c<span></span>ould </div>
<div>have taken âanywhere from a week to 11 yearsâ to unlock t<span></span>he </div>
<div>phone. Fink offered few other details about how quickly the process </div>
<div>was likely to proceed or how the software worked. Inf<span></span>ormation of </div>
<div>that sort would have helped the court better assess how the search </div>
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<div>47 </div>
<div>would turn out. For example, if the court had been presented wi<span></span>th </div>
<div>evidence that the software attempts easy-<span>to</span>-remember PIN codes </div>
<div>(like the one here) first, before moving on to more random numbe<span></span>rs, </div>
<div>it might have been able to better forecast the likelihood that </div>
<div>execution of the second warrant would have been succes<span></span>sful in the </div>
<div>time remaining before trial. </div>
<div>¶ 78<span> </span><span>I acknowledge that the prosecution could have sought up to <span></span>a </span>
</div>
<div>six-month continuance of the trial date if it had tried and failed to </div>
<div>discover the PIN code. <span>See </span>§ 18-1-405(6)(g)(I), C.R.S. 2024. But <span></span>in </div>
<div>light of Finkâs testimony, it appears that an extension of t<span></span>hat length </div>
<div>would have offered little additional certainty and mig<span></span>ht, depending </div>
<div>on the overall age of the case, have begun to raise constit<span></span>utional </div>
<div>speedy trial concerns. <span>See People v. Nelson</span>, 2014 COA 165, ¶¶ <span>21<span></span><span>-</span></span>
</div>
<div>25. Accordingly, if the district court had been required to hol<span></span>d the </div>
<div>prosecution to the burden of proof dictated by <span>Nix</span>, it might well </div>
<div>have granted dâEstreeâs motion to suppress.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 79<span> </span><span>Second, in my view, parties and trial courts in Colorado wo<span></span>uld </span>
</div>
<div>be well served by an approach to the inevitable discovery doctrine </div>
<div>that explicitly takes deterrence into account. I do not mean t<span></span>o </div>
<div>suggest that the prosecution should be required to show an </div>
</div></div>
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<div>48 </div>
<div>absence of bad faith (indeed, <span>Nix</span> rejected that very argument,<span></span> 467 </div>
<div>U.S. at 445), but as Justice Stevens pointed out in his <span>Nix </span>
</div>
<div>concurrence, the inevitable discovery doctrine would âbe </div>
<div>inconsistent with the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary <span></span>ruleâ if </div>
<div>it provided law enforcement with an incentive to commit </div>
<div>constitutional violations âby permitting the prosecution t<span></span>o avoid the </div>
<div>unc<span>ertainties inherent in its search for evidence.â <span>Id.</span><span> at 456 </span></span>
</div>
<div>(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Consistent wit<span></span>h this </div>
<div>understanding, some federal circuits have made clear t<span></span>hat the </div>
<div>inevitable discovery exception should not apply under </div>
<div>circumstances that would undermine the fundamental purpose of </div>
<div>the exclusionary rule. <span>See, e.g.</span><span>,</span><span> United States v. Crespo-Rios</span>, <span></span>645 </div>
<div>F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that inevitable discovery sh<span></span>ould </div>
<div>apply only where <span>â</span>application of the doctrine in a particular c<span></span>ase </div>
<div>will not sully the prophylaxis of the Fourth Amendmentâ<span> (quoting </span>
</div>
<div>United States v. Hughes<span>, 640 F.3d 428, 440 (1st Cir. 2011))); </span>Unit<span></span>ed </div> <div>States v. Vasquez De Reyes<span>,149 F.3d 192
, 195 (3d Cir. 1<span></span>998) </span>
</div>
<div>(holding that the inevitable discovery rule âpermits the co<span></span>urt <span>to </span>
</div>
<div>balance the public interest in providing a jury with all relevant<span></span> and </div>
</div></div>
