N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-12
The Agreement on Detainers is entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in a form substantially as follows:
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS
Article 1 - Findings
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.
Article 2 - Definitions
As used in this agreement:
C. "receiving state" means the state in which trial is to be had on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article 3 or Article 4 of this agreement.
Article 3 - Prisoner's Request for Final Disposition
F. Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the request for final disposition referred to in Subarticle A shall void the request.
Article 4 - Prosecutor's Request for Final Disposition
E. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article 5 E of this agreement, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
Article 5 - Transfer of Custody
B. The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present upon demand:
H. From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until the prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this subarticle govern unless the states concerned have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of an [and] in the government of a party state or between a party state and its subdivisions as to the payment of costs or responsibilities therefor.
Article 6 - Application
B. No provision of this agreement and no remedy made available by this agreement shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.
Article 7 - Compact Administrator
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.
Article 8 - Party States
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when such state has enacted the agreement into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom by enacting a statute repealing this agreement. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time the withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.
Article 9 - Construction
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable, and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.
History: 1953 Comp., § 41-20-19, enacted by Laws 1971, ch. 270, § 1.
Cross references. — For filing interstate compacts with supreme court librarian, see 14-3-20 NMSA 1978.
Not applicable to parolees. — The interstate agreement on detainers does not apply to parolees. State v. Frohnhofer, 2011-NMCA-109, 150 N.M. 643, 267 P.3d 78, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-009, 269 P.3d 903.
Where the state of New Mexico lodged a detainer against defendant; defendant requested a final disposition of the detainer; prior to the 180-day deadline, defendant was paroled in Colorado; and defendant’s trial did not commence before the 180-deadline, the district court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, because the interstate agreement on detainers did not apply to defendant who was a parolee. State v. Frohnhofer, 2011-NMCA-109, 150 N.M. 643, 267 P.3d 78, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-009, 269 P.3d 903.
Applicability. — The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act is an agreement between the governments of member states. The federal government also subscribes to the act and, for purposes of it, is considered a single state. It applies to transfers between states, not transfers within a state. Hence, it has no application if a prisoner in federal custody in one federal judicial district faces another federal indictment in a different federal judicial district. U.S. v. Walling, 974 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1992).
Applicability. — The provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act do not apply to pretrial detainees. U.S. v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018 (10th Cir. 1993)
Agreement not applicable where detainer for sentencing only. — A request for the disposition of an outstanding sentencing is not cognizable under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers; the 180-day requirement of Paragraph A of Article 3 applies only where a detainer for "trial" is present, not where the detainer is only for sentencing. State v. Sparks, 1986-NMCA-010, 104 N.M. 62, 716 P.2d 253, cert. denied, 103 N.M. 798, 715 P.2d 71.
Probation and parole proceedings. — This section does not apply to probation revocation proceedings. State v. McDonald, 1991-NMCA-132, 113 N.M. 305, 825 P.2d 238, cert. denied, 113 N.M. 44, 822 P.2d 1127 (1992).
Probation and parole proceedings. — The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act applies only to detainers lodged on untried criminal charges and has no applicability to probation or parole revocation detainers. McDonald v. N.M. Parole Bd., 955 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 920, 112 S. Ct. 1968, 118 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1992).
Prisoner's burden of substantial compliance. — Where a prisoner bypasses the statutory procedure and attempts to communicate directly with the receiving state, absent actual notice by the receiving state, he or she has the burden of complying substantially with the requirements of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. State v. Tarango, 1987-NMCA-027, 105 N.M. 592, 734 P.2d 1275, cert. denied, 105 N.M. 521, 734 P.2d 761, overruled on other grounds by Zurla v. State, 1990-NMSC-011, 109 N.M. 640, 789 P.2d 588.
Substantial compliance. — Substantial compliance for purposes of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act means the prisoner must file the proper documents, including the certificate of status, with the proper prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction, using registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. State v. Tarango, 1987-NMCA-027, 105 N.M. 592, 734 P.2d 1275, cert. denied, 105 N.M. 521, 734 P.2d 761, overruled on other grounds by Zurla v. State, 1990-NMSC-011, 109 N.M. 640, 789 P.2d 588.
The defendant failed to meet the requirements of this section since his petition for a writ of habeas corpus requesting revocation of the Arizona arrest warrant and removal of detainer did not constitute a request for final disposition of detainer, and there was no evidence that he gave actual notice to Arizona, or otherwise substantially complied with the statutory requirements. Palmer v. Williams, 1995-NMSC-040, 120 N.M. 63, 897 P.2d 1111.
The defendant's letter to the district attorney's office stating, "Were you to file a detainer . . ., I could request final disposition" was inadequate to activate his rights under the Interstate Agreement for Detainers Act. State v. Morawe, 1996-NMCA-110, 122 N.M. 489, 927 P.2d 44.
Actual notice of critical information required. — While the defendant did not have to furnish the certificate required by Paragraph A of Article 3 to give the prosecutor and the district court actual notice, he did have an obligation to furnish the information that would be contained therein. Since the county prosecutor and the district court did not have actual notice of critical information, such as the fact that the defendant was presently incarcerated in the Texas penal complex, the defendant was not relieved of his burden of substantially complying with the requirements of this agreement. State v. Smith, 1993-NMCA-070, 115 N.M. 749, 858 P.2d 416, cert. denied, 115 N.M. 795, 858 P.2d 1274.
