Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 3-603 – Tender of Payment

(a) If tender of payment of an obligation to pay an instrument is made to a person entitled to enforce the instrument, the effect of tender is governed by principles of law applicable to tender of payment under a simple contract.
(b) If tender of payment of an obligation to pay an instrument is made to a person entitled to enforce the instrument and the tender is refused, there is discharge, to the extent of the amount of the tender, of the obligation of an indorser or accommodation party having a right of recourse with respect to the obligation to which the tender relates.
(c) If tender of payment of an amount due on an instrument is made to a person entitled to enforce the instrument, the obligation of the obligor to pay interest after the due date on the amount tendered is discharged. If presentment is required with respect to an instrument and the obligor is able and ready to pay on the due date at every place of payment stated in the instrument, the obligor is deemed to have made tender of payment on the due date to the person entitled to enforce the instrument.
Oklahoma Code Comment
12. Subsection 3-606(a) provides that tender is governed by contract law. At common law, a tender of money is an unconditional offer by a debtor or obligor to pay to another, in current coin of the realm, a sum not less than the amount then due on a specified debt or obligation. See Davidson v. Rogers, 471 P.2d 455 (Okla. 1970). To be effective, the tender must not only be unconditional, but must be for the full amount of the debt. Landess v. State ex ret Comm'rs of Land Office, 335 P.2d 1077 (Okla. 1958) Smith v. Price, 206 Okla. 659, 246 P.2d 359 (1952). If a larger sum than that tendered is in good faith claimed to be due, then the tender is ineffectual if its acceptance involves the admission that no more is due. First Nat'l Bank of Davis v. Britton, 185 Okla. 566, 94 P.2d 896 (1939). However, when the amount due is within the exclusive knowledge of a creditor who, on demand, refuses to indicate the correct amount, then tender by the debtor of the amount he thinks is due and owing, though less than the true amount, is a valid tender. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Goings, 527 P.2d 603 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974). A valid legal tender of money by the debtor which is refused by the creditor does not operate as a satisfaction of the debt and is not a bar to an action on the debt, the effect of a tender is to discharge the debtor from liability for interest subsequent to the tender and costs afterwards incurred. Liberty Nat'l Bank of Weatherford v. Semkoff, 184 Okla. 18, 84 P.2d 438 (1938). Tender prior to suit is unnecessary when it is reasonably certain that, if made, tender would be refused. Chandler v. Independent School Dist No. 12, 625 P.2d 620 (Okla. 1981); Alfrey v. Richardson, 204 Okla. 473, 231 P.2d 363 (1951); Janeway v. Vandeventer, 172 Okla. 379, 45 P.2d 79 (1935). 13. A valid tender can result in the loss of security for a debt. An unconditional tender to a creditor of the amount of the debt acts to extinguish a mortgage lien of real property. See 42 O.S. § 20 (1910); Knudson v. Fenimore, 69 Okla. 3,169 P. 478 (1916). An unconditional tender can extinguish the lien on personal property pledged to secure its payment. See Ivey v. Henry's Diesel Serv., Inc., 418 P.2d 634 (Okla. 1966); Bardon Loan Co. v. Boggs, 159 Okla. 196, 14 P.2d 947 (1932). Of course, if the tender of the debt is not made by the debtor then the lien is not extinguished unless the creditor knew that (a) the tenderer had the right to make the tender, and (b) all of the debtor's rights would be protected by accepting the money and discharging the lien. Knudson v. Fenimore, 69 Okla. 3, 169 P. 478 (1916). 14. Subsection (b) provides that the liability of an indorser or accommodation party is discharged by the amount of the tender that is refused by the creditor. Prior Oklahoma decisions have held that the essential requirements of tender are a present readiness, willingness and ability in good faith to perform acts required by the agreement. See Chandler v. Independent School Dist. No. 12, 625 P.2d 620 (Okla. 1981); Jones v. Goldberger, 323 P.2d 344 (Okla. 1958). This appears to be substantially the same standard as the "able and ready to pay" standard set forth in subsection (c). Historical Data Laws 1961, SB 36, p. 118, §3-603; Amended by Laws 1991, SB 25, c. 117, § 91, eff. January 1, 1992.