N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-2-11
History: Laws 1889, ch. 76, § 9; C.L. 1897, § 3499; Code 1915, § 5032; C.S. 1929, § 130-115; 1941 Comp., § 45-120; 1953 Comp., § 42-1-20; Laws 1977, ch. 257, § 68; 1990, ch. 9, § 1.
The 1990 amendment, effective May 16, 1990, substituted "Corrections department" for "Penitentiary - Division" in the catchline; designated the former section as Subsection A; in Subsection A, substituted "department has the power and the duty" for "division shall have power and it shall be its duty", "the corrections facilities" for "said penitentiary", "department" for "division", and "secretary of corrections has the" for "division director shall have"; inserted "in conjunction with the standards and inspection bureau" preceding "shall inspect"; and made a minor stylistic change; and added Subsections B and C.
Failure to pursue administrative remedy bars mandamus suit against warden. — Since appellant, a prison inmate, had failed to pursue the administrative remedy provided by this section, he was barred from obtaining a writ of mandamus against warden. Birdo v. Rodriguez, 1972-NMSC-062, 84 N.M. 207, 501 P.2d 195.
Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. — Where eight named inmates and two nonprofit organizations filed a complaint in district court seeking a mixture of a classwide writ of habeas corpus and classwide injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the state's management of COVID-19 in New Mexico prisons violated inmates' rights under the New Mexico constitution, the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint with respect to all plaintiffs, because plaintiffs acknowledged that none of the named plaintiffs exhausted or attempted to exhaust the New Mexico correction department's (NMCD) internal grievance procedures, and Subsection B of this section imposes an exhaustion requirement for statutorily created rights such as declaratory relief and Rule 5-802(C) NMRA imposes an independent duty to first exhaust administrative remedies of the NMCD before petitioning for writs of habeas corpus. Moreover, exhaustion would not be futile in this case because the NMCD has the authority to address the conditions in New Mexico's correctional facilities. Anderson v. State, 2022-NMSC-019.
Medical negligence claims require administrative exhaustion. — Where plaintiff, while incarcerated at the northwest New Mexico correctional facility, was severely beaten by six other inmates, and where plaintiff filed suit against the contractor who provides medical services to inmates at the facility, alleging medical negligence for failing to properly diagnose and treat his broken jaw and ribs, and where defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff failed to exhaust the New Mexico corrections department's (NMCD) internal grievance procedure before filing his claim, and where the district court granted defendant's motion, finding that plaintiff's claim of medical negligence was substantially related to his incarceration, and thus required exhaustion of administrative remedies according to NMSA 1978, § 33-2-11(B), the district court did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, because the medical treatment was provided to plaintiff by an entity and individuals assigned to prison healthcare by the NMCD, at the prison where plaintiff was located, and during plaintiff's period of incarceration; plaintiff's claim is substantially related to his incarceration, and thus, § 33-2-11(B)'s exhaustion requirement applies. Moreover, the NMCD's grievance policy provides that medical negligence is within NMCD's authority to investigate and is substantially related to an inmate's incarceration. Lucero v. Centurion Corr. Healthcare, Inc., 2023-NMCA-050.
Dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be without prejudice. — Where plaintiff, while incarcerated at the northwest New Mexico correctional facility, was severely beaten by six other inmates, and where plaintiff filed suit against the contractor who provides medical services to inmates at the facility, alleging medical negligence for failing to properly diagnose and treat his broken jaw and ribs, and where defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff failed to exhaust the New Mexico corrections department's (NMCD) internal grievance procedure before filing his claim, and where the district court granted defendant's motion, finding that plaintiff's claim of medical negligence required exhaustion of administrative remedies according to NMSA 1978, § 33-2-11(B) and dismissed plaintiff's claim with prejudice, the district court did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, but erred in dismissing plaintiff's claim with prejudice, because dismissal without prejudice is generally the appropriate posture for an inmate's claim that has failed to complete administrative exhaustion as required by § 33-2-11(B). Lucero v. Centurion Corr. Healthcare, Inc., 2023-NMCA-050.
Expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care for monitoring inmates in prisons. — Where plaintiff, who was an inmate at a county detention center and who was assaulted and raped by three inmates, sued defendants for failing to protect plaintiff from the assault; plaintiff claimed that the area in which plaintiff was assaulted was an architectural blind spot that could not be covered by video surveillance, as well as not being directly monitored by guards, and that jurors could use common knowledge to find that it is negligence to allow inmates in an area that was not properly subject to surveillance or monitoring, either due to the existence of a blind spot or lack of guards; and defendant did not offer any testimony as to the standard of care for monitoring of inmates, jail design, video surveillance or any other factors that underlie those standards; the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants because expert testimony was required in order for a jury to make a decision regarding the standard of care of the monitoring by prison officials and the mere fact that plaintiff was assaulted did not prove that prison monitoring fell below the required standard of care. Villalobos v. Doña Ana Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2014-NMCA-044.
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Right of state prison authorities to administer neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs to prisoner without his or her consent - state cases, 75 A.L.R.4th 1124.
72 C.J.S. Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 129.