N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-10
A. Except as provided in Section 31-21-10.2 NMSA 1978, an inmate of an institution who was sentenced to life imprisonment becomes eligible for a parole hearing after the inmate has served thirty years of the sentence, which shall be construed as the retributive portion of the life sentence. Upon reaching eligibility, parole consideration for release shall focus on:
B. Before ordering the parole of an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment, the board shall:
(3) consider all pertinent information concerning the inmate, including:
History: 1978 Comp., § 31-21-10, enacted by Laws 1980, ch. 28, § 1; 1981, ch. 285, § 3; 1982, ch. 107, § 1; 1983, ch. 136, § 1; 1987, ch. 139, § 4; 1988, ch. 62, § 2; 1994, ch. 21, § 1; 1994, ch. 24, § 4; 1996, ch. 79, § 4; 1997, ch. 140, § 2; 2003 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 8; 2004, ch. 38, § 2; 2005, ch. 59, § 3; 2007, ch. 69, § 3; 2009, ch. 11, § 4; 2023, ch. 24, § 2; 2025, ch. 79, § 3; 2026, ch. 22, § 1.
The 2026 amendment, effective May 20, 2026, amended the list of factors to be considered by the parole board when considering parole of an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment; in Subsection A, after "thirty years of the sentence" added "which shall be construed as the retributive portion of the life sentence. Upon reaching eligibility, parole consideration for release shall focus on:", and added Paragraphs A(1) through A(3); added new subsection designations "B" and "C" and redesignated former Subsection B through G as Subsections D through I, respectively; and in Subsection B, added new Paragraph B(2) and redesignated former Paragraphs (2) through (4) as Paragraph B(3) through B(5), respectively, in Paragraph B(3), Subparagraph B(3)(a), after "offense" added "including mitigating and aggravating circumstances", deleted former Subparagraph (b), which provided "including mitigating and aggravating circumstances" and redesignated former Subparagraph (c) as Subparagraph B(3)(b), deleted former Subparagraph (d), which provided "whether the inmate is a habitual offender", and added new Subparagraph B(3)(c) and redesignated former Subparagraphs (e) and (f) as Subparagraphs B(3)(d) and B(3)(e), respectively.
The 2025 amendment, effective June 20, 2025, removed the requirement that offenders, as a condition of parole, pay for the costs of parole services and removed the requirement that offenders reimburse a law enforcement agency or local crime stopper program for the amount of any reward paid by the agency or program for information leading to the offender's arrest; deleted former Subsection G and redesignated former Subsection H as Subsection G.
The 2023 amendment, effective June 16, 2023, provided for parole for children sentenced as adults; in Subsection A, in the introductory paragraph, added "Except as provided in Section 31-21-10.2 NMSA 1978"; in Subsection E, after "inmate's duties relating", deleted "thereto" and added "to those conditions of parole"; and in Subsection G, Paragraph G(1), substituted "inmate" for "defendant" throughout the subparagraph.
Applicability. — Laws 2023, ch. 24, § 5 provided that the provisions of Laws 2023, ch. 24 apply retroactively to all offenders currently serving an adult sentence for an offense committed as a child.
The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in Subsection B, replaced "convicted of a capital felony" with "sentenced to life imprisonment" and added Subsection C.
The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, made the section applicable to all crimes for which an inmate has been sentenced to life imprisonment.
The 2005 amendment, effective June 17, 2005, provided that an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment for a first degree felony resulting in the death of a child becomes eligible for a parole hearing after serving thirty years of the sentence.
The 2004 amendments, effective July 1, 2004, amended Paragraph (1) of Subsection F to change one thousand twenty dollars ($1,020) to one thousand eight hundred dollars ($1,800), fifteen dollars ($15.00) to twenty-five dollars ($25.00), eighty-five dollars ($85.00) to one hundred fifty dollars ($150) and to add after "($150) "as set by the appropriate district supervisor of the adult probation and parole division, based upon the financial circumstances of the defendant. The defendant's payment of the supervised parole costs shall not be waived unless the board holds an evidentiary hearing and finds that the defendant is unable to pay the costs. If the board waives the defendant's payment of the supervised parole costs and the defendant's financial circumstances subsequently change so that the defendant is able to pay the costs, the appropriate district supervisor of the adult probation and parole division shall advise the board and the board shall hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the waiver should be rescinded".
