N.M. Const. art. VI, § 13
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters and causes not excepted in this constitution, and such jurisdiction of special cases and proceedings as provided by law, and appellate jurisdiction of cases originating in inferior courts and tribunals in their respective districts as provided by law, and supervisory control over the same. The district courts, or any judge thereof, shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition and all other writs, remedial or otherwise, in the exercise of their jurisdiction; provided that no such writs shall issue directed to judges or courts of equal or superior jurisdiction. The district courts shall also have the power of naturalization in accordance with the laws of the United States. Until otherwise provided by law, at least two terms of the district court shall be held annually in each county, at the county seat. (As amended November 6, 2018.)
The 2017 amendment, proposed by S.J.R. No. 1 (Laws 2017), and adopted at the general election held on November 6, 2018, by a vote of 337,966 for and 243,100 against, provided the legislature with authority to enact statutory adjustments to processes for appealing court decisions.
Cross references. — For terms of district court, see 34-6-2 NMSA 1978.
For appeals from metropolitan court, see 34-8A-6 NMSA 1978.
For appeals from magistrate courts to district courts, see 35-13-1 NMSA 1978.
For appeals to and from district court, see 39-3-1 NMSA 1978.
For provisions relating to habeas corpus, see 44-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.
For mandamus, see 44-2-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.
For quo warranto proceedings, see 44-3-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.
For probate jurisdiction, see 45-1-302 and 45-1-302.1 NMSA 1978.
For writs issued by district court, see Rule 1-065 NMRA.
For writ of execution, see Rule 1-065.1 NMRA.
For writ of garnishment, see Rule 1-065.2 NMRA.
For injunction procedure, see Rule 1-066 NMRA.
Comparable provisions. — Idaho Const., art. V, § 20.
Iowa Const., art. V, § 6.
Montana Const., art. VII, § 4.
Utah Const., art. VIII, § 5.
Wyoming Const., art. V, §§ 10, 24.
Delay in enforcing sentence. — Where the court delayed enforcing defendant’s sentence for thirteen months due to a mistake as to whether defendant was serving the sentence during and after an appeal, the court did not lose jurisdiction to enforce the sentence. State v. Calabaza, 2011-NMCA-053, 149 N.M. 612, 252 P.3d 836.
Indian country. — Where a state road, which was built on land owned by the federal government and administered by the United States forest service pursuant to an easement granted to the state by the forest service, served as the border between two pueblos, but was not within either pueblo and where there has been no explicit congressional or executive action recognizing the property as Indian country or transferring the property for the use of Indians or to the bureau of Indian affairs, the road was not located in Indian country for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. State v. Quintana, 2008-NMSC-012, 143 N.M. 535, 178 P.3d 820, aff'g 2008-NMCA-025, 143 N.M. 538, 178 P.3d 823.
Contempt power in New Mexico. — Courts have inherent power and statutory authority to impose remedial or punitive sanctions for contempt of court. Contempts of court can be civil or criminal, and the major factor in determining how to classify a particular contempt is the purpose for which the power is exercised. Criminal contempt proceedings are instituted to punish completed acts of disobedience that have threatened the authority and dignity of the court. Civil contempt is remedial in nature and serves to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to the orders of the court. State v. ex rel. CYFD v. Mercer-Smith, 2019-NMSC-005, rev'g 2015-NMCA-093, 356 P.3d 26.
Courts must exercise contempt power consistent with the purposes of civil or criminal contempt. — Consistent with the various purposes for which a court may exercise its contempt power, a court may impose punitive sanctions for criminal contempt, remedial sanctions for civil contempt, or both. The court may not, however, impose penalties on a person who has not been afforded the protections of the criminal law. State v. ex rel. CYFD v. Mercer-Smith, 2019-NMSC-005, rev'g 2015-NMCA-093, 356 P.3d 26.
District court did not exercise its contempt power consistent with purpose of civil contempt. — In a civil contempt proceeding, where the district court found the children, youth and families department (CYFD) in contempt of court for attempting to circumvent the court's order in placing two children that had been adjudicated to be abused, the acts of which effectively eliminated the likelihood of reconciliation between the children and their parents, the district court's order holding CYFD in contempt for violating the placement decision and imposing compensatory damages and costs was an abuse of discretion, because the district court had previously found that CYFD had no duty to support reconciliation and the court had refused the parents' proposed finding that the placements might undermine future prospects for reconciliation between the children and their parents. Because efforts toward reunification and reconciliation were no longer being required by the district court, and were therefore not a goal of any treatment plan, the purpose for which the district court exercised its contempt power was not remedial in nature and therefore cannot be upheld as a valid exercise of civil contempt power. State v. ex rel. CYFD v. Mercer-Smith, 2019-NMSC-005, rev'g 2015-NMCA-093, 356 P.3d 26.
District courts have inherent power to sanction for contempt. — The district court has inherent power to sanction for contempt. The contempt power is necessary to allow courts to regulate their docket, promote judicial efficiency, and deter frivolous filings, and it has long been recognized that a court must be able to command the obedience of litigants and their attorneys if it is to perform its judicial functions. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t. v. Mercer-Smith, 2015-NMCA-093, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008.
The district court properly invoked its inherent power to sanction for contempt where the children, youth and families department (CYFD), in an abuse and neglect case involving foster placement of children, engaged in activity and took direct actions that were in contempt of the district court’s placement order and where parents suffered injuries caused by CYFD’s contemptuous conduct, including past and future emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and psychological expenses. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t. v. Mercer-Smith, 2015-NMCA-093, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008.
