A. Except as provided in Subsection B of this section, taxes levied upon tangible property shall be in proportion to the value thereof, and taxes shall be equal and uniform upon subjects of taxation of the same class. Different methods may be provided by law to determine value of different kinds of property, but the percentage of value against which tax rates are assessed shall not exceed thirty-three and one-third percent.

B. The legislature shall provide by law for the valuation of residential property for property taxation purposes in a manner that limits annual increases in valuation of residential property. The limitation may be applied to classes of residential property taxpayers based on owner-occupancy, age or income. The limitations may be authorized statewide or at the option of a local jurisdiction and may include conditions under which the limitation is applied. Any valuation limitations authorized as a local jurisdiction option shall provide for applying statewide or multi-jurisdictional property tax rates to the value of the property as if the valuation increase limitation did not apply. (As amended November 3, 1914, November 2, 1971 and November 3, 1998.)

ANNOTATIONS

The 1998 amendment, which was proposed by H.J.R. No. 19, § 2 (Laws 1997), and adopted at the general election held November 3, 1998, by a vote of 261,507 for and 169,513 against, designated the existing language as Subsection A, added "Except as provided in Subsection B of this section", and added Subsection B.

The 1971 amendment, which was proposed by H.J.R. No. 18 (Laws 1971) and was adopted at the special election held on November 2, 1971, with a vote of 43,262 for and 30,256 against, added the second sentence.

Laws 1971, ch. 308, §§ 1 and 2, provided that all constitutional amendments proposed by the Thirtieth Legislature be voted upon at a special election on the first Tuesday of November, 1971, unless otherwise specified, and appropriated $171,000 for election expenses.

The 1914 amendment, which was proposed by J.R. 10 (Laws 1913) and adopted at the general election held on November 3, 1914, with a vote of 18,468 for and 13,593 against, rewrote this section which formerly read: "The rates of taxation shall be equal and uniform upon all subjects of taxation." See also compiler's note to N.M. Const., art. VIII, § 8.

Compiler's notes. — An amendment to this section proposed by H.J.R. No. 1 (Laws 1969), which would have allowed classification of property for purpose of valuation, was, according to 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-151, nullified by submission of proposed constitution to voters in 1969.

An amendment was proposed by H.J.R. No. 16 (Laws 1970), which would have repealed this article and adopted a new Article VIII, was submitted to the people at the general election held on November 3, 1970. It was defeated by a vote of 65,552 for and 71,537 against.

Cross references. — For statutory provisions relating to taxation generally, see Chapter 7 NMSA 1978.

For valuation of property, see 7-36-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.

For provisions relating to county valuation protests boards, see 7-38-25 NMSA 1978 et seq.

Comparable provisions. — Idaho Const., art. VII, §§ 2, 3, 5.

Montana Const., art. VIII, §§ 3, 4.

Utah Const., art. XIII, §§ 2, 3.

Wyoming Const., art. XV, § 11.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Constitutional valuation limitations. — Article VIII, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution limits the legislature’s existing plenary authority to impose valuation limitations based on taxpayer characteristics to the three enumerated characteristics of age, income and owner-occupancy. It does not impose any restrictions on the legislature’s authority to impose limitations in valuation increases based on its classification of residential property. Zhao v. Montoya, 2014-NMSC-025, aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 2012-NMCA-056, 280 P.3d 918.

Statute does not violate the New Mexico Constitution. — Section 7-36-21.2 NMSA 1978 does not violate the New Mexico Constitution because it creates an authorized class based on the nature of the property and not on the taxpayer and it does not violate the equal and uniform clause of Article VIII, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution because it furthers the legitimate state interest of fostering neighborhood preservation and stability by permitting older owners to pay progressively less taxes than new owners. Zhao v. Montoya, 2014-NMSC-025, aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 2012-NMCA-056, 280 P.3d 918.

Where a property owner purchased a residential property in 2007 that had been assessed and valued at $243,786; in 2008 the property was valued at $362,600; another property owner purchased a new home "around the corner" from the owner’s old home; in 2009, the old home was valued at $553,700 and the new home was valued at $902,500; and the owners claimed that they were entitled to the three percent limitation on increase in valuation that applied to other properties in the area that had not changed ownership, that 7-36-21.2 NMSA 1978 was unconstitutional because it created an unauthorized class of residential property taxpayers based solely upon the time of acquisition, not on the constitutionally permissible classifications of owner-occupancy, age or income, and violated the equal and uniform clause of Article VIII, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution, 7-36-21.2 NMSA 1978 was not unconstitutional because it created an authorized class based on the nature of property and not the taxpayer and because it furthered the legitimate state interest of fostering neighborhood preservation and stability by permitting older owners to pay progressively less taxes than new owners. Zhao v. Montoya, 2014-NMSC-025, aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 2012-NMCA-056, 280 P.3d 918.

Valuation methods did not create a new class of taxpayers. — The different valuation methods under 7-36-21.2 NMSA 1978 for newly sold residential property and residential property owned more than a year do not create a new class of taxpayer in violation of Paragraph B of Article VIII, Section 1 of the constitution of New Mexico because 7-36-21.2 NMSA 1978 limits revaluation for taxation purposes based on owner-occupant status. Zhao v. Montoya, 2012-NMCA-056, 280 P.3d 918, aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 2014-NMSC-025.

