Case Information

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION KEVIN L. HAMILTON, JR.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:20-cv-4103 Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley v. Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers MELISSA K. RIGGINS.,

Defendant. ORDER AND INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Ohio resident who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings this action against Defendant Melissa K. Riggins. This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis , which is GRANTED . (ECF No. 1.) All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This matter is also before the Court for an initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint.

I. Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez , 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id . at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) ^[1] as part of the statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-- * * * (B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton , 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin , 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd ., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank , F.S.B. , 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id . (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank , 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se ain complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t. , No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors , 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown , 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II. The entirety of Plaintiff’s “Statement of Claim” in his Complaint provides as follows: Melissa K. Riggins is [responsible] for personal injury, breach of contract, attorney client relationship and discrimination on grounds of person of [origin]. Any help[] great with a court date. Thank you for your time.

(ECF No. 1-1 at 6.) In the relief section of his Complaint, Plaintiff indicates as follows:

Would like a lawsuit amount ranging from

$0-50,000

$0-75,000

$240,000 to $740,000

Have done work with federal court lawsuit system thr[ough] google earth [search] engine.

Would like court date.

( Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff's Complaint provides insufficient factual content or context from which the Court could reasonably infer that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s rights. Instead, Plaintiff’s Complaint consists of nothing more than “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. These “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” fail to satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8(a). Id . (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557). Thus, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g. , Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex Prod. Co. , 517 F.3d 816 , 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan , 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson , 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation omitted)).

IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: August 18, 2020 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

[1] Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).