Civil contempt distinguished from criminal contempt. — Contempts procedurally are either civil or criminal in nature. Where the primary purpose is to preserve the court’s authority and to punish for disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the primary purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured suitor and to coerce compliance with an order, the contempt is civil. The elements necessary for a finding of civil contempt are (1) knowledge of the court’s order, and (2) an ability to comply. Intent is not an essential element of contempt, but because knowledge of the district court’s order is a prerequisite to contempt, the district court’s order must not be ambiguous. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t. v. Mercer-Smith, 2015-NMCA-093, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008.
Sufficient evidence to support court’s finding of contemptuous conduct. — Where the children, youth and families department (CYFD) defied a placement order issued by the district court in an abuse and neglect case involving foster placement of two children (children) in the custody of CYFD, the evidence was sufficient to support the district court’s findings that CYFD engaged in activity and took direct actions that were in contempt of the placement order where evidence was presented that the placement order prohibited CYFD from placing children with their former counselors from a group home where the children were receiving treatment, because the district court was concerned that placement of the children with their former counselors created dual relationships that are forbidden by the code of ethics for counselors and therapists due to the risk of the therapists confusing their roles in children’s lives, that the limitations in the placement order issued by the district court were understood by CYFD, that CYFD nevertheless arranged for children to spend the majority of their waking hours either in school or with the former counselors, and that the amount of contact between the children and the former counselors was tantamount to placement in the counselors’ homes, thus violating the placement order. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t. v. Mercer-Smith, 2015-NMCA-093, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008.
Damages for civil contempt. — Compensatory damages for civil contempt serve to make reparation to the injured party and restore the parties to the position they would have held had the court’s order been obeyed. The district court does not have discretion to deny compensatory damages, if established with reasonable certainty. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t. v. Mercer-Smith, 2015-NMCA-093, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008.
Where district court found that parents of two children in the custody of the children, youth and families department satisfied their burden of proving a violation of a court order, proximate cause, and damages, the parents were entitled to judgment for recovery of those damages. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t. v. Mercer-Smith, 2015-NMCA-093, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008.
Award of compensatory sanctions for civil contempt. — In an action for negligence, inverse condemnation, injunctive relief and damages, where defendant, the New Mexico transportation department, constructed and maintained a bridge where sediment aggradation occurred that resulted in increased risk of flooding, and where a stipulated permanent injunction was entered requiring defendant to comply with a maintenance plan, and where defendant failed to comply with the terms of the permanent injunction which, after heavy rains, resulted in damages to plaintiff’s irrigated fields, irrigation systems and crops, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that compensatory sanctions were an appropriate remedy for contempt where the permanent injunction imposed mandatory maintenance obligations on defendant, defendant had the ability but failed to comply with the maintenance plan, and where there was a causal relationship between defendant’s violation of the permanent injunction and damages suffered by plaintiff. Allred v. N.M. Dep’t of Transp., 2017-NMCA-019, cert. denied.
Sufficient evidence to support district court’s award of damages for civil contempt. — Where the children, youth and families department (CYFD) defied a placement order issued by the district court in an abuse and neglect case involving foster placement of two children (children) in the custody of CYFD, the evidence was sufficient to support the district court’s award of damages to compensate children’s parents for damage done to their chances of reconciliation with their daughters, where the evidence established that reconciliation between the children and parents was a goal and that that there were viable prospects for reconciliation prior to the placement order, that an expert in psychology submitted a letter to the district court prior to the placement hearing, and later admitted at the damages hearing, stating that any possibility of future reconciliation with the children and their parents would be significantly lessened if they were to reside with the children’s former counselors, that CYFD nevertheless arranged for children to spend the majority of their waking hours either in school or with the former counselors, an amount of contact that was tantamount to placement in the counselors’ homes, and that the parents of children suffered injuries and other harms caused by CYFD’s contemptuous conduct, including past and future emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life and psychological expenses. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t. v. Mercer-Smith, 2015-NMCA-093, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008.
Legislature may regulate court's contempt power. — Legislative directives may act to regulate the inherent power of a court to punish for contempt provided that the court retains sufficient power to protect itself and effectively administer its functions under the Code. State v. Julia S., 1986-NMCA-039, 104 N.M. 222, 719 P.2d 449.
Courts of limited jurisdiction. — This section does not limit the power to issue writs of injunction to the district court and does not preclude the legislature from exercising the constitutional authority under N.M. Const., art. VI, §§ 1 and 26, to grant injunctive authority to courts of limited jurisdiction. Martinez v. Sedillo, 2005-NMCA-029, 137 N.M. 103, 107 P.3d 543.
"Inferior courts". — District courts are inferior to supreme court, although term "inferior court" is usually applied to courts of limited or special jurisdiction. State ex rel. Harvey v. Medler, 1914-NMSC-055, 19 N.M. 252, 142 P. 376.
There are no fixed terms for nonjury trials, and unless waived by the parties, a case must be tried in the county required by the venue statute. Peisker v. Chavez, 1942-NMSC-004, 46 N.M. 159, 123 P.2d 726.
Failure to state cause of action has no jurisdictional effect. — The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action does not interfere with or detract from the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Such a failure has no jurisdictional effect. Sundance Mechanical & Util. Corp. v. Atlas, 1990-NMSC-031, 109 N.M. 683, 789 P.2d 1250.
Expungement of arrest records. — Assuming an inherent power of the courts to expunge arrest records, the power must be exercised sparingly and only in extraordinary circumstances. Toth v. Albuquerque Police Dep't, 1997-NMCA-079, 123 N.M. 637, 944 P.2d 285.
No standing to challenge civil forfeiture ordinance. — Where the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they or their members have suffered an injury in fact or experienced the imminent threat of injury by the enforcement of a municipal ordinance that provided for the civil forfeiture of vehicles operated by persons arrested for DWI, the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the ordinance under the requirements for traditional standing, organizational standing, facial constitutional challenge of the ordinance, or the doctrine of great public importance. ACLU v. City of Albuquerque, 2007-NMCA-092, 142 N.M. 259, 164 P.3d 958, aff'd, 2008-NMSC-045, 144 N.M. 471, 188 P.3d 1222.