Invocation of protections. — Writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum will not, by themselves, invoke the protections of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. State v. Montoya, 1994-NMCA-155, 119 N.M. 95, 888 P.2d 977, cert. denied, 119 N.M. 168, 889 P.2d 203 (1995).
Expiration of 180-day period on Sunday. — Where the 180-day limitation period of Paragraph A of Article 3 expires on a Sunday, a trial is timely if held the next day. State v. Alderete, 1980-NMCA-084, 95 N.M. 691, 625 P.2d 1208, cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991.
Time limitation tolled only when prisoner unable to stand trial or on continuance for good cause. — The time limitations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (Section 31-5-12 NMSA 1978) are intended to permit sufficient time and opportunity for the disposition of all pretrial proceedings and the commencement of trial before the time limitations expire. Time is tolled only when the prisoner is "unable to stand trial"; in all other circumstances, the mechanism for reasonably or necessarily extending the time limits is by a request for continuance "for good cause shown." State v. Shaw, 1982-NMCA-133, 98 N.M. 580, 651 P.2d 115.
Evidence of "for good cause shown". — Continuances because of the unavailability of a trial judge, where the assigned judge was elected to the supreme court and the other judges in the district had a full complement of cases, and because of a local rule which required the assignment of all cases involving a single defendant to one judge were "for good cause shown," pursuant to Paragraph A of Article 3 of this section. State v. Aaron, 1984-NMCA-124, 102 N.M. 187, 692 P.2d 1336.
Good cause for continuance. — The state had good cause to request a continuation beyond the 120-day limit for commencement of the defendant's trial based on its discovery that the grand jury that indicted the defendant included an unsworn juror, a deficiency that required additional time to correct. State v. Livernois, 1997-NMSC-019, 123 N.M. 128, 934 P.2d 1057.
Continuation of trial date does not violate 180-day period. — Where a trial has in fact been continued although there is no formal order continuing the trial date, the 180-day limitation period of Paragraph A of Article 3 is not violated. State v. Alderete, 1980-NMCA-084, 95 N.M. 691, 625 P.2d 1208, cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991.
The timing of defendant's trial did not violate the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. — Where defendant was charged with murder, tampering with evidence and conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence, and where defendant moved to dismiss all charges with prejudice because his trial occurred outside of the 180-day time period generally prescribed by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) and because there was not good cause for a continuance, the district court acted within its discretion by concluding that the complexity of the case and the volume of discovery amounted to good cause for a continuance. State v. Chavez, 2022-NMCA-007, cert. granted.
State's representation that it will reindict is not a de facto continuance under Paragraph A of Article 3. State v. Shaw, 1982-NMCA-133, 98 N.M. 580, 651 P.2d 115.
Time period does not commence anew upon refiling of indictment. — A second indictment on the identical charges for which a defendant was previously returned to New Mexico for pretrial and trial proceedings cannot avoid the time restrictions of Paragraph A of Article 3 on the theory that the time commences anew from the filing of the second indictment. State v. Shaw, 1982-NMCA-133, 98 N.M. 580, 651 P.2d 115.
When defendant's request for final disposition does not trigger 180-day rule. — Where the defendant wrote the district attorney in Albuquerque to request a final disposition of pending Arizona charges on the same day that he pleaded guilty to California felony charges, he had not entered upon "term of imprisonment" within this section; therefore, his request did not trigger section's requirement of trial within 180 days after request for disposition of the charge. State v. Duncan, 1980-NMCA-162, 95 N.M. 215, 619 P.2d 1259.
Triggering the 180–day provision. — The Interstate Agreement for Detainers Act becomes effective only when a detainer is filed, and a letter sent by the defendant to the district attorney's office before issuance of the detainer was insufficient to trigger the 180-day trial provision. State v. Morawe, 1996-NMCA-110, 122 N.M. 489, 927 P.2d 44.
Not applicable to sentencing. — Because the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act does not apply to sentencing and because a habitual offender proceeding addresses sentence enhancement, a defendant held in prison in another state does not have a right to a final disposition of habitual offender status within 180 days of serving a request for a final disposition. State v. Padilla, 2006-NMCA-070, 139 N.M. 700, 137 P.3d 640, cert. denied, 2006-NMCERT-006, 140 N.M. 224, 141 P.3d 1278.
Waiver of time limits. — Although the defendant did not specifically request a waiver of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act time limitations, such a waiver was implied from the defendant's waiver of all speedy trial time limitations. State v. Montoya, 1994-NMCA-155, 119 N.M. 95, 888 P.2d 977, cert. denied, 119 N.M. 168, 889 P.2d 203 (1995).
Agreement not pertinent following absolute release of prisoner. — When a sending state absolutely releases a prisoner within 120 days of his arrival in the receiving state, provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act cease to be pertinent. State v. Quiroz, 1980-NMCA-039, 94 N.M. 517, 612 P.2d 1328, cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992.
Law reviews. — For annual survey of New Mexico criminal procedure, see 16 N.M.L. Rev. 25 (1986).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Validity, construction, and application of interstate agreement on detainers, 98 A.L.R.3d 160.
Availability of postconviction relief under 28 USCS § 2254 based on alleged governmental violation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (18 USCS Appx), 63 A.L.R. Fed. 155.