Where homeowners bought and occupied new homes and in the year following their purchase, the county valued their property at significantly greater amounts for tax purposes than the county had valued the property for the previous owners; as a result of the revaluation, the property tax assessment for the property significantly increased; and the homeowners claimed that 7-36-21.2 NMSA 1978 was unconstitutional because it created a new class of taxpayer based on the time of acquisition of property, 7-36-21.2 NMSA 1978 did not create a new class of taxpayer because the homeowners did not obtain the benefit of the limitation of increases in assessed value until they purchased the property, at which time, the homeowners became members of the class of owner-occupants to whom the limitation applies. Zhao v. Montoya, 2012-NMCA-056, 280 P.3d 918, aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 2014-NMSC-025.

Legislature's inherent power to tax. — The enumeration of subjects of taxation contained in this article was merely confirmatory of the legislature's inherent power to tax, and not a limitation thereon. State ex rel. Capitol Addition Bldg. Comm'n v. Connelly, 1935-NMSC-045, 39 N.M. 312, 46 P.2d 1097, 100 A.L.R. 878.

Court cannot substitute its view in selecting and classifying for that of legislature. Anaconda Co. v. Property Tax Dep't, 1979-NMCA-158, 94 N.M. 202, 608 P.2d 514, cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980).

Article covers whole subject of tax exemption and has repealed existing territorial provisions on the subject. Albuquerque Alumnae Ass'n of Kappa Kappa Gamma Fraternity v. Tierney, 1933-NMSC-011, 37 N.M. 156, 20 P.2d 267. For tax exemptions, see N.M. Const., art. VIII, §§ 3 and 5.

"Taxes," as used in this section, applies only to taxes, in the proper sense of the word, levied to raise revenue for general purposes. State v. Ingalls, 1913-NMSC-068, 18 N.M. 211, 135 P. 1177.

Generally. — State board of equalization succeeded to all the power of the territorial board, which included fixing the value of shares of all national banks and other banking institutions, the tax to be imposed being in lieu of any taxes which otherwise might be assessed upon their property. First Nat'l Bank of Raton v. McBride, 1915-NMSC-047, 20 N.M. 381, 149 P. 353 (decided prior to 1914 amendment).

State board of equalization had power to equalize valuations of property for taxation purposes by classes, both as between classes in the same county and as between counties throughout the state, and fact that the action taken resulted in increase or decrease of total valuations in state was immaterial. South Spring Ranch & Cattle Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 1914-NMSC-011, 18 N.M. 531, 139 P. 159 (decided prior to 1914 amendment).

Taxpayer must show that taxing statute patently arbitrary and capricious or void for uncertainty in order to defeat the statute on constitutional grounds. C & D Trailer Sales v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1979-NMCA-151, 93 N.M. 697, 604 P.2d 835.

II. TANGIBLE PROPERTY.

All tangible property in New Mexico is subject to taxation in proportion to value, and should be taxed, unless specifically exempted by the constitution or by its authority. Sims v. Vosburg, 1939-NMSC-026, 43 N.M. 255, 91 P.2d 434.

Phrase "taxes levied upon tangible property" as used in this section has same meaning as "taxes levied upon real or personal property" used in Section 2 of this article. Hamilton v. Arch Hurley Conservancy Dist., 1938-NMSC-004, 42 N.M. 86, 75 P.2d 707.

Classification of property generally. — The constitution in this section and sections 3 and 5 of this article, in effect, classes tangible property into that exempt from taxation, that which may be exempted and that which must be taxed. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. State Tax Comm'n, 1936-NMSC-029, 40 N.M. 299, 58 P.2d 1204.

Shares of bank stock are intangibles in respect to taxation. First State Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 1936-NMSC-040, 40 N.M. 319, 59 P.2d 667.

Section does not apply to license or privilege taxes. Veterans' Foreign Wars, Ledbetter-McReynolds Post No. 3015 v. Hull, 1947-NMSC-074, 51 N.M. 478, 188 P.2d 334; State ex rel. Taylor v. Mirabal, 1928-NMSC-056, 33 N.M. 553, 273 P. 928, 62 A.L.R. 296.

Privilege tax deemed nonproperty in nature. — Where the tax involved is a privilege tax, it is in the nature of a nonproperty tax to which this section is not applicable, and reasonable classifications allowing the imposition of such taxes by the legislature do not deny equal protection or due process. Sunset Package Store, Inc. v. City of Carlsbad, 1968-NMSC-105, 79 N.M. 260, 442 P.2d 572.

Annual auto license fee not unconstitutional property tax. — Laws 1912, ch. 28 (repealed), fixing an annual license fee for operating an automobile was not unconstitutional as a property tax imposed without regard to value of property on which it was made, but was a license tax, since character of tax is not determined by the mode adopted in fixing its amount. State v. Ingalls, 1913-NMSC-068, 18 N.M. 211, 135 P. 1177.

Gross receipts tax on sale of mobile homes constitutional. C & D Trailer Sales v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1979-NMCA-151, 93 N.M. 697, 604 P.2d 835.