Review of magistrate court's suppression order. — The state may obtain judicial review of a suppression order of a magistrate court by filing a nolle prosequi to dismiss some or all of the charges in the magistrate court after the suppression order is entered, and refiling in the district court for a trial de novo. State v. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040, aff'g 2004-NMCA-110, 136 N.M. 295, 97 P.3d 627.
Constitutional claims. — Without question, the district court has the authority to consider constitutional claims in the first instance. Maso v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2004-NMCA-025, 135 N.M. 152, 85 P.3d 276, aff'd 2004-NMSC-028, 136 N.M. 161, 96 P.3d 286.
Constitutional grant of "original jurisdiction" means the district courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Sanchez v. Attorney Gen., 1979-NMCA-081, 93 N.M. 210, 598 P.2d 1170.
Original equity jurisdiction is in district courts and not justice courts (now magistrate courts). Durham v. Rasco, 1924-NMSC-049, 30 N.M. 16, 227 P. 599.
A district court is without constitutional jurisdiction to enforce an IPRA action against another court of equal or superior jurisdiction. — In a superintending control proceeding arising from an Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) action filed in the fifth judicial district court, where the real party in interest, a party to a civil case in the first judicial district court, sought to inspect email communications related to a draft copy of a preliminary injunction order that a first judicial district court judge (judge) had been preparing for issuance in the underlying civil case and the contents of a personal election Facebook page maintained by the judge, not only did the enforcement action fail to name the proper defendant, because the designated records custodian is the only official who is assigned IPRA compliance duties, but because the action was a coercive judgment ordering production under IPRA, the fifth judicial district court had no constitutional jurisdiction to litigate any aspect of an IPRA enforcement action against the first judicial district court, because Article VI, Section 13 of the New Mexico constitution prohibits a district court from issuing writs of mandamus or injunction directed to judges or courts of equal or superior jurisdiction. Pacheco v. Hudson, 2018-NMSC-022.
Reduction of excessive fees. — It is clearly within the equitable power of the court to consider and reduce an excessive fee; thus if the trial court determines that the amount of attorney's fees specified in a contract is reasonable, it may order such amount paid, but when the reasonableness is challenged, it is incumbent upon the court to determine the value of the services rendered. Budagher v. Sunnyland Enters., Inc., 1977-NMSC-035, 90 N.M. 365, 563 P.2d 1158.
Inherent power to appoint receivers. — Laws 1933, ch. 32 (repealed) providing that "court to which the application is made shall appoint the state bank examiner as such receiver" amounted to no more, in a judicial proceeding in a court of equity, than a recommendation to the judiciary to appoint him in the interests of economy and business management. Otherwise, the enactment would be unconstitutional in view of this section and N.M. Const., art. III, § 1, for courts of equity have inherent power to appoint receivers for corporations, and such appointment is a judicial function. Cooper v. Otero, 1934-NMSC-008, 38 N.M. 164, 29 P.2d 341.
Jurisdiction in damage suit against utility. — The trial court correctly retained jurisdiction of a case seeking tort and contract damages against utility for failure to supply water meeting certain minimal standards of quality, since the environmental improvement agency (now the environmental improvement division of the health and environment department) and public service commission had no expertise in considering tort and contractual claims and was without power to grant the relief that plaintiffs asked; 74-6-13 NMSA 1978 of the Water Quality Act evidences the legislative intent that common-law remedies against water pollution be preserved. O'Hare v. Valley Util., Inc., 1976-NMCA-004, 89 N.M. 105, 547 P.2d 1147, rev'd in part, 1976-NMSC-024, 89 N.M. 262, 550 P.2d 274.
Jurisdiction to try title to property. — Probate courts in New Mexico have no jurisdiction to try or determine title to either real or personal property as between an estate or heirs and devisees on the one hand and strangers to the estate on the other; this jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the district court. Conley v. Quinn, 1954-NMSC-112, 58 N.M. 771, 276 P.2d 906, superseded by statute, In re Estate of Harrington, 2000-NMCA-058, 129 N.M. 266, 5 P.3d 1070; McCann v. McCann, 1942-NMSC-051, 46 N.M. 406, 129 P.2d 646.
Where a widow was incidentally an heir but her claim to one-half of the property involved was not the claim of an heir in administration, but was a claim arising under the community property system, the probate court was without jurisdiction to try her controverted claim of title to one-half the real estate involved as her share of the community. Conley v. Quinn, 1954-NMSC-112, 58 N.M. 771, 276 P.2d 906, superseded by statute, In re Estate of Harrington, 2000-NMCA-058, 129 N.M. 266, 5 P.3d 1070.
Jurisdiction in probate matter. — District courts had no original jurisdiction to allow a claim against an administrator and surety on his bond, where the probate court had jurisdiction and the claim had been filed, allowed and paid in part, and no appeal was taken from the action of such probate court, and where the complaint neither alleged grounds for nor prayed equitable relief, but asked a money judgment only. Michael v. Bush, 1921-NMSC-011, 26 N.M. 612, 195 P. 904 (case decided prior to 1975 enactment of Probate Code, Chapter 45 NMSA 1978).
Charitable Solicitations Act. — Where the foundation does not point to any language in any federal statute expressly displacing the Charitable Solicitations Act, and the foundation has failed to demonstrate congress’ intent to preempt the field covered by the act, the foundation’s argument that the act does not apply to it is rejected and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the civil investigative demands. The Coulston Found. v. Madrid, 2004-NMCA-060, 135 N.M. 667, 92 P.3d 679.
