*1 BREARD v. ALEXANDRIA. Argued 7-8,

No. 399. March 1951. Decided June *2 appellant. cause for Shockley argued E. Russell Jr. Harry Wagner, was J. him on the brief With filed brief cause and argued H. Peterman Frank appellee. filed were appellant supporting curiae Briefs amici Na- for the D. Shaw and Forbes E. ‘Coulson by Robert M. Inc.; Clark Publishers, Magazine Association tional al.; et Corporation & Son F. Collier for the P. Clifford Direct Association George for the National M. and J. Selling Companies.

Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant Jack H. here, Breard, regional repre- Keystone sentative of Readers Service, Inc., Pennsyl- vania corporation, was arrested going while from door to door City in the Alexandria, Louisiana, soliciting subscriptions for nationally known magazines. The ar- rest solely was ground he had violated an because he had not obtained prior consent owners the residences solicited. Breard, a resi- dent of Texas, in charge was of a crew of solicitors who go from house to house the various cities and towns in the area under Breard’s management and solicit sub- scriptions nationally known magazines periodicals, *3 including among others the Saturday Evening Post, La- dies’ Home Journal, Country Gentleman, Holiday, News- week, American Home, Cosmopolitan, Esquire, Pic, Par- ents, Today’s Woman and True. spend These solicitors only a days few in each city, upon depending its size. Keystone sends a card from its home office to the new subscribers acknowledging receipt of the subscription and thereafter periodical the is forwarded to the subscriber publisher the in interstate through commerce the mails.

The ordinance under which the arrest was made, far so as is here pertinent, reads as follows:

“Section 1. Be it Ordained by the Council of the City of Alexandria, in Louisiana, legal session con- vened that practice of going upon in and private residences the City of Alexandria, Louisiana solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise not having been requested or invited so to do by the owner owners, or occupant or occupants of said private residences for purpose of soliciting orders for the sale goods, wares merchandise disposing of and/or and/or to be declared the same hawking or peddling nuisance as such punishable nuisance misdemeanor.” books statute has been on import, of similar one

It, or that: stipulated It is many years. Alexandria Council, City by the enacted was “Such ordinance householders some reasons, because other among in- in some authority that complained to those were solicitors another, or reason for one stances, householders and some discourteous, or undesirable courteous was a solicitor whether that, complained intrusion uninvited any not desire they did not, home.” their privacy of into the under- were ordinance of the purposes protective opinion. in its of Louisiana Supreme by the scored at 555. 2d So. 825-828, 47 820, at 217 La. ordinance, there for violation appellant’s trial At that the ground quash a motion was Amend- Fourteenth of the Clause Due Process violates it violates Constitution; Federal ment guar- violates Clause; Commerce Federal speech and freedom Amendment the First antees Four- by the to the states applicable made press, of the United Constitution to the Amendment teenth *4 by was overruled quash motion to Appellant’s States. sentenced and guilty found he was and trial court Supreme jail. days 30 fine or serve $25 a pay and conviction appellant’s affirmed Louisiana objections. constitutional federal rejected the expressly appeal, here on is The case 2d 553. So. La. 47 Texas, S. 413. U. Jamison 1257; C. § among disagree proceed liberty and declare All una- equal There meaning. true to its themselves as per- cannot private gain, opportunists, nimity that mitted to arm themselves with an acceptable principle, such as that of a right to work, privilege engage interstate commerce, or a free press, proceed and to use it as an iron standard to smooth path their by crushing the living rights of others to privacy repose. This case for an adjustment calls of constitutional rights in light of the particular living conditions of place. the time and Everyone cannot have his own way yield and each must something to the reasonable satisfaction of the needs of all.

It is true knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or to attempt license an entry, justifying ingress to the home solicitors, and peddlers hawkers for all kinds of salable articles.1 When such visitors are barred premises from by notice or order, however, sub- sequent trespasses been have punished.2 Door-to-door canvassing has flourished increasingly in years recent with the ready market furnished by rapid concentration of housing. The infrequent and still welcome solicitor to the rural home became to some recurring nuisance in towns when the visits were multiplied.3 Unwanted 1 Restatement, Torts, §167; Cooley (4th ed.) Torts §248. 2Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 49 S. E. 369, appeal 2d dis missed, statutes collected, Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 147,n. 10. 3“We must assume practice existed in the town as the first section states, and that it had become annoying and dis turbing objectionable to at least some of the citizens. We practices think like have general become so and common as to be judicial knowledge, and frequent that the ringing of doorbells of private residences itinerant vendors and solicitors is in fact a nuisance to occupants of homes. It is appellee its solici tors and their methods alone that must be considered in determining the reasonableness of ordinance, many but others as well who seek way in the dispose same of their wares. One follows another until ringing doorbells quietude disturb the of the home and become annoyance.” constant Town Green River v. Fuller Co., Brush 112, 114. F. 2d *5 night nuisance, or are a or by day knocks on door peace merchant, The local retail worse, quiet. competition unmindful of effective too, has not been a selling many lines. As by furnished house-to-house thought really fairness, may matter of business not sporting through in his home and his quarry to corner open put pressure prospect purchase. door on the As expected exigencies ordinarily of trade are not to have higher rating constitutionally tranquillity than the of responsible municipal the fireside, sought officers have way to annoyances preserving complete curb the while freedom for desirable homes. The idea visitors to the of barring classified by salesmen from homes means of posted notices by rejected individual householders was early as practical less than an regulating ordinance solicitors.4

