N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 44.50 – Public health threat; determination.

(a) Public health threat of an arthropod vector-borne disease based on historical risk shall be determined by the documentation of a public health threat as described in subdivision (b) of this section, once in the previous three years, or two or more times in the previous 10 years, and by a finding, based upon the risk assessment considerations set forth in section 44.51 of this Part, that current conditions pose a substantial risk to human health.
(b) A public health threat of an arthropod vector-borne disease based on current activity shall be determined by the presence of human vector-borne disease or the presence of disease-specific etiologic agents in a known or suspected vector as specified below, and substantiated by information required by the risk assessment activities described in section 44.51 of this Part.
1. (1) The presence of human vector-borne disease includes, but is not limited to:
  1. (i) a single human or equine case of EEE;
  2. (ii) a single human case of St. Louis Encephalitis (SLE); or
  3. (iii) epidemiologic evidence of clustering of human cases of:
    1. (a) California Encephalitis (CE);
    2. (b) Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever (RMSF);
    3. (c) Lyme disease;
    4. (d) Babesiosis;
    5. (e) the occurrence of indigenous cases of other arthropod-borne etiologic agents which include, but are not limited to:
      1. (1) dog heartworm;
      2. (2) malaria;
      3. (3) tularemia;
      4. (4) powassan; or
      5. (5) dengue.
2. (2) The presence of disease specific etiologic agents in a known or suspected vector includes, but is not limited to:
  1. (i) isolation of EEE virus or SLE virus from mosquitoes or an avian host;
  2. (ii) demonstration of vector infectivity rates in excess of 5 percent in known or suspected tick vectors of the rickettsia of the spotted fever group, or in excess of 30 percent in known or suspected tick vectors of the Lyme disease spirochete in association with documented human cases;
  3. (iii) site specific, multiple isolations of the related alpha virus, the Highlands J (HJ) virus, from known or suspected mosquito vectors, indicative of potential EEE virus activity;
  4. (iv) demonstration of an imminent potential for the transfer of the etiologic agent from the endemic cycle to the epidemic disease cycle, including but not limited to:
    1. (a) the demonstration of a significant rise in antibody levels or significant IgM antibody levels in avian hosts of EEE virus or SLE virus during the recognized period of disease activity; or
    2. (b) the demonstration of high levels of parasitemia (≥20 percent) in the mammalian reservoirs for human babesia; or
    3. (c) in the case of established clustering of human cases of dog heartworm, malaria, powassan, dengue or tularemia, the demonstration of infective forms or etiologic agent isolation from known or suspected arthropod vectors.