Authority to issue garnishment. — Since garnishment is both a special proceeding, and a remedial writ, ancillary to the main action, the district courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of garnishment in the exercise of their jurisdiction in the main action only to the extent that jurisdiction over such special proceedings as garnishment is conferred by law; therefore, district court did not have jurisdiction to issue writ of garnishment where the amount in question was not in excess of the jurisdictional amount of magistrate courts having venue within the county. Postal Fin. Co. v. Sisneros, 1973-NMSC-029, 84 N.M. 724, 507 P.2d 785.
Jurisdiction over felony offense. — Former 64-22-2, 1953 Comp., insofar as it purported to give justice of the peace authority to accept a guilty plea for felony offense of driving under the influence of liquor, violated this section and N.M. Const., art. VI, § 23. State v. Klantchnek, 1955-NMSC-036, 59 N.M. 284, 283 P.2d 619.
Former 13-8-2, 1953 Comp., was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to confer "exclusive original jurisdiction" over those contributing to juvenile delinquency in juvenile courts, since constitution vests sole and exclusive jurisdiction for trial of felony cases in the district courts. State v. McKinley, 1949-NMSC-010, 53 N.M. 106, 202 P.2d 964.
Under this section, sole and exclusive jurisdiction for the trial of felony cases is in the district courts. State v. Garcia, 1979-NMSC-049, 93 N.M. 51, 596 P.2d 264.
Misdemeanor charges relating to felony must be tried in district court. — Because district court has original jurisdiction over all felony charges, when misdemeanor charges brought in magistrate's court are linked to a felony charge arising out of the same transaction, the trial should be in the district court. State v. Muise, 1985-NMCA-090, 103 N.M. 382, 707 P.2d 1192, overruled by State v. Laguna, 1999-NMCA-152, 128 N.M. 345, 992 P.2d 896.
Jurisdiction is acquired in criminal case by filing of information. State v. Vaughn, 1964-NMSC-158, 74 N.M. 365, 393 P.2d 711.
Where the prosecution was commenced by the filing of the information, upon that filing, the district court had jurisdiction; that jurisdiction was not lost by the failure of the trial court to note the date of filing on the information, where there was nothing showing defendant was prejudiced in his defense on the merits. State v. Vigil, 1973-NMCA-089, 85 N.M. 328, 512 P.2d 88.
Effect on jurisdiction of remand of accused for preliminary hearing. — The district court does not lose jurisdiction of the information theretofore filed by abating it and remanding the accused to the magistrate for a proper preliminary hearing, nor is there any requirement for the filing of a new information after such new preliminary examination. State v. Vaughn, 1964-NMSC-158, 74 N.M. 365, 393 P.2d 711.
Failure to provide preliminary hearing. — Jurisdiction may be lost "in the course of the proceeding" by failure of the court to remand for a preliminary examination when its absence is timely brought to the attention of the district court; but defendant may waive his right to the examination. State v. Vaughn, 1964-NMSC-158, 74 N.M. 365, 393 P.2d 711.
District courts may perform pretrial review of death penalty aggravating circumstances. State v. Ogden, 1994-NMSC-029, 118 N.M. 234, 880 P.2d 845, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 936, 115 S. Ct. 336, 130 L. Ed. 2d 294.
Burden of proof in attacking jurisdiction. — Burden was upon Indian defendant claiming through pretrial motions a lack of jurisdiction in the district court to try him, to prove the same, and having presented no evidence as to lack of jurisdiction, defendant did not meet his burden. State v. Cutnose, 1974-NMCA-130, 87 N.M. 307, 532 P.2d 896, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 299, 532 P.2d 888.
Jurisdiction over juveniles. — Provision allowing creation of inferior courts does not in any sense require that the jurisdiction of district courts over juveniles established by this section be transferred to a court inferior to the district court; to the contrary, the jurisdiction was placed in the district courts and was to remain there until an inferior juvenile court was created. Peyton v. Nord, 1968-NMSC-027, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716.
District court is one of general jurisdiction under this section, and the fact that proceedings were instituted against defendant for murder committed when defendant was a juvenile after he had attained his majority did not preclude prosecution for the crime of murder. Trujillo v. State, 1968-NMSC-179, 79 N.M. 618, 447 P.2d 279.
Juvenile court part of district court. — Juvenile court (now 32A-1-5 NMSA 1978 with the childrens' court, a division of the district court) was part and parcel of the district court, not an inferior court created pursuant to N.M. Const., art. VI, § 1, and was invulnerable to attack as violative of either N.M. Const., art. VI, § 1 or this section. Peyton v. Nord, 1968-NMSC-027, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716.
Court has jurisdiction over guardianship, paternity and parental rights. — The district court, whether or not sitting as the children's court, has jurisdiction over disputes concerning guardianship, paternity and termination of parental rights. Thatcher v. Arnall, 1980-NMSC-052, 94 N.M. 306, 610 P.2d 193.
Rule 10-111 NMRA limits inherent power of district judge to appoint a special master in children's court. State v. Doe, 1979-NMCA-126, 93 N.M. 621, 603 P.2d 731.
State court was without jurisdiction to restrain picketing which allegedly constituted unfair labor practices where there was no suggestion directly or indirectly that the picketing was attended by violence, as this matter has been preempted by federal legislation. Your Food Stores of Santa Fe, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 1564, 121 F. Supp. 339 (D.N.M. 1954); see also, Retail Clerks Local 1564 v. Your Food Stores of Santa Fe, Inc., 225 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1955), rev'g 124 F. Supp. 697 (D.N.M. 1954).