The Town of Green River, Wyoming, in 1931 undertook to remedy by ordinance of irritating incidents house- to-house canvassing for sales. The substance of or- dinance, so far as here material, is the same as of Alexandria, Louisiana.5 The Green River ordinance was sustained Appeals Circuit of of the Tenth Circuit in an attack cor- nonresident poration, a solicitor of orders, through a bill an injunction prohibit its enforcement, on the federal grounds constitutional of interference with interstate deprivation commerce, of property process without due law, and denial of the equal protection of the laws. Town Bunger, Wyo. Town Green River 52, 70, 58 P. 2d Hosiery City cf. Real Silk 462; Mills Richmond, 298 F. 126. 5 consideration, ordinance now under apply does § sale, soliciting “the sale, milk, dairy products, orders for the vegetables, poultry, eggs garden produce other farm and Appellant point against present ground makes no Tigner v. Texas, invalid classification. Cf. Williams Arkansas,

628 Co., Green River v. Fuller 2d Brush 65 F. 112. No

of of review that decision was An sought. employee of the Company challenged Brush again the same ordinance in the courts of in Wyoming prosecution 1936 on a by the town for the misdemeanor of violating its terms. On this attack certain purely state grounds were relied upon, which we need not notice, and the charges of violation of the Federal Constitution repeated. were The ordi nance held was valid Supreme Court of Wyoming. Town Green River Bunger, v. 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P. 2d 456.6

6 validity of Green River ordinances has also been considered in a number of state courts. Colorado, (in Five Louisiana cases states — previous to the one), instant Mexico, New York, New Wyoming— upheld ordinance, have against objections beyond that it was scope police of the power, deprived property rights vendors of without process law, due deprived equal them protection of the laws, of the infringed upon the Commerce Clause and the First and Four teenth City Amendments. McCormick v. Montrose, 493, 105 Colo. 969; 99 2d Shreveport P. Cunningham, v. 481, 190 649; La. 182 So. Jones, Alexandria v. 923, 216 La. 79; 45 Gallup, So. 2d Green v. 71, 46 N. M. 619; People 120 P. 2d Bohnke, v. 154, 287 N. Y. 38 N. E. 2d Bunger, Wyo. Green River v. 52, 50 58 P. 2d 456. states, Eleven hand, the other have held such ordinances invalid. All of these part states acted in at least on grounds, nonfederal only federal argument, constitutional which was considered states, three was that based on the Due Process Clause. No state court, voiding ordinance, has reached the Commerce Clause or the First urged Amendment issues principal grounds here. The relied on prohibited have been that the conduct amounted at most only private to a public one; nuisance and not a that there was no showing injury public safety by health or prohibited conduct; right that there occupation, was a vested in a lawful so that subject only regulation it was prohibition; but not to and that the beyond delegated ordinance was powers municipality. White, (not Prior v. 132 private Fla. 180 So. 347 more than nuisance); Clay Mathews, v. (affirming 185 Ga. 194 E. 172 opinion by evenly without court); DeBerry LaGrange, an divided App. 74, (not nuisance; Ga. 8 S. E. 2d 146 invades an inalienable right occupation to the soliciting); Blair, Osceola v. 231 Iowa (not nuisance, deprives N. W. 2d persons property right of a urged appellant Court, this appeal Process. —On

Due the Fourteenth under unconstitutionality particularly unreasonable of such Clause Due Process Amendment “the placed on Green River restraints life,” occupations of the common in one engage right to Liebmann, U. S. alia, Co. State Ice inter New citing, He also Tanner, 244 262, 278, and Adams of interstate commerce alleged prohibition upon the relied regulation.7 police of a guise under the *7 781, Baking Co., Ky. Sterling v. Donaldson 287 occupation); Mt. their beyond scope the (not nuisance, the public 2d 237 a 155 S. W. Air, 536, 192 v. Bel 172 Md. municipal police power); Jewel Tea Co. municipal- delegated powers of nuisance, (not not within a A. 417 (not 768, Geneva, N. W. 664 Neb. 291 Tea Co. v. 137 Jewel ity) ; Jay citing Clause, arbitrary, Due Process nuisance, violates public a Humor, Inc. J. Bryan, N. Good 504); Baking 264 U. S. Burns Co. v. (not valid Commissioners, 162, 2d 113 11 A. a 124 N. L. v. Board of J. municipality); McAlester v. powers of regulation, beyond police (only private a Co., P. 2d 924 98 Union Tea 186 Okla. Grand 783 Farmer, 143, 186 S. E. Orangeburg v. C. 181 S. nuisance); of state occupation, violation in prohibits lawful (unreasonable, parte motive); Ex improper process, enacted due with federal and (beyond powers 2d 525 Faulkner, S. W. R. 143 Tex. Cr. 630, 1 E. 2d 269 Culpeper, 172 Va. S. municipality); White v. nuisance). (not public Culpeper cases contained dis- Air Bel in the and The ordinances It case. should in the instant criminatory not involved provisions Bohnke, in upheld the ordinance New York while also that be noted tracts, was religious that case distribution supra, applied Struthers, S. 319 U. in Martin v. decision before this Court’s decided subsequently been ordinances has River of Green 141. Enforcement sect, Witnesses the Jehovah’s against members enjoined as v. Zimmerman Supp. and Springs, 40 F. Donley v. Colorado Supp. 582. (Ohio), 38 F. London 325; Portland, Hosiery v. Mills 7 He cited: Real Silk Co. Textbook 34; International Pennsylvania, S. 273 U. Di Santo v. Robbins 401; v. Arkansas, Rogers 227 U. v. 91; Pigg, Seelig, Inc., District, Baldwin Taxing Shelby U. S. Michigan, U. S. 511; Stewart Here this Court dismissed want of a substantial question. federal 300 U. S. 638. For an answer argument that the ordinance denied process due because of its unreasonable restraint on the right to engage in a legitimate occupation, this Court cited three cases: Gund ling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. ;8 183 Western Association Turf v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. ;9 359 and Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79.10 8An forbidding cigarettes the sale of without a license upheld.

