N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-4-4
A. As used in this section:
(5) "right to custody" means the right to physical custody or visitation of a child arising from:
I. Any defendant convicted of violating the provisions of this section may be assessed the following expenses and costs by the court, with payments to be assigned to the respective person or agency:
History: 1978 Comp., § 30-4-4, enacted by Laws 1989, ch. 206, § 1.
Bracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not part of the law. Section 32-1-25.1 NMSA 1978, was repealed by Laws 1993, ch. 77, § 234, effective July 1, 1993. For present comparable provisions, see 32A-4-8 NMSA 1978.
Laws 2023, ch. 205, § 16 provided that references to the human services department shall be deemed to be references to the health care authority department.
Repeals and reenactments. — Laws 1989, ch. 206, § 1 repealed former 30-4-4 NMSA 1978, as enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 58, § 1, relating to custodial interference, and enacted a new section, effective April 4, 1989.
Cross references. — For provisions of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, see 40-10A-101 to 40-10A-403 NMSA 1978.
Severability. — Laws 1989, ch. 206, § 2 provides for the severability of the act if any part or application thereof is held invalid.
Sufficient evidence to support custodial interference. — Where custody of the defendant’s child was transferred to the children, youth and families department; the child was placed in a foster home; the child left the foster home and returned to the defendant’s home; the defendant allowed the child to stay with the defendant in the defendant’s home and never informed either the police or the children, youth and families department that the child was doing so, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of custodial interference. State v. Romero, 2009-NMCA-012, 145 N.M. 594, 203 P.3d 125, cert. quashed, 2009-NMCERT-002, 145 N.M. 704, 204 P.3d 29.
Section not unconstitutionally vague. — The terms "without good cause," "protracted time," "maliciously," "detaining," and "deprive permanently" as used in this section are of such well recognized meaning that individuals are placed on notice of the conduct sought to be proscribed and, therefore, the section is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Luckie, 1995-NMCA-075, 120 N.M. 274, 901 P.2d 205, cert. denied, 120 N.M. 184, 899 P.2d 1138.
Jurisdiction. — The child must be present in New Mexico when criminal acts of custodial interference are committed for New Mexico to have criminal jurisdiction. State v. Sung, 2000-NMCA-031, 128 N.M. 786, 999 P.2d 430.
Proper venue for the trial of the offense of custodial interference. — In the event elements of a crime were committed in different counties, the trial may be had in any county in which a material element of the crime was committed. Interfering with or depriving a custodial parent of their right to custody is an essential element of the crime of custodial interference as are the methods for accomplishing the interference or deprivation. Because deprivation is an element, where the person was deprived of the right of custody establishes a proper venue for the trial of the offense of custodial interference. State v. Lefthand, 2015-NMCA-117, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-011.
Where defendant violated an order of custody, issued by a Taos county district court, by depriving the father of the child of his right to custody, the father’s right to custody exists with him in his county of residence, the county in which he was given custody, and the county in which he was deprived of the custody of his son. Under the custodial interference statute, a person may be charged in the place where the harm sought to be prevented by the statute results, and therefore venue may lie in Taos county district court. State v. Lefthand, 2015-NMCA-117, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-011.
Elements of custodial interference. — To be guilty of custodial interference for taking the children for two weeks, the defendant had to have engaged in either interference by "taking" or "failing to return" the children without good cause. State v. Munoz, 2006-NMSC-005, 139 N.M. 106, 129 P.3d 142.
Protracted period of time. — Trial court's refusal to give defendant's requested jury instruction defining "protracted period of time" was not erroneous because the meaning of the phrase is readily understandable and the defendant argued in closing arguments that two weeks was not long enough. State v. Munoz, 2006-NMSC-005, 139 N.M. 106, 129 P.3d 142.
Good cause. — The term "good cause" encompasses the concepts of subjective "good faith" and objective reasonableness of the defendant and therefore a defendant must have an honest belief that his actions are necessary to protect a child from harm and that honest belief must be reasonable. State v. Munoz, 2006-NMSC-005, 139 N.M. 106, 129 P.3d 142.
Defense waived by no contest plea. — Although defendant's challenge to the jurisdiction of a Missouri court in entering a modification to an earlier divorce decree is a defense to the charges of custodial interference, defendant waived the defense when he entered a no contest plea. State v. Hunter, 2005-NMCA-089, 138 N.M. 96, 117 P.3d 254, rev'd, 2006-NMSC-043, 140 N.M. 406, 143 P.3d 168.
Legal right to custody not absolute. — Parents' natural and legal right to custody of their children is prima facie and not an absolute right. State v. Sanders, 1981-NMCA-053, 96 N.M. 138, 628 P.2d 1134.
Parent's natural right to custody includes the right to remove the child from this jurisdiction in the absence of any legal modification of that right, but that right may be lost through court order. State v. Whiting, 1983-NMCA-123, 100 N.M. 447, 671 P.2d 1158.
Parental right to custody curtailed by custody order. — Because of the custody order under Sections 40-4-7B(4) and 40-4-9.1 NMSA 1978, defendant's otherwise natural and usual right to remove her children from the court's jurisdiction is curtailed to the extent that she could not do so without the court's consent. State v. Whiting, 1983-NMCA-123, 100 N.M. 447, 671 P.2d 1158.
Right continues until terminated by appropriate authority. — A parent has a legal right to the custody of his child unless that right had been terminated, however temporarily, by appropriate authority. State v. Sanders, 1981-NMCA-053, 96 N.M. 138, 628 P.2d 1134.
Double jeopardy violation. — Where, although there were three children involved, the alleged violation relates to only one custody order for all the children, the court violated double jeopardy requirements in convicting defendant on three counts of custodial interference, and sentencing defendant consecutively on each count. State v. Hunter, 2005-NMCA-089, 138 N.M. 96, 117 P.3d 254, rev'd, 2006-NMSC-043, 140 N.M. 406, 143 P.3d 168.
Written judgment required. — A parent's legal right to custody of a child does not end until entry of, and the giving of, notice of a judgment in compliance with Rule 62(a), N.M.R. Child. Ct. (see Rule 10-352 NMRA), requiring a signed written judgment and disposition. State v. Sanders, 1981-NMCA-053, 96 N.M. 138, 628 P.2d 1134.
Law reviews. — For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to domestic relations, see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 325 (1982).
For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to criminal law, see 13 N.M.L. Rev. 323 (1983).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Kidnapping or related offense by taking or removing of child by or under authority of parent or one in loco parentis, 20 A.L.R.4th 823.
Liability of legal or natural parent, or one who aids or abets, for damages resulting from abduction of own child, 49 A.L.R.4th 7.