Primary jurisdiction is essentially doctrine of comity between the courts and administrative agencies, and depends on whether the questions presented are exclusively factual issues within the peculiar expertise of the commission or if statutory interpretation or issues of law are significant, and specific legislative declarations that common-law remedies are unimpaired are uniformly respected when primary jurisdiction questions arise in the field of public nuisance. O'Hare v. Valley Util., Inc., 1976-NMCA-004, 89 N.M. 105, 547 P.2d 1147, rev'd in part, 1976-NMSC-024, 89 N.M. 262, 550 P.2d 274.
Jurisdiction of utility condemnation proceedings. — Because the 2000 amendment to 62-6-4A NMSA 1978 exempted generation and transmission cooperatives from the regulatory jurisdiction of the Public Regulation Commission, the district court had jurisdiction under this section to consider an application under 42A-1-9 NMSA 1978 by a generation and transmission cooperative to enter and survey land for condemnation suitability studies. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n. v. King, 2003-NMSC-029, 134 N.M. 467, 78 P.3d 1226.
Jurisdiction of review of state board decision. — Legislatively-created boards, while clothed with certain quasi-judicial powers to administer agencies, are not courts, and in this instance the board was not acting in its quasi-judicial capacity. Because the board did not act as an inferior court or tribunal in denying benefits to the retiree, the district court's jurisdiction was not limited by this section. Rainaldi v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 1993-NMSC-028, 115 N.M. 650, 857 P.2d 761.
The district court has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. — Where respondents made property transfers between individuals or their trusts and wholly-owned limited liability companies, and where the Bernalillo county valuation protest board (board) determined that the transfers did not constitute a change of ownership on the grounds that the property had the same ultimate owner owning the property, the district court had appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the board, a quasi-judicial body, and certiorari was the appropriate means of determining whether the board exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded illegally in the underlying agency proceedings. Giddings v. SRT-Mountain Vista, LLC, 2019-NMCA-025.
District court was exercising its original jurisdiction in reviewing the constitutionality of the procedures implemented by administrative agency. — In a case arising from an administrative proceeding relating to five applications submitted by developer who was seeking zoning changes and amendments to the land use plans of the city of Santa Fe, where plaintiffs appealed to the district court the city's governing body's approval of developer's request, and where the district court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the governing body had violated plaintiffs' due process rights at the public hearing, the district court was exercising its original jurisdiction, because NMSA 1978, § 3-21-6(B) requires the governing body to comport with due process but neither mandates nor permits the governing body to evaluate the constitutionality of its own actions, and the district court reviewed the constitutionality of the procedures implemented by the governing body and not any decision by the governing body about whether plaintiffs had received constitutionally sufficient due process. As a result, plaintiffs' appeal of the district court's decision was not governed by 12-505 NMRA and its associated timelines and procedural requirements, but was governed by the direct appeal procedures set forth in 12-201 NMRA. Shook v. City of Santa Fe, 2023-NMCA-086.
Individual procedures challenged by plaintiffs do not establish due process violations. — In a case arising from an administrative proceeding relating to five applications submitted by developer who was seeking zoning changes and amendments to the land use plans of the city of Santa Fe, where plaintiffs appealed to the district court the city's governing body's approval of developer's request, and where the district court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the governing body had violated plaintiffs' due process rights at the public hearing, the district court did not err in determining that the governing body did not violate plaintiffs' rights to procedural due process where the planning commission received written public comment from forty-two members of the public and at a two-day hearing heard testimony from forty-six members of the public, and where plaintiffs failed to specify how additional procedures would have further safeguarded their rights nor demonstrated that the processes employed by the governing body created a risk of erroneous deprivation of their rights . Shook v. City of Santa Fe, 2023-NMCA-086.
Licensing act. — Act to create boards for the licensing of contractors, and to vest them with administrative powers, did not contravene this section, vesting original jurisdiction of all matters and causes in the district courts. Fischer v. Rakagis, 1955-NMSC-057, 59 N.M. 463, 286 P.2d 312.
Exhausting of administrative remedies. — The requirement of the Public Utility Act (62-3-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.) that a person first exhaust his administrative remedies before resorting to the courts does not violate this section, granting general jurisdiction to the district courts except as elsewhere limited by the constitution. Smith v. Southern Union Gas Co., 1954-NMSC-033, 58 N.M. 197, 269 P.2d 745, explained in Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers' Ass'n, 1960-NMSC-052, 67 N.M. 108, 353 P.2d 62.
Appellate jurisdiction over justice of peace courts. — District courts had appellate jurisdiction over all cases originating in justice of peace courts (now magistrate courts). Lea Cnty. State Bank v. McCaskey Register Co., 1935-NMSC-069, 39 N.M. 454, 49 P.2d 577.
Magistrate court order suppressing evidence. — The state does not have the statutory authority or constitutional right to immediately appeal a magistrate court order suppressing evidence to the district court. State v. Heinsen, 2004-NMCA-110, 136 N.M. 295, 97 P.3d 627, aff'd 2005-NMSC-035, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040.
Preclusion of supervisory authority by executive or legislature unconstitutional. — Any action of the executive or legislative branch of a municipal government which would preclude the supreme court or the district court from exercising its superintending or supervisory authority over the municipal court violates the state constitution. Mowrer v. Rusk, 1980-NMSC-113, 95 N.M. 48, 618 P.2d 886.
Appeal where district court sits as inferior court. — No provision is made by the constitution for an appeal from the district court sitting as an inferior tribunal to itself sitting as the district court. State ex rel. Weltmer v. Taylor, 1938-NMSC-035, 42 N.M. 405, 79 P.2d 937.
Authority relative to arbitrations. — Once an arbitration award is granted, whether or not by a court-supervised process, the Uniform Arbitration Act (44-7A-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.) provides a mechanism for the courts to take jurisdiction to confirm the award, to vacate, modify or correct the award, within narrow statutory limits, to enforce an arbitration agreement under the act and to enter judgment on an award and to take appeals from various types of orders, including an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award, an order modifying or correcting an award or an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing. Daniels Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Jordan, 1982-NMSC-148, 99 N.M. 297, 657 P.2d 624.