was “Regulations respecting pursuit of a lawful trade or business very are of frequent occurrence in the various country, cities and regulations what such shall be and to particular what trade, occupation business or they apply, shall questions are State determine, and their determination comes proper within the exer- police cise of power State, and regulations unless the are utterly so extravagant unreasonable and in their purpose nature and property personal rights of the citizen are unnecessarily, wholly manner arbitrary, interfered with destroyed without process law, due they beyond do not extend power of the State pass, they subject form no for Federal interference.” 177U. S. at 188. 9A *8 making statute it unlawful to purchaser refuse a of a ticket admission place to a public of except entertainment in certain circum relating stances to drunkenness vice, upheld. and was deprive “Does the statute the any property defendant right of without process due of law? question We answer this negative. in the Decisions court, of this all, familiar to cited, and which need not be recognize possession, by the State, powers each of never surrendered to the Government; powers General which State, except as restrained its own constitution or the Constitution of the United States, may only public exert not for health, public morals public and safety, general for but good, or common for the well-being, good comfort order of people.” 204 U. S. at 363. regulation, “Such a in just, promotive itself is peace likewise of good among order places those attend public who entertainment or amusement.” Id. at 364. following The sections of a statute upheld: of Arkansas were “ ‘Sec. That it any shall be person unlawful for persons, or ex- cept provided as hereinafter act, in section this to drum or solicit case Green River this Court since opinions The this power police argue that the any ground given have not infirmities soliciting has constitutional over of a state concept in the principle embodied process under the due trade or business. carry on an inoffensive of freedom to Tanner, supra, invali- Decisions as Liebmann such The point here. hardly are dating legislative action, necessity convenience and required former a certificate of employment prohibited and the latter ice, to manufacture for their services. agencies receiving from remuneration pro- River can be characterized as Green obtaining hibitory appellant’s legitimate business of subscriptions periodicals only in the limited sense subscriptions forbidding solicitation of house-to-house regulatory legislation canvass without All invitation. prohibitory The usual methods of sense. solici- patronage any hotel, lodging house, eating house, business or for bath house, physician, masseur, surgeon, practitioner, or other medical train, cars, depots any operating or railroad or common carrier running or within the State of Arkansas.

“ any 2. That it shall unlawful for railroad or common ‘Sec. operating knowingly carrier a line of Arkansas within State trains, by any permit depots or to be used its cars within the State drumming soliciting patronage person persons or for or business or hotel, lodging eating house, house, physician, any house, for bath drumming masseur, surgeon, practitioner, or or or other medical whatsoever; soliciting any profession ....’” business S. 86. U. saying: quoted Supreme

This Court of Arkansas “ soliciting physicians, through ‘Drummers who the trains swarm houses, hotels, etc., burden to those who are bath make existence a subjected repeated It is true that the traveler to their solicitations. may importunities, this does not render a deaf ear these but turn *9 may keep annoying. any unpleasant and The drummer the less himself against disorderly conduct, still render within the law beseeching annoyance by his much to travelers a source to ” Id. 89. way to doctor or a hotel.’ allowed to lead a agencies open.11 periodicals, mail, local radio, —are tation — position today a strong neither case is Furthermore, Nebraska, See Olsen appealed. Bunger as it was when North- seq., and Lincoln Union 243 et 236, 313 U. S. Co., western 335 U. S. protection property rights does

The Constitution’s city impotent guard make its citi- not a state a to annoyances regulation zens of life because the may doing legitimate the manner a business.12 restrict question right carry propriety The of a man’s on with selling presented a standard is here in its method appealing most form —an assertion door-to-door so- licitor that the Due Clause of the Fourteenth Process permit Amendment does state or its subdivisions deprive specialist selling door-to-door his means of putting livelihood. But aside argument e., i. after all it is the commerce, periodicals, sales of and not the methods, petitioner’s business, we think a legitimate occupation that even may be restricted Jensen, Burdening But Selling, Rocky cf. Interstate Direct Mt. L. Rev. up 275: “To disclaim this economic effect holding suggest the ordinance and to other methods of merchan dising direct-selling retailing, businesses short of local as was done Appeals 112], Tenth Circuit Court of F. 2d shows [65 knowledge a woeful lack of problems of the actual of direct-to- merchandising.” consumer York, Nebbia v. New 523: government making our form of property “Under the use of and the normally private of contracts public are matters of and not of con general governmental cern. rule is that both shall be free of rights rights property interference. But neither nor contract are absolute; government may if cannot exist the citizen at will use property fellows, his to the detriment of his or exercise his freedom Equally with the of contract to work them harm. fundamental right public regulate private it in the common inter is that Railway Agency York, 106; Daniel v. Express est.” New Family Security Co., 336 S. 220. Ins. U. Life

633 in the dissent public interest. See prohibited Liebmann, 280, 303. 262, 285 U. S. Ice Co. v. New State are reasonable where there problem legislative The is this ordinance action.13 hold that legislative for We bases Four- the Due Process Clause not invalid under Amendment. teenth Bunger con this Court Clause. —Nor did