Assessment for conservancy district not "tax". — An assessment for conservancy district purposes made under Laws 1927, ch. 45 (73-14-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.) is not a tax within meaning of this section. Gutierrez v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1929-NMSC-071, 34 N.M. 346, 282 P. 1, 70 A.L.R. 1261, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 610, 50 S. Ct. 158, 74 L. Ed. 653 (1930).

Laws 1923, ch. 140, § 502 (repealed), relating to conservancy districts and authorizing preliminary assessments to defray preliminary costs of surveys and engineers' fees, did not violate this section. In re Proposed Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1925-NMSC-058, 31 N.M. 188, 242 P. 683.

Succession tax not violative of section. — Laws 1919, ch. 122 (repealed), the Succession Tax Law, did not violate this section, since it did not tax tangible property. State v. Gomez, 1929-NMSC-063, 34 N.M. 250, 280 P. 251.

Tax on gasoline not property taxation. — The first part of this section clearly refers to property taxation. The tax imposed upon the "sale or use of all gasoline sold or used in this state" is not property taxation, but, in effect, as in name, an excise tax. The state has the power to select this commodity, as distinguished from others, in order to impose an excise tax upon its sale or use; and since the tax operated impartially upon all, and with territorial uniformity throughout the state, it is "equal and uniform upon subjects of taxation of the same class". Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642, 41 S. Ct. 606, 65 L. Ed. 1139 (1921).

Tax on extracted oil and gas held not property tax. — Tax imposed by Laws 1933, ch. 72 (repealed), upon oil and gas secured from the soil was an excise tax, and not a property tax on tangible property not in proportion to value thereof, and was not unconstitutional. Flynn, Welch & Yates, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 1934-NMSC-001, 38 N.M. 131, 28 P.2d 889.

Separate taxation of oil and gas well equipment not precluded. — A tax on production of oil and gas wells, based on one-half of market value after deducting certain items, does not preclude separate taxation of equipment used in connection with such wells. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. State Tax Comm'n, 1936-NMSC-029, 40 N.M. 299, 58 P.2d 1204.

There is a substantial difference between underground and open-pit mines sufficient to support a distinction between them for tax purposes. Anaconda Co. v. Property Tax Dep't, 1979-NMCA-158, 94 N.M. 202, 608 P.2d 514, cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980).

Dams and reservoirs are assessed and taxed separately at their situs, separately from the lands they irrigate. Storrie Project Water Users Ass'n v. Gonzales, 1949-NMSC-052, 53 N.M. 421, 209 P.2d 530.

Affording relief to taxpayer. — The court will not ordinarily afford relief to a taxpayer whose property is not assessed more than the law provides. In re Taxes Assessed Against Property of Scholle, 1938-NMSC-028, 42 N.M. 371, 78 P.2d 1116.

Remedy of taxpayer not assessed more than law allows. — A taxpayer who is not assessed more than the law provides has no cause for complaint in the courts in the absence of some well-defined and established scheme of discrimination or some fraudulent action, and the taxpayer's remedy is to have the assessing authority raise the value on the property claimed to be valued too low to a level with his own. Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 1959-NMSC-067, 66 N.M. 221, 345 P.2d 750, 76 A.L.R. 2d 1071.

Relief granted by state, not federal, courts. — If there is illegal discrimination as to the assessment against one or more taxpayers, New Mexico courts will grant relief and not require the taxpayer to proceed in the federal courts. Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 1959-NMSC-067, 66 N.M. 221, 345 P.2d 750.

Courts may not reclassify, revalue or reassess property. — Neither supreme court nor the district court may reclassify, revalue or reassess property, improperly classified by taxing officials, and consequently, assess at an excessive valuation. Gerner v. State Tax Comm'n, 1963-NMSC-022, 71 N.M. 385, 378 P.2d 619.

Authority to settle tax suits not affected. — The authority of district attorneys to compromise and settle tax suits is not affected by this section. State v. State Inv. Co., 1925-NMSC-017, 30 N.M. 491, 239 P. 741.

Sovereign immunity doctrine not applicable in mandamus proceeding. — In a mandamus proceeding to require the performance of a duty plainly required under the constitution, i.e., to prescribe an assessment ratio so that property shall be uniformly assessed in proportion to its value, the sovereign immunity doctrine is not applicable. State ex rel. Castillo Corp. v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 1968-NMSC-117, 79 N.M. 357, 443 P.2d 850.

Burden on plaintiff to prove unreasonable assessment. — The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that an unreasonable number of typical or representative properties were assessed at a level considerably under the figure at which his property was assessed. Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 1959-NMSC-067, 66 N.M. 221, 345 P.2d 750, 76 A.L.R. 2d 1071.

Description of items by taxpayer. — The taxpayer is not required to describe each specific item, but certainly a large enough number so that the court can obtain a true account of the situation without engaging in conjecture. Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 1959-NMSC-067, 66 N.M. 221, 345 P.2d 750, 76 A.L.R. 2d 1071.

No appellate review of assessment when question moot or abstract. — When cause of action under this section is destroyed where neighboring county raises its tax assessment to figure higher than one in plaintiff's county and the issues involved in the trial court no longer exist, then an appellate court will not review a case merely to decide moot or abstract questions. Hamman v. Clayton Mun. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 1964-NMSC-182, 74 N.M. 428, 394 P.2d 273.