The 2003 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective February 3, 2004, substituted "an institution" for "prison" in Subparagraph (2)(f) of Subsection A, added "except for sex offenders as provided in Section 31-21-10.1 NMSA 1978" at the beginning of the first sentence of Subsection C and substituted "an institution" for "a corrections facility" in the first and second sentences of that subsection, and substituted "institution" for both "correction facility" and "facility" in the fourth sentence of Subsection D.
Commencement of parole. — Subsection C of Section 31-21-10 (now Subsection D) requires commencement of the parole period as soon as the felony sentence has been completed. Gillespie v. State, 1988-NMSC-068, 107 N.M. 455, 760 P.2d 147.
A court may attach a two-year parole period to a consecutive sentence for third and fourth degree felonies. State v. Utley, 2008-NMCA-080, 144 N.M. 275, 186 P.3d 904, cert. denied, 2008-NMCERT-004, 144 N.M. 47, 183 P.3d 932.
Subsection A of this section does not create a minimum sentence for those sentenced to life imprisonment. Compton v. Lytle, 2003-NMSC-031, 134 N.M. 586, 81 P.3d 39.
Good time credit not available. — The legislature intended to differentiate between capital and noncapital felons by allowing for good-time credits for the latter and denying them to the former; a life sentence does not have a determinate maximum sentence to be reduced by good-time credits. Compton v. Lytle, 2003-NMSC-031, 134 N.M. 586, 81 P.3d 39.
Minimum period of incarceration for parole eligibility for life sentences prior to 1980. — Where petitioner pled guilty to four murder charges and was sentenced to four life sentences; three of the sentences ran concurrently with each other and consecutive to the fourth sentence; during plea negotiations petitioner’s attorney advised petitioner that based on the law at that time, petitioner would be eligible for parole after serving ten years on each of the two consecutive life sentences; once incarcerated, however, petitioner was notified that the eligibility period for parole was thirty years on each life sentence; petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the timing of petitioner’s eligibility for parole; prior to 1977, the statute provided for a minimum ten-year period of incarceration for eligibility for parole; in 1977, the legislature first enacted a provision, effective July 1, 1979, that repealed the statute and established a new, thirty-year minimum period of incarceration for eligibility for parole and then enacted an amendment, effective June 21, 1977, to the same statute that did not change the pre-1977 minimum ten-year period of incarceration for eligibility for parole; the 1978 recompilation of the statutes compiled the 1977 amended version of the statute as Section 31-21-10 NMSA 1978 and referred to the first 1977 enactment requiring a minimum thirty-year period of incarceration for parole eligibility in a compiler’s note without including the text; in 1980, to resolve the confusion, the legislature repealed and reenacted Section 31-21-10 NMSA 1978, effective February 22, 1980, to provide for a thirty-year period of incarceration before eligibility for parole and purported to make the new statute apply retroactively to all crimes committed on or after July 1, 1979; petitioner’s crimes were committed on September 17, 1979 and petitioner was sentenced on May 14,1980; in Quintana v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 100 N.M. 224, 668 P.2d 1101 (1983), the court held that the first 1977 enactment repealed the statute so that the 1977 amendment of the statute was ineffective with the result that in 1977, the statute provided for a minimum thirty-year period of incarceration for eligibility for parole; in Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1989), the court ruled that the holding in Quintana was unforeseeable and retroactively enhanced the petitioner’s sentence in violation of ex post facto principles and violated the petitioner’s federal due process rights; and in this case, in reliance on Quintana, the district court dismissed petitioner’s petition and ordered petitioner to serve thirty years instead of ten years before consideration for parole, petitioner was eligible for parole upon the completion of ten years of incarceration on the second life sentence. Skidgel v. Hatch, 2013-NMSC-019, 301 P.3d 854, overruling Quintana v. New Mexico Dep't of Corrs., 1983-NMSC-066, 100 N.M. 224, 668 P.2d 1101.