Commerce Com under the ordinance invalid the Green River sider upon or an burden as an unreasonable merce Clause As commerce.14 interference with interstate upon behalf, Court relied Bunger’s cited in this cases Kansas, 255 Kansas 251, 254, (allowing Asbell v. 209 U. S. imported, into the inspection to have own cattle its Jones, slaughter); Savage v. state, except immediate sale (allowing regulate 225 501, U. S. 525 state Indem require feeds); a formula for stock Hartford Illinois, Illi nity (upholding Co. v. 298 158 an 155, U. S. keep requiring nois statute commission merchants to rec consignments ord of out-of-state and obtain a license and give bond).15 California, 423, 454-455; Arizona v. Henneford Co., 577, Mason

Silas U. S. 14Constitution, I,Art. 8.§ may distinguished. Bunger easily The cases cited for County Taxing District, Rogers Arkansas, Shelby cases of the Michigan, upon taxes and Stewart v. relate to is true of Real or licenses to do an interstate business. The same is, however, in Hosiery Portland, There Mills 268 U. S. 325. Silk “Nor can we should be noticed: this latter case a statement that possible theory purpose prevent accept expressed an really enough legislation interferes with justify which frauds is v. Farmers legitimate interstate commerce. See free flow of Shafer a com should be read as Co., P. 336. That 268 U. S. 189.” Grain carry on bond to requiring a license and a on an ordinance ment Brown, 341, 361. S. Parker v. 317 U. interstate business. Cf. case, 217 Textbook invalid in the International The statute held interstate require license to transact one was construed U. Appellant not, course, argue does the Commerce Clause all regulation forbids local solicitation for inter- state business. system, necessarily

“Under our constitutional there *11 the States, Congress acts, remains to until a wide range permissible power appro- for the exercise of priate jurisdiction to their although territorial inter- may state commerce be affected. . . . States are thus enabled to deal with local and to exigencies exert the absence of legislation conflict federal with protective an essential power.”16 power Such state long has been recognized.17 Appellant argues that the ordinance violates the Commerce Clause practical “because the operation of the ordinance, as applied appellant to and similarly others situated, imposes Seelig, business. Baldwin v. 511, 294 U. S. held invalid a state law prohibiting imported sale milk from another state unless the price paid selling in the price state reached require- the minimum ment of regulating sellers in the case, state. The Di Santo 273 U. S. 34, holding invalid as a direct requir- burden commerce a state law ing steamship agents procure license, longer can no be cited as authority ruling. for such a v. Thompson, 109, 313 U. S. California None of problem these cases reach the here under consideration of regulation local of solicitor’s conduct. 16Kelly Washington, 1, v. 302 U. S. 9-10. 17Cooley Wardens, v. Board 299; 12 How. Emert Missouri, v. 296; Tennessee, U. Austin v. 343; 179 U. S. Minnesota Rate Cases, 402, 408; U. S. Dept. South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 177, 187; 303 U. S. Thompson, 313 U. S. California Brown, Parker v. 341, 359, 362; 317 U. S. Witsell, Toomer v. 385, 394; Pipe Panhandle Michigan Eastern Line Co. v. Pub. Comm’n, Serv. 341 U. S. 329. “As has been so often stated but require nevertheless seems to con- repetition,

stant upon not all burdens commerce, only but undue or discriminatory ones, For, though are forbidden. ‘interstate business pay way,’ must consistently its a State with the commerce clause put cannot a barrier around its borders to bar out trade from other interstate com- upon discriminatory burden an undue prohibition tantamount in effect is merce and household- attempt to secure such commerce.” negli- results costly and is said to be too er’s consent business, stipu- extent interstate gible. The of this Green River asserts that Appellant lated, large.18 is issue, commerce inapplicable to the Bunger, supra, the effect met, made and because point was although upon commerce was at date, of the ordinance “before the it was decided and because “incidental”19 great purpose of bring naught constitutional States thus Congress regulate giving power Commerce fathers ‘To may Nations, among .’ Nor foreign the several . . with States pro- guise which accomplished in the of taxation prohibition be Richmond, discriminatory Nippert v. excluding or effect.” duces 416, 425-426. Co., where the Sears, & And Roebuck cf. Nelson *12 engaged by corporation retail within a state of stores maintenance such sales selling permit the to tax held to state in direct mail was agents corporation’s within though residents, none of its even to the sales. any with state had connection regularly accounts subscriptions in the field solicitation “The subscription circulation of the total annual from 60% 50% circulation magazines submit verified nationally-distributed which During period .... of Circulations to the Audit Bureau reports magazines per of such average date, circulation issue 1925 to from solicitation, . . has amounted subscription . to field attributable per is average circulation annual total than more 30% Keystone by subscription value obtained The total .” sue . . . $5,319,423.40. in 1948 was employer, Service, appellant’s Readers organi magazine publishers, a trade association national is a There mag nationally distributed publish some members whose zation copies. This million of 140 circulation combined with a azines plan to which registry central maintains a sponsors and association belong. subscriptions, soliciting Keystone, like agencies manner a useful not continued as test has as a “Incidental” 'affecting inter of matters regulation validity local determining the commerce. state they sustained, not because be are to the state regulations “Such they inter- control ‘direct,’ . not because . . than rather ‘indirect’ are River Ordinances of Green widespread enactment upon interstate and cumulative effect their actual before urged that forecast.” It is possibly could be commerce Mond, v. Du of Hood & Sons our recent cases Madison, City Milk 340 U. 525, and Co. Dean permit will not local interests demonstrate this competition against out-of-state protect themselves curtailing interstate business.20 Milk in Dean Co. regulation was because the partly