III. EQUAL AND UNIFORM.

General requirements for validity of taxation. — The state may select its subjects of taxation, and, so long as the tax is equal and uniform on all subjects of a class and the classifications for taxation are reasonable, such legislation does not offend this section of the state constitution. Gruschus v. Bureau of Revenue, 1965-NMSC-013, 74 N.M. 775, 399 P.2d 105; Anaconda Co. v. Property Tax Dep't, 1979-NMCA-158, 94 N.M. 202, 608 P.2d 514, cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980).

Remedy for differential treatment of property. — A taxpayer is not entitled to an exemption under Article VIII, Section 1(A) of the New Mexico Constitution based on evidence that another taxpayer with similarly used property received such an exemption, absent a finding that the unequal taxation was intentional, fraudulent or discriminatory. CAVU Co. v. Martinez, 2014-NMSC-029, aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 2013-NMCA-050, 302 P.3d 126.

Remedy where there is no constitutional violation. — Where the taxpayer’s property was not actively used as a school on January 1, 2010 and was not used actively as a school until August 2010 when the fall semester began; the county assessor determined that the property did not qualify for an educational use exemption in 2010; and the taxpayer claimed that the taxpayer’s property should be exempt from taxation because the county assessor had granted an exemption to another school that was not operating as a school on January 1, 2010 and that did not begin school operations until the fall semester of 2010; and the taxpayer did not offer any evidence or claim that the county assessor’s disparate treatment of the two properties was the result of fraud or systematic discrimination, any disparity did not rise to a constitutional violation and the taxpayer’s only remedy was to remove the exemption from the other school property, rather than to exempt the taxpayer’s property from taxes. CAVU Co. v. Martinez, 2013-NMCA-050, 302 P.3d 126, cert. granted, 2013-NMCERT-004.

Uniformity clause of New Mexico constitution requires uniformity of property taxation within a county as well as statewide uniformity of assessments. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

Rationale for section. — The rationale for the provision that "taxes shall be equal and uniform upon subjects of taxation of the same class" is that all property should bear its share of the cost of government. NRA Special Contribution Fund v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1978-NMCA-096, 92 N.M. 541, 591 P.2d 672, cert. quashed, 92 N.M. 464, 589 P.2d 1055 (1979).

Uniformity and equality do not mean mathematical exactitude in appraisals for tax purposes. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

Invidious assessment. — Failing to tax all alike as result of wrong intentionally done by taxing officer was an "invidious assessment" and violated this section prior to its amendment. First Nat'l Bank v. McBride, 1915-NMSC-047, 20 N.M. 381, 149 P. 353.

No violation of Uniformity Clause shown. — Although taxpayers were able to present evidence that a disparity existed between their lot and those of other lots in their subdivision, their failure to present any evidence that the disparity was substantial, intentional, or related to the overall assessment of the property, or that their lot was overassessed militated against a finding that there was a constitutional violation of the uniformity clause. Hannahs v. Anderson, 1998-NMCA-152, 126 N.M. 1, 966 P.2d 168, cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351.

Duty of tax assessor. — A tax assessor has a constitutional duty to take the necessary action to require, so far as possible, equality and uniformity in taxation on a continuing basis. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

Legislature is authorized to exempt certain property from taxation and none other. Dillard v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 1948-NMSC-069, 53 N.M. 12, 201 P.2d 345.

State may constitutionally tax one class and exempt other classes if the classification reasonably tends, in some lawful way, to facilitate the raising of revenue. Beatty v. City of Santa Fe, 1953-NMSC-110, 57 N.M. 759, 263 P.2d 697.

There need be no relation between class of taxpayers and purpose of appropriation according to the supreme court of the United States in New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573, 58 S. Ct. 721, 82 L. Ed. 1024 (1938). Beatty v. City of Santa Fe, 1953-NMSC-110, 57 N.M. 759, 263 P.2d 697.

Valuations and taxes to be based on standard. — To have uniformity and equality in a form of tax, the valuations must be established by some standard, and after valuations are fixed, the taxes based upon such valuations must be levied by a standard. It is only thus that each taxpayer may bear his fair share of the burden of government. Gerner v. State Tax Comm'n, 1963-NMSC-022, 71 N.M. 385, 378 P.2d 619.

Uniform method of taxation requires that each reappraisal be part of a systematic and definite plan which provides that all similar properties be valued in a like manner. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

Violations of constitutional uniform taxation requirements frequently result in violations of equal protection clauses. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

Taxpayer must not be subjected to discrimination in the imposition of a property tax burden which results from systematic, arbitrary, or intentional revaluation of some property at a figure greatly in excess of the undervaluation of other like properties. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

To support claim under uniformity clause of New Mexico constitution, the taxpayer must show that the inequality is substantial and amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

Factors in determining discrimination in property revaluation plan. — In determining whether a property revaluation plan constitutes intentional and arbitrary discrimination in violation of this section and N.M. Const., art. II, § 18, all relevant circumstances should be taken into consideration. Such factors should include, but not be limited to, the resources realistically available to the assessing authority, the time limitations involved in the plan, the availability of other alternatives and the amount of temporary inequalities in valuations which result from the cyclical implementation of the plan. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

Mere errors of judgment not unconstitutional discrimination. — Mere errors of judgment in estimating market value of property will not be sufficient to show unconstitutional discrimination in the assessment of unequal taxes, however, good faith alone will not justify an assessment which is discriminatory in fact. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

There exists no constitutional inhibition against double taxation. New Mexico State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy v. Grant, 1956-NMSC-068, 61 N.M. 287, 299 P.2d 464.