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<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPS6UWKBZO&Expires=1728536566&Signature=iPEvkU5OC5FPi4N1AiFHuUk9Opc%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIFtfD2Ez3JMDb4MbnsKue0sSlWceRGAVSolTbgmrm9VJAiA3JPi4P6S9extweDDPns%2Bd5h%2FYlzrI5Hw5Lx32j2zGGCqyBQhtEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM4TgBc5ht0DC2AJY%2FKo8F7qSALm9PItWg%2BCzJYMsqcR%2BY63pXgo6JCCEGS1plO0dn3TawAeo5fsJJAP9e6YZerRshoIe27gzpWWY53NzdxGt6ZO3l%2FuM4TEYyP935rQdKgnR03XSk9vuaQ45OGVgNCUAyJ38AX8FNnhn0LJXaZjnSmleqm27mI%2BEs%2FKkfXA8KEjZmpUejdDqf7Ya108h6%2BwNsPDDBuNNM3Ht3sbOd11BYlx1lLWV4a8H7u94Bow68BMB8VIiC7mwbPxnS0fBg9w71z09vGd7JQElHJuBcKc9GwdOF0KPZ8Gs%2BpIL4glv7ikLuzynlkUR5VRT3DezH3dlyLz%2Bgh%2BN5S7KKQEF63TwbeLiggOzlQJPc0oQpVWgtY8pZ0u5o7XmTOJQ%2BNGIw1DvRh7NUKgBuBwfZQZDkVRJ1Wfm4PawOjOBGet1w82qp0b%2BLa2NuqCjLW7%2Fyl%2FadKPfdARcP8ltQXsk4LDt59oZBYulpcwcm3egPXLCJIrPtNyvXm0lUB8QsYqbSEXiG2NybT0l%2FD%2FUj9S0aCWGFbgAi0jVa4JUI36uRpKfl%2ByF%2F1c6Op19SBu3RtFJeiedbMYn85UYYm5cfOobB4gmL8Q33m%2FgClUBeY%2BXaK7prVtXr8nKceJz8Wsi%2B0vzEyGlTrKkGE3Ec%2F9I%2FCsvSRZCvhk7KZE7Q9iqdQ19gPXDwS3%2FM7RqKlEe0I9U3DJUdP3r7LmfExhdTzHQ7EwtScIoDy7PtWYWQhxT7OZcrOYuTUukm8AtlRBPL2McaEFfbk50WeNjYi%2FtMl8ukSvrZzaGtzmXEeOLWsRH6aWk8jcnutFMP%2BnM2l2Ff%2FOFPj4CnUxfi5dKriCupfngdNmm1jxhz6Ek5xZ0F3xY5TmHZ9%2BxFazCMnJ24BjqyAdBrXXeffGhNbbjae78%2BtzJVgxPmy8XeQL3C8jx3eNyZJ7cnKKMib%2BC3qodL9uDu%2F5F21Qgn8gwklrISpeRjnm3th7sIc6FGJGEQ%2BJuJr90anXl2WRB1z2p0QYa342p%2B6VBvG%2ByGf7FJ356zmyz8aLCNduYJCzja8a5QuZ6iarOCgSbX3YtbGUDvUjJR0bY8g2V%2B67gGtpTb%2BUjYAIquI1CllkC5nEi6LbN4PyAL326%2BSFE%3D"><div>
<div>49 </div>
<div>probative evidence in a criminal proceeding against societyâs </div>
<div>interest in deterring unlawful police conductâ).</div>
</div>
<div><div>3</div></div>
<div>
<div> </div>
<div>¶ 80<span> <span>As the majorityâs analysis makes clear, the circumstances </span></span>
</div>
<div>before us here seem to be exactly what those cases had in mind. <span></span> </div>
<div>With trial fast approaching, and apparently facing a very real </div>
<div>possibility that the clock would run out before the prosecuti<span></span>on </div>
<div>could <span>collect the important evidence saved in dâEstreeâs cell <span></span>phone, </span>
</div>
<div>Agent Fink took a shortcut and made a conscious decision <span></span>to open </div>
<div>the phone using the PIN code that she knew full well had been </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>3</div></div>
<div>
<div> Notably, several states have rejected the reasoning of <span>Nix </span>
</div>
<div>altogether and held as a matter of state constitutional law t<span></span>hat the </div>
<div>prosecution must demonstrate the absence of bad faith <span></span>for the </div>
<div>inevitable discovery rule to apply. <span>See Garnett v. State</span>, 308 A.3d </div>
<div>625, 648 <span>(Del. 2023) (â[O]</span>ur holding that the inevitable-discovery </div>
<div>exception is compatible with Article I, § 6 [of the Delaware </div>
<div>Constitution] assumes that it will be applied only when it<span></span> is clear </div>
<div>that <span>â</span>the police have not acted in bad faith to accelerate t<span></span>he </div>
<div>discovery of the evidence in question.<span>ââ</span>) (citation omitted); <span>Stat<span></span>e v. </span>
</div>
<div>Holly<span>, 2013 ND 94, ¶ <span>55<span>, </span></span>833 N.W.2d 15
, 33 <span>(â</span>When a shortcut is </span> </div> <div>taken that circumvents the requirements of the Fourth Amen<span></span>dment, </div> <div>the requirements of the inevitable-discovery doctrine have not b<span></span>een </div> <div>met<span>.â); <span>Smith v. State<span>,948 P.2d 473
, 481 (Alaska 1997) (recognizing </span></span></span> </div> <div>the inevitable discovery rule but limiting its application under the </div> <div>Alaska Constitution <span>âwhere the police have intentionally or </span> </div> <div>knowingly violated a suspect<span>âs rightsâ</span>); <span>Commonwealth v. Sbordone</span>, </div> <div>678 N.E.2d 1184
, 1190 (Mass. 1997) (The inevitable discovery rule </div>
<div>may apply â<span>as long as the officers did not act in bad faith <span></span>to </span>
</div>
<div>accelerate the discovery of evidence, and the particular </div>
<div>constitutional violation is not so severe as to require <span></span>suppression.<span>â). </span> </div>
</div>
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<div>50 </div>
<div>illegally obtained. If ever there was a time that called for an a<span></span>dverse </div>
<div>consequence, this was it. Otherwise, we would be sanctioning </div>
<div>precisely the type of unlawful police conduct that the exclusi<span></span>onary </div>
<div>rule was intended to discourage. </div>
</div></div>
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