Mandamus involving a suit pending in another court. — A district court is not uniformly required to deny a petition for mandamus out of deference to a suit that is pending before another district court. Rather, the district court, in exercising its discretion, should take into account the similarities of parties and issues and consider whether the district court first having jurisdiction over the matter is properly situated to settle the whole controversy and address the rights of the respective parties. Fastbucks of Roswell, N.M., LLC v. King, 2013-NMCA-008, 294 P.3d 1287.
Where the attorney general filed suit against defendants in the first district court alleging that defendants’ lending practices and consumer loans were unconscionable under common law and the Unfair Practices Act (Chapter 57, Article 12 NMSA 1978); defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus against the attorney general in the fifth district court to prohibit the attorney general from pursuing the first district court lawsuit on the grounds that defendants’ loans complied with the Small Loan Act (58-15-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.), and that the attorney general was acting beyond the attorney general’s statutory and constitutional power in bringing the first district court lawsuit; the fifth district court had jurisdiction to consider the mandamus petition and venue was proper in the fifth district court; defendants had the opportunity to raise the arguments raised in the mandamus petition in their defense to the first district court lawsuit; and the fifth district court dismissed the mandamus petition on the grounds that the writ of mandamus would intrude on the first district court’s jurisdiction and that the first district court provided an adequate forum for defendants to raise their challenges to the attorney general’s powers, the fifth district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for mandamus. Fastbucks of Roswell, N.M., LLC v. King, 2013-NMCA-008, 294 P.3d 1287.
Concurrent habeas corpus jurisdiction. — Supreme court and district court have concurrent jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases, and in absence of controlling necessity in the first instance, relator will be relegated to district court; the decision in the district court is not res judicata on a subsequent application to supreme court. Ex parte Nabors, 1928-NMSC-025, 33 N.M. 324, 267 P. 58.
What court may grant writ of habeas. — One district court of this state may grant a writ of habeas corpus for the release from the state penitentiary of a prisoner held therein under a commitment from another district court; as intervenor was being detained within the first judicial district, there can be no question that the court in that district had jurisdiction to consider intervenor's petition for habeas corpus. State ex rel. Hanagan v. District Court of First Judicial Dist. ex rel. Cnty. of Santa Fe, 1965-NMSC-089, 75 N.M. 390, 405 P.2d 232.
Evidence in habeas proceeding. — To establish absence or loss of jurisdiction in trial court through denial of petitioner's constitutional rights, evidence outside the record may be received in habeas corpus proceedings. Orosco v. Cox, 1965-NMSC-098, 75 N.M. 431, 405 P.2d 668.
Habeas corpus is not "special statutory proceeding" within meaning of Laws 1937, ch. 197 (39-3-7 NMSA 1978) permitting appeal of such proceedings, and supreme court had no jurisdiction of appeal from district court order remanding relator to sheriff's custody, but he could thereafter institute proceedings in habeas corpus in the supreme court. In re Forest, 1941-NMSC-019, 45 N.M. 204, 113 P.2d 582.
Habeas corpus to attack adoption judgment. — A writ of habeas corpus is a permissible collateral attack on a judgment of adoption. Normand ex rel. Normand v. Ray, 1988-NMSC-054, 107 N.M. 346, 758 P.2d 296.
Jurisdiction over state officers, boards and commissions. — Under this section and N.M. Const., art. VI, § 3, supreme and district courts each have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus against all state officers, boards and commissions in all cases, whether the proceeding was instituted by the attorney general ex officio, in behalf of the state for some prerogative purpose, or brought by some private person for the assertion of some private right; the supreme court will decline jurisdiction in absence of some controlling necessity therefor, and will do so in all cases brought at instance of a private suitor. State ex rel. Owen v. Van Stone, 1912-NMSC-003, 17 N.M. 41, 121 P. 611.
Right to tenure may not be enforced by mandamus, since in absence of positive provision of law it is not a clear legal right. Lease v. Board of Regents of N.M. State Univ., 1972-NMSC-042, 83 N.M. 781, 498 P.2d 310.
Authority over canvassing board. — Under general power conferred upon it by constitution, district court had authority to make order compelling county canvassing board to canvass votes which had been delivered to it late, to cancel certificates of election issued before entire vote was canvassed and to issue new certificates if final canvass showed others to be elected. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Chavez, 1937-NMSC-022, 41 N.M. 300, 67 P.2d 1007. See also, 1-14-21 NMSA 1978.
Recount order. — Recount provisions of former Election Code (Laws 1929, ch. 41) constituted a special case or proceeding created by legislature in compliance with this section, enlarging jurisdiction of district court, but the judicial functions vested did not go beyond the order of recount, and additional functions vested in the district judge were ministerial. State ex rel. Scott v. Helmick, 1930-NMSC-103, 35 N.M. 219, 294 P. 316.
Injunctions are granted to prevent irreparable injury for which there is no adequate and complete remedy at law. If an interference is of a continuous nature, the constant recurrence of which renders a remedy at law inadequate, except by a multiplicity of suits, then a sufficient ground for relief by injunction is afforded. Kennedy v. Bond, 1969-NMSC-119, 80 N.M. 734, 460 P.2d 809.
Legislature may not deprive district courts of power to issue writs of injunction unless it provides an adequate remedy at law as a substitute; a statutory remedy for assessment of privilege tax requiring taxpayer who objects to validity of tax to bring an action every 60 days to recover payments made under protest, until final determination, is not an adequate remedy. Lougee v. New Mexico Bureau of Revenue Comm'r, 1937-NMSC-062, 42 N.M. 115, 76 P.2d 6.