It was against interstate commerce that discriminated down. struck an erecting protecting

“In economic barrier thus from major competition with- industry against local plainly discriminates State, out the Madison do, commerce. This it cannot even interstate protect unquestioned power exercise of its if non- safety people, health and of its reasonable discriminatory to conserve alternatives, adequate legitimate interests, local available.” Id. at 354. are apply clause as to to the Alex- Nor does alternatives itself knocks on andria ordinance. Interstate commerce It only by regulating the local door. that knock may protected by public the interests of the home only state activities such a manner as to affect the commerce operations. they upheld rather than to command its But are to be upon a consideration of all relevant facts and circum- because may appropriately appears *13 the matter is one which stances it safety, regulated well-being in the interest of the health and of local which, character, prac- communities, because of its local the and and involved, may adequately never be dealt with tical difficulties 341, Brown, Congress.” v. 362-363. Parker 20 passage argument to blame the of the ordi seeks So far as this arguments disregard should be retailers, it. Such on local we nance California, legislators, v. 283 not courts. Arizona presented to to 423, 455. p. 639, U. S. See infra.

637 in Hood & Likewise action.21 private from as distinct against out- the discrimination Du Mond it was Sons refusing the order invalidated dealers of-state Where to an out-of-state distributor.22 buy milk license situation, in a similar existed, somewhat no discrimination burden permissible as a regulation upheld we the state Line Pipe Eastern Panhandle accord, commerce.23 See Comm’n, S. 336. 329, 341 U. Pub. Serv. Michigan v.Co. many our publishers of importance to recognize We selling by method house-to-house periodicals of the however, law, constitutional As a matter of solicitation. posi- in no different operations are business they their than Clause concerned Commerce tion so far as the repre- Appellant, their wares.24 the sellers of other at 354-355: 21 340U. S. prefers rely upon its own officials City of Madison “If readily open inspection is sources, such

inspection of distant milk charge and reasonable hardship for it could actual to it without processors.” producers importing inspection to the of such cost 531-532, 525, 533: S. 336 U. recognized, as Seelig, 294 opinion in Baldwin v. U. S. 511] “It [the protect inhabitants power in State to its we, do broad hazards, highway traders safety, fraudulent perils health or com- adversely upon interstate bear of measures which even use upon principle that emphasis repeated it laid merce. But advantages by curtailment may own economic promote its State burdening commerce. of interstate its to shelter power of State between distinction “This fraud, even safety from health or their menaces to people from commerce, and its lack interstate dangers from those emanate when commerce flow such retard, or constrict burden power history our deeply in both advantage, rooted is one economic their law.” and our Products, Eisenberg Farm Board Milk Control 1249, 49 2d 58 P. 670, Ariz. Moore, Giragi Board, 301 U. S. Press v. Labor Associated 64 P. 2d Ariz. 1, 7. States, 326 U. Press v. United 132-133; Associated *14 638 canvasser, a door-to-door right

sentative or in his own as protect regulations no free violate local is more privacy above, than are other solicitors. As we said open by the seeking usual methods of business are left much produce ordinance. That methods do as such not canvassing is, business as house-to-house constitution adjustment immaterial and a for at ally, matter legislation. of federal Cf. local level in the absence Benjamin, Prudential Co. v. Ins. Taxation 328 U. S. 408. prohibition or threatens interstate commerce with Richmond, 327 U. S. bad, Nippert discrimination is v. 416, but regulation that leaves out-of-state sellers on the same basis as local sellers cannot invalid reason. peddling,

While taxation and licensing hawking or defined selling delivering state, long has thought been no to show violation of the Commerce Clause, solicitation of subsequent orders with interstate shipment has been immune from such an exaction.25 These explained decisions have been by this Court as em bodying protection commerce discrimination apparent made most regardless fixed-sum licenses sales.26 the legislation Where an added financial burden upon sales in commerce or an exaction privilege doing interstate regulation commerce but a matters, local apply. different considerations think

We Alexandria’s ordinance falls in the classifica- tion of regulation. The economic effects on interstate commerce in soliciting door-to-door gainsaid. cannot be Emert v. 296; 156 U. S. Missouri, see Commonwealth v. Ober, (Mass.) 493; Cush. Crenshaw v. 389, 399-400; Arkansas, 227 U. S. v. Rogers Arkansas, Caskey Baking Co. Virginia, 313 U. S. Co., 33, 55-57; Nippert McGoldrick Berwind-White Richmond, 421-425. *15 compel as this such ordinances engaged, so To solicitors pros- approach to technique of new of a development the advantages gain competitors retail Their local pects. in their investments of their stores from the location of movement flexibility retains his stock but the solicitor heavy from investment. and freedom type River of ordinance Green use of the general many of com- the needs the adaptation to its shows willing even are not enacted it. We munities that have record, the unsupported appraise suggestion, to from the selfish predominantly springs wide use that such of local merchants. influence Struthers, decision in Martin

