N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16D-1
History: 1953 Comp., § 64-3-504, enacted by Laws 1978, ch. 35, § 91; 1998, ch. 67, § 2; § 66-3-504 NMSA 1978 recompiled and amended as § 30-16D-1 by Laws 2009, ch. 253, § 1 and 2009, ch. 261, § 1; 2025, ch. 4, § 11.
Recompilations. — Laws 2009, ch. 253, § 1 and Laws 2009, ch. 261, § 1 recompiled and amended former 66-3-504 NMSA 1978, relating to unlawful taking of a vehicle or motor vehicle, as 30-16D-1 NMSA 1978, effective July 1, 2009.
The 2025 amendment, effective June 20, 2025, increased penalties for repeat and habitual vehicle theft offenders by allowing enhancements based on prior convictions for any vehicle-related theft crimes rather than requiring multiple convictions for the same specific charge; in Subsection A, deleted former Paragraphs A(1) through A(3) and added "felony as provided in Section 30-16D-4.1 NMSA 1978".
The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in Subsection A, at the beginning of the sentence, deleted "Any person who" and added the language up to "any vehicle"; after "motor vehicle", added "as defined by the Motor Vehicle Code" and added the language at the beginning of the sentence up to "is", in Paragraph (8) of Subsection A, after "fourth degree felony", deleted "if the vehicle or motor vehicle has a value of less than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500)" and added "for a first offense"; in Paragraph (2) of Subsection, after "felony", deleted "if the vehicle or motor vehicle has a value of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) or more"; and added "for a second offense"; added Paragraph (3) of Subsection A; deleted former Subsection C, which provided that district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over offenses prescribed in this section; and in Subsection C, changed "division" to "motor vehicle division of the taxation and revenue department".
Specification of "anything of value" resulted in double jeopardy. — Where the child was charged with armed robbery for taking both an automobile and the keys to the automobile in violation of Section 30-16-2 NMSA 1978 and for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle in violation of Section 30-16D-1 NMSA 1978, the child’s conduct underlying both crimes was unitary; and both convictions required the same proof of the theft of the automobile, the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle conviction was subsumed by the robbery conviction and the child’s conviction for both resulted in double jeopardy. State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d 1024.
Sufficient evidence to prove unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. — In delinquency proceedings where the child was charged with unlawful taking of a motor vehicle and reckless driving, there was sufficient evidence to support the jurors' reasonable determination that the child committed the delinquent act of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle where the state, in addition to presenting Facebook messages in which the child apologized to the victim and claimed that she was intoxicated when she took the victim's vehicle, presented testimony from the victim that after getting out of his vehicle to hug the child goodbye, the child pushed him aside and took off in his vehicle without his permission, and that she failed to stop even though he ran after her, banged on the driver side window, and yelled for her to stop. State v. Jesenya O., 2021-NMCA-030, 493 P.3d 418, rev'd on other grounds by 2022-NMSC-014.
The general/specific rule of statutory interpretation does not limit prosecutorial discretion to choose between prosecuting possession or taking of a motor vehicle. — Where defendant was convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and where defendant claimed, in a motion for directed verdict, that his conviction should have been vacated because the general/specific rule of statutory construction required the prosecutor to charge the more specific unlawful taking of a motor vehicle rather than the more general possession of a stolen motor vehicle when there was evidence supporting the violation of both statutes, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion, because there is a presumption that the legislature intended to punish the two offenses separately based on the fact that each statute requires proof of at least one element that the other does not, and therefore also intended to leave prosecutorial charging discretion intact, and defendant did not present evidence of legislative intent sufficient to overcome this presumption. State v. Carbajal, 2026-NMCA-030, cert. denied.