Taxes must be equal and uniform upon subjects of same class. — There is no state constitutional inhibition against double taxation in the sense frequently used. The requirement that must be met to escape the stricture of its being illegal is that taxes must be equal and uniform upon subjects of the same class. Amarillo-Pecos Valley Truck Lines v. Gallegos, 1940-NMSC-004, 44 N.M. 120, 99 P.2d 447.

"Double taxation" held not suffered. — An attorney who paid a $5.00 license fee for board of commissioners of state bar, a $1.00 license fee under Sales Tax Law and the gross income tax was held not to have suffered "double taxation" prohibited by this section. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Tittmann, 1938-NMSC-005, 42 N.M. 76, 75 P.2d 701.

Special tax districts no violation of section. — Where legislature by special law created a state road through two counties, it could require levy of special tax on all the property within one of the counties for purpose of providing a fund for improvement of the highway therein, since it thereby created a special taxing district, which it had the power to do, without violating this section. Borrowdale v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1915-NMSC-093, 23 N.M. 1, 163 P. 721.

Taxes levied under district school bonds not in violation of section. — Taxes levied under a bond issued in accord with portions of Laws 1937, ch. 36 (repealed), providing that a school district within which is located a state school conducting a high school may vote, issue and sell district school bonds, for purpose of joining with the state school in erecting and furnishing a high school building, or purchasing ground therefor, were not in violation of this section, since the taxes were equal and uniform throughout the district. White v. Board of Educ., 1938-NMSC-009, 42 N.M. 94, 75 P.2d 712.

Equality provision of section does not extend to local assessments for improvements levied upon property specially benefited thereby; it did not apply to conservancy district's preliminary fund assessment. State ex rel. Capitol Addition Bldg. Comm'n v. Connelly, 1935-NMSC-045, 39 N.M. 312, 46 P.2d 1097, 100 A.L.R. 878.

Exemption of industrial revenue bonds from taxation no violation of provisions. — Statute authorizing issuance of revenue bonds by municipality for industrial development and providing that bonds so authorized, the income therefrom, shall be exempt from all taxation by state on any subdivision, was not violation of constitutional provision requiring that taxes be equal and uniform insofar as the exemption was confined to municipal property. Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 1956-NMSC-111, 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920.

Town pollution control project to be used by private corporations. — The fact that pollution control project to be used by private corporations and financed by funds from industrial revenue bonds was to be owned by the town, and therefore be exempt from ad valorem taxes, did not violate this section. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Town of Hurley, 1973-NMSC-032, 84 N.M. 743, 507 P.2d 1074.

Power of legislature to classify for purposes of taxation. — Former 2% privilege tax (1937 amendment to 59-26-31 NMSA 1978) from which qualified benefit societies were exempt did not violate this section. Power of legislature to classify for purposes of taxation and to impose tax in question must be conceded if any reasonable or sound basis can be found to sustain it. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Casados, 21 F. Supp. 989 (D.N.M.) 1938, aff'd, 305 U.S. 558, 59 S. Ct. 79, 83 L. Ed. 352 (1938).

Power to levy excise tax. — Given a reasonable classification of subjects, the power of the legislature to levy an excise tax is almost unlimited, at least so long as it does not go to the extent of extortion or confiscation. George E. Breece Lumber Co. v. Mirabal, 1930-NMSC-033, 34 N.M. 643, 287 P. 699, 84 A.L.R. 827, aff'd, 283 U.S. 788, 51 S. Ct. 352, 75 L. Ed. 1415 (1931).

Excise tax need bear no relation to object. — That excise tax need bear no relation to the object for which the proceeds are to be expended is well settled. New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573, 58 S. Ct. 721, 82 L. Ed. 1024 (1938), and George E. Breece Lumber Co. v. Mirabal, 1930-NMSC-033, 34 N.M. 643, 287 P. 699, 84 A.L.R. 827, aff'd, 283 U.S. 788, 51 S. Ct. 352, 75 L. Ed. 1415 (1931); Beatty v. City of Santa Fe, 1953-NMSC-110, 57 N.M. 759, 263 P.2d 697.

Classification of commodities, businesses or occupations for excise tax purposes, under which the classes are taxed at unequal rates or one class is taxed and another is exempted, will be upheld as constitutional if it is not arbitrary nor capricious and rests upon some reasonable basis of difference or policy. Beatty v. City of Santa Fe, 1953-NMSC-110, 557 N.M. 759, 263 P.2d 697.

Excise tax upon use of gasoline for any purpose. — An excise tax laid upon the use of gasoline for any purpose in the state preserves equality and uniformity of taxation within constitutional requirements. George E. Breece Lumber Co. v. Mirabal, 1930-NMSC-033, 34 N.M. 643, 287 P. 699, 84 A.L.R. 827, aff'd, 283 U.S. 788, 51 S. Ct. 352, 75 L. Ed. 1415 (1931).