Even before this Court’s person a applied to 141, holding invalid, when an meeting, religious advertising distributing leaflets forbidding the Struthers, Ohio, City of of the door, to the occupants residence summoning of Chafee, comment. See had created less extreme cases our (1941), 406.27 Speech in the United States Free problems. Of all canvassing more serious house raises “House to enti ideas, the least unpopular this seems spreading methods slight persuasion are possibilities of protection. The to extensive tled value annoyance. as Great compared with the certainties place a man views, home is one where exposing to novel citizens if he desires. up in ideas his own ought be able to shut himself searches and only from unreasonable free not There he should be strangers expound distasteful hearing from uninvited seizures but also It disregarded like a handbill. cannot be doctrines. A doorbell propagandist and purpose of a several minutes ascertain takes Moreover, hospitable get him. . . . rid of more at least several windy doorstep while he on a to leave a visitor housewives dislike robbery or worse inside the house errand, yet once he is explains his in odd of salvation and salesmen peddlers of ideas may happen. So regular run of regulation as much as to call seem brands important home is as Freedom . . . commercial canvassers. wondering Justices help whether the speech. I cannot freedom To the city council duty protecting falls the its practices citizens deemed pri- subversive of vacy quiet. and of A depends protection householder on his city board rather than guarding churlishly his en- with forbidding trances orders the entrance of solicitors. A sign would to be a have small billboard to make the differentiations between the welcome and unwelcome that can in an be written ordinance once for all homes. cheaply police power

“The of a state beyond extends health, safety, morals and comprehends duty, within constitutional limitations, protect well-being and tranquility of community.”28 *16 When there is a legislation reasonable basis for protect social, the distinguished as from economic, of the welfare a community, it is not for this Court because of the Com- merce Clause to deny the locally exercise sovereign of the power of Louisiana.29 Changing living conditions or vari- of Supreme quite the Court are organized aware of the effect of upon front-door people intrusions who are not sheltered from zealots impostors by and of staff servants or the locked of entrance an apartment house.” Cooper, Kovacs v. 77, 83. 336 U. S. 29United States v. Co., Carolene Products 304 U. S. 154: very “But their inquiries, legislative nature such judg where the question, ment is drawn in must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or reasonably which could be assumed support affords challenges for it. Here validity the demurrer the of the statute on its face and it is from evident all the considerations presented Congress, may and of judicial notice, those which we take question that the is at least debatable whether in commerce filled milk unregulated, should be left restricted, wholly or in some measure or prohibited. Congress, As that decision finding was for neither the of by weighing a court evidence, arrived at jury nor the of verdict can be substituted for it.” Texas, Florida,

See Jamison v. Skiriotes v. 69, 79; Louisiana, 272 Hebert v. commu- of different or habits experiences in

ations as regulations legislative for different call may nities well of Powers doing business. of manners and to methods Their the states. control subject to municipalities are intimate more from a made needs is of local judgment legis- any other that of than conditions local knowledge of Alex- of ordinance say that this cannot body. We lative toas commerce interstate impede's or burdens andria so city. that powers of regulatory exceed not point to a we come Finally First Amendment. — the invali- ground aas in this urged heretofore such This ordinance. River a Green of dation and speech of freedom abridgment is an ordinance an ideas advocates oral press or Only press. solicitors open to the point. It was urge this could press is not point or brushes. gadgets regulations ordinary restraints is free re- regulation, labor taxation state, such modern appellant’s as stated 24, but, n. above at ferred to un- arbitrary, places an brief, “because well established upon a burden and undue reasonable circulation of distribution method and essential tan- effect, is and, periodicals magazines lawful such utilization prohibition to a tamount *17 pro- of necessarily has elements Regulation method.” money- is not that argument Thus the hibition. “in go him to entitle of the solicitor activities making the distri- that will, but at private residences” upon or canvassing is through door-to-door periodicals of bution kind of This protection.30 Amendment to First entitled fact mere because the protected is said distribution bar does not distribution of the out money is made that 30 City 146; v. Lovell Struthers, 319 v. U. Cf. Martin 444, 452. Griffin, 303 S.U.

642 protection.31 Amendment We publications from First put periodicals are sold does

agree the fact that the First Amendment.32 beyond protection them a com- brings The into the transaction selling, however, mercial feature. never

The and Fourteenth Amendments have First press speech been treated as absolutes.33 Freedom of where, does not mean that one can talk or distribute Rights when and other how one chooses. than those adjustment By rights, the advocates are involved. liberty expression orderly we can have both full and an life. supporting appellant’s case comes nearest to Struthers,

contention Martin v. 319 141. U. S. There municipal forbidding anyone summoning occupants of a advertise- residence to the door to receive invalid applied ments was held to the free distribution dodgers “advertising religious meeting.” Attention 1 was directed n. of that case to fact that at “solely ordinance was not aimed commercial advertis- ing.” It was said:

“The ordinance anything does not control but respect distribution of literature, and in that it sub- judgment community stitutes for the judgment Pp. of the individual householder.” 143- 31 516, 531. Thomas v. 323 U. S. Collins, 32 77, 88, 14; Cf. Kovacs v. 336 U. S. Cooper, n. concurrence at 90. 24, supra. See n. 33 296, 303, 304; Connecticut, Cox v. New Cantwell v. 569; Chaplinsky U. S. v. New Hampshire, Hampshire, 568; 105, 109-110; v. Prince Pennsylvania, U. S. Murdock 158, 166; Massachusetts, U. S. S.U. York, Saia New Feiner v. New 340 U. S. 315. collection of York, See the cases p. Maryland, at 276 ff. Niemotko *18 was because: distributor to release the The decision every citi- to information to distribute “Freedom clearly receive it is so he desires to zen wherever that, putting society a free preservation of vital to the of time regulations health police and aside reasonable pre- fully distribution, it must manner of and Pp. 146-147. served.” appli- carefully phrased dissent even to this