Sua sponte injunction inappropriate. — A district court may not issue an injunction on its own, without process and without prior notice. State v. Bailey, 1994-NMCA-107, 118 N.M. 466, 882 P.2d 57, cert. denied, 118 N.M. 256, 880 P.2d 867.
Quo warranto against judge. — Quo warranto proceeding against person holding office of district judge is personal against the individual, not in his official character, and is within jurisdiction of district court. State ex rel. Holloman v. Leib, 1912-NMSC-031, 17 N.M. 270, 125 P. 601.
Election contest remedy. — In adopting an election contest procedure as an exclusive private remedy, legislature has committed no offense against jurisdiction of district courts to issue writs of quo warranto. State ex rel. Abercrombie v. District Court, 1933-NMSC-057, 37 N.M. 407, 24 P.2d 265.
District courts may issue writs of certiorari as ancillary process in aid of their jurisdiction. Lea Cnty. State Bank v. McCaskey Register Co., 1935-NMSC-069, 39 N.M. 454, 49 P.2d 577.
Certiorari distinguished from appeal. — Appeals and writs of error are in no sense to be compared to certiorari, and, generally speaking, the presence of the right to appeal makes inappropriate and unavailable the right to certiorari. Roberson v. Board of Educ., 1967-NMSC-176, 78 N.M. 297, 430 P.2d 868, appeal after remand, 1969-NMSC-136, 80 N.M. 672, 459 P.2d 834.
Use of certiorari to bring up transcript. — For purpose of exercising their jurisdiction of whatever kind or nature, the district courts are specifically authorized to issue various writs, including writ of certiorari. A writ of this nature may be employed by district court to bring up "a transcript of all entries made in his docket relating to the case" where a justice of peace fails to file this transcript. Rixey v. Burgin, 1935-NMSC-031, 39 N.M. 176, 42 P.2d 1118.
Certiorari to bar commissioners. — District court has power to issue, hear and determine a writ of certiorari, directed to board of commissioners of state bar, and inquire into its jurisdiction to suspend an attorney from practice, since latter board is a tribunal inferior to district court. State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs of State Bar v. Kiker, 1927-NMSC-073, 33 N.M. 6, 261 P. 816.
Certiorari to review licensing board decisions. — Because the Uniform Licensing Act (61-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.) did not provide a retired psychologist with a basis for appealing a decision of the New Mexico board of psychologist examiners to require an oral examination for reinstatement of her license, she could request a writ of certiorari to obtain review of the board's alleged due process violations. Mills v. New Mexico State Bd. of Psychologist Exam'rs, 1997-NMSC-028, 123 N.M. 421, 941 P.2d 502.
Challenge of driver's license revocation. — Driver's challenge of the revocation of his driver's license by motor vehicle division had to be in the form of a writ of certiorari, since his license was mandatorily revoked due to three DWI convictions and he had no other statutory means of appeal; because the remedy was a writ of certiorari, he was required to follow the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 1-075 NMRA. Masterman v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1998-NMCA-126, 125 N.M. 705, 964 P.2d 869.
Prohibition defined. — Writ of prohibition is best defined as an extraordinary writ, issued by superior court to inferior court to prevent latter from exceeding its jurisdiction, either by prohibiting it from assuming jurisdiction of a matter over which it has no control, or from going beyond its legitimate powers in a matter of which it has jurisdiction. State ex rel. Harvey v. Medler, 1914-NMSC-055,
Prohibition is preventive and not curative writ, and where garnishment proceedings in the magistrate court were an accomplished fact before the application for prohibition had been filed in the district court, a writ of prohibition could not properly issue to undo or correct that which had already been accomplished. State ex rel. Alfred v. Anderson, 1974-NMSC-101, 87 N.M. 106, 529 P.2d 1227.
Writ to be used with caution. — Prohibition is not a writ of right, granted ex debito justitiae, but rather one of sound judicial discretion, to be granted or withheld according to circumstances of each particular case; it is to be used with great caution for the furtherance of justice when none of the ordinary remedies provided by law are applicable. State ex rel. Harvey v. Medler, 1914-NMSC-055, 19 N.M. 252, 142 P. 376.
Absent inferior court jurisdiction, prohibition to issue. — If the inferior court or tribunal has jurisdiction of both the subject matter and of the person where necessary, writ of prohibition will not issue, but absent such jurisdiction, the writ will issue as a matter of right. Gilmore v. District Court, 1930-NMSC-084, 35 N.M. 157, 291 P. 295.
Magistrate court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction. — Where the state filed a criminal complaint in magistrate court charging defendant with two misdemeanor counts of criminal sexual contact; the complaint did not contain a sworn statement of facts; the state filed an amended complaint after the statute of limitations had expired; the district court issued an emergency writ of prohibition on the ground that the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction; the magistrate court had jurisdiction to make determinations regarding the sufficiency of the complaints and the alleged expiration of the statute of limitations and to try defendant on the misdemeanor charges; and defendant had a right to a de novo appeal to the district court from the magistrate court’s decision, the writ of prohibition was not appropriate because the magistrate court had proper subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction and defendant had an adequate remedy at law. State v. Valerio, 2012-NMCA-022, 273 P.3d 12, cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-001.
Prohibition cannot be used to correct mere irregularities, or to perform functions of an appeal or writ of error, as a general rule. State ex rel. Harvey v. Medler, 1914-NMSC-055, 19 N.M. 252, 142 P. 376.