Validity of tax on tobacco sustained. — In almost every case in which the question has arisen, the courts have sustained the validity of statutes or ordinances imposing a tax on cigars, cigarettes and other forms of tobacco, as against objections based on violation of the rule requiring uniformity of taxation or constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the law. Beatty v. City of Santa Fe, 1953-NMSC-110, 57 N.M. 759, 263 P.2d 697.

Provisions relating to auto licenses. — Laws 1912, ch. 28 (repealed), providing for automobile licenses, did not conflict with constitutional provision with respect to equality and uniformity under authorities holding that constitutional provision is restricted to property tax. State v. Ingalls, 1913-NMSC-068, 18 N.M. 211, 135 P. 1177.

Uniformity requirement as to taxes levied for county purposes. — This section does not require uniformity throughout the state as to taxes levied and assessed for purely county purposes, the requirement of uniformity being met in such case if operation of tax is equal and uniform throughout the county. Love v. Dunaway, 1923-NMSC-051, 28 N.M. 557, 215 P. 822, superseded by statute, New Mexico Prop. Appraisal Dep't v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Lea Cnty., 1971-NMSC-008, 82 N.M. 267, 479 P.2d 771.

Making uniform state's share of ad valorem taxes. — There must be a uniform percentage ratio, or some other means of equalization, so as to make uniform the state's share of ad valorem taxes, and the manner by which it is done, the court leaves to the state tax commission (now property tax division of the taxation and revenue department). State ex rel. Castillo Corp. v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 1968-NMSC-117, 79 N.M. 357, 443 P.2d 850.

IV. METHODS.

Provisions relating to auto licenses not in contravention. — Provision in Laws 1925, ch. 82 (repealed), relating to automobile licenses, that county assessor should prepare an assessment roll of motor vehicles, fix the assessed valuation thereof, in accordance with a schedule prepared by state tax commission (now property tax division of the taxation and revenue department), specifying valuations of vehicles of the several makes, types and models, making proper allowances for depreciation, and extend the taxes thereon, did not contravene the uniformity clause of the constitution. State ex rel. Taylor v. Mirabal, 1928-NMSC-056, 33 N.M. 553, 273 P. 928, 62 A.L.R. 296.

Continuing partial annual reappraisal not violative of section. — Where only 20% of a county was reappraised during the year and the equalization program was a continuing one, the reappraisal program did not violate this section of the constitution of New Mexico. Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 1959-NMSC-067, 66 N.M. 221, 345 P.2d 750, 76 A.L.R. 2d 1071.

Determination of value by "reasonable cash market value". — Generally, the "reasonable cash market value" reflected by sales of comparable property is to be used to determine value if there have been such sales. Hardin v. State Tax Comm'n, 1967-NMSC-239, 78 N.M. 477, 432 P.2d 833.

Determination where no "market value" for property. — In situations where property has no "market value" based on comparable sales earning capacity, cost of reproduction and original cost, less depreciation, furnish proper criteria for consideration in determining value. Hardin v. State Tax Comm'n, 1967-NMSC-239, 78 N.M. 477, 432 P.2d 833.

Hypothetical or speculative values not to be used in determination. — Classification or assessment of property for tax purposes, premised upon hypothetical or speculative values believed, ultimately or at some later time, to be or become the true market value of such land, cannot legitimately be the basis of determining its value. Gerner v. State Tax Comm'n, 1963-NMSC-022, 71 N.M. 385, 378 P.2d 619.

Discriminatory method for reappraising land entitles taxpayer to relief. — A well-defined and established scheme of discrimination in the method used for reappraising land within a county violates this section and entitles the taxpayer to relief. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

Reassessment violating law may be enjoined. — Laws 1933, ch. 86 (repealed), providing for an assessment every four years and prohibiting increased assessments in intervening years and Laws 1933, ch. 104 (repealed), conferring power on county equalization board (now county valuation protests boards) to revise and revalue property except where such valuation is fixed by law or by state tax commission (now property tax division of the taxation and revenue department), conformed with this section, and a reassessment in violation of those laws could be enjoined. Vermejo Club v. French, 1938-NMSC-069, 43 N.M. 45, 85 P.2d 90.

Evidence to arrive at uniformity in assessment. — To arrive at uniformity in the assessment of property for taxation, as provided in this section and N.M. Const., art. VIII, § 2, the taxing authority and the taxpayer can introduce evidence regarding the ratios of assessed values to market values as the latter are reflected in actual sales of any other real estate in the taxing district for a reasonable period prior to the assessment date. Peterson Properties v. Valencia Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 1976-NMCA-043, 89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d 1074.

Classification and valuation found excessive and discriminatory. — Classification and valuation of property suitable for grazing purposes at 10 times the valuation of other property of the same character and quality and similarly situated because of its classification as lots held for speculation for oil or other purposes, absent any evidence of such speculative purposes, was so excessive and discriminatory as to entitle taxpayer to relief, despite fact that some other owners of like tracts were similarly assessed or that these lands, while similar to grazing lands, were not actually used for grazing purposes. Gerner v. State Tax Comm'n, 1963-NMSC-022, 71 N.M. 385, 378 P.2d 619.