There was As Amendment. principles of the First cation of the free solici- the commercial entered into this no element of opinion narrowly was limited to tation invitation to of an precise fact of the free distribution incon- necessarily we feel that is not religious services, reached in this case. sistent with conclusion Alabama, In Marsh Tucker U. Texas, 517,34 was held this state under punish trespass, after notice a state unable to printed matter, distributors of statute, criminal certain religious than commercial. The was held more statute In principles invalid under of the First Amendment. the Marsh case it Tucker private corporation, was States, that property case the United owned the used as permissive passways company government-owned In public towns. neither case dedication use was there to permissive fair say but it seems use of the ways equal pro was considered such dedication. Such colporteurs tection was extended offending against trespass similar state laws after distributing, notice to desist, publications like in private apart tenants Commonwealth, ment house. Hall 188 Va. 49 S. E. 2d 369, appeal, conviction, after ground denial rights, of First Amendment dismissed ap- on motion of Notes, g., These cases called forth numerous e. 46 Col. L. Rev. 244; Geo. L. J. Mich. L. Rev. 848. *19 the pellee because of lack of substance in to dismiss 2, supra. question, 875, 912; see n. private

Since it is not individuals but the local governments prohibited by federal that are First and the abridging speech Fourteenth Amendments from free Virginia Hall press, a does not rule conviction tres- pass if However, after notice ordinance. as we have a above, p. 640, city may speak shown council for the subject police power, we would citizens on matters to the in present prosecution have time-honored offense trespass private grounds on after notice. Thus Marsh and Tucker cases applicable are here. constitutionality

This ordi- makes Alexandria’s upon nance balancing turn a of the conveniences between some publisher’s householders’ desire for and the privacy right publications way to in precise distribute him soliciting brings those think the best results. hospitable issue into of the brings rights collision the housewife, around her peering Monday morning on courteous, door, chained with of Mr. those Breard’s possibly persistent solicitor, offering but well-trained joint bargain through and information culture subscription Saturday Post, to the Pic and To- Evening day’s many Woman. Behind housewife are house- in the where Green River wives home-owners towns “Key- ordinances offer aid. Behind Mr. Breard are their $5,000,000 subscrip- stone” with an annual business of periodicals and the with tions their use of house-to-house canvassing pub- to secure subscribers for valuable their lications, together with other housewives who desire solici- opportunity help tors to offer them the and remind and them, doors, at for publications. their subscribe

Subscriptions may by anyone be made interested receiving magazines without annoyances of house- canvassing. to-house We think those communities that may control found methods of sale obnoxious have these a us, be, It would misuse them ordinance. seems speech press and free guarantees of free great of the community to force admit guarantees use those of its premises to the resi- publications solicitors of home principles of the abridgment no dents. We see Amendment in this ordinance. First

Affirmed. *20 with Mr. Justice Vinson, Mr. Chief Justice whom Douglas dissenting. joins, hitherto before us makes criminal the ordinance soliciting magazine of sub-

legitimate practice business prior invitation of scriptions from door to door without only to the face that ordi- Looking the homeowner. under against objections as nance, the Court sustains it Commerce Clause and the Clause, the Due Process the the I dissent and would reverse First Amendment. raised, all judgment reaching below without of the issues undue in ordinance constitutes an for, my opinion, the discriminatory burden on interstate commerce. The Court holds because “ordinance falls in that the is free regulation,” city classification of council Ante, In p. my to burden interstate commerce. prohibition ordinance is a flat view, the of solicitation. Supreme recognized this fact when The Louisiana “provid [ing] the ordinance as for it characterized invitation, prohibition blanket without save of solicitation 217 La. exempt.” specifically for food who vendors, are Court, the 2d at 556. Unlike this state 828, 47 So. at character acknowledged prohibitory court the Com- appellant’s in claim under rejecting opinion: following portion of its Clause'in the merce It imposes no license. tax, “The ordinance no territory, on prohibition activity an local is a problematical commodity of a involving sale actually in dis- originating state, another which im- through tributed the United States Mails. It poses no burden nor itself, on the distribution on phase nor commodity, any manufacture of the transportation place from one to another of commodity.” (Emphasis original.) La. 2d at 47 So. at 556. Shelby County

At Robbins least since the decision Taxing District, (1887), this Court has regarded process of soliciting goods orders to be shipped being across state as commerce lines interstate transportation as much as itself. Under the line following principle, cases this reexamined and reaffirmed Richmond, in Nippert (1946), 327 U. the process subjected solicitation interstate cannot be commerce taxes, bonding requirements licenses or in their practical operation unduly discriminate burden today purport interstate commerce. The Court does not acknowledges, to overrule this line of decisions. And it *21 the sharply distinguished the Court has must, process of solicitation of interstate business from the es- ped- sentially retailing operations hawking local Wagner Covington, 251 dling. 95, See v. U. S. 103- (1919), 104 Nor cases cited therein. does opinion dispute that has a severe economic this ordinance impact upon appel- the substantial interstate business of employer, industry lant’s magazine well as the entire which subscription derives annual its 60% 50% prohibited from very type circulation of solicitation I in its hold- disagree this ordinance. with the Court prohibition” ing imposing that an ordinance “blanket can under Commerce Clause as mere be sustained regulation.