Prohibition against district court proceedings. — Mandamus and injunction proceedings were within jurisdiction of the respondent district court under the provisions of this section, and the supreme court would not prohibit the lower court from proceeding unless its jurisdiction was being exceeded or, in the exercise of superintending control, the supreme court was moved to do so to prevent irreparable mischief, exceptional hardship, costly delay and undue burdens of expense, or where the remedy by appeal was grossly inadequate. State ex rel. State Bd. of Educ. v. Montoya, 1963-NMSC-171, 73 N.M. 162, 386 P.2d 252.
Where prisoner had been ordered discharged from custody of warden of penitentiary and the order was not appealed, it was final, and respondent-district court judge, sitting in the district in which prisoner was being detained, had jurisdiction to consider petition for habeas corpus; hence remedy of prohibition was not available to the state. Rodriguez v. District Court, 1971-NMSC-101, 83 N.M. 200, 490 P.2d 458.
Wrongful issuance of search warrant. — Police officers and assistant district attorney were immune from liability for alleged wrongful issuance and service of a search warrant which was valid on its face, in which court ordered police officers to search for child being unlawfully held by parent, take him into custody, keep him safely and make a return of the proceedings on the warrant. Torres v. Glasgow, 1969-NMCA-053, 80 N.M. 412, 456 P.2d 886.
Contempt sanction warranted. — Trial judge properly invoked his inherent power to issue a contempt sanction to preserve the decorum, respect and dignity of the court where defendant refused to obey the trial judge's order to button his top button and fix his tie and by disrupting the proceedings through his disorderly attempts to leave. Purpura v. Purpura, 1993-NMCA-001, 115 N.M. 80, 847 P.2d 314, cert. denied, 115 N.M. 79, 847 P.2d 313.
Sex offenders. — Under its broad grant of jurisdiction and under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (Chapter 29, Article 11A NMSA 1978), a district court has jurisdiction to determine whether a defendant is a sex offender and to give the defendant written notice of the registration requirements in 29-11A-7A NMSA 1978; however, the court is not authorized to order the defendant to comply with the registration requirements - that duty is legislatively mandated by 29-11A-4 NMSA 1978. State v. Brothers, 2002-NMCA-110, 133 N.M. 36, 59 P.3d 1268, cert. quashed, 134 N.M. 123, 73 P.3d 826 (2003).
Jurisdiction over violations of municipal ordinances. — A municipal court does not have exclusive jurisdiction where driving while intoxicated or acts of domestic violence are alleged to have occurred within the city limits and to violate both state laws and municipal ordinances, and a municipal peace officer may refer criminal charges to any prosecutor at any level for evaluation and prosecution in municipal, magistrate or district court. Nothing in the law binds an officer to file charges in municipal court where the charges stem from activities that allegedly violate a municipal ordinance and a state law or a county ordinance. 2008 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 08-06.
Not precluded from holding commitment hearing away from county seat. — Absent a showing by the "developmentally disabled" person that his substantive rights have in any way been abridged if his involuntary commitment hearing is not held at the county seat, the district court is not precluded from adopting the practice of holding such hearings at the commitment facility when, in its discretion, such practice would better serve the public convenience. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-20.
Review by commissioners not final. — Action of county commissioners in reviewing discretion of county superintendent as to creation of a new school district under Laws 1907, ch. 97, § 22 (since repealed) could not be final, notwithstanding that statute. 1914 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 14-1308.
Law reviews. — For comment on State ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n v. Zinn, 72 N.M. 29, 380 P.2d 182 (1963), see 3 Nat. Resources J. 356 (1963).
For article, "Prisoners Are People," see 10 Nat. Resources J. 869 (1970).
For article, "The Writ of Prohibition in New Mexico," see 5 N.M. L. Rev. 91 (1974).
For article, "Medical Malpractice Legislation in New Mexico," see 7 N.M. L. Rev. 5 (1976-77).
For survey, "Article VII of the New Probate Code: In Pursuit of Uniform Trust Administration," see 6 N.M. L. Rev. 213 (1976).
For note, "Mandamus Proceedings Against Public Officials: State of New Mexico ex rel. Bird v. Apodaca," see 9 N.M. L. Rev. 195 (1978-79).
For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Administrative Law," see 11 N.M. L. Rev. 1 (1981).
For article, "Habeas Corpus in New Mexico," see 11 N.M. L. Rev. 291 (1981).
For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to civil procedure, see 12 N.M. L. Rev. 97 (1982).
For comment, "The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of New Mexico District Courts over Civil Cases Involving Indians," see 15 N.M. L. Rev. 75 (1985).
For article, "Statutory Adoption of Several Liability in New Mexico: A Commentary and Quasi-Legislative History," see 18 N.M. L. Rev 483 (1988).
For article, "A Different Kind of Symmetry", see 34 N.M. L. Rev. 263 (2004).
For article, "Federal Courts, State Power, and Indian Tribes: Confronting the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule", see 35 N.M. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 21, 54.
Availability of writ of prohibition or similar remedy against acts of public prosecutor, 16 A.L.R.4th 112.
Modern status of rule relating to jurisdiction of state court to try criminal defendant brought within jurisdiction illegally or as result of fraud or mistake, 25 A.L.R.4th 157.
Family court jurisdiction to hear contract claims, 46 A.L.R.5th 735.
Effect, on jurisdiction of state court, of 28 USCS § 1446(e), relating to removal of civil case to federal court, 38 A.L.R. Fed. 824.
Propriety of federal court's considering state prisoner's petition under 28 USCS § 2254 where prisoner has exhausted state remedies as to some, but not all, claims in petition, 43 A.L.R. Fed. 631.
Removal to federal court, under 28 USCS § 1441(d), of civil action brought in state court against foreign state, 63 A.L.R. Fed. 808.
Existence of pendent jurisdiction of federal court over state claim when joined with claim arising under laws, treaties, or Constitution of United States, 75 A.L.R. Fed. 600.
21 C.J.S. Courts § 12 et seq.