58 Pa. Code § 147.1
The provisions of this § 147.1 adopted June 17, 1983, effective June 18, 1983, 13 Pa.B. 1944; amended November 23, 1984, effective November 24, 1984, 14 Pa.B. 4285; amended June 19, 1987, effective July 1, 1987, 17 Pa.B. 2464; amended March 25, 1994, effective March 26, 1994, 24 Pa.B. 1582; amended March 13, 1998, effective March 14, 1998, 28 Pa.B. 1316. Immediately preceding text appears at serial pages (236623) to (236624).
Constitutionality
A summary judgment based on qualified immunity was improvidently granted in favor of an officer and his co-defendants, who were all officers or officials of the Pennsylvania Game Commission, because an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer in the defendant’s position would know that searches such as the warrantless home and business search made in this case may only be carried out under a properly executed warrant. Showers v. Spangler, 182 F. 2d 165 (3d Cir. Pa. 1999); affirmed in part reversed in part 182 F.165 (1999).
Officers of the Game Commission are still entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct during an inspection conducted pursuant to this regulation; despite the fact that the premises inspection provisions of this regulation are inconsistent with the inspection language of the authorizing statute, which render the regulation language invalid; despite the fact that this regulation fails to limit the inspecting officer’s discretion through careful limitations of place and scope, rendering it unconstitutional, and; despite the fact that the inspection more closely resembled a search than an inspection. Showers v. Spangler, 957 F. Supp. 584 (M. D. Pa. 1997).
Search and Seizure
This regulation is insufficient to grant officers of the Pennsylvania Game Commission the type of sweeping search power the defendant/officer claims (a search for criminal physical evidence and not an inspection of a taxidermist’s records), where, at best, the regulation confers a limited power to search the transaction records of permittees—albeit under all too generous terms of time (on demand) and place (the premises). Showers v. Spangler, 182 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 1999).