647 regulate Commerce “To power given is Congress 8, I, § Art. Const., S.U. States.” among . several . . Wardens, 12 Board Cooley v. doctrine cl. police exercise its a state permits (1851), How. commerce upon interstate impinging manner in a powers local and essentially regulation subject of only where undue against is no discrimination there only when then approach an This is commerce. on interstate burden imposes which approach an practical, in the grounded whether determine “duty to Court this upon name its whatever attack, under ordinance] statute [or discrimination work operation practical its may be, will Maxwell, v. & Co. Best commerce.” interstate against ordinance, on That this (1940). 455-456 454, S. 311 U. us not relieve home does protect face, professes its of the ordinance effect practical weigh the duty to of our on its discrimination Lack of commerce. upon interstate as sufficient regarded been heretofore has face practical its into inquiry without an sustain Milk Co. Dean g.,E. commerce. interstate upon effects (prohibition (1951) Madison, 340 S.U. v. city); miles from five than more pasteurized of milk sale Portland, 268 U. Mills v. Hosiery Silk Real bond); Minnesota file that solicitors (requirement (1925) inspec- requiring (1890) (statute Barber, state). within of meat tion solicitors, affecting ordinances upon other passing

In fact economic noting the not hesitated has this among oth are, competitors’ [solicitors] ‘real that “the Richmond, Nippert merchants.” retail local ers, the See Maxwell, supra. v.Co.& citing Best supra, at at District, supra, Taxing County Shelby Robbins also *22 competition” “effective acknowledges The Court 498. ante, merchants, retail local and the solicitors between appraise its refusal is deliberate 627, but p. practical effect of this ordinance as to in- deterrent terstate commerce, ante, p. I think plain it prohibition” “blanket upon appellant’s solicitation dis- criminates unduly burdens interstate com- merce favoring local retail merchants. “Whether or not was so intended, are those its necessary effects.” Nippert Richmond, supra, at 434. The fact that this exempts solicitation local essentially purveyors farm products shows that local economic interests are relieved the burdensome effects of the ordinance. No one doubts that protection of the home is a proper subject of legislation, but that end can be served without prohibiting interstate commerce. Our prior decisions cannot be avoided by limiting their au- thority to the limited categories of tax and license. On we contrary, must guard against state action which, “in any form or any under guise, directly burden [s] prosecution of interstate business.” Baldwin Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 522 (1935), citing International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 S. 91, U. 112 (1910). See also Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525 (1949). I cannot agree that this Court should defer to the City Council of Alex- andria as though we had before us an act of Congress regulating commerce. ante, See p. 640. Court, “[T]his and not the state legislature city [or council], under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the com- peting demands of state [or local] national inter- ests.” Southern Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, Pacific (1945).

The Court upon relies Bunger v. River, Green 638 (1937), where the conviction of a Fuller Brush man was sustained under an ordinance akin to the one before us. The order was entered without argument, without opinion and with citation of the three cases discussed Court, ante, at p. 633, each of which cases sustained as “incidental” to interstate commerce state action regu- *23 the sale and cattle, feeding of inspection lating local produce.* recently so principles case the apply I to this would Madison, 340 U. Milk v. Co. in Dean announced our Dean discussion In of its the course (1951). instant remarks decision, the Court Milk the local knocks on itself commerce “Interstate case of this decisions prior Ante, I read the 636. As p. door.” of Dean avoidance justifying far from fact, Court, that cannot ordinance that the Milk, my conclusion buttresses applied Clause be Commerce with the consistently appellant. Douglas Mr. Justice Black, with whom

Mr. Justice dissenting. joins, and states held that cities 1943, this May 3,

On on the impose flat taxes laws not enforce which could literature, religious sales of door-to-door privilege Pennsylvania, Murdock v. Opelika, Jones persons it unlawful make 105, or which ringing knocking on doors home from home to go political or other religious, occupants to to invite doorbells Struthers, Martin public meetings. kinds of invade were held strong dissents, these laws 141. Over violation religion in speech, press and liberty of ma new Today a Amendments. First and Fourteenth former dissenters adopts position jority solicita forbidding door-to-door city sustains a Post, News subscriptions Saturday Evening tion of to the this cannot magazines. week and Since decision other grounded strange that, relying three cases passing *It is after validity Commerce solely under on “incidental” as a test “has not con- Clause, should itself that such a test the Court state regu- determining validity of local tinued as manner a useful Ante, affecting p. n. 19. commerce.” lation of matters interstate Jones, with reconciled Murdock and Martin cases, judicial practice Struthers seems to me good calls for their forthright overruling. But whether this is *24 done not, or it should be plain my disagreement with the majority of the Court as now constituted stems basically concept different the reach from constitutional liberty press any rather than from opinion difference of as to what former cases have held. Today’s decision marks a judicial revitalization of the prevailed views which before this Court embraced the “ philosophy that the First gives preferred Amendment status to protects. liberties I pre- adhere position ferred philosophy. my It is belief that the free- dom of people of this Nation cannot survive even a governmental little hobbling religious or political ideas, whether be they orally communicated or through the press.

The constitutional sanctuary for press must neces sarily liberty include publish In circulate. view of our economic system, it must also include freedom to solicit paying subscribers. Of course homeowners can if they forbid reporters wish newsboys, magazine ring solicitors to their doorbells. But when the home owner himself has not done I this, believe that the First Amendment, interpreted with regard due for the freedoms it guarantees, bars laws present like the ordinance which punish persons who peacefully go from door to door as agents of the press.* *Of course I believe that the present ordinance could constitu- tionally applied goes a “merchant” who from to door door “selling pots.” Compare Martin Struthers, Chrestensen, Valentine

with 316 U.