Reasonable time limitation on completion of revaluation program. — Where a cyclical program of revaluation is undertaken, such plan need not necessarily be completed within a single year; however, it must be completed within a reasonably limited time. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

Lack of adequate resources no excuse for unequal assessments. — Lack of adequate resources with which to undertake and complete a cyclical reappraisal within a reasonable time cannot be relied upon as an excuse for unequal tax assessments where the assessor has a mandatory duty to achieve equal and uniform property taxation. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

Assessment based on invalid carry-over assessment unconstitutional. — Where taxpayer's 1975 assessment is not based on any new reappraisal, but is a result of an automatic carry-over of a 1974 assessment which was constitutionally invalid, the 1975 assessment is unconstitutional. Dale Bellamah Land Co. v. County of Bernalillo, 1978-NMSC-095, 92 N.M. 615, 592 P.2d 971.

Inequality in yearly reappraisals of some property unconstitutional. — Singling out one or a few taxpayers for reappraisals for several years in succession while virtually all other owners of comparable properties do not undergo a single reappraisal in the same period is an inequality that is neither temporary nor constitutional. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965.

Temporary inequalities constitutional. — Since there is no requirement under this section for reappraisals of all comparable properties within a county to be completed within a single year, temporary inequalities which result from the practicalities of carrying out a county-wide systematic and definite property appraisal program are inevitable and constitutional. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 1978-NMSC-094, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965; Dale Bellamah Land Co. v. County of Bernalillo, 1978-NMSC-095, 92 N.M. 615, 592 P.2d 971.

Equalization of valuation of property for taxation purposes. — State board of equalization under Laws 1913, ch. 84, § 13 (repealed), had power to equalize its valuation of property for taxation purposes by classes, both as between classes in the same county and as between counties throughout the state, and fact that action taken resulted in increase or decrease of total valuations in the state was immaterial. South Spring Ranch & Cattle Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 1914-NMSC-011, 18 N.M. 531, 139 P. 159.

Under Laws 1915, ch. 54, § 6 (repealed), state tax commission (now property tax division of the taxation and revenue department) could only increase or decrease the entire property within a given county, except such as it had previously valued, and such as has been assessed at its actual value, by a uniform percentage. Taxes based on values set by the commission on varying percentages of increase or decrease could be enjoined. Maxwell Land Grant Co. v. Jones, 1923-NMSC-008, 28 N.M. 427, 213 P. 1034.

Distinction between subdivided and unsubdivided agricultural land did not offend section. — Distinction drawn by former statute (72-2-14.1, 1953 Comp.) between subdivided and unsubdivided agricultural land, for tax purposes, did not offend this section and did not violate due process. Property Appraisal Dep't v. Ransom, 1973-NMCA-015, 84 N.M. 637, 506 P.2d 794.

Section 7-36-20 NMSA 1978 establishes special method of valuation for land used primarily for agricultural purposes, determined on the basis of the land's capacity to produce agricultural products. This "green belt" law is clearly an exception to the general mode of property valuation for tax purposes established by the property tax code and the New Mexico constitution, i.e., market value. County of Bernalillo v. Ambell, 1980-NMSC-062, 94 N.M. 395, 611 P.2d 218.

Duty of county valuation protests boards to hear taxpayer's valuation protest on any grounds. — When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be given its literal meaning; the language of 7-38-24 and 7-38-25 NMSA 1978 (formerly 72-2-37 and 72-2-38, 1953 Comp.) clearly and unambiguously gives to the county valuation protests boards the duty to hear a protest of the valuation of a taxpayer's property on any grounds whatsoever, including the grounds of allegedly unconstitutional discrimination in comparison with assessments of other properties. In re Miller, 1975-NMCA-116, 88 N.M. 492, 542 P.2d 1182, rev’d, 1976-NMSC-039, 89 N.M. 547, 555 P.2d 142.

The 1914 amendment took effect as soon as election was closed. 1914 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 14-1404.

Provisions deemed separable. — It is the obvious conclusion of the United States supreme court that the second and third phrases of the first sentence are separable, the second being applicable solely to property taxes and the third applying to all other taxes, or at least to all excise taxes. 1961 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 61-68.

Liability of lessee of university-owned land. — The lessee of university-owned land is not liable for ad valorem taxes based on the assessed value of the land itself, as distinct from the value of the improvements erected upon the land. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-24.

Exemption of veterans from ad valorem taxes. — The veterans exemption laws do not exempt a veteran from the payment of ad valorem taxes for the taxable year during which property was purchased by the veteran from a nonveteran owning the property on January 1st of such year. 1959 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 59-133; see also, N.M. Const., art. VIII, § 5, and notes thereto.

Nonprofit water corporation subject to ad valorem taxation. — A nonprofit corporation organized to provide a community water system pursuant to 3-29-1 NMSA 1978 is not "another municipal corporation" and is subject to ad valorem taxation. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-38.

Timber may be separately assessed where it is owned by persons other than those owning the land upon which it stands. 1919 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 19-2389.

Evaluation and assessment generally. — In view of the fact that the adoption of the amendment in 1914 dissolved the board of equalization, and the county commissioners had not the power to evaluate the property of certain corporations and other property excluded by Laws 1913, ch. 81, § 4 (repealed), the evaluation and original assessment fell to county assessors under § 5 of that act. 1914 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 14-1399. For provisions relating to the county valuation protests boards, see 7-38-25 NMSA 1978 et seq.

Valuation of property for tax assessment purposes. — In arriving at the value of property for tax assessment purposes, mathematical formulae may lawfully be employed as a factor for determining the ultimate amount of tax due, but the validity of such formulae is dependent upon the proper consideration of all relevant factors. 1961 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 61-93.

