N.M. Stat. Ann. § 35-10-3
History: 1953 Comp., § 36-12-2, enacted by Laws 1968, ch. 62, § 123.
Repeals. — Laws 1968, ch. 62, § 171, repealed former 36-12-2, 1953 Comp., relating to disqualification of justice by interest or relationship, effective January 1, 1969.
Sufficiency of notice. — The notice to quit should be sufficiently definite to inform the tenant of the meaning of the notice, but the landlord's signature is not indispensable. Lund v. Ozanne, 1906-NMSC-001, 13 N.M. 293, 84 P. 710 (decided under former law).
Where sufficient. — Allegation in complaint "that on a certain day, to wit, the 30th day of September, 1949, at said county, demand in writing was duly made by plaintiff of said defendant for, and requiring the payment, said rent then due, amounting to the said sum of $4000., or the possession of said demised property, but said defendant neglected and refused for the space of three whole days and upward, after demand so made as aforesaid, and still neglects and refuses, to pay said rent, or surrender possession of said premises," sufficiently alleged statutory notice. Kuykendall v. Ulibarri, 1952-NMSC-007, 56 N.M. 43, 239 P.2d 731 (decided under former law).
Defenses allowed. — This section allows any defense, whether legal or equitable, to be raised that does not try title or boundaries to the disputed property. Wal-Go Assocs. v. Leon, 1981-NMSC-022, 95 N.M. 565, 624 P.2d 507.
Suit precluded by Subsection C. — Where defendants purchased ranch four years prior and remained in possession and plaintiff does not claim any possession prior to that, has never been in possession either as owner, tenant or in any other capacity, but bases title on a disputed contract between the parties, the plaintiff's title is so directly and inextricably involved in the action for unlawful detainer that suit is precluded by 35-10-3C NMSA 1978. Reinhart v. Lindholm, 1972-NMSC-087, 84 N.M. 546, 505 P.2d 1222.
Real estate provisions not violated. — Where the title to real estate is drawn in question indirectly or incidentally, statutory and constitutional provisions are not violated. Brown v. Bigham, 1958-NMSC-110, 65 N.M. 45, 331 P.2d 1106 (decided under former law).
Question of title resolved previously. — Prohibition in Subsection C against investigation of questions of title in unlawful detainer actions did not mean that magistrate court and district court lacked jurisdiction to decide whether plaintiff was entitled to possession of property which he had purchased at foreclosure sale but which defendant had failed to vacate, since the only question of title, that of the validity of the order of the district court under which the deed was issued to the plaintiff, had previously been resolved against the defendant. Minor v. Riebold, 1974-NMSC-033, 86 N.M. 279, 523 P.2d 14.
Question of title deprived metropolitan court of subject matter jurisdiction in action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. — Where plaintiff filed a petition by owner for writ of restitution in the metropolitan court, alleging that plaintiff purchased the home at issue from the personal representative of the estates of the previous owners of the home, and where defendant, the occupant of the home, alleged that the personal representative had no authority to convey the home, and where the metropolitan court granted the petition and issued a writ of execution for forcible entry or unlawful detainer that ordered defendant to be removed from the home, and where, on appeal to the district court, the district court dismissed defendant's appeal and issued is own writ of execution for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the metropolitan court erred in exercising jurisdiction, because the metropolitan court could not resolve plaintiff's right to possession without also investigating the question of title, and, as a result, the metropolitan court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. As a consequence of the metropolitan court's lack of jurisdiction, the district court also lacked jurisdiction to address the merits on appeal. Triple R Dev. LLC v. Stinebaugh, 2025-NMCA-008.
Trial by jury. — Right to a trial by jury does not exist in an action for forcible entry and detainer in the absence of statutory authority. Reece v. Montano, 1943-NMSC-054, 48 N.M. 1, 144 P.2d 461 (decided under former law).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 6, 34, 35, 37, 42, 43.
Right of landlord legally entitled to possession to dispossess tenant without legal process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177.
36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 23 to 28, 35.