Assessment of farm machinery and equipment. — Farm machinery and equipment for ad valorem tax purposes must be assessed in proportion to the full actual value of the property subject to the tax. 1961 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 61-93.

Assessment on net product violative of section. — Laws 1915, ch. 55 (repealed), providing that mines should be assessed for taxation on their net product violated this section. 1917 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 17-2050.

Income tax subject to section. — The income tax, being an excise tax, is subject to the limitations imposed by this section. A provision relating to such would violate the equality clause if it were given retroactive construction. 1961 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 61-68.

Arbitrary classification based on incomes invalid. — A statute making an arbitrary classification between incomes to be taxed and those in part or in whole exempt from or not subject to taxation is invalid. 1961 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 61-68.

Law reviews. — For note, "Forest Fire Protection on Public and Private Lands in New Mexico," see 4 Nat. Resources J. 374 (1964).

For comment, "Land Use Planning - New Mexico's Green Belt Law," see 8 Nat. Resources J. 190 (1968).

For note, "Serrano v. Priest and Its Impact on New Mexico," see 2 N.M. L. Rev. 266 (1972).

For article, "Ad Valorem Tax Status of a Private Lessee's Interest in Publicly Owned Property: Taxability of Possessory Interests in Industrial Projects under the New Mexico Industrial Revenue Bond Act," see 3 N.M. L. Rev. 136 (1973).

For comment, "Coal Taxation in the Western States: The Need for a Regional Tax Policy," see 16 Nat. Resources J. 415 (1976).

For comment, "Taxation of the Uranium Industry: An Economic Proposal," 7 N.M. L. Rev. 69 (1976-77).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation § 159.

Automobile license tax as affected by constitutional provisions as to uniformity and discrimination in taxation, 5 A.L.R. 761, 126 A.L.R. 761.

Business or profession as "property" as used in provision as to uniformity and equality of taxes, 34 A.L.R. 719.

Newspapers and magazines, equality and uniformity in taxation of, 35 A.L.R. 11, 110 A.L.R. 327.

Gasoline, equality and uniformity requirements as applicable to license tax on, 47 A.L.R. 985, 84 A.L.R. 839, 111 A.L.R. 185.

Dog taxes, discrimination in, 49 A.L.R. 850.

Additional tax levy necessitated by failure of some property owners to pay their proportions of original levy as violating requirement of uniformity, 79 A.L.R. 1157.

Tax anticipation warrants, relation of uniformity clause to, 99 A.L.R. 1039.

Installments, constitutionality of statute permitting payment of taxes in, 101 A.L.R. 1335.

Relieving property subject to assessment from all or part of such assessment, 105 A.L.R. 1169.

Quo warranto to test constitutionality of statutory provisions in respect to taxation, 109 A.L.R. 326.

Domicile of decedent as regards taxation, diverse adjudications by courts of different states as to, 121 A.L.R. 1200.

Taxation in same state of real property and debt secured by mortgage or other lien thereon as double taxation, 122 A.L.R. 742.

Notes or obligations secured by real estate mortgage and those unsecured, discrimination between, as regards property taxation or exemption therefrom, 129 A.L.R. 682.

Tolls as taxes within constitutional provisions respecting taxes, 167 A.L.R. 1356.

Who may complain of underassessment or nonassessment of property for taxation, 5 A.L.R.2d 576, 9 A.L.R.4th 428.

Military personnel, provisions of Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act relating to taxation of property of, 32 A.L.R.2d 618.

"Blockage rule" or "blockage discount theory" in determining stock valuation for purposes of taxation of intangibles, 33 A.L.R.2d 607.

Eminent domain, rights in respect to real estate taxes where property is taken in, 45 A.L.R.2d 522.

Solid mineral royalty as real or personal property, 68 A.L.R.2d 728.

Oil and gas royalty: expenses and taxes deductible by lessee in computing lessor's oil and gas royalty or other return, 73 A.L.R.2d 1056.

Equal and uniform taxation, real estate tax equalization, reassessment, or revaluation program commenced, but not completed within the year, as violative of constitutional provisions requiring, 76 A.L.R.2d 1077.

Civil liability of tax assessor to taxpayer for excessive or improper assessment of real property, 82 A.L.R.2d 1148.

Laundries, taxation of self-service, 87 A.L.R.2d 1007.

Income or rental value as a factor in evaluation of real property for purposes of taxation, 96 A.L.R.2d 666.

Landlord and tenant: construction of provision of lease providing for escalation of rental in event of tax increases, 48 A.L.R.3d 287.

Property tax: exemption of property leased by and used for purposes of otherwise tax-exempt body, 55 A.L.R.3d 430.

Property tax: Business situs of intangibles held in trust in state other than beneficiary's domicil, 59 A.L.R.3d 837.

Validity, construction, and effect of state statutes affording preferential property tax treatment to land used for agricultural purposes, 98 A.L.R.3d 916.

Validity of statutory classifications based on population - tax statutes, 98 A.L.R.3d 1083.

Classification, as real estate or personal property, of mobile homes or trailers for purposes of state or local taxation, 7 A.L.R.4th 1016.

84 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 21 to 38.